Mud, Blood and Poppycock: Britain and the Great War (Cassel Military)

by Gordon Corrigan

  4 Figures for Great Britain are from Census Historical Tables 1991, HMSO, London, 1991. For Ireland the figures are from W. E. Vaughan and A. J. Fitzgerald (eds.), Irish Historical Statistics – Population, Royal Irish Academy, Dublin, 1978. Up to and including 1911 Irish censuses were held concurrently with those in Great Britain. Owing to unrest it was not possible to hold an Irish census in 1921, and in both 1926 and 1937 separate censuses were conducted in both the Irish Free State/Éire and Northern Ireland. To obtain the Irish figures for 1921 and 1931, extrapolation from the 1911, 1926 and 1937 tables has been employed.

  5 This was relatively new. The public-school system expanded greatly during the Victorian age. Prior to that officers tended to be younger sons of the middle classes, the largest group being the sons of officers, and were generally educated in the grammar schools.

  6 Eton War Memorial Council, List of Etonians Who Fought in the Great War MCMXIV–MCMXIX, privately published, London, 1921.

  7 H. R. Stokoe, Tonbridge School in the Great War, Whitefriars Press, London, 1923.

  8 Sedbergh School records, courtesy of the Archivist.

  9 St Lawrence College records, courtesy of the Bursar.

  10 Royal School Armagh records, courtesy of the Headmaster.

  11 J. M. Winter, The Great War and the British People, Macmillan, London, 1985.

  12 French deaths on the Western Front from sickness alone were thirteen per cent of the total.

  13 See my Sepoys in the Trenches, the Indian Corps on the Western Front 1914–1915, Spellmount Publishers, Staplehurst, 1999.

  14 Jon Cooksey, Barnsley Pals (3rd impression), Leo Cooper, London, 1996.

  15 Figures are from Soldiers Died in the Great War 1914–19, and Army Roll of Honour, Soldiers Died in the Second World War, CD-ROMs, Naval and Military Press, 1999 and 2000. The figures are for other ranks only, as officers’ residence and place of enlistment for WWI are not shown. The comparisons for the two wars are not entirely accurate, as records from WWI very often do not show a man’s residence or place of birth, but in all cases do show place of enlistment. World War II records do not show place of enlistment but do show place of birth. I have therefore taken place of enlistment to indicate residence for WWI, and place of birth to show residence for World War II.

  16 In World War II conscription, applied in Great Britain before the outbreak of war, was not applied to Northern Ireland because the Unionist government there raised the same objection. It has been claimed that the proportion of the population volunteering for the British forces from the (neutral) south was rather greater than that from the (province of the UK) north!

  3

  THE HORRORS OF THE TRENCHES

  The perception of soldiering in the Great War is of a young patriot enlisting in 1914 to do his bit, and then being shipped off to France. Arriving at one of the Channel Ports he marches all the way up to the front, singing ‘Tipperary’ and smoking his pipe, forage cap on the back of his head. Reaching the firing line, he is put into a filthy hole in the ground and stays there until 1918. If he survives, he is fed a tasteless and meagre diet of bully beef and biscuits. Most days, if he is not being shelled or bombed, he goes ‘over the top’ and attacks a German in a similar position a few yards away across no man’s land. He never sees a general and rarely changes his lice-infested clothes, while rats gnaw the dead bodies of his comrades.

