Russia at war

by Alexander C Werth

  The collapse of his ally, Mussolini, is another mighty blow.

  Not that that was quite enough. The theme of much of the comment about that time was that, splendid though the political achievements of the Allies were in Italy, there was a growing danger of the Germans now trying to drag out the war; therefore it was

  necessary to strike at Germany herself; i.e. land in France.

  It is doubtful, however, whether the Russians had any serious illusions left on the

  possibility of such a landing in 1943.

  Two developments of the summer of 1943, after the victory of Kursk, concerned Russian policy vis-à-vis Germany. First, with the liberation of large areas of the Soviet Union, some terrible German atrocities had come to light; and these called for a definite policy of ruthless punishment; on the other hand, pending an agreed Anglo-American-Soviet

  policy on Germany, it was felt that certain political precautions were called for, now that Hitler's last hope of defeating the Russians had been smashed at Kursk.

  So only a few days after this victory, there were these two seemingly contradictory

  manifestations of the Soviet attitude to Germany. One was the Krasnodar trial, where a handful of Russian traitors were sentenced to death for collaborating with the Gestapo in exterminating 7,000 Jewish and other Soviet citizens, chiefly by means of the

  dushegubka, the word for "soulkiller", which was applied to the gas wagon which the Gestapo had used to exterminate its victims—men, women and children. It was the first public trial in Russia in which Gestapo horrors were revealed to the world with a mass of details which at that time were still completely new. In the light of later discoveries—

  such as Maidanek and Auschwitz—the Krasnodar revelations were small stuff; but they

  were almost the first concrete example of their kind, and made a deep impression on

  soldiers and civilians alike. The trial was fully reported for days at the beginning of the Russian Orel offensive. As "hate propaganda" it was first-rate, but all these details of how screaming children were pushed into the gas wagon were so horrifying that not only did the press abroad tend to play down the Krasnodar trial, but even in Russia some sceptics wondered whether the whole thing hadn't been somewhat touched up for propaganda

  purposes—little knowing that Krasnodar, with "only" 7,000 victims, was merely a minor episode in the Gestapo's and the SD's activities throughout Europe.

  And then another startling development took place. On the very day after the Krasnodar verdict the Russian press came out with a spectacular display of the fact that a Free German Committee, composed of anti-Nazi war prisoners and a few German émigrés in

  Russia, had been formed. In Russia it at first caused some mental confusion; for it was certainly a curious development coming, as it did, on top of the Krasnodar trial, at that time the high-water mark of anti-German "bestiality" propaganda. Abroad, it aroused acute suspicion in many quarters. It was whispered that the Russians were preparing for a separate peace with Germany, perhaps even with Hitler... Molotov assured the British Ambassador that the whole thing was nothing but propaganda intended to create

  confusion in the minds of the German army and people, and so lower their resistance, which "Vansittartite" and "Ehrenburg" propaganda was obviously not doing; but the fact that the decision to form this Free German Committee had been taken unilaterally,

  without any consultation with the Allies, left, at least for some time, many doubts in the minds of "ill-disposed" people abroad. There can, indeed, be little doubt that, at least until Teheran at the end of 1943, there was some fear, not least on the British-American side, of a "dirty deal". It is perhaps characteristic that during the fighting in Italy, where, especially during the autumn and winter, there were many hard and heart-breaking

  moments, with little prospect of any early progress, the British troops at Monte Cassino and Monte Camino should (as we know) have been repeatedly told: "We've got to stick it, because if we have no foothold in Europe at all (and there won't be anything in France till next year) the Russians, tired of losing so many men, may pack up."

  On the very day of the opening of the Krasnodar trial, the Russian press published with great prominence a written statement by a German officer, Oberleutnant of tanks Frankenfeld who said that, till the end, he had fought with distinction, but that he considered Germany's persistence in continuing the war as senseless and suicidal.

  ... On July 8 it became clear to us that the offensive had failed and that the whole year's campaign was lost. Now, much as it hurts me, I am absolutely convinced of

  the inevitable defeat of Germany: the only questions are: how soon?—in two or six months?—and where?— in the east or in the west?

  What was I to do? Die in the next days or months, without doing the German people any good? .. . and knowing that the continuation of the war would lead only to the senseless use of gas and even more fearful casualties? The future of the German

  people is wholly in the hands of the victors.

  Taking a long view of it, he decided to "hasten Germany's defeat".

  But this was only a small prelude to what was to come five days later when, under

  enormous headlines, the formation of the Free German Committee was announced. The

  announcement took a peculiar form: the reproduction, in the Russian press, of the first number of Freies Deutschland, "Free Germany", organ of the National Committee. This paper explained that on July 12 and 13 (that is at the very time the Russian Orel offensive had begun) a conference had taken place in Moscow among German officers and

  soldiers, together with various anti-Nazi Reichstag deputies and writers who had been in Moscow since before the war.

  The delegates, the Soviet press said, came from all the German war-prisoners' camps in the Soviet Union, men of different social classes and of different political and religious views. The Committee was elected unanimously. The President was Erich Weinert, well-known German communist writer, and the vice-presidents, Major Carl Hetz, and

  Lieutenant Graf von Einsiedel. (The latter explained, at the time of his capture, that he was a grandson of Bismarck's and said he regretted that Hitler had ignored Bismarck's golden rule not to attack Russia and the West at the same time.)

  The Committee said that Germany was now in deadly danger, and in fact used many of

  the arguments that were to be used a year later by those who attempted to assassinate Hitler in July 1944.

  Hitler is dragging Germany down the abyss... Look what is happening at the fronts; in the last seven months Germany's defeats are unparalleled in history: Stalingrad, the Don, the Caucasus, Libya, Tunis. Hitler, who is responsible for all this still stands at the head of our State and our Army... British and American troops are on the threshold of Europe.

  Look what is happening at home: through the allied bombings, Germany has

  already become a theatre of war... Facts are inexorable: the war is lost. But the attempt to drag out the war at a fearful price can only lead to the catastrophe of the nation. But Germany must not die.

  If the German people continue inertly to follow Hitler, then he can be overthrown only by the armies of the Coalition. But that would mean the end of our national

  independence and the partition of our country.

  If the German people have the courage to free Germany of Hitler... then Germany

  will have won the right to decide her own fate, and other nations will respect her...

  But no one will make peace with Hitler; therefore the formation of a genuine

  National Government is an urgent task... Such a government can be formed only by

  men who have risen against Hitler and are resolved to render harmless the enemies of the people—Hitler, his patrons and companions.

  Such a Government will recall the troops to the German frontier. Only under such a government can Germany, as a sovereign state, discuss the conditions of peace.

  The forces in
the Army, true to their Fatherland, must play a decisive part in this.

  Our aim is a Free Germany, i.e. a strong democratic power totally unlike the

  impotent Weimar Republic...

  The programme included the abrogation of anti-minority and racial laws, the restoration of trade unions, freedom of trade (i.e. no "bolshevisation"), the liberation of the victims of Nazi terror; the just and merciless trial of war criminals and war culprits.

  German soldiers and officers (it concluded), you have the weapons in your hands.

  German people! organise resistance units inside the country! For People and

  Fatherland! For immediate Peace! For the Salvation of the German People! For a

  Free Independent Germany!

  The document was signed by Major Karl Hetz, Major Heinrich Homann, Major Stesslein,

  several captains and lieutenants, dozens of NCO's and privates; Anton Ackermann, a

  Chemnitz trade union official; Martha Arendsee, Reichstag Deputy; Johannes Becher,

  writer, Willi Bredel, writer, Wilhelm Florin, Wilhelm Pieck, Walter Ulbricht, all

  Reichstag deputies; Gustav Sobottka, trade union leader of Ruhr miners; and two more writers, Erich Weinert and Friedrich Wolf. (Weinert had just written a book of anti-Nazi poems, called Dank für Stalingrad, which was published in Moscow; much cf it was emotional German verse, with the then, in Russian eyes, somewhat unfashionable theme:

  "My beloved German people, how law have you fallen! ")

  Naturally, all this was not, strictly speaking, committing the Soviet Government in any way. It was the Free German Committee, without any authority, and not the Soviet

  Government that was promising the Germans "sovereignty" if an anti-Nazi "National Government" were set up. Obviously, the Soviet Government could make no such

  promises to Germany without consultation with the Allies.

  Nevertheless it was, both internally and internationally, a curious step to take, and during the period that followed, some odd reactions to it could be observed both in Russia and abroad.

  The truth is that the Free German Committee had by this time become an important basis for Russian propaganda in Germany, and especially among the German army. Speakers

  from the Free German Committee talked daily and nightly to Germany from Moscow

  radio. Hundreds of thousands of copies of Freies Deutschland were printed weekly and showered over the German lines. It was a large, extremely well printed and well produced paper, with a mass of good reading matter: but in this paper the Soviet Union's

  benevolence to the German people seemed to be so great that every possible precaution was taken to keep copies of Freies Deutschland out of the hands of foreigners, especially of foreign diplomats and correspondents in Russia. For, without the full acceptance by such readers of the view that this was propaganda, and nothing but propaganda,

  calculated to undermine German morale, it might have given rise to all sorts of

  undesirable comments, especially in the American press hostile to Russia. Nor were

  Russians allowed to read it, except for that first number. The thing was intended for Germany, and for Germany only.

  Whether, in setting up this Free German Committee and in printing this "Free German"

  paper (whose Wilhelmian black-white-and-red border particularly scandalised so many

  "Comintern" Germans in Russia), the Soviet Government was also thinking in terms of

  "just in case" will perhaps never be definitely established. But it is certainly quite conceivable that there was an element of "insurance" in all this—for, supposing there was a palace revolution in Germany, and the Generals took over from Hitler, and attempted to negotiate a general peace, or a separate peace with the West, the Free

  German Committee and its later by-product, the Bund Deutscher Offiziere, with several of the Stalingrad generals among them, who were now calling for the overthrow of Hitler, might have become a useful diplomatic weapon in the hands of the Russians. All kinds of possibilities can, indeed, be envisaged if the plot against Hitler in July 1944 had

  succeeded; and if that had happened, the Free German Committee might have been of

  some value to the Soviet government. Also, one never could tell—it might come in useful even after the complete defeat of Germany; for there was not sufficient reason to suppose that complete unanimity would reign forever among the occupying powers. Also, from

  the standpoint of German internal propaganda, it was important to be able to impress upon the German people, if necessary, that the Russians were the first to have set up a Free German Committee, and that Stalin's benevolence was of more lasting consequence than all Ehrenburg's bloodcurdling threats. As it happened, the Free German Committee proved to be of only small practical importance; but in July 1943 there were still all kinds of possibilities in the future, and perhaps the Russians thought they had better be

  prepared for them. It should also be remembered that this was before Teheran: and suspicions of a possible double-cross by the "other fellow" existed—though only faintly

  —on both sides.

  Perhaps the Russians also thought that the German defeat at Kursk might have greater immediate repercussions inside Germany than it actually had.

  If the Free German Committee was not to play any political part whatsoever, it was

  because the Nazis kept control of Germany and the German people till the very end.

  Later, after Germany's surrender, some of the old German communists, who had been in Russia since before the war, were sent to Germany to do some "organisational" work; the soldiers on the Free German Committee, and on the Bund Deutscher Offiziere were not going to play any appreciable part in this sequel.

  [ It is notable, all the same, that Field-Marshal Paulus, General Korfes (also of

  Stalingrad), and some others settled in East Germany and adopted a pro-Russian line.]

  It was indeed, obvious from the start that at least a great part of the Free German

  Committee—which actually included among its rank-and-file members some SS men!—

  was never intended to be anything but a tool of Russian propaganda. Barring, of course, an "accident" to Hitler.

  [ In Child of the Revolution, Wolfgang Leonhard, who was one of the contributors to the Free German paper in 1943-4, describes the consternation some aspects of the "Free German" move caused among the German communists then in the Soviet Union,

  especially the Wilhelmian black-white-red colours which, more than the "Weimar"

  colours, were expected to appeal to German soldiers and officers.]

  Chapter XIII STALIN'S LITTLE NATIONALIST ORGY AFTER

  KURSK

  With the great victory of Kursk in July 1943 and the subsequent rapid advance of the Red Army along a vast front towards the Dnieper and beyond, the conviction grew in the

  country that the war had been as good as won, though final victory was still very far ahead, and would still cost another million lives or more.

  Leningrad was still under German shellfire, but Moscow, with its frequent victory salvoes and fireworks, was now completely out of danger; symbolically, in August 1943, the

  whole diplomatic corps was allowed to return to Moscow from Kuibyshev—Japs,

  Bulgarians and all.

  On August 22, a programme of urgent reconstruction measures was published. The

  purpose of this programme was, as far as possible, to put the liberated areas on their feet again, so that they should not be a lasting burden to the rest of the country. It provided, among other things, for the supply of seeds for autumn sowing, for the return of the cattle and tractors that had been evacuated before the retreat, for the emergency reconstruction of railways, railway buildings and for the building of rudimentary dwellings for railwaymen.

  From now on, to the end of the war, there was a curious clash of two conflicting

  tendencies, both of them characteristic of the personality of Stalin.
The Marshal

  combined in a strange way an urge to return to a semblance of "Leninist purity" with a streak of the most jingoist Great-Russian nationalism. In his Memoirs Ilya Ehrenburg says that it was in 1943, after Stalingrad and especially after Kursk, that this Great-Russian jingoism manifested itself with particular vigour, and made a writer like Lydia Seifullina squirm. "I always considered myself a Russian; but since my father was a Tartar, I shall damn well call myself a Tartar from now on. I don't like this Russian ultra-nationalism," she said.

  The Russian ultra-nationalism took on peculiar forms in 1943 and made some foreign

  observers go so far as to talk about a "return to Tsarism". And not only foreign observers, but some startled Russians too. A typical 1943 film was Eisenstein 's Ivan the Terrible, specially made on Stalin's orders, and depicting the cruel but wise State-Builder of Muscovy as the obvious forerunner of Stalin. The most striking example of the new

  measures was the decision to set up nine "Suvorov Schools" in the liberated areas—i.e.

  Cadet schools closely modelled on the pre-Revolution Cadet Corps. The "cult of the uniform", which had begun at the time of Stalingrad, was now in full swing. More than that: the Suvorov Schools (nine of 500 pupils each) were clearly intended to create

  something of an "officer caste".

  There was certainly something "Tsarist" about these Suvorov Schools. In a statement to Red Star on August 25, 1943, Lieut.-Gen. Morozov, head of the Military Education Establishments, said:

  The Suvorov Military Schools are established, as is indicated by the instructions of the Council of People's Commissars and of the Central Committee of the Party,

  after the manner of the old Cadet Schools. This means that the pupils will receive here not only a complete secondary education but also an elementary knowledge of

  military problems. Having completed his education in a Suvorov School, such a boy will become a worthy Soviet officer. The whole system of this education is based on the idea that the military consciousness should penetrate into the pupils' flesh and