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Boots on the Ground: The history of Project Delta

Page 23

by Carpenter, Stephen


  Operation Cass Park began on an ominous note. The first team to be inserted was Roadrunner Team 101. One team member fell from the ladder on insertion, breaking his arm. He was extracted and the team continued the mission. Team 101 made its last radio contact on April 4th and was not seen or heard from for the duration of Cass Park. Recon Team 1 was inserted on April 2nd and found themselves in the middle of a battalion bivouac area on the 3rd. They called for gunships and tactical air support and managed to be extracted without casualties. Recon Team 4 was inserted on April 7th and was immediately pursued by NVA. They engaged five NVA on the 8th, killing one, and were pursued by an estimated company. They requested air strikes and reinforcements. The 2nd Company, 81st Airborne Ranger Battalion was inserted to link with Team 4.76,78,80,81,82

  At the same time on the 8th, Recon Team 2, Mike Sillings, Ted Aslund and J.D. Benoit, reported being pursued by an unknown sized enemy force using a very skilled and persistent tracker. The team moved quickly and stealthily, maneuvering so as to observe their back trail and cover it as best they could. Around 1400 the team sought some deep cover in thick brush to observe their back trail. They hid themselves and stayed alert. They soon heard the sounds of the tracker moving towards them. The tracker reached his hands in to part the undergrowth and Ted Aslund remembers saying to Mike Sillings, “Get ready to rock n’ roll.” The team opened fire, killing the tracker, and began to run for their lives. Almost immediately they heard the sounds of dogs on their trail. For the next two hours they tried to outrun the dogs to no avail. They ambushed the dogs, who had outdistanced the tracking team, and took advantage of the lull to find a good place to spend the night. The team gathered its wits and reviewed their options.

  In the pre-mission briefing, Doc Simpson had pointed out all the directions the team was not to run in because of known enemy concentrations. Left with essentially a single compass azimuth to follow, the team prepared to move at first light. As soon as the sun rose the team found itself severely limited by heavy fog and listened nervously to the sounds of yet another dog on their trail. The team found themselves running deeper and deeper into enemy territory and unable to make radio contact. They finally were able to raise the FAC and were told that extraction was not possible due to the heavy weather and fog.

  The team found itself being pressured and pushed at every turn. They came upon a camp that had women in it cooking and doing laundry. They came upon many bunkers and heavily traveled trails. They eventually bedded down in an empty bunker for the afternoon and at dusk they walked through the camp and out the other side. On the third day Team 2 found itself on a steep hillside above a stream. Across the stream was a large open meadow with what appeared to be stumps scattered across it. The team tied themselves to trees with their A7A belt straps so as not to tumble down the 70 degree slope in the night. In the very early morning hours, J.D. Benoit spotted a small luminous light moving up the hill towards them. He alerted the team and they collectively decided that it must be the dial of a wrist watch. The NVA soldier stood and attempted to bring his weapon up. Before he could, Benoit killed him with a burst from his CAR 15. As the team loosed themselves to run, the “tree stumps” in the field stood and came on line to assault the hill. The team heard a tank approach the far end of the field and as it turned to face them, it shone a spot light on their hillside. The team quickly shot out the light and came under a barrage of fire. They crested the hill and found themselves in a large cultivated field with machine gun positions set up in the trees around it.

  The teams ran for their lives and at daylight were able to raise an Air Force jet on the Air Force emergency frequency. Soon they had a FAC overhead directing them to an LZ. Another FAC joined the first and both FACs fired their white phosphorus marking rounds at the enemy to slow them down. Ahead of them, one of the 281st ships was shot down and the extraction was delayed by the rescue efforts for the air crew. As the team emerged onto the LZ, they saw that it was another vegetable garden with machine gun positions on either side of it. Aslund recalls seeing the large caliber guns firing their tracer rounds from the canopy and being silenced by the Wolfpack guns. Aslund made a lunge for the helicopter and slipped on the skid, sliding backwards. The strong hands of Ted Perkins, the recon man riding recovery that day, grabbed Aslund’s web gear and pulled him into the chopper. Perkins said, “This is no Goddamn place to play around.” Aslund doesn’t recall that he was playing around at all.