  Real life was very different. The original BEF, composed of pre-war regulars and reservists, did do quite a lot of marching, but they would have been very unlucky to have to tramp all the way from Boulogne to Belgium. As far as possible men moved by train until they were a few miles from the front, and as the war went on and motor lorries became available these too were used to speed up movement. As early as October 1914 London buses were shipped out to the front for use as troop carriers. The pre-war army was in any case well accustomed to marching. They had to be prepared to fight anywhere in the world, and most of the likely places lacked both roads and railways. The regulars’ feet had been toughened by regular route marches in peacetime; twenty miles in a day was normal, and forced marches could cover twice that. The reservists were not so lucky. In the army they wore boots, but when most had completed their engagements with the colours they had taken civilian jobs where they wore shoes. Reservists sitting by the side of the road, boots off and feet bleeding, were a common sight in the early days, until the advance into Belgium and the retreat to the Marne hardened their feet. The old sweats rarely sang. It was not a British thing to do, and whilst German and French soldiers were taught marching songs as part of their training, the British regulars thought it was silly, and a waste of breath better kept for marching. When they did sing it was more likely to be an obscene parody, rather than well-crafted and melodious lines about home and mother. The men of the New Armies, untainted by experience, did sing, and so did some of the more naive Territorials, but even that tended to be put on for the cameras or the reporters, well behind the lines.

  British armies had always entrenched when necessary. In Wellington’s time trenches were usually employed only during sieges, as the Duke preferred to keep his men on a reverse slope from where he could move them to a threatened point. In any case the standard musket was difficult to load lying down, so soldiers fought standing up. As weaponry improved it became increasingly important to shelter soldiers from enemy fire. Colourful clothing and gaudy flags disappeared from the battlefield; breech-loading weapons could be handled from behind cover or lying down; and rifled barrels increased range and accuracy to the extent that anyone not under cover was an easy target. The best way to obtain protection from enemy observation and fire was to disappear into the ground – to occupy a trench. A well-constructed trench allowed the man to move about in safety and to carry out his personal administration, sleep and use his weapon with a modicum of protection. In the early stages of the Great War men dug trenches where and as they could. They used drainage ditches, banks, hedges, folds and dips in the ground. Until October 1914 and the end of the race to the sea the war was still mobile, and the makeshift trenches were adequate until it was time to move on. Once the conflict settled down into what would effectively be siege warfare until 1918, the trench lines became more sophisticated and better constructed, with bunkers and dugouts, drains and fire-steps.

  French and German ideas on trench construction differed according to the military philosophy of the two nations. The French military doctrine was one of constant aggression: the offensive was what mattered, and their defence works reflected this. They were largely earthen, used little concrete and were often without revetment. Their primary purpose was to provide a launching pad for the French attacks that, by their ferocity, would drive the invader out into the open, where he would be destroyed. German defences, on the other hand, were stoutly and meticulously constructed. Concrete was used in abundance, and deep dugouts were built; in some cases so well built and so deep that no Allied artillery could affect them, as the British would learn to their cost on the Somme. The Germans were on someone else’s territory and, once the Schlieffen plan failed, were content to stay on the defensive while the Allies tried again and again to evict them. Once the initial phase of movement was over, the Germans only mounted three major offensives on the Western Front: at Ypres in 1914, at Verdun in 1916, and the so-called Kaiserschlacht of 1918. This is not to say that German soldiers never attacked; they often did, as in the Second Battle of Ypres in 1915, or at Cambrai in 1917, but these were local attacks for immediate tactical objectives: to test new weapons and methods, or to counter-attack to regain lost ground. British soldiers often commented that German trenches were better than their own, and this was generally true. Allied trenches were temporary, even if some of them did not move very much for three years.

  The design and dimensions of British entrenchments were based on a good British compromise. The British adopted much from the French methods, but they also used concrete and revetting when available. Unlike the French, the British ar
my was not wedded to the idea of constant attacks. Indeed, in private, some British commanders and politicians thought that Britain should stay on the defensive until her New Armies were ready and then intervene massively, end the war, and dictate the future shape of Europe. In a coalition war this could not be, and the British recognised that trenches would be from where attacks would be launched; but they wanted them to provide sound and comfortable protection too.

  As it became clear that action would no longer consist of wide enveloping movements followed by a pursuit by the cavalry, trench systems became more sophisticated. There were usually three lines of trenches. The forward line or front line, or more usually firing line, was the trench nearest the enemy. How far away it was from the opposing line depended on the ground, and often they were not sited to the Allied advantage. In some areas opposing trenches were only twenty yards apart, but this was unusual. The normal distance was between 200 and 500 yards.

