The McMahon Line- a Century of Discord

by J J Singh

  THE

  McMAHON

  LINE

  A CENTURY OF DISCORD

  J.J. SINGH

  For

  Anupama, Vivek and Urvashi

  and

  the people of Arunachal Pradesh

  Contents

  Preface

  PART I

  WHERE TIBET, CHINA AND INDIA MEET

  1Roof of the World: Geography of Tibet

  2History and Geopolitics

  PART II

  THE YOUNGHUSBAND EXPEDITION

  3Clouds over Lhasa

  4Tibet on Its Knees

  5First Exile of the Dalai Lama (1904–1909)

  PART III

  CHINA’S FORWARD POLICY

  6Chinese Subjugation of Tibet (1905–1911)

  7Southern Frontiers of Tibet

  8The Dalai Lama Flees to India

  PART IV

  BRITAIN WAKES UP

  9Tibet Policy of the British

  10Eastern Himalayan Frontier

  11British Administration of Eastern Himalayan Region

  PART V

  SIMLA CONFERENCE, 1913–14

  12The Prelude

  13The Conference Proceedings

  14Defining and Delineating the McMahon Line

  PART VI

  POST-SIMLA, WORLD WAR I AND AFTER

  15Dalai Lama’s Temporal, Spiritual Rule Reinstated

  16Tibet: A Political Chessboard; Panchen Lama;

  Death of Dalai Lama

  PART VII

  BOUNDARY ISSUE BETWEEN INDEPENDENT INDIA AND PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

  17Bonhomie, Appeasement, Imprudence, Deception

  18Disputed Areas in the Ladakh and Central Sectors

  19Hurtling Towards the Border War

  PART VIII

  THE ENIGMATIC DRAGON

  20Understanding the Middle Kingdom and the Dragon

  PART IX

  TOWARDS RESOLUTION OF THE BOUNDARY DISPUTE

  21India–China Boundary Negotiations

  22The Way Forward

  Notes

  Appendix 1

  Appendix 2

  Appendix 3

  Appendix 4

  Appendix 5

  Appendix 6

  Appendix 7

  Appendix 8

  Index

  Acknowledgements

  About the Book

  About the Author

  Copyright

  Preface

  The Sino-Indian border dispute has had a profound impact on the contemporary history and modern-day evolution of the two Asian giants, China and India. It was over this dispute that the two countries fought a brief but fierce war in October–November 1962, and it is this issue that has been the cause of skirmishes and stand-offs between the border forces on both sides both before and after this war.

  The genesis of the boundary problem lies in a web of complex issues, fundamental among them being the partly undemarcated, partly delimited and, at many places, undefined, albeit traditionally accepted, boundary that has existed for many centuries between the two great civilizations.

  The arena where all this has played out is visually dramatic. The two countries are separated by the grandest mountain chains in the world—the Karakoram, the Kunlun and the Himalayas. And sandwiched between the countries (and also further complicating their confrontation) is the ancient kingdom of Tibet, which has now become an autonomous region of China (as highlighted in Figure 1). The Sino-Indian boundary of over 4,057 kilometres averages the height of the Alps, at places being even higher than Mont Blanc. It traverses perhaps the most desolate and uninhabited yet picturesque high-altitude regions on the globe where nothing but frontier zones had existed for centuries.

  Considering these factors, a study of the geopolitical and historical dimension of the region where India, the Tibet Autonomous Region and China meet will help us understand the complexities of the boundary problem that has severely impacted relations between the two emerging powers of Asia for more than half a century now.

  Four aspects had to be considered for this study: first, the effect of geography on this region; second, the question of how far one must go back in history so that the ‘boundary fixing’ is relevant to the realities of the present times; third, the significance of the McMahon Line drawn up during the Tripartite Conference involving British India, Tibet and China during 1913–14; and fourth, the defining parameters for arriving at a reasonable, fair and mutually acceptable Sino-Indian boundary. After this we consider the way forward.

