Vietnamese troops and aircraft performed well, indicative of a well coordinated effort by a well trained force. This operation served to give a psychological boost to the ARVN by revealing the enemy’s vulnerability.9
This otherwise successful operation was marred only by the unwieldy process required to commit the ARVN Rangers. The rangers were originally under the direct command of the LLDB. This, it was reasoned, was because the original mission of the rangers was as a regional reaction force to support other LLDB units. A subsequent decision was made that once an operation was approved and teams were committed, the use of the Rangers became the prerogative of the VN/US field commanders.5
Early in January, 1965, 5th SFG(A) PCS detachment B5/220, under Major Art Strange, took over Project DELTA. PCS Detachment A-511, under Captain Thomas Pusser, and TDY Detachment A-132, Okinawa, under Captain Paul Smith, shared the Ranger and Recon responsibilities.
Project Delta conducted several reconnaissance missions near the resort city of Vung Tau, located on the coast approximately 130 kilometers from Saigon. Two teams were inserted north of the city on January 15th, where two VC battalions were suspected to be located. On January17th, Team #1 found a battalion sized unit base camp strategically placed within a village. The village street had been fortified on both sides such that emplaced gun positions were offset, thus enabling cross fire on any attackers. Team #2, in a separate action, made contact with an enemy force of unknown size resulting in two VC KIA. Both teams avoided further contact and were exfiltrated on January 19th. On January 21st, a team advised by SFC Eddie Adams assaulted a house guarded by a VC platoon. The house had been the center of activity for a VC battalion that had moved toward the coast. The Delta force was met with automatic weapons fire but managed to rout the enemy from their positions, capturing a prisoner and numerous weapons and documents. Meanwhile, a second Delta team encountered an element of the moving battalion and discovered they had penetrated the enemy’s perimeter. They sat tight, observing the enemy activity and managed to kill a perimeter guard and successfully evade pursuit to an extraction point. The reconnaissance elements of Project Delta had evolved into a meaningful force with field tested protocols that would continue to be built upon for the duration of the Project.10
CHAPTER V: VUNG RO BAY; CHANGING THE TIDES OF WAR
Throughout its involvement, the United States had repeatedly stated its willingness to scale down its involvement in Vietnam if aggression from the North was checked and peace restored. In spite of mounting evidence to the contrary, the world community didn’t acknowledge the increased involvement of the North until February, 1965.3 On February 16th, 1965, a U.S. Army officer flying his helicopter along the coast of central South Vietnam suddenly spotted a large, camouflaged vessel perpendicular to the shore. Cargo was being unloaded and stacked on the beach at Vung Ro, an isolated bay on the rocky coast. The pilot immediately radioed his sighting to the Senior Advisor to the South Vietnamese 2nd Coastal District, headquartered in Nha Trang, who in turn notified the coastal district commander, Lieutenant Commander Ho Van Ky Thoai. Thoai dispatched South Vietnamese A-1 Sky Raiders to the bay where they attacked, capsized and sank the ship in shallow water.3
Project Delta was alerted to the mission in Nha Trang and prepared to mobilize elements of the Airborne Ranger Battalion from Nha Trang and Dong Ba Thin. The briefing the American advisors received prior to being deployed from Nha Trang indicated that an unidentified ship had been sunk at Vung Ro Bay.2 The mission, assigned to 2nd Company, was to move to an area near the ship and then move to the area immediately surrounding the ship and secure it. This involved being transported by helicopter to a point several kilometers southwest of the ship location. From there, the company had to board an LSM (Landing Ship Medium), move to a point somewhere near the innermost point of Vung Ro Cove, make a beach assault, and move south and west toward the ship itself. At approximately 1300 hours on the 19th of February, the company was lifted by helicopter to Dai-Lanh, approximately seven (7) kilometers from the objective. Later that afternoon, the company boarded LSM # 405 and moved to sea. The decision was made to postpone the beach landing until the following morning.
There were two acceptable sites for beach landings. The Americans preferred to hit the beach closest to the target area. The Vietnamese Flagship Commander and the Vietnamese Company commander felt that the fire would be too heavy on the beach closest to the objective and the far beach was chosen. An uneventful night was spent aboard the LSM. The LSM was accompanied by a Patrol Craft (PC) and a Patrol Craft Escort (PCE), the PCE being the flagship. At 0930 hours the next morning, the three ships began moving for the objective. All three ships were firing. Their armament consisted of 40mm cannons, 20mm guns, and one five inch gun on each of the escort craft. The ships were brought under a crossfire of small arms and automatic weapons from unidentified enemy locations.
As the ships continued toward their objective, the LSM received a considerable number of hits and one Vietnamese 20mm gunner aboard the LSM was shot in the head. He fell to the floor and SSG James Malia rushed to his position, fully exposing himself to the fire, and pulled the mortally-wounded gunner to a safe position.