  In an ideal world, where the defenders had ample warning of the approach of an attacker, the defending commander would decide where he wished to stop the foe and a detailed reconnaissance would be carried out. Factors considered included the ability to dominate the approaches, preferably from higher ground. Dominating meant that the defending troops should be able to observe and fire on the ground over which the attacker must advance. This did not mean that the infantry in the trenches should necessarily be able to fire their rifles at long range. Defending on the forward slope of a ridge or hill facing the enemy line of advance meant that one had a good field of view and fire, but the enemy had the same advantage, and the defenders could not move or carry out routine administrative tasks in daylight. To site defence works on the top of a hill risked creating dead ground over which the enemy could move without being seen. Much reliance was therefore placed on using the reverse-slope position, which prevented the attacker from knowing exactly where the defending trenches were until he had crossed the crest, and allowed much more freedom of movement to the defender. While the reverse slope gave the defender a much shorter field of fire, this could be countered by the use of artillery – which could fire over ridge lines – directed by observers hidden on the forward slopes.

  Once the commander had decided where he was to defend, detailed reconnaissance by local commanders took place, and the lines of the trenches were marked out by spitlocking (turning the earth with shovels) or with tape. Then the troops arrived and digging started. The procedure for the digging was all laid down: how many diggers per yard of front, the dimension of the trench itself and its parapet and parados, where the fire-step was to be constructed and where the traverses were to go. The parapet was a bank of earth thrown up in front of the trench itself to allow a man to fire his rifle from the trench with a rest for his elbows and as much protection from incoming fire as possible. The French calculated that one foot four inches of packed earth (and incidentally four feet of manure) were required to stop a standard German rifle bullet. This was wildly optimistic and the British tended to make their parapets thicker – about four to five feet of earth. The parados was the equivalent of the parapet, but behind the trench. Its purpose was to stop bullets from carrying on to the next line of trenches, to shield men from the blast of a shell exploding behind them, and to serve as a parapet if the enemy managed to get behind the firing line. As the trench was supposed to be deep enough to allow a man to walk along it fully upright, without showing any part of his body above the parapet, a fire-step had to be constructed to allow men to fire their weapons from the trench. This was a simple platform in the side of the trench, onto which men stepped when required to defend their position.

  As a shell dropping into a trench could spread its blast for many yards on either side, trenches were not simple straight lines. They followed the lie of the ground, with frequent dog-legs and bends, and where they had of necessity to be in a straight line, they had inbuilt traverses. A traverse was a barrier to blast, created by digging the trench in a crenellated shape. Most traverses were reverse, that is they jutted behind the trench, but some were deliberately built forward, to provide the defenders with a flanking-fire position. A traverse every eighteen to thirty feet was normal, and not only limited the effect of a well-aimed shell, but provided an obstacle to enemy movement should the trench be infiltrated. By the same token traverses also provided an interloper with cover, so loopholes were dug through them and they were sited far enough apart to prevent an enemy from throwing a grenade further than into the next trench bay along.

  Immediately behind the main firing trench, and anything from ten to twenty yards from it, was a narrower trench running parallel to the main trench. This was the command or supervision trench, designed to allow the commander of that sector to move rapidly along his area of responsibility. It was here that battalion headquarters might have a forward position and where a communal officers’ dugout, or shelter, for the officers of the company controlling the sector might be situated. It was linked to the main firing line by frequent short communication trenches.

  Revetting was the process of shoring up the sides of the trench, to prevent it caving in during wet weather or as a result of enemy shelling. Revetting material was initially whatever could be obtained: doors from abandoned houses were widely used. As time went on purpose-designed wood, rabbit-wire netting and, eventually, corrugated iron were supplied. Corrugated iron was easier to handle and quicker to install than lengths of wood, but it had to be securely fastened, as a sheet of it sent flying by a shell could act as an airborne guillotine. To enable men to leave the trenches to patrol in no man’s land, or to attack the opposing lines, ladders were built into the sides of the trench, or portable versions provided.

