The Enemy At Home

by Dinesh D'Souza

  The Chinese may appear from this example to be amusingly unsophisticated, yet we all adopt a reference point that privileges our own position in space and time. When we speak of the “Middle East,” for example, we are using a geographical term of Western origin. From the point of view of Western observers, the “East” began where Europe ended, and the middle region of the then-known East was conveniently called the Middle East. So, too, the term “Middle Ages” is based on a Western division of time into ancient, medieval, and modern. Obviously the people who lived in the Middle Ages didn’t know they lived in the Middle Ages.

  Moreover, terms such as “Middle Ages” or “Dark Ages” do not have the same connotation outside Western civilization that they do within it. Recently historian Joseph Ellis accused Islamic fundamentalists of trying to take Muslims back to the “Dark Ages.”6 Apparently Ellis doesn’t know—or simply forgot—that the Dark Ages were not dark in the Muslim world. In fact, the period between 700 A.D. and 1500 A.D. was the golden age of Islamic civilization. From the point of view of Muslim historians, the Islamic world was civilization itself and beyond Islam’s borders were only barbarians.

  This Islamic perception may strike us as arrogant, but historian Bernard Lewis writes that this arrogance was “not without justification.” China during this period had a rich, powerful, and sophisticated civilization, but it remained regional, confined to one group of people and one part of the world. By contrast, Islam was the first universal civilization, stretching across three continents and encompassing an astonishing diversity of white, black, yellow, and brown people. Lewis notes that “Islam represented the greatest military power on earth. It was the foremost economic power in the world. It had achieved the highest level so far in human history in the arts and sciences of civilization.”7

  As historian Albert Hourani shows in A History of the Arab Peoples, the great culture of Islam radiated outward from its great cities: Damascus, Baghdad, Cairo, Nishapur, Granada, and Istanbul. This was at a time when London and Paris were small towns. The intellectual heritage of Greece and Rome, largely lost to Europe, was preserved, debated, and enriched by Islamic thinkers of the caliber of Ibn Rushd (Averroes), Ibn Sina (Avicenna), al-Farabi, al-Ghazali, al-Biruni, and al-Kindi.8 Western historians commonly identify the “Dark Ages” as a low point of European history, so they define “progress” as moving onward and upward, away from the past. By contrast, many Muslim historians see their history as one of precipitous decline from the glorious era, and they do not hesitate to identify “progress” with moving back to the days when the Muslim civilization was at its summit.

  Ethnocentrism is not only a problem in understanding history; it also inhibits us from understanding contemporary events, such as those leading up to 9/11. For example, it is an article of faith, at least among conservatives, that the West won the Cold War against what Reagan justly termed the “evil empire.” But bin Laden strenuously disputes the premise. His view, echoed by other radical Muslims, is that by pushing the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan, the Muslims began the process that resulted in the Soviet collapse. Bin Laden thinks he won the Cold War. In making such a claim, he is not entirely delusional: the Soviets were driven out of Afghanistan by a combination of American technology, American and Muslim money, and the indefatigable fighting zeal of the Muslims who called themselves the “Arab Afghans.” What matters here is not whether bin Laden is right or wrong, but that he is convinced of having won a great victory over godless communism, and this belief emboldened him to attack the United States.

  To some degree ethnocentrism is unavoidable, because human beings have no alternative to viewing the world through some background set of assumptions and beliefs. If ethnocentrism cannot be completely overcome, however, the scope of its errors can be reduced and minimized. The way to do this is to turn assumptions into questions. We should always be aware of the blinders that ethnocentrism places on our minds. We should listen open-mindedly to what the Muslims have to say, trying to understand them as they understand themselves. We should try to make sense even of the people and practices that seem most outlandish to us, such as Muslims who seek divine rule in the modern world or Muslim men who marry multiple wives.

  Equally important, we should try and see ourselves as they see us. In doing this we should recognize that they, too, are viewing us somewhat ethnocentrically, through the lens of their assumptions and beliefs. Even so, we should carefully consider what our critics and enemies say, even when what they say is harsh. We cannot content ourselves with goofball expressions of innocence, such as President Bush’s profession of disbelief that there are people in other parts of the world who hate America. “I’m amazed that there’s such misunderstanding of what our country is about that people would hate us…. Like most Americans, I just can’t believe it. Because I know how good we are.”9 Painful though it may be to admit, some of what the critics or even enemies say about America and the West is not necessarily based on misunderstanding. Some of their charges may be true. In that case we will have to figure out how to respond to their justified complaints.

  Contrary to the multicultural mantra, true understanding does not involve a suspension of judgment about other cultures, or a double standard that routinely condemns Western culture and exalts non-Western cultures. Rather, it involves a willingness to critically and open-mindedly evaluate other cultures as well as our own culture. In some cases, this involves a quest for an independent or universal standard of evaluation to assess others as well as ourselves. Although sometimes challenging, these efforts are indispensable to helping us comprehend better why the Muslims do what they do, so that we can more intelligently resolve what we should do about them.