  The team landed at the air strip in Phu Bai and was told to stand by to be transported to Nha Trang for debriefing at headquarters, an unusual procedure. Instead, a Major showed up in a jeep and transported them to 101st Airborne HQ where they gave the team debriefing to the Commanding General. At the conclusion of the debriefing the General commented that he didn’t believe a word of what they reported. Mike Sillings calmly looked the General in the eye and said, “Take your rusty ass out there see what you can find.” The General replied that he would do just that.101 One month later, almost to the day, the 101st Airborne began what it characterized as a “reconnaissance in force” of Hill 937 in the Ashau Valley. The engagement would become known as the battle of Hamburger Hill. Forty six Americans would lose their lives and some four hundred more would be wounded. It would mark a significant turning point in the way the remainder of the Vietnam conflict would be conducted.59

  Roadrunner Team 103 made contact and became split. Recon Team 3 reported being in the middle of many NVA and sent continuous reports of enemy sightings. On April 9th a 281st gunship was shot down with serious injury to its four crew members. They were rescued and medevaced. Recon Teams 2 and 3 were extracted after firefights that left several enemy dead. All but one member of Roadrunner Team 103 was recovered and Roadrunner Team 104 was extracted. The pace was frenzied. It would only get worse.76, 78, 80, 81, 82

  On April 9th and 10th the Nung BDA Platoon and 3rd Ranger Company were inserted with the primary mission of finding the missing Roadrunner Team 101 and the missing member of Roadrunner Team 103. Both units would be plagued by NVA sniper and hit and run tactics. The Rangers suffered one killed and several wounded. Neither the Rangers nor the Nungs found any sign of the missing Roadrunners.82

  Recon Team 7, Terry Bryan, David Barta and Tom Long, was inserted on April 15th. On the morning of April 16th Team 7 reported being in heavy contact and requested gunships, air strikes and immediate extraction. SGT Ted Aslund was the belly man for the extraction. When the helicopter arrived on the LZ Aslund could see the bodies of two team members lying still in the grass. Dave Barta was laying down constant fire in all directions to cover recovery efforts. Aslund recalls that Barta was involved in “one hell of a fire fight” and holding off the enemy force almost single handedly. Aslund says that the rescue ship never would have made it down without Barta’s heroic efforts.

  Terry Bryan had lost two fingers and was also wounded in the arm and leg. Aslund dragged the wounded Bryan, a wounded LLDB and the other two uninjured LLDB into the helicopter. Aslund fought Terry Bryan, who insisted on recovering Tom Long. Aslund could see Long’s body from the helicopter and noted no movement. The helicopter was under intense enemy fire and had been hit multiple times. The helicopter struggled to take off. Knowing that the helicopter could handle no more weight in its damaged condition, and knowing that any attempt to recover the two dead would result in more injuries, Aslund made the decision to leave Long’s body and save the rest of the team. SSG Thomas K. Long and one LLDB, were reported missing.

  The 1st Ranger Company had been immediately launched to search for the missing team members. The lead helicopter crashed while attempting to insert the Rangers a couple of kilometers from the battle scene, killing the pilot and injuring the crew and one Ranger. Aslund’s crippled helicopter managed to land within the newly inserted Rangers’ positions and requisition another helicopter to transport the wounded to Phu Bai.101,82 On April 19th the 1st Ranger Company found the body of SSG Thomas K. Long.82

  While this recovery operation was
being launched, Recon Team 9 was inserted and came into contact with a larger NVA force. They called for air strikes and managed to evade the enemy and were extracted by McGuire rig hours later when aircraft were freed up.

  Recon Team 8, Ted Perkins and Fred Foster, also made contact with the enemy and was extracted about the same time as Team 9. In a situation no recon man liked to find himself in, Ted Perkins had an overwhelming need to void his bowels. In spite of efforts to evacuate bowels before missions and the use of “no shit” pills, bad water and indigenous rations could frequently cause the drizzles. As Perkins squatted to accomplish the task at hand, three NVA soldiers walked briskly up a trail toward his position and opened fire. Perkins was struck in the buttocks but managed to return fire. He returned the few meters to his team carrying three AK 47s and called for extraction. He had been compromised, in a compromising position.101

  On April 17th, Recon Team 6’s third day in the hole, the team reported they were in heavy contact and requested immediate assistance. After a last frantic radio communication there was no further contact with the team. With two Ranger Companies and the Nung BDA platoon engaged in ground searches for missing team members elsewhere, immediate search efforts were limited to air searches conducted at low treetop level until April 19th when 2nd Ranger Company and the BDA platoon were inserted along with several Recon men to search for the missing team.82 Among the search team were recon men Ted Aslund and Mike Sillings. The Rangers would conduct a search lasting days and punctuated by frequent enemy sightings and contacts. They quickly found an area that showed signs of a recent battle. Trampled grass, expended 5.56 mm casings and blood were found.

