(2) The ability to formulate and execute a plan in time to exploit a target while it is still available.
5. Organization: Project Delta is organized into three elements for its operations.
a. Headquarters and TOC: responsible for planning and controlling the activities of the assets. It contains the necessary administrative section, a planning and operations section, a communications section, and an aviation section.
b. Reconnaissance element: this element consists of six teams, each made up of eight VNSF and two USSF advisors. The teams are responsible for the reconnaissance of selected targets, and are capable of engaging targets if deemed suitable.
c. Reaction force: the force consists of three Airborne Ranger companies, each containing approximately 115 VNSF and four USSF advisors. (CIDG forces may be available in the operational area to augment this force.)
6. Operational Control: Project Delta operates under the control of the C-Detachment of the particular CTZ within which it may be operating. In certain instances, it may be feasible to extend operational control to the B-Detachment responsible for the operational area.
7. Aircraft Capabilities and Requirements:
a. Organic aircraft assigned to Project Delta are as follows:
(1) Two C-47’s.
(2) Four CH-34’s.
(3) These aircraft are from the Vietnamese Air Force and have their own handpicked crews and pilots.
b. With these assets, Project Delta is capable of air-landing fifty VN personnel, adequate for the support of the operations of the recon teams.
c. In order to employ at least one Ranger Company in a single lift, at least ten helicopters, HU-1B, or six helicopters, CH-34, are required if the organic assets are employed also. For an airborne operation involving one Ranger Company, three C-123’s would be required.
8. Security Requirements:
a. Physical Security: Project Delta maintains personnel sufficient to provide for the security of its operational base.
b. Planning Security: the operations of which Project Delta are capable are of a type whose method is highly subject to compromise. For this reason, Project Delta staff and USSF advisors prefer that operational planning and preparation be conducted on a level which permits the minimum essential number of personnel to become involved in this operation.
c. Operational Security: It has been shown in previous operations that the maximum length of time for which these operations can be conducted in a given operational area is two weeks. Beyond this time, the Viet Cong are capable of deducing our methods of operation and the limits of the operational area, thereby compromising the effort & exposing the assets to unacceptable risks.
9. Deviations from the foregoing concepts will not be approved by local commanders without prior approval of Vietnamese Special Forces High Command & Hq 5th Special Forces Group (Abn).
Early in 1965 the 5th Special Forces Group mobilized in its entirety from Fort Bragg to Nha Trang. MACV remained very much involved in determining Project Delta’s activities; however, 5th Group assumed a more direct oversight role. The days of autonomy enjoyed by Captain Richardson went quickly by the wayside. The Project still occupied the tent city at the end of the runway in Nha Trang. Living conditions remained primitive and a very wet monsoon season left the area a complete mud hole. Many of the U.S. advisors abandoned the camp to the LLDB and obtained a beachside villa for their use between operations. They set up comfortable quarters for themselves and, away from the eyes of authority, turned the villa into a money making proposition through sale of food and beverages.7
Training continued throughout the winter and spring, albeit at reduced levels for the lack of presence of the U.S. advisors and the wet weather. During March and April of 1965, Delta was tasked with reconnaissance in several areas of the country. The mode of operation became one where efficiency of motion was the objective. To accomplish this, a small number of teams were mobilized to a Forward Operations Base (FOB), along with a Company of Rangers, as a reaction force, and enough men to staff a Tactical Operations Center (TOC). The size of the teams was once again eight LLDB and two U.S. advisors, and it became accepted practice to operate smaller patrols from a patrol base during the missions. The team size enabled the team to become as much a ‘hunter/killer’ team as a recon team.7