  THE WESTERN EFFORT to understand the Islamic world is never more difficult than when Muslims do things like blow themselves up while flying planes into buildings—actions no sane Westerner would even contemplate. Yet we must try to understand the suicide bomber, not only because of 9/11, but also because the Iraqi insurgency seems capable of recruiting a virtually inexhaustible supply of suicide bombers. Already there have been hundreds of suicide bombings in Iraq, and one report shows that suicide plays a role in two out of every three insurgent attacks.10 The issue here isn’t “terrorism” because terrorism is defined as an attack on civilians whereas many of the suicide attacks are launched against military targets. Whether the target is military or civilian, suicide missions are now the primary weapon of choice used by the enemy in this war, and so far they constitute a strategy that the West can neither comprehend nor effectively resist. Why would someone willingly seek death? How do you defend against an attacker who is ready to die?

  If we listen carefully to the bombers—those who leave records or seek to explain their actions—we discover they speak a strange language. In the last hours before he piloted United Airlines flight 93, which crashed in Pennsylvania on 9/11, Ziad Jarrah wrote a final letter to his wife, Aysel Sengun. “I did not escape from you,” he said, “but I did what I was supposed to. You should be very proud of me. It’s an honor, and you will see the results, and everybody will be happy. I want you to remain very strong as I knew you…. Keep your head high. The victors never have their heads down!” Or consider the videotaped statement of London bomber Mohammad Sidique Khan, released through Al Jazeera: “I and thousands like me are forsaking everything for what we believe. Our driving motivation doesn’t come from tangible commodities that this world has to offer…. Our words are dead until we give them life with our blood.” A Palestinian volunteer for suicide bombing told journalist Nasra Hassan that his selection for a death mission was “the happiest day of my life.” The only fear he felt, he confessed, was that something might go wrong and he might be prevented from successfully completing his mission. “The power of the spirit pulls us upward,” he added, “while the power of material things pulls us downward.”11

  Such statements are not restricted to suicide bombers but are also made by Islamic radicals who go to fight for Islam
in faraway countries or commit murder in the name of their religious cause. One Iranian who fought in the Iran-Iraq war says he envies his comrades who were killed. “I dream of martyrdom,” he told author Elaine Sciolino. “I am waiting for it to happen. To prepare myself, I have eliminated all personal relationships. I have no attachment to my wife or son, only to God.” Recently Muhammad Bouyeri, the twenty-seven-year-old Moroccan who slashed the throat of Theo van Gogh, a descendant of the family of painter Vincent van Gogh, was tried for homicide in a court in Amsterdam. The prosecutor, Frits van Straelen, told the court that Bouyeri had perpetrated a “hate crime.” He said, “The accused preaches a message of hate and violence. He preaches that anyone who thinks differently can be killed.” But, speaking in a calm voice, the defendant challenged this view. “I acted out of conviction and not out of hate,” he said. “If I am ever released, I would do exactly the same thing again.” Facing Theo van Gogh’s mother, Bouyeri said, “I don’t feel your pain. I don’t know what it’s like to lose a child that was brought into this world with so much pain. I hope that you will derive some comfort from the maximum sentence.”12

  Almost as disturbing as the suicide bombings and murderous attacks themselves are the celebrations and justifications offered by Islamic radicals. On September 11, 2001, Hamas issued an “Open Letter to America,” which ended, “We stand in line and beg Allah to give you to drink from the cup of humiliation—and behold, heaven has answered.” While terrorist actions like 9/11 inspire Muslim jubilation, few Muslims seem interested in publicly condemning suicide missions and the murder of innocents. Even the condemnations appear to assume a defensive mode. Listen to the words of Eyad al-Sarraj, a prominent physician in Gaza who is generally liberal and pro-American in a part of the world where those qualities are a rarity: “Martyrs are at the level of prophets. They are untouchable. I can denounce suicide bombings, which I have many times, but not the martyrs themselves, because they are like saints. The martyr sacrifices himself for the nation. If you want to be a part of this culture, you have to understand this. I don’t believe in religion myself, but I cannot say that martyrs are wrong. If you do that, you will discredit yourself completely.”13

  Some Western analysts, baffled and dismayed, have tried to interpret suicide bombings and murder attacks as the desperate actions of losers who can’t get a girl in this life and so strap bombs on their chest in the hope of getting seventy-two virgins in paradise.14 Or maybe the suicide bombers simply hope to cash in on the few thousand dollars that their sponsors typically contribute to the families of the martyrs. In one or two cases, such as the pathetic “shoe bomber” Richard Reid, this description rings true, but as a generalization it seems dubious. After all, there are plenty of losers in America: how many of them could be persuaded to blow themselves up for a little money and the prospect of six dozen virgins in heaven? Even losers are smart enough to say, “First show me the virgins.”