  The Rangers followed a trail near the battle site and encountered two enemy wearing tiger fatigues and carrying M-16s. Both were killed in the ensuing fire fight, effectively ending any further intelligence value they might have had. Their uniforms and weapons would cause members of Project Delta to speculate on the fate of the team for many years to come.101

  Project Delta’s Commanding Officer, LTC Alan Park, to this day recalls the event with great emotion and feels as if he lost his own family that day.81 The Rangers continued their hunt for the team for several days and found an NVA hospital complex. They were instructed to leave it alone and were extracted the next day.101 The team, like Roadrunner Team 101, was never found. SSG Charles Newton, SGT Charles Prevedel and SP4 Douglas Dahill were listed as Missing in Action.82 At the Special Operations Association Reunion (SOAR) held in Las Vegas in September of 2008, a representative of the Joint Personnel and Accountability Command (JPAC) announced that the remains of all three missing members of Team 6 had been recovered from near the battle site, identified and repatriated.

  While searching for Long’s body the Rangers discovered a cache of rocket and mortar rounds. Project Delta U.S. losses for Operation Cass Park were one killed, five wounded and three missing in action. Losses inflicted on the enemy were much greater. One of the telling statistics of the operation was that thirty medevac missions were flown as opposed to twenty four total ground missions.82

  The name of Thomas K. Long is inscribed on Panel 27W, Line 96 of the Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial.

  The name of Douglas Dahill is inscribed on Panel 27W, Line 99 of the Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial.

  The name of Charles Newton is inscribed on Panel 27W, Line 102 of the Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial.

  The name of Charles Prevedel is inscribed on Panel 27W, Line 103 of the Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial.

  The following is an account of the Phu Bai operation from the memory of Delta Medic SSG Dennis McVey. “My worst day in Vietnam was in April, 1969 when I had to go identify SSG Thomas K. Long’s (KIA 4/16/69) body after having been in the jungle for several days. His body was recovered by the Delta Rangers and was at the Battalion Aid Station at Phu Bai Airfield in a body bag. I identified Thomas from his equipment and mission documents. It was evident that he had not been touched or searched by anyone while he lay in the jungle. He had been hit by small arms fire several times and probably died immediately.”66

  “Just prior to that, on April 17, 1969 the air-powered Deuce and a half horns blew (Refers to the air horns on an Army 2 1/2 Ton truck) and as I was up for recovery we went out to try and pick up RT6 with Charles Newton, Charles Prevedel, and Douglas Dahill, and three indigenous personnel. When we got into the AO and started circling we received heavy ground fire from a 12.7 machine gun and had to move off while the gunships worked the area; they also drew fire but suppressed the fire or destroyed the gun. When we moved back in to try again there was no radio contact and no visual sighting. However I did see enemy movement on the ground and actually fired on them with my CAR 15 as we were that low looking for signs of the team. We got weathered out and the BDA platoon and other teams went in the next day but they were never found. To this day I still hate the sound of deuce and a half air horns as they always meant someone was in trouble or that we were being hit with a probe or mortar/rocket rounds.”66

  While flying recovery on another mission in the Ashau, Dennis McVey remembers problems of a different sort. “I was flying recovery to pull Al Drapeau and his team out as they were in contact and moving to an extraction LZ. They could not get to a sit down LZ so I had to bring them out on ladders, while we were hovering and just as I dropped the ladders, the crew chief said the pilot wants you. I looked around and the pilot pointed to the cockpit dash where the twenty minute red fuel warning light had come on. Not an ideal situation! However the 281st was not going to leave our guys on the run in contact with out trying to get them. We got the team into the chopper and the pilot took off like hell towards the airfield at Phu Bai. I warned Al and the team to be ready for an unprepared landing. We were in sight of the airfield when the fuel lines started to collapse from the pumps sucking dry tanks; it’s a horrible sounding high pitched screaming noise. The noise stopped and the turbine died just as we crossed the end of the runway but the pilot managed to sit it down without major incident except for springing the skids a little. That same day we picked up a team on McGuire rigs and the chopper was so low on fuel that we set them down on a sand bar in the middle of a river and a chase chopper picked them up. The red light came on for the second time that day, but we were closer to the airfield and landed normally.”66