  Given the considerable lack of accurate historical records or maps on the subject, the ever-changing notions of where the boundary should lie, dictated by the political climate in this region over the last two-and-a-half centuries, have ensured that neither China nor India, both successor states in the larger sense of the term, has yet convincingly proved to the other the historical, traditional and legal rights by which each claims its boundaries. Fortunately, since the 1980s the leadership of both nations has adopted a statesman-like and visionary approach to constructively engage on and resolve the vexed boundary issue in a peaceful and pragmatic manner, thereby preventing another conflict. This disputed border has not witnessed any conflict during the last five-and-a-half decades.

  As far as the India–China boundary issue is concerned, the focus of this work has been limited to the McMahon Line and to India’s north-eastern frontier. The other areas of the boundary have been given briefer treatment. A meaningful analysis of the frontier region of north-east India, east Tibet and south-west China must also take into account the strategic compulsions of the British Indian empire that extended from Afghanistan to Burma (now Myanmar) a century ago. What has emerged from this study is a clearer perspective of the Chinese grand design of a direct link connecting Yunnan province with Lhasa, cutting across northern Burma and the tribal territories of upper Assam, thus bypassing the steep, snow-covered parallel ranges and treacherous canyons formed by the Irrawaddy, Salween, Mekong and Yangtze rivers and also evading the region inhabited by the fierce Khampa tribe. As discussed later, this work covers the little-addressed geopolitical and geostrategic dimensions that need to be kept in mind for any sound resolution of the border dispute.

  To understand the evolution of the McMahon Line, one must also study the corresponding political developments during the latter half of the first decade of the twentieth century in south-east Tibet, north Burma, Bhutan and Sikkim. These developments were the fallout of the Younghusband expedition to Lhasa and the Chinese ‘forward policy’ along the Sino-Tibetan frontier region, also called the Marches, the Assam frontier and northern Burma. The reaction of the British along the frontier regions of both north Burma and north-east India manifested in measures to ensure the security of the Indian north-eastern frontier—the tea industry in Assam in particular—and north Burma. At that point in time, neither the Chinese nor the British appeared to be concerned about the western part of the Indo-Tibetan frontier (the Ladakh region), having already fixed the frontier at the Karakoram Pass. As the Russian threat had subsided and no financial investments were at stake, there was no urgency to put in place a demarcated boundary between Ladakh and Tibet as far as the British Empire was concerned. An undefined boundary highlighted by a colour wash on the map was all that represented the north-western frontier of British India up to 1947, and surprisingly, this representation continued till 1954.

  In the case of China, the geostrategic imperative to link both Sinkiang (presently Xinjiang) and Yunnan provinces with Lhasa was the driving force behind its claim and occupation of Aksai Chin along the western periphery and the raison d’être for its conception of Hsikang province to link Yunnan w
ith Lhasa by carving out portions of Tibet proper, some parts of the tribal territories south of the Himalayas and some northern parts of Burma. The latter strategic design of the Chinese has escaped the attention of most analysts and, unfortunately for the Chinese, this fictitious dream of Chao Erh-Feng died a sudden death with the downfall of the Manchu Empire and the breakout of the October 1911 revolution. These events led to the eviction of the Chinese and an end to their authority over Tibet for the next four decades till the ‘de facto independent’ Tibet was ‘liberated’ in 1951 by the army of People’s Republic of China.

  The twenty-first century has been predicted to be dominated by the two Asian giants under discussion. Whether it turns out to be one of conflict, a protracted contest or a genial tango between the dragon and the elephant, as they are referred to, is not easy to forecast. Yet, unquestionably, the focus of the world would be on Asia during this century. About three centuries ago, over 40 per cent of the world’s gross domestic product was generated by India and China. Today the world seems to be moving once again in that direction, slowly but surely.