An operation was conducted from March 13th through March 20th, 1965, in the area around Hue. The advance coordinating elements departed Nha Trang on the 13th, followed by four recon teams, four H 34 helicopters, and the 1st Airborne Ranger Company on the 14th. On the 15th, two aerial reconnaissance flights were made, the second of which departed at 1420 hours. Three recon teams, designated Teams 3, 4, and 6, were infiltrated beginning at 1638 hours the same day. All of the teams reported finding indications that the areas were used as way stations for infiltrating Viet Cong and discovered many fortifications, man traps and foxholes. On the 18th, Team 3 encountered a single man in thick brush who ran downhill from them upon discovery. The team sergeant and team medic broke ranks and went crashing downhill after him. A series of about 20 shots, later described by the U.S. advisors as outgoing rounds, were fired. The VN team leader followed down the hill and another series of shots was heard. The team leader and medic emerged with the weapon and pack belonging to the team sergeant and proceeded up the hill. The U.S. advisors asked about the team sergeant and received a curt “He dead,” in response. Shortly thereafter, all three teams were exfiltrated without incident. The team leader may have reacted to the team sergeant’s undisciplined charge down the hill with his own undisciplined punishment. The record is notably silent on this matter except for the fact that the After Action Report (AAR) filed with 5th Group headquarters strongly recommended that the VN team leader be relieved. The 1st Ranger Company was inserted on the 20th to search for the missing team sergeant’s body. They were accompanied by members of Team 3, but were not successful. They came under sporadic sniper fire and lost one Ranger, who died of his wounds. 11
On March 25th, a few short days after the Hue operation, Teams 1, 2, and 5 were dispatched to Phan Rang to determine enemy activity in three operational areas. The 1st and 2nd Companies of Airborne Rangers also mobilized. All three recon teams infiltrated the night of March 29th. Team 1 made contact with an enemy squad on the 30th and continued the mission until they were relieved on an LZ by the 1st Ranger Company on April 1st. Team 2 observed some enemy activity and was relieved on the LZ by the 2nd Ranger Company. Team 5 observed what they believed to be ten VC engaged in uncovering a cache. The team captured the ten unarmed men but did not locate any cache. They called for an exfiltration and the prisoners were exfiltrated by H 34s while the team continued the mission. The team decided to take the captured sampan and float the river to the village of Ba Ngoi and get transportation back to Dong Ba Thin. While these missions were anything but ‘dry holes’, they yielded little useful information except that there was probably a company sized VC unit that lacked real organization that was operating in the area.12
Project Delta was alerted on April 12th for an operation to be conducted from Pleiku. Four recon teams were inserted on April 14th and all four teams confirmed that at least three battalions of the enemy had passed through the area in the preceding two weeks. The information gathered on these four missions pointed to very strong evidence that the enemy troops were regular North Vietnamese Army (NVA). The positions had been well placed and camouflaged on the military crests and had been virtually undamaged by heavy bombing. The few troops observed in the area were in platoon sized units and wore khaki uniforms. This proved to be the first hard intelligence indicating an organized offensive from the North was underway.13
In early June, 1965, Project Delta was alerted for a mission from Phu Cat in the coastal area north of Nha Trang and near Qui Nhon. There were reports that a Prisoner of War (POW) camp was located nearby. After a two day delay caused by unavailability of support assets from II Corps, four recon teams were committed to different areas in the Area of Op
erations (AO). One team was successful in locating the POW camp, but found it had been vacated very recently. Another team observed enemy troop movements and called for air support. This proved to be the first successful use of air bombardment directed from the ground by Project Delta personnel.14 The Phu Cat operation was cut short and preempted by a higher priority mission in III Corps. The Project immediately packed up and moved to Bien Hoa.15The reconnaissance was conducted in two phases, each consisting of three teams. One team was tasked with surveilling a rubber plantation. After locating and approaching the plantation, the team observed two companies of enemy wearing blue uniforms. The team placed an experimental beacon transmitter, backed off, and requested an air strike. The Command and Control (C&C) element flew over the team in an H 34 and advised them to move further from the target. The team complied and established contact with the Forward Air Controller (FAC) who would direct the incoming aircraft. The team gave detailed instructions for the bombing runs and waited as the aircraft came in and dumped their ordnance. Immediately upon delivery of the bombs, the area around the team came alive with enemy fleeing the target in small groups. Remaining hidden overnight, the team proceeded to the plantation to assess the bomb damage. They discovered two things; first, the bombs had missed their targets by at least a hundred meters; and, second, there