  “After losing several people at Phu Bai, the Project went into stand down and regrouping. Several of us stayed at the FOB during the stand down and a company from the Mike Force provided security. The FOB was about 5 clicks down the road from Camp Eagle and the 101st Division, the unit we were working for. The FOB was on a hill overlooking a small valley that the 101st, CCN FOB, and the Phu Bai Airfield were using as a dump. Periodically, the 101st would send some guys out with a 5,000 gal fuel truck with various contaminated fuels and lay out a hose and flush the fuel into the dump then burn everything in order to try and keep the Vietnamese scroungers out of the dump. One day the 101st guy’s forgot to roll up the hose prior to lighting off the dump and they burned up the truck and almost themselves, it was great entertainment for the stay behind party. We also worried about all of the scroungers being around the area for security reasons due to the decreased number of people at the FOB. To try and solve the problem SSG Jay Graves Delta Recon, SSG Walt Hetzler Mike Force, and myself SSG McVey decided to chase them away using persistent CS Powder. Jay was wearing shorts and a tee shirt and I was just wearing shorts, Walt was in Jungle fatigues. We grabbed a 5 gal container of persistent CS powder and with Graves driving, Hetzler in the back seat and me in the front passenger seat we took off across the helo pad/runway and circled the scroungers while I poured out the CS powder. What a disaster, we did not even think about what happens in a moving vehicle that is stirring up dust and creating wind. The CS Powder hit the ground, got stirred up by the jeep and all came right back into the jeep and onto us. Our eyes were watering from the powder and our noses were running like a water hose, and our skin was burning like crazy. Only one or two of the scroungers were aff
ected and the rest laughed and started throwing rocks at us. Graves beat a hasty retreat in the jeep and that was the last time we bothered the scroungers.”66

  “Summer-Fall 1969”, 9 June 1969-31 October 1969. During the summer and fall of 1969, conduct of operations was increasingly turned over to Vietnamese, US troops withdrew in greater numbers amid reaffirmations of support for the Republic of South Vietnam government. President Nixon announced the reduction of the U.S. military presence in South Vietnam which would be demonstrated initially by the withdrawal of 25,000 troops by 31 August 1969.

  American troop strength had peaked at 543,400 in April 1969 but dropped to 505,500 by mid October. More scattered than before, enemy attacks were concentrated on South Vietnamese positions. U.S. combat deaths were down in the early fall as American units switched to small unit actions. The trend was not constant, however, because U.S. troops deaths which had fallen well below l00 a week in the fall, rose above 100 later in the year.65

  Operation Cass Park II began a week later on May 2nd, 1969 and ran through July 5th. Project Delta was OPCON to the Americal Division and set up its FOB adjacent to the 5th Marines at An Hoa. Project Delta fielded a total of thirty three Recon and Roadrunner missions during Cass Park II. A total of eleven enemy contacts occurred in which four U.S. advisors were wounded. The contacts were made with small units ranging from individuals to an estimated company. Weather deteriorated as the operation progressed, signaling the onset of the wet season monsoons. Cloud cover became a problem for air support. In spite of the relatively low number of enemy contacts there were numerous sightings of enemy and many reports of pursuit by enemy forces that seemed unwilling to close with the teams. Cass Park II revealed that NVA/VC used the AO frequently as a travel route and a cache area for weapons and food. Units identified as working in the area were the 231st Transportation Battalion, the 233rd Transportation Battalion and the 4th Transportation Battalion. Several infiltration routes from Laos and dispersal routes within South Vietnam were identified. It was evident that the enemy had been moving through the area unmolested for a long period of time. A lack of security noted by several teams, and the unwillingness of the enemy to engage the teams may have been a reflection on their lack of counter reconnaissance training. Even when contact was initiated with the enemy they were reluctant to pursue. The enemy was dressed in a variety of uniforms and mixed uniforms of black, green and khaki. Weapons were uniformly AK 47s and SKSs. One Roadrunner team observed a Soviet manufactured 37 mm anti aircraft gun being pulled by two cows and accompanied by four armed NVA escorts. Recon Team 1A was inserted on June 17th. Their mission was typical of most of the missions run during Cass Park II from the standpoint of visual observations. Every once in a while a mission comes along that yields a surprise or two. This is the actual intelligence report issued after Team 1A’s debriefing and is included in the After Action Report for Cass Park II.83

 

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