Lords of Alba

by Ian W. Walker

  The triumph of Ragnall in capturing York and its wealth must have rung alarm bells across the rest of Britain about the danger presented by this new and aggressive Viking power. In southern Britain, the surviving Christian powers of Mercia and Wessex had come together in around 880 to form an alliance against the Danish Vikings. This alliance had brought rich rewards in the form of major defeats for the Danes of East Anglia at Holme in 903 and the Danes of York at Tettenhall in 910. In the face of this revived threat from York, it would perhaps not be surprising to find that a similar solution was tried in the north also, and indeed, it appears that the Mercians were looking for allies in the north at around this time. The admittedly late and highly coloured Fragmentary Annals contains some saga material that appears to confirm this. It records that ‘Queen’ Aethelflaed of Mercia made peace with the men of Alba and the Britons of Strathclyde so that whenever the Vikings attacked her they would assist her and vice versa. It goes on to relate that ‘the men of Alba and the Britons fell upon the towns of the Northmen and destroyed and pillaged them.’

  In 913 the Annals of Ulster record the death of Eadwulf ‘king of the Saxons of the North’ who was Ealdorman of English Northumbria. He was succeeded by his son Ealdred but his demise probably encouraged Ragnall, the new ruler of York to intervene in this region. According to the History of St Cuthbert, Ragnall invaded English Northumbria, defeated the English, who lost the best of their army, including Alfred, son of Brihtwulf, a tenant of St Cuthbert’s church, and expelled Ealdorman Ealdred from his lands. The exiled Ealdred fled north with his brother Uhtred to seek refuge at the court of King Constantine II of Alba. This event is not dated but is indicated to have taken place at some point during the episcopate of Bishop Cuthheard of St Cuthbert’s church at Chester-le-Street, who died in 915. It therefore happened at some point between 913 when Ealdred succeeded his father and 915 but cannot at present be more securely dated. The victorious Ragnall proceeded to allocate estates in English Northumbria to his followers, including former lands of St Cuthbert’s church. In the process two Viking lords called Olaf Ball and Skuli were given lands at Eden and Billingham respectively, which had previously belonged to St Cuthbert. This seizure of church property by the heathen Vikings was greatly resented by St Cuthbert’s clerks, who composed an edifying miracle story. This attributed Olaf’s subsequent early death to the retribution of their aggrieved saint, as a lesson to future robbers who failed to respect the church.

  In 914 Ragnall was faced with the threat from a new Danish fleet from Brittany under Ottar and Harold. This fleet had raided along both shores of the Bristol Channel earlier in the year. It had been defeated and Harold had been killed by the combined forces of King Edward of Wessex and Lady Aethelflaed of Mercia. The Danes had then turned northwards under the command of Ottar to contest control of the Irish Sea region with Ragnall and his Norwegians. Bard, son of Ottar, who had presumably replaced Harold, attempted to seize the Isle of Man but was opposed by the forces of Ragnall. The result was a naval battle off the Isle of Man which ended with the death of Bard and the complete defeat of his force. Ragnall had emerged from this initial contest victorious but the danger was not over. The rest of the Danish fleet led by Ottar occupied Waterford in southern Ireland and proceeded to pillage widely in Munster for the following two years. The presence of the Danish fleet in this region, taking spoils that should have been his, could not be tolerated by Ragnall. In 917 Ragnall and his brother, Sihtric Caech or ‘One-eye’, moved to restore their own power and influence in Ireland and drive out these Danish interlopers. A period of sharp conflict followed before Ragnall finally seized Waterford and Sihtric reoccupied Dublin. This internecine fighting between rival fleets, although ultimately successful, kept Ragnall preoccupied with Ireland for several years, leaving his kingdom at York vulnerable to attack.