were now troops in battalion strength mustered in the area. The team called for another air strike. As soon as the bombing began, the enemy again scattered in small groups throughout the jungle. The team evaded the enemy troops with the noise from the bombing masking their noise and by using travel routes through dry stream beds and thick vegetation. They found that they were being followed and paralleled in their movements. They were extracted under heavy enemy small arms fire. Another team in a nearby AO heard the bombing at the plantation and over the course of two days heard bugles blowing followed by the sound of many men engaged in laughing and talking. The team split and sent a small unit, the LLDB team leader and two LLDB, to have a look. Shortly after the recon element departed, an enemy soldier stumbled into the team’s perimeter and was taken captive. The next morning, in order to prevent compromise, the team moved toward the agreed upon rally point, an exfiltration LZ. Upon arrival, two men, one U.S. advisor and one LLDB, were sent to circle the LZ and make sure it was secure, thus splitting the team yet again. After several hours, the two men had not returned, and neither had the three man recon element that had departed the day before. The senior U.S. advisor and the remaining four LLDB were extracted along with their VC prisoner. Two days later the wounded U.S. advisor, SGT Morley, and his LLDB teammate were picked up two kilometers from the LZ and medevaced. The other three team members were not recovered. 15
It is important to note that several themes began to emerge from these five operations. First, all of the U.S. advisors in the two operations agreed that team field discipline was poor, team security was lax, and there appeared to be a lack of determination on the part of the LLDB to complete the mission. Second, communication with the FOB and with the aircraft was unreliable. Every team was plagued with periods of little or no radio contact and times when the relay aircraft noise overshadowed good communication. Ultimately this led to the observation that the assumption of failure of the equipment caused the teams to ignore routine communications. Third, the rapid mobilization of a minimal number of assets, originally hailed as a strong point, quickly became identified as the cause for poor pre-mission intelligence dissemination and insufficient team preparation. Fourth, to further complicate matters, it seemed that once MACV made the assignment for Delta assets they didn’t follow through with coordination with the Corps commanders and local units. As a result sufficient support from local air commands, artillery batteries, and other logistical centers was not forthcoming. Fifth, and of even greater concern, it was felt that the POW camp was compromised as a target by having too many personnel aware of it, leaving maps and documents uncovered for too long, and having the extra delay time between target identification and infiltration of the teams. Sixth, the practice of splitting teams into smaller units while on a mission invited disaster. Reuniting separated elements often called for unnecessary expenditure of air assets and made unreliable communication even less reliable. 14,15
These operations did, however, yield much useful information. In addition to identifying enemy units and strength, the teams were able to discern enemy tactics that were practiced and disciplined. They learned that when the battalion sized unit was attacked at the rubber plantation, the troops evacuated in an organized manner, under the cover of jungle canopy along dry stream beds, to prepared positions in the surrounding areas. This indicated a level of organization of local guerrilla forces not seen before. Once the enemy was aware that a team was in the area, they would engage in a disciplined tracking and observation operation. Several times the teams indicated that they could have been engaged by the enemy, but were not. It was apparent that the enemy’s priority was to capture, rather than kill, the entire team. Failing that, they would then attempt to kill the team at or near the extraction LZ and try to shoot down the aircraft. 14,15
Several recommendations came out of these learning experiences. First, better communication between the teams and air elements is a must. Second, a quieter fixed wing aircraft such as the U1B Otter should be used for air relay. Third, better use of the Rangers as a reaction force or as a blocking force could have inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy when they fled bombing runs. Fourth, poor LZ selection caused aircraft damage and endangered all personnel involved. Alternative methods needed to be developed for extraction of troops under fire.14,15
