BEF Campaign on the Aisne 1914
Page 9
Lieutenant the Honourable Lionel Tennyson, the Hampshire and England cricketer and grandson of the poet Alfred Lord Tennyson, was on the 11 Brigade staff. He too had memories of the march to Vénizel: ‘after an awful march of 27 miles still in torrents of rain to the village of Rozierés, we were ordered to advance once more just as we got ready to billet for the night, and arrived after yet another drenching at Vénizel’. Any thoughts Tennyson may have had of crossing the Aisne the next morning were dashed by orders for the whole brigade to cross the damaged bridge immediately and move onto the high ground above Bucy-le Long:
‘The whole of 11th Brigade crossed the river. This was the manner of their crossing, which at the time seemed to us the riskiest and most slap-dash proceeding ever … In the midst of the inky darkness, and although the men were so tired with their march in the rain that they went to sleep as they stood or marched, they crossed the girder one by one. It was sixty feet above the river and quivered and shook all the time.’59
As advance guard, 1/Hampshire was the first battalion to cross the Vénizel Bridge, unfortunately without Private George Pattenden whose feet had once again refused to support him. The Hampshires were closely followed by the 1st Battalion Rifle Brigade (1/Rifle Brigade) and the stretcher bearers from 10/Field Ambulance who reached the bridge at 11.00pm and completed their crossing in thirty minutes. Following the Rifle Brigade were the 1st Battalion East Lancashire Regiment (1/East Lancs) and Gerald Whittuck and the Somersets who, ‘crossed the Aisne just before light … It was nervous work and took a long time as we could only go in single file’. The men, according to the 1/SLI war diary, were tired and grumpy, but no mention was made of any opposition, presumably the German rearguard had long since retired beyond Bucy-le-Long.
Hunter-Weston’s own account of the night’s operations describes the small-arms ammunition carts being unloaded and their contents being passed over the girder by hand. Written sometime after the event, and in a rather self-congratulatory tone, his four-page report to the 4th Division does highlight what can be achieved in the face of adversity.
At Vénizel the river forms a wide loop which passes under the steep southern edge of the valley allowing flat, open water meadows to stretch for over a mile to the foot of the high ground. Across this open ground a single road – the present day N95 – ran from the bridge to Bucy-le-Long, a road which was very much exposed to enemy observation and one which in the coming days would become almost impossible to negotiate safely in daylight. Above Bucy-le-Long the high ground took the form of three spurs where it was expected the enemy rearguard would be positioned.
Hunter-Weston’s judgement of the potentially dangerous and exposed nature of the Bucy-le-Long road was apparent in his report:
‘In order to hold the crossing of the river at Vénizel effectively it was in the opinion of the brigadier necessary to hold the heights above Bucy-le-Long which dominated the bridge and the flat ground between those heights and the river. He therefore ordered the brigade to advance to the attack of those heights and to seize them at the point of the bayonet. The leading battalion, the 1st Hants, were ordered to take the central spur on which is La Montagne Farm. The Somersets were ordered to the left spur, NW of Bucy and the Rifle Brigade the right spur north of Ste Marguerite. The E Lancs being kept in reserve south of the centre of Bucy-le-Long.’60
Captain Johnston and D Company of the Hampshires had been first into the village which they found unoccupied as they passed through the deserted main street on their way up the slope. As far as Gerald Whittuck was concerned the march from the bridge was, ‘one of the worst night marches I remember’. After a march of 30 miles since starting off early on 12 September, the men were almost dead on their feet. The battalion reached Bucy-le-Long just as it was getting light:
‘We were sent to occupy the high ground. This did not look much like an attack at dawn and I think it was just as well the ridge tops were not occupied, as the men were dead tired. We only saw a party of Uhlans on the top of the ridge as we reached the top and they disappeared at once. Prowse came up later and told me the points he particularly wanted me to guard and gave me direction in case of further advance. I posted groups to guard these points and withdrew my company to a bank running along the edge of a wood just below the crest of the ridge.’61
With 11 Brigade established along a frontage of 3 miles between le Moncel and Crouy, it was now the turn of 12 Infantry Brigade to cross the river. The temporary repair work on the road bridge was enough to allow three battalions of Brigadier General Frederick Anley’s brigade to begin using the bridge at 6.00am on 13 September. The bridge had been passed fit for light duty after the sappers had manhandled one of the 68/Battery guns across and by 11.00am Anley had the bulk of his brigade – together with the guns of 68/Battery – over the river and moving under heavy shell fire across the water meadows towards Bucy-le-Long, leaving the 2nd Battalion Inniskilling Fusiliers (2/Inniskillings) to bring the remaining guns and equipment of XIV and XXXVII Brigades over the bridge. From his vantage point on the Chivres spur Hauptmann Walter Bloem had a grandstand view of the advance of the British 12 Brigade:
‘Stretched across the broad expanse of meadows between us and the meadows was a long line of dots wide apart, and looking through glasses one saw that these dots were infantry advancing, widely extended: English infantry too, unmistakable. A field battery on our left had spotted them, and we watched their shrapnel bursting over the advancing line. Soon a second line of dots emerged from the willows along the river bank, at least ten paces apart, and began to advance. More of our batteries came into action; but it was noticed that a shell, however well aimed, seldom killed more than one man, the lines being so well and widely extended … our guns now fired like mad, but it did not stop the movement: a fifth and a sixth line came on, all with the same wide interval between men and the same distance apart. It was magnificently done.’62
Incredibly, in spite of the heavy shell fire from the German gunners casualties were relatively light. Major Christopher Griffin commanding the 2nd Battalion Lancashire Fusiliers put much of this down to good discipline and resolve:
‘The battalion advanced across the shell-swept plain to Bucy-le-Long in lines of half companies. This manoeuvre was admirably carried out, largely due to the excellent leading, and disregard of danger, of company officers; the lines moved forward as steadily as if on parade. The casualties, which were few, would have been increased four-fold it there had been any hanging back or hesitation in the advance.’63
Meanwhile on the right of Gerald Whittuck and the Somersets, the Hampshires had taken up positions around La Montagne Farm to find the enemy strongly entrenched some 1,500 yards in front of them, while to their right the Rifle Brigade were in place north of le Moncel. The arrival of 12 Infantry Brigade extended the British line on the right whereas further back, a little to the north of Vénizel, were elements of the XIV Brigade guns which, although exposed to the German gunners on the Chivres spur, had little choice but to stand their ground. Up at La Montagne Farm the 31/ and 55/Howitzer batteries were in place providing support to the French advance north of Soissons, whilst at Le Moncel Lieutenant Cecil Brereton and 68/Battery were in support of the Rifle Brigade:
‘We were then ordered up to support the infantry at the top of the hill. Found the Rifle Brigade there. We brought a section into action and immediately got shelled like fury from two places. Went back and got another section on the right. Noise appalling and could not make my orders understood. First rounds from the right section hit the crest and by the time we had run these up it was getting dark. The shelling was by now quite furious and we were only 800 yards from the German infantry who turned machine guns onto us as well.’64
The advance of the Lancashire Fusiliers was halted briefly at Bucy-le-Long before they moved to Ste Marguerite from where they were ordered to attack the western edge of the Chivres spur. The hoped for assistance from 14 Infantry Brigade which was in position half a mile west of Missy
unfortunately did not materialize in time to take part in the attack. Accordingly a rather piecemeal and under-strength attack on the Chivres spur advanced either side of the minor road leading from Ste Marguerite to Chivres with 2/Essex on the left and the Lancashire Fusiliers on the right. The Essex war diarist recording that the ‘Lancashire Fusiliers were ordered to attack Chivres covered by fire from the battalion. The attack failed’. Major Griffin’s account again:
‘None of us realized we were about to bump into the enemy, well entrenched and in carefully selected positions … the task assigned to us was to advance with the Ste Marguerite-Chivres road on our left, and attack the position east of Chivres. The battalion moved through the back gardens of Ste Marguerite almost to Missy, and entered the wood east of Ste Marguerite … the Germans became aware of our presence, after we had advanced about three quarters of a mile, and opened a brisk fire on us. About this time it was decided to deploy in the open, as it was getting late in the afternoon, and the wood had become practically impenetrable. Woodman’s and Fulton’s companies deployed on the left, while Blencowe’s and Evatt’s held the right edge of the wood facing the German trenches, which were only a couple of hundred yards away.’65
All four of the Lancashire companies then came under heavy fire from enemy trenches south of the village and from the Chivres spur but continued to press on regardless until it became impossible to make any effective headway. At what point Major Griffin was wounded is not clear but the battalion as a whole suffered sixteen killed including 25-year-old Second Lieutenant John Paulson and another three officers and forty-four other ranks wounded.66 The battalion was quite clearly distressed by the high number of men who were classed as missing; of these eighty-three missing other ranks the war diary had this to say:
‘Many under the heading of missing got to within 100 yards of the enemy, and whether killed or wounded, with the exception of 5 or 6 of the latter, who were brought in after dark, could not be recovered, and it can only be hoped that we shall meet the majority restored to health on our arrival at Berlin.’67
Apart from the optimistic reference to Berlin, the battalion had just been initiated into the art of the frontal assault against an entrenched enemy and as it withdrew to consolidate the line and await the arrival of the relieving battalion the men had little idea that the line of hurriedly-scraped rifle pits they now occupied would soon stretch from the Belgian North Sea coast to the Swiss border. After dark the relief arrived in the form of 2/Manchesters from Brigadier General Stuart Rolt’s 14 Brigade.