  In 918 King Constantine II of Alba was ready to exploit the opportunity presented by this internecine fighting to intervene in English Northumbria. He did so, partly to assist the refugee Ealdred, to whom he may now have been connected by marriage (see Chapter 4, p. 91), but partly to increase his own power and influence. He was aware that Ragnall was preoccupied with events in Ireland and assumed, reasonably enough, that he would be unable to return before Constantine had secured his aims. In the absence of Ragnall and his forces, York and his other northern English conquests were more vulnerable than ever before. This fact was recognised by the men of York themselves, who apparently sought to take advantage of Ragnall’s absence to surrender the city to Lady Aethelflaed of Mercia. To Constantine this must have seemed too good an opportunity to miss. He saw the prospect of securing control over English Northumbria in Ragnall’s absence. If he could do so he would have a client region under Ealdorman Ealdred on his southern borders. He may even have considered the mouthwatering prospect of securing control of the rich commercial centre at York itself.

  In 918 Constantine therefore took advantage of Ragnall’s preoccupation in Ireland to advance into English Northumbria. He marched south under the protection of the Cathbuaid, the same crozier of St Columba that had brought him victory against the Vikings in 904. He was accompanied by the Britons of Strathclyde and the brothers Ealdred and Uhtred and was probably joined on the way south by the men of English Northumbria. He may have enjoyed some initial success on this expedition since the Fragmentary Annals mention ‘Scots and Britons falling on the settlements of the foreigners’ at about this time. The location of the subsequent battle at Corbridge suggests that Constantine had penetrated as far as the River Tyne at the very least. In addition to this northern pressure, the Vikings of York were also under pressure from the Mercians to the south. In 917 Lady Aethelflaed of Mercia had occupied Derby and, in 918, captured Leicester. Indeed, it is possible that this coordinated campaign was a product of their alliance against the Vikings. In the absence of their king and faced with the threat of war on two fronts, some of the local Danes approached Lady Aethelflaed offering to provide sworn pledges to submit to her direction. They probably hoped to avoid outright conquest by some form of submission. It is possible they made a similar approach to Constantine, but in the light of his military success it is likely that he rejected them out of hand.

  This dire emergency and the open threat to York itself finally forced Ragnall to return from Ireland. In 918 a large army led by Ragnall and the earls Ottar and Gragabai (Krakabein) landed in northern England and came up against the men of Alba and their allies at Corbridge on the River Tyne in northern England. The Annals of Ulster include a fulsome report on the event as follows:

  . . . Ragnall, King of the Danes and the jarls Ottar and Krakabein forsook Ireland and proceeded afterwards against the men of Alba. The men of Alba, moreover, moved against them and they met on the bank of the Tyne in northern England. The heathens formed themselves into four battalions: a battalion with Gothfrith, grandson of Ivar, a battalion with the two jarls and a battalion with the young lords. There was also a battalion in ambush with Ragnall, which the men of Alba did not see. The men of Alba routed the three battalions which they saw, and made a very great slaughter of the heathens, including Ottar and Krakabein. Ragnall, however, then attacked in the rear of the men of Alba and made a slaughter of them, although none of their kings or mormaers was cut off. Nightfall caused the battle to be broken off.6

  It would seem from this account that it was nightfall that saved Constantine from possible disaster. He took heavy losses to his men but Ragnall’s forces had also suffered severe casualties.

  It is interesting to note the tactics employed by Ragnall in this engagement. He appears to have kept back a large reserve under his own command, ready to intervene at a crucial stage in the fighting. It was this precaution that seems to have prevented Constantine from securing a complete victory and allowed Ragnall to secure a draw. It may possibly have been a tried and tested tactic or it may have been attempted following a recent incident in Ireland. On 22 August 917, Ragnall’s forces were engaged by Niall Glundub
, King of Ireland and his army near Cashel in Munster. The Viking army was apparently on the brink of defeat in this encounter when Ragnall arrived late with reinforcements and swung the battle back in his favour. This incident may have provided the inspiration for Ragnall’s deliberate use of a similar tactic in Northumbria or it may be an earlier example of its use. In either case it shows a certain tactical flair and refutes the common idea that medieval warfare was always little more than a slogging match.