Shortly afterward the ships withdrew. At the insistence of all of the American advisors, the attack was again launched at 1045 hours. The ships again encountered a crossfire, but continued toward the beach. The company was in an assault position near the front of the LSM as the ship prepared to drop the ramp. During this assault the Vietnamese personnel aboard the naval vessels suffered three more wounded and one more KIA. The outer gates of the ship swung open, and the ramp slowly lowered to the beach, which, by this time, was only a few meters away. As the ramp reached a level position, the troops, including the officers, began moving rapidly backward until only one thin line of troops extended down each side of the ship. As the ramp touched the sand, the troops momentarily froze.
SSG Malia, who had been positioned several troops back from the lead man with his platoon leader, immediately seized the initiative, leaped to the front of the ramp, began firing and led the men onto the beach. This galvanized the entire company into action. They quickly established fire superiority over the Viet Cong, and a successful and vigorous beach assault was made with no further casualties suffered by the friendly forces. By 1100 hours, the beach had been secured. The troops then spread out in a near-horseshoe shape against the bases of Vung Ro and Hon Ra mountains. The Company Commander, contrary to orders issued to him from the Vietnamese Special Forces High Command, elected to assault the mountain to the right (Vung Ro Mountain). The U.S. advisors persuaded the commander to drive directly toward the objective, and the column moved out along the base on Hon Ba Mountain. Here, the column encountered mortar fire from a 60mm mortar. The first two rounds hit directly in the column wounding four Vietnamese Airborne Rangers. Several more rounds stalled the progress of the Rangers.
The Naval ships brought fire upon Vung Ro Mountain and the mortar was momentarily silenced. Far greater casualties were prevented by the presence of boulders which surrounded the troops in the lead platoon. The column again moved out and discovered a cache which included two VC houses, several boats, rafts, Chinese antiaircraft sights for a 50 caliber machine gun, and seven belts of 50 caliber armor piercing tracer ammunition, totaling 350 rounds. While the cache was being destroyed, the lead elements encountered enemy resistance and killed four Viet Cong.
By this time, the Vietnamese had received intelligence stating that a light machine gun would be encountered, either imminently, or within the next several hundred meters. The movement of the column virtually halted as the word spread down the column. SSG Malia took the point and kept the unit moving. At 1630 hours, the troops moved onto the fringes of the second beach. Here, still several meters ahead of the next man, he noticed footprints leading into the dense undergrowth a few meters from the water’s edge. He investigated these, just as the lead element reached the edge of the beach. SSG Malia found an enormous cache of we
apons, medicines and munitions, and rushed out to tell the Company Commander. However, the Viet Cong guarding the cache opened fire, and the Vietnamese immediately retreated to the safety of the rocks; SSG Malia and a platoon leader, 2nd LT Bay, then led a personal charge across an open beach, directly in the face of enemy fire. Men who had just retreated left their positions and joined the charge across the beach, laying down a heavy barrage of small arms fire. The Viet Cong immediately broke contact and the beach was secured.
Throughout the rest of the day the Rangers and their advisors moved ammunition, rifles, medicines, and explosives to the beach. The cache proved to be the largest found in the Vietnamese war to date. It totaled nearly 100 tons of explosives, recoilless-rifle ammunition, hand-grenades, .50 caliber ammunition similar to that found in the first cache; and very large quantities of high-quality critical medical items including Japanese blood plasma, Bulgarian penicillin and Streptomycin, and various North Vietnamese, Chinese and Russian medicines. Included were tens of thousands of rounds of ammunition made in Russia. More than 2000 Mauser 98’s were found, plus substantial quantities of Chinese “Burp” guns and Russian Light Machine Guns.2
Late on the afternoon of the assault, the U.S. Special Forces advisors were informed by the Ranger Company Commander that there had been a coup in Saigon and that all military operations were to cease. The advisors elected to stay with the cache that night and set up a small Command Post among some large boulders. The Rangers were unsettled by news of the coup and did not follow good procedure and ignored security concerns. The Delta advisors radioed their situation to Delta headquarters in Nha Trang and were advised to sit tight since all aircraft were grounded. The next day a landing craft arrived and the Delta Rangers loaded as many of the weapons as they could and put out to sea. The Vietnamese commander would not allow the advisors to burn or blow the remaining cache. Later that night the Ranger Company was ordered to assault the beach again; retake it and hold it until members of the International Control Commission and the press arrived. In the mean time, the rest of the Ranger battalion was deployed inland from the coast in a mop up operation. On the morning of the 21st, the 2nd Company assaulted the beach and retook it without resistance. This constituted the second amphibious combat assault on a beach in Vietnam that involved U.S. troops, weeks ahead of the unopposed landing of the Marines at China Beach in March. On a much more somber note, Major Strange informed the Special Forces advisors that their teammate, Sp5 Ron Gaffney, had been killed by small arms fire on the inland patrol. He was the first U.S. casualty in Project Delta.2
The name of Specialist Fifth Class Ronald Gaffney is inscribed on Panel 01E, Line 93 of the Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial.