  Barbed-wire obstacles of varying depths were erected in front of the trenches to slow up enemy movement and, more importantly, to channel attackers into a killing area where they could be fired on by machine guns, rifles or artillery. At first the British army had virtually no wire, and obstacles were primitive and created from wire taken from farmer’s fields. In time huge amounts of wire were manufactured and issued, and belts of wire were constructed deep enough to keep the enemy out of grenade-throwing range.

  This was the ideal, when defending troops had ample time to select the location of their trenches and to plan and construct them according to laid-down principles. In practice, trenches developed wherever the fighting had come to a halt. Neither side could advance, so they stayed where they were and dug in, often under fire and in positions where getting under cover was the first priority, regardless of fields of fire or reverse slopes. For most of the war the British army was in the northern portion of the Allied lines, in Flanders, where there is a high water-table and few hills. Far from being situated in high, well-drained land, British trenches were often in flat, marshy ground where they could be overlooked by German positions. The alternative would have been to retreat to ground of their own choosing, then fend off the advancing Germans while the ideal was constructed. This was not possible, even if the Allies had been willing to give up yet more ground to German occupation, and so the British army defended as and where it could.

  Behind the firing line, and anything from 200 to 500 yards from it, was the support line. This was identical to the firing line and its purpose was to check any local enemy penetration of the firing line. Further back again was the reserve line, which held reserves who could mount a local counter-attack if an enemy succeeded in capturing a portion of the forward trenches. The French tended to do without the reserve line, relying on their artillery instead. As they had far more guns than the British, this tactic was usually successful.

  So that troops could move around in the forward positions, and so that rations, ammunition and stores could be brought up and casualties moved back, the three lines of trenches were linked with communication trenches. They might have traverses in them if time permitted; if it did not then they zigzagged forward, which produced the same effect without impeding movement up and down. As time went on more
and more communication trenches were built, dummy trenches dug and saps pushed out. A sap was a trench which ran out into no man’s land; from it, observation parties would watch the enemy line and raids on the opposition could be mounted.

  It was easy to get lost in the network of communication trenches, and so trench maps were issued and signposts erected. British communication trenches had names reminiscent of home – Regent’s Street, the Strand – or of something that had happened there – Dud Corner, Sniper Alley.

  At first British map-marking convention showed enemy positions in blue and friendly ones in red, but this was changed to conform with the French, who used the reverse system.

  Trench maps showing the trenches of one’s own side were classified ‘secret’, and forbidden in the front line – if they were captured during an enemy attack the results could be disastrous.

  Despite the tales of rats, lice and general filth, cleanliness and hygiene in the trenches were strictly enforced. The army paid a great deal of attention to its latrines, as indeed it had to. Disease caused by poor hygiene had dogged armies throughout history and dysentery had always been a frequent visitor. By now the army was well aware that if human waste was not disposed of properly, unnecessary casualties would follow. The average man produces 2.4 pounds’ weight of faeces and urine per day. In the average company-defended position this is a ton a week, over a frontage of about 200 yards. While a few men on patrol, or larger bodies in a war of movement, might practise cat sanitation and get away with it, men in trenches could not be allowed to drop their trousers where they felt like it. In the forward areas latrines were constructed just behind the trenches, at the end of a communication trench or off the command trench, and out of view of the enemy. They were usually deep pits with wooden seats on top. Disinfectant was provided, and when full the latrine was closed and covered over, the area was marked as ‘foul ground’ and another latrine was dug. Farther back, the deep-trench latrine, a pit up to sixteen feet deep, was excavated by the Royal Engineers. The deep-trench latrine was an example of perpetual motion, or perhaps cessation of motion, as it never filled unless the entire battalion suffered from diarrhoea. Faeces deposited well out of the light and left alone, without chemicals being thrown on them, break down and dissipate naturally.1 The army being an hierarchical organisation, there were of course separate latrines for officers, senior NCOs and junior ranks.