  During my military career and my subsequent tenure as a governor in the north-east spanning over half a century (1961–2013), I had ample opportunity to serve in the Arunachal Pradesh (the erstwhile North-East Frontier Agency, or NEFA) and Sikkim regions, and in the Uttarakhand and Ladakh regions of India’s northern frontier. I acquired through these years first-hand and intimate knowledge of the history, geography, ethnic diversity, traditions and culture of the people living in these regions along the Sino-Indian boundary. My stint in the army and as governor in these regions has therefore considerably helped me in this project.

  Importantly, my experience of about four years as additional director general of military operations at the Army Headquarters, whose major responsibility was—and continues to be—the handling of all operational issues related to the security of the external boundaries of the nation, my later tenure as chief of army staff, and my few visits to China, official and unofficial, have given me wide exposure and insight in Sino-Indian matters. My five-and-a-half years as governor of Arunachal Pradesh brought me excellent opportunities to visit the far-flung corners of this strategic front-line north-eastern state of India, and helped me know the people and understand the geostrategic and political features of this region.

  In a tripartite convention among Britain, Tibet and China 105 years ago, Sir Henry McMahon drew a ‘red line’ on a small-scale map (1 inch to 60 miles) in Simla that delineated the frontiers or limits of Tibet. The British objective at this conference at Simla during 1913–14 was to secure for Tibet a fully autonomous status under a nominally suzerain China and to determine the Sino-Tibetan frontier to put an end to the state of war in eastern Tibet by drawing a ‘blue line’ and, incidently, delineating the Indo-Tibetan frontier in the process. Having a benign Tibet as a neighbour and a buffer state would guarantee the security of the north-eastern frontier of British India. The reluctance of the British to support full independence for Tibet and their insistence on Chinese suzerainty over Tibet even after 1913, when there was absolutely no presence of the Chinese in all of Tibet, was based on imperial geopolitics and economic reasons—the impact for Britain on the freedom struggles of its own colonies not being the least! Besides, the British were seeking an arrangement that would continue to keep the Russians at bay, something that they had achieved to a large degree by the Anglo-Russian treaty of 1907. Although these British aims could only be partially achieved as the Chinese declined to sign the Simla agreement even though they concurred with most of the articles of the draft convention, in hindsight many benefits accrued to the British—the delineation of the Indo-Tibetan boundary along the Himalayas (the McMahon Line) and the restoration of their image as the most significant global empire, besides other intangible gains.

  Of greater consequence to British India was the portion of the red line that demarcated the boundary between Tibet and British India from Bhutan to Burma. Definitely more important from the Chinese perspective was the lesser known blue line drawn by McMahon on the same map. This line divided Greater Tibet into two parts: the first, a fully autonomous state, though one nominally under Chinese suzerainty and called, ironically, ‘Outer Tibet’, comprising Lhasa, west and central Tibet; and the second, an ‘Inner Tibet’, marching with the frontiers of Szechuan and Yunnan provinces of China, which would be under full control of China but would fall short of being classified as akin to a Chinese province. While China did not raise any objections to the portion of the red line depicting the Indo-Tibetan boundary, it mainly contested the alignment of the blue line separating Outer Tibet from the Chinese Inner Tibet. China also had some issues concerning the red line (not related to the frontier with north-east India) which defined the limits of Tibet. Besides, China also wanted some Tibetan territory in the Kokonor, Kansu and Amdo regions to be included in China proper. It was on account of these reasons that the Chinese refused to ratify the Simla convention of 1914.

  Differences in the on-ground perception and interpretation of this red line—now famously known as the McMahon Line—and the Aksai Chin area of Ladakh unilaterally claimed by China were the principal reasons that triggered the Sino-Indian war of 1962. The war had disastrous consequences for India and for Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first prime minister. These reasons continue to constitute the major bone of contention between India and China as the two nations traverse the journey towards resolution of the boundary issue pertaining to the Karakoram and Kunlun ranges and the Great Himalayas.