The Detachment Sergeant Major, Charles T. McGuire, was instrumental in resolving part of this problem. Many of the techniques for successful insertions and extractions of personnel under varied terrain conditions and different tactical situations were born from the ingenuity of Project Delta NCOs and constantly improved over time. Vietnam introduced the helicopter as a primary method of transporting troops to and from the battlefield. Each of the different models of helicopters had their own capabilities and limitations. Fuel capacities limited time on station for Delta teams operating far beyond normal distances; power of individual models limited lifting capacities; helicopter size and maneuverability limited the ability to set down in smaller LZs. A combination of options needed to be developed to address all of the tactical situations that would be encountered. Ideally, a helicopter could swoop into an LZ, offload a team and lift off again in a matter of seconds while decoy ships leap frogged from formation to perform mock insertions and confuse the enemy. For LZs that were too tight for a landing or had obstacles on them, rope ladders were in use early on. These early ladders were light in weight and comprised of flexible nylon rope with narrow span climbing steps. They required the climber to negotiate the steps from an attitude diagonal to the ladder to avoid flexing the ladder too far from the weight of the climber and his combat load. Rappelling was a viable option for insertion and was practiced and utilized early on. An LZ that was accessed by rappelling was usually too restrictive to allow use of ladders for extraction. Because Delta recon teams often operated in thick triple jungle canopy, a method for extraction needed to be devised. A jungle penetrator that resembled a large anchor had been used for a period of time with limited success. The penetrator was attached to an electric hoist installed on the helicopter and often snagged or became entangled in the jungle foliage and operated only at the limited speed of the hoist.
Project Delta’s Sergeant Major Charles McGuire came up with an idea that was put into use and was an immediate success. Named in his honor, the McGuire rig was the method used to extract a team by rope when the extraction helicopter could not descend low enough to either sit down, low hover, or utilize its two 35’ ladders. A McGuire rig was simply a 15’ x 3” nylon strap (type A7A) fashioned into a loop large enough for a man to sit in tied to the outside (running) end of a 120 foot ½ inch nylon rope and stowed on the left side of the helicopter inside
a Griswold container (a thick canvas weapons container). If the helicopter could descend down to at least 100 feet altitude above the team, McGuire rigs were dropped to the team and they were extracted by rope.91
The nylon rope was S folded and secured by rubber bands to two canvas strips that had been sewn into the inside of the Griswold container. The Griswold container performed three functions: to keep the rope from fouling, to protect the rope when walked on, and to protect the rope from the sharp outer edge of the helicopter floor. The inside (standing) end of the rope was clove hitched to an 6”x 6”x 5’ teak wood yoke in the center of the helicopter floor and secured by snap link to at least three anchor rings in the floor of the helicopter. The yoke had three large “O” rings bolted into its side and was snap linked by these “O” rings to floor anchor rings on the right side of the helicopter. A sandbag weighing about 20 to 30 pounds was tied to the bottom of the A7A strap loop and tucked up under the outside end of the Griswold container. Three McGuire rigs were usually installed in each helicopter.91
The heart and soul of the McGuire rig system were its ropes, and good rope maintenance was crucial to the dependability of McGuire rigs. The ½ inch nylon ropes were rated at 3600 pounds. After each use, ropes were carefully inspected, and if even one thread in a rope had been damaged, it was discarded. Each thread ran the entire length of the rope and if even one thread was damaged, the entire rope was weakened. In the life of these 120-foot ropes, there was a 20% stretch factor before they were no longer safe to use. Each time a rope was used, it was stretched a little bit longer until it had lost all of its elasticity at about 140 feet, and before this happened, it was replaced. But this created a problem with varying lengths of rope. If a new 120-foot rope was used to replace a damaged rope, it would be shorter than the other two McGuire rig ropes and its rider would ride possibly 10-feet higher than the other two riders. To correct this, the new rope was tied between the bumpers of two vehicles and the rope was stretched until its length matched the other two. Another significant improvement to the rigs occurred in 1967 when Norm Doney suggested a nylon wrist strap be sewn into the top of the A7A seat so that the rider would have another measure of protection from being knocked from the seat during extraction or from falling out from unconsciousness due to loss of blood. 91
Boots on the Ground: The history of Project Delta Page 6