The 12 Brigade attack, undertaken without any significant support from British guns and against a position of which they knew very little, made no progress in the face of enemy infantry and artillery fire. As 11 Brigade had already discovered, the British guns established on the heights south of the river were unable to locate and neutralize the German batteries on the high ground to the north of the river and in particular on the Chivres spur. Indeed Hunter-Weston had come to the conclusion, on 13 September, that further progress was unlikely without considerable artillery support. Moreover, the lack of any centralized control of divisional artillery units did not give rise to a culture of close co-operation between the infantry and artillery. This decentralization contributed to several incidents where the 5th Division artillery fired upon the infantry of the 4th Division on the spurs above Bucy-le-Long, adding to the misery of the troops holding the forward positions.68
The war diaries of the other battalions which were in the line above Bucy-le-Long on 13 September recount a similar story of stalemate. The Rifle Brigade diary recorded the arrival of Cecil Brereton’s 68/Battery guns and immediately sent one platoon from B Company to support the gunners, noting that once the battery opened fire, the enemy counter-battery fire was instantaneous forcing Brereton and his men to retire with six men wounded and fifteen horses killed. Ordered to attack late in the afternoon, the Rifle Brigade advanced with two companies to the crest of the spur where they were met with a withering fire from artillery and German infantry. Tennyson’s diary:
‘About 30 of our fellows were killed and another 70 or 80 wounded, as well as Captains Nugent, Harrison and Riley, the last named very slightly. Sergeant Dorey,69 my old platoon sergeant of No. 7 Platoon, when I was in B Company, was killed, and Rfmn Spindler and many others I knew killed. Sergeant Walker, who had done so well at Ligny and had been recommended for the DCM and Médaille Militaire, had his leg almost blown off in this advance, but hanging by a bit of bone. It is hardly credible but he took his pocket knife out and on the field where he lay cut his leg off, and bound his leg up and when it grew dark he was still conscious when he was brought in on a stretcher.’70
The Rifle Brigade casualties were – according to the war diary – fourteen killed and three officers and thirty-three other ranks wounded, Tennyson’s estimate of the number killed and wounded being a little overstated. The 68/Battery guns were withdrawn under the cover of darkness:
‘We went down the hill to Ste Marguerite and were told to entrench ourselves back by the Aisne. Major Short suggested we should take up a good position south of the Aisne, but for reasons of ‘morale’ this was not allowed … looked at our position and then said to Loch,71 ‘what a terrible place to put up, we will catch it alright tomorrow.’72
The Somersets were shelled heavily during the afternoon, losing three men killed and a number wounded, prompting Gerald Whittuck to begin digging the company in with their entrenching tools. ‘We were holding a wide extent of front and it did not seem probable to me that we could remain in such a position. We were all expecting a further advance’. Like Whittuck, Brigadier Haldane was also expecting to advance, although by the time he and his brigade were over the river, an element of doubt was apparent in his diary, ‘it was uncertain at this time if the enemy intended to stand or continue his retreat’.
Haldane’s advance over the river suffered a minor setback when the pontoon bridge put across the river by 9/Field Company was damaged on the night of 13 September. A complete 18-pounder field gun and limber drove over the side into the river causing ‘considerable damage to the bridge and it took two hours to get it repaired’. While Lieutenant Young lamented the loss of three horses, he rather gleefully remarked that the ‘gun remained on the bottom of the river for three or four days before we could get it out’. The gun and its limber belonged to 122/Battery and was the last remaining gun of Second Lieutenant Clarrie Hodgson’s section, the remainder having been destroyed at Le Cateau:
‘They said we would be able to cross it any minute now, so I had a talk to the fellow doing it and he said, “yes, very well, if you’d like to risk it without side rails.” So off we started trying to get across this river along the pontoon bridge. Well, just as the horses and gun got halfway across a German shell pitched into the river. It frightened the horses so much that they slewed off the bridge dragging the gun with them.’73
This unfortunate mishap diverted Aylmer Haldane’s 10 Infantry Brigade to the damaged road bridge where it too had to cross in single file. ‘We did not begin to cross till nearly midnight’, commented Haldane, ‘and reached Bucy about 1am on the 14th’. Haldane’s arrival, almost twenty-four hours after 11 Brigade first entered Bucy-le-Long, at least plugged the gaps in the 11 Brigade frontage which was worrying Gerald Whittuck but it was far too late to make a difference against a strongly-entrenched enemy.
Undeterred by the inconsistent artillery support, the 4th Division was ordered to push on north over the plateau between Vregny and Crouy with the intention of supporting the advance of the 5th Division from their bridgehead at Missy and dislodging the German guns at Clamecy which were effectively holding up Maunoury’s advance on the left. But Wilson hesitated. There would need to be a significant increase in the level of artillery support for such an attack to succeed and in Wilson’s view, unless the French Sixth Army on the left and the 5th Division on his right could make a decisive move forward, the plan was doomed to failure. And doomed it was, little
if any progress was made by the French and the 5th Division made no headway. Haldane’s brigade – which was not involved in the attack – suffered badly from shell fire, losing over 100 officers and men as they struggled to find shelter.
On 15 September Haldane was given operational command of the 4th Division units north of the river and those of 19 Brigade yet to cross. Haldane’s chief concern was the maintenance of the line on the high ground above Bucy-le-Long but at the back of his mind was always the logistics of a retreat to the river. His diary again betraying his concern:
‘At first the suggestion that additional bridges should be provided … was not favourably received in higher quarters … A retreat, even if carried out at night, would have been a hazardous operation, rendered still more so by the possibility of finding the pontoon bridge at Vénizel destroyed by hostile shells. But before we left the Aisne … several alternative means of crossing had been made.’74