  In this work the focus, as mentioned earlier, has been limited to the north-eastern frontier of India. The McMahon Line, by and large, follows the crest of the eastern Himalayas and delimits the northern frontier of Arunachal Pradesh in India. It extends eastwards from the tri-junction of Bhutan, China and India to Myanmar and beyond. Could the century-old McMahon Line provoke another conflict in the region, as predicted by some experts? An endeavour has been made in this book to address this question and suggest the possible way forward.

  Within a month of conclusion of the Simla conference on 4 August 1914, Great Britain got drawn into the First World War. For the next five years, ‘empire building’ and ‘safeguarding of the empire’ were put on the back burner, and matters like Tibet and the McMahon Line almost went into oblivion. By a fortuitous turn of events, and because of the alacrity of Olaf Caroe, a British official in the external affairs department in Delhi in the mid-1930s, the McMahon Line maps and the Indo-Tibet Agreement of 3 July 1914 were literally dug out from the dust-laden almirahs of the department and brought out. Surprisingly, these historical documents had not been formally shared with the administrative authorities in Assam, including the lieutenant governor at Shillong. It is my belief that events such as the outbreak of the Great War riveted the attention of the world powers on central Europe, which then became the centre stage of global developments, reducing the Tibetan issue to a petty affair of the British Empire. Consequently, the enforcement of decisions taken at the historic convention of July 1914 at Simla was put on the back burner. The Tibetans, who at that time were de facto independent, were well aware of and content with the boundary defined by the McMahon Line. The Indo-Tibetan Agreement of 1914 had clearly delineated the boundary eastwards from Bhutan up to the tri-junction of India, Tibet and Burma and beyond, to the Isu Razi Pass on the Irrawaddy watershed.

  The date 3 July 2014 signalled the completion of 100 years of the signing of the much underrated yet now historical McMahon Line and the Simla Convention.

  On the surface, relations between India and China appear to be on the right trajectory. Trade between them is burgeoning, and estimated to touch 100 billion USD in the near future. They are in close cooperation in diverse fields relating to world trade and the World Trade Organization, counter-terrorism, security of sea lanes, global warming, strengthening of the UN to make it more representative, and improvement of military-to-military ties. However, there are the negatives in their re
lationship, such as the intractable boundary issue, the tension-filled face-offs between their armed forces, the reported diversion of river waters and construction of dams, the adverse balance of trade as far as India is concerned, the Tibet and Dalai Lama factors, and the Sino-Pakistan relationship.

  India–China ties, however, have an overarching impact on peace, prosperity and stability in the region, and perhaps the world too. Undoubtedly, Sino-Indian relations are going to be under the gaze of the international community for a better part of this century. Hence the interest generated by the subject will have contemporary relevance for decades to come.

  India and China may have a strategic and cooperative partnership in place. Our leaders may have adopted a statesman-like approach and agreed to resolve our boundary dispute and other problems in a peaceful, mature and pragmatic manner. Nonetheless, the unresolved boundary problem that led to the 1962 Sino-Indian war along the Himalayan borders had intensely bedevilled our relations for almost three decades, from the late 1950s to 1988 (the visit of India’s prime minister Rajiv Gandhi to China after thirty-four years), and continues to be the most daunting of our problems. The scars of the border war have left their impression on an entire generation of Indians, but the same generation in China perhaps has nothing more than a faint memory of it, although they may remember the Mao era better for other reasons.

  Having examined the impact of geography and history in keeping the Himalayan region and Tibet isolated and autonomous for centuries and having also determined how far one must go back in history to determine the status of Tibet and her borders with China and India, this study moves on to describe the evolution of the McMahon Line and the nuances of British India’s Tibet policy from the eighteenth century up to India’s independence in 1947. Thereafter, the narrative focuses on Sino-Indian relations during the first decade after Independence—a peaceful one, until the conflicting boundary claims emerged like a sinister monster and led to the fierce and fateful border war in October–November 1962 between the two nations. This war proved to be a decisive debacle for India.