  It should be noted that this account assumes that only one battle took place at Corbridge during this period. It is about time that the idea that two different battles were fought at Corbridge, between the same opponents and within a few years of each other, was finally discarded. This notion appears to have gained widespread acceptance on the back of Wainwright’s article of 1950 entitled ‘The Battles at Corbridge’. Unfortunately, the account offered by Wainwright relies on the misinterpretation of a late source which contains few reliable dates and does not offer secure evidence to support his argument. It also ignores his own advice that the invention of two or three different Ragnalls to reconcile complex sources from this period was an ‘unnecessary complication’. This advice is very sound and should be applied when considering what actually occurred at Corbridge. If there is no solid evidence for two battles, why introduce this unnecessary complication?

  A closer examination of the sources available makes it clear that there was, in fact, only one battle at Corbridge. This is the encounter described so vividly by the reliable Ulster annalist under 918 and quoted above. The Scottish Chronicle, composed around 975, also mentions only a single battle between Constantine and Ragnall, which also took place in 918 on ‘the moors near the Tyne’. It seems indisputable that this is the same battle as that mentioned by the Ulster annalist. ‘The moors near the River Tyne’ is a fairly accurate description of the area around Corbridge. The Newcastle Tyne is such a well known landmark that there is no need to invoke the obscure Haddington Tyne simply to convert this into a separate event. The mention of a battle at Corbridge in northern English sources, including The History of St Cuthbert, supports this identification. They do not, contrary to the opinion of Wainwright and others, provide a secure date for this Corbridge battle. They only suggest that it occurred at an unspecified time after some events that took place during the episcopate of Bishop Cuthheard, who died in 915. They do not claim that the battle itself took place during Cuthheard’s episcopate and it could therefore have happened in 918. This removes the main plank of Wainwright’s argument and means that there is no reason whatever not to accept that this battle at Corbridge is that reported by the Annals of Ulster in 918.

  The fact that the three different sources that mention this battle take a different view of the result is not uncommon. It should not be taken as support for more than one battle. It is interesting nevertheless to note the differing views on the results of the Battle of Corbridge. The Ulster annals are fairly clear that this hard-fought encounter was a victory for Ragnall, though a pyrrhic one. The Fragmentary Annals and the Scottish Chronicle suggest a victory for the Scots. The History of St Cuthbert reports a defeat for the Scots even though this means by implication a defeat for Ealdorman Ealdred. It is clear that the spin doctors have been at work. What can a modern historian make of all this? It appears that one result of this encounter was that Ealdorman Ealdred and his brother were able to recover control over English Northumbria. In 920 The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle records that Ealdred participated in a submission to King Edward, the ruler of a newly united England. He did so alongside Constantine II and Ragnall of York. It is not, however, clear whether he did so as an independent ruler, which seems unlikely in view of his position, squeezed between his two more powerful neighbours. It seems most likely that he was a client of Constantine, who had probably secured his restoration following the clash with Ragnall at Corbridge in 918.

  In the aftermath of the Battle of Corbridge there were a number of important changes in the political map of the British Isles. In December 918, King Edward of Wessex assumed control of Mercia following the deposition of his young niece Aelfwynn, daughter of Lady Aethelflaed. This brought an enormous increase in his power and made him, for the first time, an important figure in northern Britain. He now ruled an area that extended north to the Mersey and to the borders of the territory of King Ragnall of York. On 14 September 919 Sihtric Caech, King of Dublin and brother of Ragnall of York, defeated and killed Niall Glundub, King of Ireland in a battle at Islandbridge near Dublin. This victory temporarily improved the position of the Viking rulers of Dublin and York. The combined result of these events was to undermine the partial success achieved by Constantine in 918. The position of his new ally and subordinate Ealdorman Ealdred of English Northumbria was now potentially threatened by a Viking revival and the appearance of a new English power in the north. The potential challenge to King Constantine’s new authority in this region was clear.

