Napoleon's Poisoned Chalice

by Dr Martin Howard

  He then professed to feel sentiments of good will towards me and expatiated upon the praise I was entitled to from everybody at the present moment.

  The last words are underlined in Verling’s journal, implying that either Bertrand or the doctor or both believed this state of affairs not to be inevitable. After some prevarication, Bertrand came to the point.

  Our influence has been repeatedly used to induce him to see you, and in vain, even when he thought he was going to die. The Governor now recedes from Lord Bathurst’s letter [a letter of May 1818 in which it is stated that Napoleon should be able to select his own doctor], Napoleon has made a choice; obstacles are thrown in the way, he is about to refuse him. The correspondence is becoming more warm (the Governor is a man who never feels a blow until he is knocked down). He [Lowe] perseveres in wishing to force you upon him, and I warn you that motives will soon be attributed to him for this line of conduct in which your name will unavoidably be implicated, and in a manner in which your name ought not to appear. I therefore advise you to retire immediately from the situation.

  Verling replied that as a military medical man, it was his duty to remain at his post and that he felt able to resist any false imputations. Was this a genuine attempt to get rid of Verling? Forsyth believed so and he describes the surgeon’s dismissive response as ‘spirited’. It is more likely that the Grand Marshal was deliberately raising the stakes and trying to force Verling to make a concession to Napoleon without the consent of the Governor. This interpretation is supported by Madame Bertrand’s behaviour. It is improbable that she was acting without her husband’s approval when, a few weeks later, she tried to involve the doctor in a discussion of his role at Longwood. She expressed her anxiety that he should become Napoleon’s physician and asked him directly if he would be prepared to accept the conditions offered to Stokoe. Verling tactfully declined to give a straight answer and subsequently informed Lowe of the approach. The Governor advised him to keep his distance from the Grand Marshal.

  On 1st April, Montholon made a much more detailed proposal to Verling. The surgeon, fearing that he might be entrapped in a new French intrigue, made the following verbatim record of the Count’s offer and copied it to the Governor in the form of a memorandum.

  Having had a reason to visit at Count Montholon’s he took an opportunity when we were alone of introducing the subject of Napoleon choosing a surgeon. He said, I must be aware that he had long endeavoured to fix Napoleon’s choice on me, and how flattering it would be to me should I now be chosen notwithstanding that I was the person selected by the Governor, as this must be attributed to the favourable impressions made by my conduct during the 8 months I had been at Longwood. He informed me that propositions which the Governor might perhaps accept, had this morning been made, and if accepted Napoleon would instantly choose a Surgeon, but that he could not think of having near him l’homme du Gouverneur; by this, he meant he said any person whose views of promotion and of self interest might prompt him to act under the Governor’s influence.

  If, on the contrary, I was willing to become l’homme de I’Empereur, to attach myself, comme le sien propre [as his very own], the Count Montholon was authorised to make a proposal to me, which he advised me to accept, as I should at once obtain a degree of his confidence by avowing the motives of making my fortune, a motive much more intelligible to him than any vague declaration of admiration of the Man.

  He said that Napoleon was willing to give me an allowance of 12,000 Francs per annum, to be paid monthly and he [Montholon] had represented to him the danger I might incur of de perdre mon état [losing my position], pointing out the examples of Mr O’Meara and Mr Stokoe, he would at once advance a sum to my practice in Bills upon the house of Baring, the interest of which should be equal to my present pay from the British Government.

  He asked the amount of my pay and I told him nearly £1 per day on this Island. He told me Napoleon would not require from me any thing which should compromise me with Government or with any tribunal, or even in public opinion – that Mr O’Meara had never been required to do any thing of this nature – I should be able when I saw him to judge the state of his liver which he himself thought was much diseased; that in my Bulletins my report might lean rather to an augmentation than a diminution of the malady. That I might draw the line rather above than below, as he was still in hopes that la force des choses [the force of circumstances] might summon him from St. Helena.