Major Strange accompanied the ICC (International Control Commission) representatives, along with the new President of South Vietnam, Dr. Phan Huy Quat, and an entourage of press, to Vung Ro Bay. On the next day, the Rangers loaded all the ammo, medical supplies, and weapons on board the landing craft and were returned to Nha Trang by helicopters.2
The discovery of this enormous arms shipment had a monumental effect on the course of the war. The ship itself was fairly new and had been manufactured in Communist China. Documents recovered on board included three North Vietnamese nautical charts, military health records of North Vietnamese soldiers, a Haiphong newspaper dated January 25, 1965, and North Vietnamese identification cards recovered from the bodies of crewman. Confronted with this overwhelming evidence, the United Nations investigated the incident and issued a ‘White Paper’ acknowledging and condemning the overt North Vietnamese involvement in the South. The United States State Department prepared a report at the end of February, 1965, that describes the Vung Ro Bay findings as incontrovertible evidence of the North’s continued aggression in the South and goes on to call it a threat to the freedom and security of South Vietnam.3 The stage was set for an escalation in U.S. involvement in Vietnam.
CHAPTER VI: 1965; RAMPING UP
The second named campaign of the Vietnam War was “Defense”, 8 March 1965 - 24 December 1965. During this campaign the U.S. objective was to hold off the enemy while gaining time needed to build base camps and logistical facilities. The U.S. also attempted to consolidate its ground operations more efficiently. For this purpose, it organized the U.S. Army Vietnam (USARV). U.S. support in the I Corps tactical zone, composed of five northernmost provinces, was to be primarily a Marine Corps responsibility; the U.S. Army was to operate mainly in the II and III Corps tactical zones which comprised the Central highlands, adjacent coastal regions, and the area around Saigon; and ARVN troops were to retain primary responsibility for the Delta region of the IV Corps.
On 19 October 1965. three VC regiments totaling 6,000 men attacked a Civil Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) - U.S. Special Forces at Plei Me, near the entrance to the Ia Drang Valley, in what purported to be the start of a thrust to cut the country in half.
With the assistance of massive air strikes, elements of the newly arrived 1st Cavalry Division thwarted the enemy in a battle that lasted nearly a month and included several engagements. The Ia Drang Valley action was the costliest in terms of casualties to date. The successful defense of the region improved security in and around the Central Highlands and raised the morale of the soldiers involved.65
This shifting of gears for the U.S. involvement in Vietnam would require that security be established for the coming construction of facilities to support the growing U.S. presence. Reports of enemy strongholds, way stations and infiltration routes needed to be verified. Areas designated for construction of major support facilities, such as the airfields planned for Phan Rang and Phu Cat, needed to be secured for construction units. Under Major Strange, Project Delta conducted a series of operations in early 1965 that further defined the unit’s role as a versatile reconnaissance tool.
The following message was sent to the C Detachment Commanders sometime in 1965. It was intended to alert them to the availability of Project Delta for specific mission purposes.
SUBJECT: Capabilities and Employment of Project Delta Assets
TO: All “C” Detachment Commanders, VNSF and USASF
1. This letter outlines the concept of operation for expanded employment and further exploitation of the Delta assets in conjunction with the VNSF/USSF/CIDG Program.
2. The operations of Project Delta assets are potentially of great value to the counter-insurgency effort throughout RVN. The operations to date have these three effects upon the VC effort: deep penetration into hitherto “inviolate” VC zones, the inflicting of casualties upon the VC in his supposedly “safe” zones, and the psychological effect upon the VC of realizing that the RVN forces are capable of undertaking such operations, “turning the tables on the VC.”
3. Project Delta Mission.
a. Reconnaissance: To reconnoiter areas of suspected enemy activity and to determine the reaction force necessary to exploit any targets located. This mission does not include employment in reconnoitering a general area to fulfill an area study.
b. Reaction: To conduct quick-reaction operations against targets selected as a result of reconnaissance. Such operations would include raids, ambushes, “snatch” operations, and rescue operations in denied areas. This mission does not include employment as conventional infantry in area searches, search and destroy operations, and village sweeps.
4. Concept of Operations: Small reconnaissance teams are deployed against areas of suspected enemy activity. These teams are capable of selecting targets and calling in the necessary reaction force to destroy the target.
a. All assets are capable of infiltrating an area by land, by air landing, rope ladder, or rappelling, by water, and by parachute, to include “blind” jumps into trees.
b. The reconnaissance teams have a hunter/killer capability. They are normally committed for a period of five days, the amount of time the teams can operate without resupply or undue fatigue.
c. The teams have the following options for exploitation of targets:
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(1) Exfiltration to the operations base to give the intelligence and assist in planning the attack.
(2) Remain in the area, receive the reaction force, and guide the force to the target or be evacuated after receiving the force.
(3) Exploit the target themselves.
(4) Call for artillery and air strikes.
(5) After directing the reaction force, move to another area to seek new targets.
d. The value of the reaction force depends upon two factors:
(1) The airlift capability to transport the necessary troops in one lift, thus avoiding piecemeal commitment and loss of surprise and shock action.
Boots on the Ground: The history of Project Delta Page 5