  In the following year, 920, King Edward appears to have made an initial foray into northern politics. He was at Bakewell in Derbyshire building a burh near the northern borders of Mercia. He probably used the opportunity offered by his physical presence in the north to establish a firm basis for future relations with his new neighbours. The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle reports: ‘And then the King of the Scots and all the people of the Scots, and Ragnall and the sons of Eadwulf and all who live in Northumbria both English and Danish, Norsemen and others, and also the king of the Strathclyde Welsh and all the Strathclyde Welsh chose him [Edward] as father and lord.’ It is clear, however, that this interpretation of events is an English one and it is likely that matters were viewed rather differently by the other parties involved. It was probably seen from a Scottish or Viking perspective as a meeting intended to reach mutual agreement on boundaries and spheres of influence in the region. King Edward was now an extremely powerful ruler, but he had yet to demonstrate this power to his northern neighbours. Until he had done so there was no pressing reason for these men to submit to his authority in the way indicated by the Chronicle account.

  It is far more likely that the Chronicle offers a carefully slanted interpretation of negotiations between Edward and his new northern neighbours. He would probably have sought to test the waters before seeing how far he could push each of them. He had more scope to coerce Ragnall of York, who was on his immediate border and most exposed to attack. He might have sought to exploit a common sense of English identity and a possible resentment of Scottish influence in his approach to the English of Northumbria. On his part, Ealdorman Ealdred may have welcomed closer ties with Edward in an effort to reduce the influence of both Constantine and Ragnall in his land. It is less likely that the Scots, who were more distant and had not yet felt the impact of southern English power, were prepared to submit in the same way. It is perhaps more likely that Edward’s approach to them was to seek the confirmation or renewal of the earlier alliance struck between Alba and Mercia in 907. The Chronicle seems to indicate that English Northumbria and Strathclyde were independent powers when they submitted to Edward, but it is perhaps just as likely that they were subordinate to Constantine, or possibly even Ragnall, and took part as his subjects. It is important to remember that things are not necessarily what they seem in this source.

  There would be no opportunity for King Constantine to assess the immediate implications of the creation of a united kingdom of the English before a series of deaths changed the position once again. In 921 King Ragnall of York died and was succeeded by his brother Sihtric Caech, who had been expelled from Dublin the year before. In the aftermath of this, Sihtric devoted his resources to recovering Dublin for his brother Gothfrith and had little time for affairs in northern Britain. In due course, Gothfrith was restored and entered Dublin later in the same year and commenced a series of raids across Ireland. This raiding absorbed all of Gothfrith’s attention and resources, including perhaps the resources of his brother in York. In 924 King Edward of England himself died and was ev
entually succeeded after a period of internal dispute by his eldest son Athelstan. It appears that Athelstan had been raised at the Mercian court of his aunt Lady Aethelflaed and therefore, arguably, had a better understanding of northern affairs than his father.

  In 926 Athelstan established an alliance with Sihtric of York, who was baptised as a pre-requisite for his entry into Christian society and subsequently married to Athelstan’s daughter Edith. This brought Sihtric into the English King’s circle and provided the latter with some influence at his court. It may also have offered Sihtric some reassurance against English aggression, at least in the short-term. This alliance, however, was a much more ambiguous arrangement as far as Constantine of Alba was concerned. It could be seen as another weapon being used by his English ally to keep the men of York subdued, but it could also represent a potential threat to Alba itself. If Athelstan strengthened his links with York, he might subsequently choose to ally with York against Alba. If this happened, Athelstan would pose a threat to Constantine himself and to his influence over English Northumbria and possibly even Strathclyde. It was a potentially dangerous departure from the previous hostility between the English kingdoms and the Vikings of York.

  In 927 Sihtric of York died prematurely and his brother Gothfrith briefly abandoned Dublin in order to succeed him. The new ruler Gothfrith had lost his own son Halfdan only a year before and had surrendered control of Dublin when he left for York. He would rule as King of York for little more than six months. Immediately, King Athelstan exploited his relationship with Sihtric and Gothfrith’s weakness as the newly installed king to intervene in York. He expelled Gothfrith from York, according to one version of The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, and assumed direct control. A contemporary Latin poem in praise of King Athelstan, which celebrates his occupation of York in 927, confirms that King Constantine was still an ally of the English King at this point in time: