Boots on the Ground: The history of Project Delta

by Carpenter, Stephen

  No major infiltration routes traversing the northern half of the AO in any direction were found. Delta Recon and Roadrunner Teams were placed astride suspected infiltration routes throughout the northern half of the AO. This effort resulted in finding some foot trails, none of which showed indications of heavy use by the enemy. In addition, continuous aerial surveillance by Delta air elements on a 24-hour basis, using starlight scopes during the hours of darkness, failed to find infiltration routes in the area. Some cultivated areas, small foot trails, and sightings indicated that small family groups of Montagnards lived throughout the AO. Former villages and hamlets shown on maps either no longer exist on the ground or had not been inhabited for a long period of time. Montagnard groups were most probably hiding in small valleys and draws close to their fields. Montagnards living in the AO were believed to be members of the Jarai tribe.

  APD (Sniffer) missions flown repeatedly by Delta assets, especially in the southern half of the AO, resulted in some heavy MODE 1 (People) and

  MODE 2 (Smoke) readings in valley areas. Each of these target areas was taken under fire by escorting gunships with unknown results. Only two incidents of enemy ground fire directed against Delta air assets were recorded. One occurred on December 19th when Delta helicopters received a heavy volume of small arms and automatic weapons fire while making a low pass to check a smoke sighting. No damage to friendly aircraft resulted and suppressive fire by gunships silenced enemy ground fire. The second incident occurred on December 22nd during the extraction of Recon Team 9 when helicopters received small arms fire without sustaining damages.

  It was concluded that no major NVA or VC units were located in the northern half of the AO, with the exception of possible NVA units located in the extreme northern portion of the AO. Small Montagnard VC units armed with rifles and possibly some automatic weapons were scattered throughout the northern half of the AO.86

  Project Delta spent the Christmas Holiday at the FOB in Kontum. The highlight of the day was the football game between the Delta men and the 281st AHC. The football game was conducted with rolls of concertina wire serving as goal lines on either end of the field. Delta let the 281st score at will. The game was dubbed The Toilet Bowl.

  CHAPTER XVII: 1970, LAST HURRAH

  1970 began on a freakish and ominous note. SFC Richard V. Williams had recently joined Project Delta and was looking forward to his first operation. On the morning of January 26 he drove one of the jeeps obtained for the Project on the raised road at the end of the runway in Nha Trang. As he passed the end of the runway an Air Vietnam C 54 aircraft attempted to land with flames coming from its engines and the passenger compartment. The aircraft overshot the runway and bounced through the fence and over the road, catching SFC Williams and the jeep in a tangle of burning fence and airplane wreckage. The aircraft burst into flame and came to rest on the CIDG village school across the road from the runway. SFC Williams died from his injuries as did everyone aboard the aircraft and many school children.

  The name of Richard V. Williams is inscribed on Panel 14W, Line 70 of the Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial.

  Operation Sabre and Spurs was conducted between February 11 and March 11, 1970. Project Delta was OPCON to Company A, 5th Special Forces Group at Bien Hoa. The FOB was set up outside the A Camp at Polei Klang. Delta Forces were to locate, surveil and interdict the Jolley Road; and to locate and eliminate elements of the 81st, 84th, and 86th Rear Service Units. The Delta AO was separated into 29 lateral reconnaissance zones. Each zone was 3 kilometers wide and varied in length from 17 to 47 kilometers.

  Recon teams (each having six men - two U.S. advisors and four VNSF) were inserted on zone reconnaissance missions on the east west axis and reverse. Roadrunner teams (each having five CIDG personnel dressed in NVA uniforms) were given route reconnaissance missions on north south trails and along the banks of the Dong Ngai River. BDA platoons (each having three U.S. advisors and 24 CIDG Nungs) were given point reconnaissance and raid missions at random locations throughout the AO. This was intended to confuse the enemy on the scheme of Delta intelligence collection and also served as a rapid check on current intelligence.

  Ranger companies were used to conduct area reconnaissance missions derived from information furnished by the BDA platoons and other sources. Delta artillery (175mm guns) provided interdiction, blocking, and preparatory fires. Delta aviation provided 24 hour surveillance using aerial observers during daylight hours and starlight scopes at night. Delta forces conducted 63 ground operations: 20 were by Delta Recon teams, 16 were by Delta Roadrunner teams, 20 were by the BDA Platoons and 7 were by the Delta Ranger Battalion. Delta forces discovered that the Jolley Road was a network of intersecting north south and east west trails varying in width from one to three meters. This network was interdicted by ambush, patrols, airstrikes, and artillery fire. Delta forces located elements of the 81st, 84th, and 86th Rear Service Units. Most of these elements fled before Delta forces could initiate contact. Delta did destroy administrative and logistical areas that were abandoned by fleeing enemy. Delta forces destroyed 157 huts, 195 bunkers, 15 sampans, 8 foot bridges, one bulldozer, and captured 46 bicycles, seven weapons, and numerous documents. MSG Orville G. Robinette prepared and published 57 area studies covering the assigned AO. Each study concentrated on a 36 square kilometers area and indicated the following: the combat index point, trails, landing zones, possible fire support bases, sites of enemy activity, and terrain analysis. As a result of this operation, Delta members wrote the following studies:

  No. 1 DELTA Patrolling Techniques SSG Joe E. Alderman

  No. 2 DELTA Artillery (175mm guns) Tactics SFC David A. Norville

  No. 3 DELTA Combat Indexing SFC Alton E. Monroe

  No. 4 DELTA Raid and Ambush Methods SFC Donald J. Taylor

  These and many others were collected over time and first typed and distributed to the men of Project Delta by Joe Alderman in 1970. Norm Doney and Joe collaborated on assembling the “Tips of the Trade” original document both during their times together at Project Delta and during their other assignments in the Vietnam Special Operations theater. Norm posted smaller easily digested versions for the men of Recon Company, CCC, while he was 1st Sergeant there in 1970. There is no doubt that many of these tidbits of wisdom were derived from many great recon men over a long period of time. Each and every morsel is a lesson learned from a real experience, either with a happy ending or a tragic one. I’m sure that most came to light over a cold beer after a hot mission. No matter the source, the “Tips of the Trade” has morphed into a collection that serves the Special Operations soldiers of today. A version of “Tips of the Trade” is included as Appendix V.

  No contacts with major enemy units occurred in the AO. Most contacts and sightings involved enemy rear service elements of squad and platoon size and were concentrated in the northern portion of the AO, along the DONG NGAI RIVER through the center of the AO, and in scattered areas in the southeastern and southwestern portions of AO HORSE. The most significant contact took place on March 4th near the southeastern edge of AO HORSE when the 2nd Ranger Company was attacked by an estimated force of 30 NVA using AK-47, SKS, and B-40 rockets supported by machine guns. The enemy unit was forced to break off the attack and withdraw under fire by Delta ground and air elements. Documents captured during contacts and in enemy way stations and bases indicated that elements of the 81st, 84th, and 86th Rear Service Groups were operating the AO and engaged in the production of food, maintenance of trails, transportation of material, and in the maintenance of local security. Documents also indicated that enemy forces in the area were suffering from an extreme shortage of food and a very high sickness rate. Reconnaissance and surveillance along the Jolley Road complex showed the trail activity was light and involved foot traffic only. No indications of vehicular traffic were found, except a wounded POW stated that on 8 March 70 eight enemy, including 5 nurses, had moved north along a trail using Honda motorcycles. In addition, a large number of bicycles were found
in several way stations along the Jolley Road complex.87

  Operation Sabre and Spurs proved to be an experiment of sorts in what one Commander’s idea of Vietnamization should be. Although reconnaissance had always been the core business of Project Delta, Sabre and Spurs introduced a new mode of operation where the Nung Platoons were used heavily to conduct raids and other offensive operations. The number of BDA platoon missions equaled the number of Recon missions for the first time. Because these missions put Delta on the offensive, the BDA Platoons were augmented with many Recon men and others. One such mission occurred on the last day of Operation Sabre and Spurs and sent Delta back to Nha Trang in a subdued state. On March 10th the First BDA Platoon was inserted at1235 hours into their second AO of the day. The platoon commenced movement and found two storage huts which it destroyed. The platoon moved north along a trail and was ambushed at1255 hours by an unknown size enemy force. The platoon called for gunship support and forced the enemy to withdraw to the north. During the initial contact three U.S. and 1 Nung CIDG were WIA. One of the U.S. and the CIDG wounded were moved to an LZ and medevaced. The remainder of the platoon returned to reestablish contact with the enemy and direct air strikes against enemy positions. The wounded American who was medevaced, SP4 Stephen Spiers, died of his wounds. He was the medic for the operation.

  The name of Stephen Spiers is inscribed on Panel 13W, Line 9 of the Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial.

  Operation Cavalry Glory (2-70) was a continuation of Operation Sabre and Spurs. The AO was changed to include the area bordering II Corps and III Corps. Operation Cavalry Glory ran from March 22nd through April 21st, 1970. Project Delta was to start reconnaissance and surveillance on March 22nd in the assigned area of operations to locate, trace, and interdict trail networks; to locate caches and base areas of the 84th Rear Area Service Group and other enemy units operating in the area; and to locate and engage enemy elements within unit capability. The Delta AO was separated into six reconnaissance sectors initially, and later five additional sectors were added. Each zone varied in size and shape depending primarily upon terrain. Project Delta conducted 59 ground operations: 16 were by Recon teams, 13 were by Delta Roadrunner teams, 25 were by BDA and Ranger Platoons and 5 were by the Delta Ranger Companies. Delta artillery (175mm and 155mm guns) provided interdiction, blocking and preparatory fires. Delta aviation provided 24 hour surveillance employing aerial observers during daylight hours and starlight scopes at night. Project Delta concluded that the majority of enemy traffic was concentrated in the eastern portion of the AO, primarily oriented northwest southeast along the II and III CTZ boundary. These well maintained trails were effectively interdicted by Delta resources. Project Delta located the 84th Rear Service Group and subordinate elements, to include the K76E Hospital unit security elements. Most of these elements fled after initial contact, however their logistical and administrative areas were destroyed. No contacts with major enemy units occurred in the AO. Most contacts and sightings involved enemy rear service elements of squad and platoon size and were concentrated in the northeastern and southeastern portion of the AO, east of the DONG NGAI RIVER and along the boundary between II CTZ and III CTZ. Contacts and sightings west of the Dong Ngai were minor in nature, with one exception. This engagement involved security elements of the K76E Hospital unit. Documents captured during contacts and in enemy way stations and bases identified the 84th Rear Service Group and subordinate elements and indicated that these units were operating in the area east of the Dong Ngai on both sides of the II CTZ and III CTZ boundary. They were conducting rear service activities such as procurement and issuance of food and transportation of supplies. Documents also indicate that the 84th RSG had been specifically tasked to support the 33rd NVA Regiment and was experiencing severe food shortages and supply problems because of allied operations.88

  Operation Delta Dagger (3-70) was conducted from May 15th through June 9th, 1970. In the six months since Project Delta left Mai Loc in November, 1969, CIDG Camp A-101 had been attacked by sappers in an early morning raid and suffered destruction of most of the camp structures. The FOB was set up outside the Special Forces CIDG Camp A-101. Project Delta was again OPCON to the 101st Airborne Division. During Operation Delta Dagger Project Delta conducted 35 ground operations: 13 by Recon teams, 9 by Delta Roadrunners, 11 by BDA or Ranger Platoons and 2 were company sized operations by the 81st Airborne Ranger Battalion. No contacts with major enemy units occurred in the AO. Most contacts and sightings involved enemy elements ranging from squad to company size units and occurred along Route 616. The area where Route 616 crosses the Xe-Pone river was identified as a way station/supply transfer point with truck park protected by at least a company size force. Anti aircraft fire encountered in this area was intense and included 12.7mm fire. The ford across the river was considered impassable, however new road construction work had been observed on both sides of the ford during the first week of the operation. A total of 5 enemy trucks and large amounts of supplies (possibly ammunition) were destroyed in this area by Delta air assets. A combat assault by a friendly exploitation force after intensive and accurate air strikes on 28 May 70 had to be aborted due to a heavy volume of enemy ground fire originating from trench lines and bunkers extensive enough to accommodate a Battalion size force. In addition, one large and well used east west trail was observed connecting this area with the “Laotian Salient”.89