  He [Montholon] however was much more in dread of apoplexy [a stroke] attacking Napoleon, to which they all thought he had a strong tendency, but advised me to be guarded upon this subject as it was one on which he [Napoleon] would not converse and from which he wished to avert his thoughts. To this proposal I replied that I considered it totally incompatible with my duty to enter into a private agreement with Napoleon Bonaparte.

  Frédéric Masson believed that Montholon’s attempts to win over Verling revealed the Frenchman’s poor judgement and lack of morality. The offer of money was mercenary and the hint that Napoleon’s illness might be exaggerated was crude. The Count realised that he had gone too far and returned to the doctor a few days later, telling him that the suggestion that he should play up the Emperor’s symptoms was entirely his own and had not been approved by Napoleon who only required that his surgeon should conduct himself faithfully (loyalement) towards him. Verling continued to play a straight bat, saying that he could not be expected to enter into any secret arrangement or make any promise without the Governor’s permission. Montholon enquired what he would do if Napoleon were suddenly to become very ill. The doctor replied that he would be prepared to see him under these circumstances, as an emergency consultation did not equate with an agreement to be the patient’s normal medical attendant.

  The French were not to be deterred by Verling’s repeated refusals to engage in clandestine negotiations. Count de Montholon made further attempts to win him over in August and September 1819. On the first of these occasions, Montholon was in bed due to illness. He was surrounded by papers which included communications with Napoleon. He told Verling that it was ‘his own fault’ if he did not become the Emperor’s physician and offered him a document to sign. This contained the same stipulations as contained in Montholon’s previous correspondence with the Governor. The Count made every effort to sugar the pill. By signing the document, he explained, Verling would only be showing himself to be an ‘honest man’ willing to see Napoleon in an emergency. The surgeon’s acceptance would be wholly conditional and the British Governor would be able to confirm or annul it. His acceptance would surely be viewed as a formality and would be perceived to arise from a ‘laudable desire’ to give medical assistance to a patient with an illness requiring urgent attention. Furthermore, if the surgeon was willing to sign this preliminary agreement, he would immediately receive 3,000 Louis which he would keep irrespective of the nature of his future employment. If Verling remained some time at Longwood as the Emperor’s doctor he was guaranteed an income of 500 Louis a year for life.

  The doctor was not deflected by this circumlocution and he replied that he could not consider signing any paper however conditional it might be. No doubt, he remembered that Stokoe had agreed to proposals made under similar terms. He asked the Count to put himself in his place and to imagine how he would react. Montholon assured him that he would readily accept if in Verling’s situation as it would resolve the immediate ‘crisis’ and that when another doctor arrived to replace him, perhaps the return of Stokoe or a new foreign surgeon, he would be able to depart Longwood on good terms with Napoleon. Verling commented that this was all just repetition of the previous proposal; he again stressed his unequivocal rejection of every part of it and left the bedroom. He quickly informed the Governor of the latest attentions paid to him and that the financial inducement had been increased.

  The final attempt to procure Verling’s services was made a couple of weeks later. Montholon had recovered sufficiently to be walking back to his house f
rom Bertrand’s and he invited the doctor to accompany him. He had convinced Napoleon to employ Verling without any conditions and without any signed documentation. All that the Emperor required was that his new physician would give his word of honour not to make any written report of his health without him receiving a copy and that he should not repeat any conversation he might hear at Longwood. Indeed, Napoleon would not need his doctor to write any health bulletins so only the second point was relevant. As Verling records in his journal, Montholon could not prevent himself introducing a hint of subterfuge.

  He added there were engagements which every medical man took tacitly, such as to conceal any little disease or infirmity to which his patient was liable. Upon my looking at Montholon, he said that he had replied to Napoleon that this was a matter of little consequence since he had none, to which he [Napoleon] replied, but suppose it possible I should get la chaude piss [the hot piss – the urethritis of venereal disease] you would not have it inserted in a bulletin.

  The Count had assured his master that Verling was a man of honour. When the doctor repeated his refusal of any secret compact, emphasising the vital role of the Governor, Montholon expressed his regret. He was sorry that Verling was missing such an opportunity. His wife, the Countess de Montholon, had made it her last wish before leaving the island that Verling should become the Emperor’s doctor and Madame Bertrand was also ‘warm in his interest’. The steadfast surgeon reaffirmed that his mind was made up and wished Montholon good evening. An entry in Bertrand’s journal for 7th September reveals that Montholon was, on this occasion, the mouthpiece for the Emperor and his retinue, who still hoped to convert Verling to their cause. Napoleon wished the surgeon to be sounded out; was he prepared to sign secret guarantees and to write bulletins for the eyes of the French only? Walter Henry was aware of the pressure being exerted on his medical colleague. He confirms that Verling ‘indignantly rejected’ the bribes offered to him and also that he reported the facts immediately to Sir Hudson Lowe.6

  Verling’s prompt communication of all the French efforts to subvert him was designed to placate the Governor and to remove him from any suspicion. Lowe, as has already been amply demonstrated, was a man who was suspicious of all his subordinates. In the face of Verling’s irreproachable conduct, he laboured to find a reason to distrust and despise him beyond the fact that he was liked by the French. In the spring of 1819, Bertrand asked Verling about his family and connections in Ireland. The question was probably innocent but the anxious surgeon decided to inform Lowe of the conversation and the fact that he had friends in Ireland who were Catholics. In an act of maliciousness which is ignored by Forsyth and reluctantly acknowledged by other pro-Lowe historians, the Governor immediately wrote to Bathurst to bring this to his attention and to imply that Verling was therefore worthy of suspicion. Fortunately for the doctor, Bathurst was actually in favour of Catholic emancipation and he delivered a snub to the Governor. In his reply, sent on 8th April via Goulbourn, he ordered Lowe to inform Verling that the Governor’s reference to his Roman Catholic relations could ‘make no impression on his Lordship’s mind’. He added:

  Whatever may be his connections in Ireland or the religion either of himself or them, Lord Bathurst cannot permit any circumstance of that nature to invalidate the confidence to which his uniform, discretion, and propriety of conduct, up to the date of your late communication so justly entitle him.

  This deserved slap of the wrist must have been distasteful for Lowe, particularly as he had little choice but to pass on the content of the letter to Verling as directed. The doctor notes that Lowe personally read him the relevant extract on 21st August.7

  Having lost this skirmish and having been humiliated in the process, Lowe was now gunning for the Artillery Surgeon. A week later, Verling reported to the Governor that Montholon’s health was deteriorating and that the Count had attributed this to the number of letters and messages he was forced to receive by the British authorities. Lowe was annoyed and demanded a subsequent meeting at which he angrily accused the doctor of implying that he had personally caused the Count’s illness by treating him inhumanely. Verling riposted that he had only stated that Montholon’s health was worse, and that the comments regarding the correspondence came from the patient and not from him.

  When Verling added that Matthew Livingstone, a surgeon of the East India Company, had also called to see Montholon, Lowe again tried to find fault, complaining that he was unaware of this. The surgeon said that he had informed the Governor’s staff of the visit of his medical colleague. Lowe persisted, accusing Verling of not obeying instructions issued to him earlier in the month to report ‘anything extraordinary’ which occurred at Longwood. Verling agreed to read this letter again but pointed out that he believed it improper for him ‘to come forward every moment obtruding my opinion’. He continues in his journal.

  He [Lowe] observed that in my capacity as a British officer that he thought that I might assist and forward the views of the Governor. I told him that I conceived it my duty to deviate as little as possible from my medical capacity and that in this instance especially I saw nothing further to be required of me than a declaration of the actual state of Count Montholon’s health.

  Lowe’s initial distrust and subsequent growing dislike of Verling is well demonstrated in Gorrequer’s diary. The references to Verling become more frequent in April 1819. On the 4th, Gorrequer writes;

  3rd Magnesia [Verling] soon after came in where we both were and after speaking to him some time, on going away he [Lowe] said to me: ‘Didn’t you observe his manner of speaking, how short he breathed as if frightened’ and again expressed himself very doubtful of his being trustworthy.

  Two days later, the secretary reveals that the Governor was ‘displaying hostility’ towards Verling and that he believed the doctor to be concealing his knowledge of events at Longwood. And again on the 7th;

  Great Gun Magnesia [Verling] came and Mach [Lowe] asked afterwards ‘Did you see a man in your life so embarrassed.’ Finds a great deal of faults with him for having indulged Veritas [Montholon] …’

  Five months later, in September, the entries suggest that Lowe’s antipathy to Verling had increased.

  Mach said Magnesia Great Gun [Verling] had played a double part. The rancour he showed against him. His jealousy. He said that any other should be chosen in his place.

  At the same time, Lowe was writing to Verling approving his conduct; the charge of playing a ‘double part’ was not only unsubstantiated but also hypocritical.8

  Despite this constant questioning of his loyalty, Verling was ordered to stay at Longwood. As he was not fulfilling his intended role as the Emperor’s personal physician, there is the question of how he spent his time and also to what extent he became involved in the day-to-day affairs of the exiles. Was he another O’Meara or did he really keep his distance from the French, as he protested in his communications to Lowe? There is scant evidence that he enjoyed his residence at Longwood and, in his journal, he often moans about duties which he believed to be inappropriate and demeaning for a medical man. Lowe pressurised him to act as a British spy. This was particularly the case during the Stokoe affair. In late January 1819, Gorrequer writes a note to Verling that demonstrates both the Governor’s obsession with detail and the demands made on the doctor.

  Can you inform him [Lowe] whether Count Montholon was with General B. [Napoleon] before he saw Mr Stokoe on the morning of the 17th, or if Count Montholon only saw General B. after Mr Stokoe had left him. Also, if Count Montholon and Count Bertrand were together that morning.

  Further questions are posed regarding the exact times at which various individuals arrived and departed Longwood. Verling was also resentful of being used as an interpreter. He was fluent in French so this was expedient but, in the event, he found it difficult to fulfil this duty without complications. In August 1819, he writes in his journal:

  Having more than once thought that no good could arise to me from any interfer
ence however indirect in the unpleasant communications that occasionally go on at Longwood, I had expressed to the Governor my unwillingness to act as an interpreter and he fully agreed with me.

  Lowe acquiesced to this request saying that there should be no need for the surgeon to do any further translation.

  Bertrand confirms that the French asked Verling to read English dispatches to them and, in the Grand Marshal’s journal, there are some hints that the doctor, at least in his early days in residence, was willing to run certain errands for the prisoners. There is a cryptic note made during August 1819 that ‘le médecin’ had been very helpful in handling some papers belonging to O’Meara who was just about to depart the island. The Grand Marshal is probably being intentionally vague but it is very likely that he was referring to Verling. A few months earlier, in March, ‘le docteur’ had similarly informed the French of reports of growing support for the Emperor in their homeland. Bertrand implies that he did this with much enthusiasm, relating the conscripts’ cries of ‘Vive Napoléon!’ Verling makes no reference to these incidents in his journal.

  Less contentious is Verling’s role as Longwood’s ‘General Practitioner’. This was quite separate from his potential attachment to Napoleon – a fact that Madame Bertrand, his most demanding patient, was keen to remind him of. She was concerned that her favourite doctor would be forced out of Longwood and that she would be abandoned. Verling tolerated her but the following journal entry for February 1819 suggests that it was not an ideal doctor-patient relationship.