  On May 21st, 1970, Al Drapeau, a long time Delta recon man, was flying along with a Pink Team from the 2/17th Cavalry. Drapeau was flying in the copilot’s seat as the observer over his prospective AO in the tri-border area of Laos, South Vietnam and North Vietnam (DMZ). The OH-6 helicopters flew low and fast and were accustomed to drawing automatic weapons and small arms fire from enemy troops that they surprised with their sudden appearance. It was unusual for aircraft to be targeted by anything larger than a 12.7 mm machine gun (similar to the U.S. .50 caliber machine gun) over South Vietnam. Aircraft that flew bombing missions over North Vietnam, however, were often fired upon by a vicious anti aircraft weapon known as the “Golden Hose.” It was the ZSU-23-4, a track mounted, four barreled, fully automatic, 23 mm anti aircraft weapon that fired yellow tracers loaded at intervals with regular ammunition. The high cyclic rate of the weapon resulted in what seemed to be a stream of yellow water from a hose. Somehow the Pink Team made a navigation error and headed across the DMZ into North Vietnam. As soon as anti aircraft firing filled the sky they realized their mistake and made a hasty retreat back to the south. Somewhere just inside the DMZ the “Golden Hose” caught up with them, hitting the helicopter several times, wounding the plot in the leg and wounding Al with several fragments of shrapnel. Drapeau attempted to gain control of the helicopter but the helicopter was traveling near maximum speed of 150 knots and crashed. The bubble shape of the cockpit allowed the helicopter to roll several times and it came to rest on Al’s side of the bird. Al quickly released his seat harness and pulled the wounded pilot from the wreckage. He dragged the pilot away from the LOACH and set up a hasty perimeter. The gunships called for help and a crew quickly arrived and extracted the men to safety. Al later sat calmly in the medical tent and drank a beer as Ed Foshee removed the fragments from his body and sewed his wounds.100,98

  Route 616 crossed a major ridge line via a narrow and winding pass. The road through the pass showed that the enemy had spent considerable time and effort to build and maintain it. Initially, ground and aerial reconnaissance showed continuous efforts by the enemy to keep the road passable for truck traffic despite repeated air strikes. Since May 24th however, truck traffic through the pass had ceased and no signs of road repair were observed until June 7th when Delta FAC reported sighting one bulldozer and signs of road repair work. On the same day, the road was cut again by airstrikes. Reconnaissance and surveillance throughout the AO showed only minor signs of trail activity in all areas other than along Route 616. Traffic along Route 616 initially appeared to be heavy. During the last two weeks of the operation however
, indications of truck traffic along Route 616 decreased sharply and traffic may have ceased completely. The BDA Platoon reported on June 6th that Route 616 showed no sign of truck traffic since the last heavy rain (approximately 2 weeks previously). Ground fire directed against friendly aircraft was initially heavy and included 12.7 mm anti aircraft fire.

  Most ground fire incidents occurred in the vicinity of main enemy concentrations along Route 616. During the last 2 weeks of the operation however, ground fire incidents decreased sharply and involved isolated incidents of small arms fire only. The sharp decrease of road activity and enemy ground fire experienced during the second half of the operation was most likely the result of constant airstrikes on key targets and action taken by Delta assets resulting in the known destruction of 10 enemy trucks, 2 bulldozers and large quantities of supplies along

  Route 616.89

  During Operation Delta Dagger the 220th Catkillers provided the FACs. Based in Phu Bai with the 320th Reconnaissance Airplane Company, it wasn’t their first experience with Project Delta. In 1968 and 1969 the 220th had assigned Jack Bentley and John Hillman to support operations in I Corps. WO1 Joe “Nokey” Klutts was assigned for Delta Dagger and after flying for the first few weeks he was told to fly to Phu Bai and pick up a relief pilot. The relief pilot was a long time personal friend of Klutts and a classmate from flight school named Larrie Landersheim. Klutts rose before daylight on May 23rd, 1970 and flew to Phu Bai to pick up Landersheim. He remembers waking Larrie about 0630 and Landersheim’s first question was “Do I have to fly today?” Joe replied that he didn’t at which time Larrie reached into his cooler, withdrew a cold beer and drank it down. After a quick shower the two loaded into the O1E and flew to Mai Loc. Nokey had a mission scheduled that day and left Larrie at the TOC for his orientation. Nokey flew his mission and remembers hearing someone broadcast a “Mayday” message on the radio. He quickly determined that Project Delta’s Command and Control helicopter had been shot down and he hurried the short distance to the crash site. Klutts recalls that the helicopter appeared to have crashed skids down and was on its side, in flames. Another FAC on the scene reported that there were no survivors. Klutts headed back to the FOB and was met by Roy Sprouse who said, “Goddamn! You’re supposed to be dead!” He had gotten the report that the Catkiller FAC was on the C&C ship and had perished along with Project Delta’s Commanding Officer, Major Shane Soldato and the entire crew. Klutts immediately realized that his friend Larrie Landersheim was lost.100,89