  Moreover, it is not just the bombers we need to understand but the culture that produces large numbers of them. Even if many of the bombers are pathological or deluded, we need to figure out the system that finds such men and directs them to lethal political ends. In other words, we need to understand the motivation not merely of the compliant bombers but also of the powerful men who recruit them, train them, and then send them out to kill and be killed. Even more broadly, we require a better grasp of the tidal wave of resentment toward the United States that is coming from the Islamic world. This hatred is so strong that a 2005 Zogby survey showed Muslims would rather have China, instead of the United States, as the world’s superpower. The suicide bombers are only the most extreme expression of an anti-American animus that seems widely shared among Muslims.

  AMERICAN LIBERALS HAVE a confident explanation for suicide bombers and insurgents: they are striking back against America and Europe for the West’s long and continuing history of oppression, conquest, occupation, and exploitation. In understanding Islamic radicalism, many liberals focus on the sins of Western history and American foreign policy. It is illuminating to consider some of the main outlines of this analysis.

  They’re very upset at us for the Crusades. In an earlier chapter I quoted Bill Clinton’s argument that Muslims are still exchanging horror stories about the Crusades. Clinton’s view is passionately advocated in James Carroll’s recent book Crusade, which portrays the Crusades as a horrific act of Western aggression that still shapes the military thinking of America’s leaders and inspires outrage in the Muslim world. “The Crusades were a set of world historic crimes,” Carroll writes. “That trail of violence scars the earth and human memory even to this day—especially in the places where the crusaders wreaked their havoc.”15 President Bush himself seems unnerved by the term. Having once described the American response to Al Qaeda as a “Crusade,” Bush promptly apologized for using this scary word. The best thing going for Clinton’s and Carroll’s argument is that bin Laden frequently describes Americans and Europeans as “Crusaders.”

  Is it reasonable to think that Muslims today are genuinely outraged about events that occurred a thousand years ago? It’s true that Muslims have a good general knowledge of their history. It’s possible that they have extremely long memories. But precisely for these reasons, we can be sure that the argument advanced by Clinton and Carroll is wrong. Let us remember that before the rise of Islam, the region we call the Middle East was predominantly Christian. There were Zoroastrians in Persia, polytheists in Arabia, and Jews in Palestine, but most of the people in what we now call Iraq, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt were Christian. The sacred places in Christianity—where Christ was born, lived, and died—are in that region. Inspired by Islam’s call to jihad, Muhammad’s armies conquered Jerusalem and the entire Middle East, then pushed south into Africa, east into Asia, and north into Europe. They conquered parts of Italy and most of Spain, invaded the Balkans, and were preparing for a final incursion that would bring all of Europe under the rule of Islam. So serious was the Islamic threat that Edward Gibbon speculated that if the West had not fought back, “Perhaps the Koran would now be taught in the schools of Oxford, and her pulpits might demonstrate to a circumcised people the sanctity and truth of the Revelation of Mahomet.”16

  More than two hundred years after Islamic armies conquered the Middle East and forced their way into Europe, the Christians finally did strike back. Rallied by the pope and the ruling dynasties of Europe, the Christians attempted in the eleventh century to recover the heartland of Christianity and to repel the irredentist forces of Islam. These efforts are now called “the Crusades.” (The term is an invention of modern scholarship; it was unknown to the Christians and Muslims who fought in those battles.) The First Crusade was a modest success. The Christians captured Jerusalem in 1099. Then the Muslims regrouped and routed the Crusaders, and Saladin re-conquered Jerusalem in 1187. Subsequent Crusades were failures, and Jerusalem remained under Muslim rule.

  The Crusades were important to Europe because they represented a fight to capture Christianity’s holiest site and also because they were part of a battle for the survival of Europe. The Crusades are also seen as a precursor to Europe’s voyages of exploration and conquest, which inaugurated the modern era. By contrast, the Crusades have never been important to the Muslim world. Muslims were already in control of their own holy sites in Mecca and Medina. Not once did the Crusaders threaten the heartland of Islam. From the point of view of Muslim historians, those battles were seen as minor disruptions on the periphery of the Islamic empire. The Abbasid caliphs, based in Baghdad, were far more concerned with rival Islamic dynasties, such as the Fatimid dynasty in Egypt.

  In summary, the Crusades were a belated, clumsy, and defensive reaction against a much longer, more relentless, and more successful Muslim assault against Christendom. Liberal scholars like Carroll view the Crusades as a clear example of the pointless and harmful effects of “holy war.” Christendom, in their view, was simply not worth defending in this way. The striking aspect of the l
iberal critique is that it stresses the horrors of the Crusades while virtually ignoring the Islamic jihad to which the Crusades were a response. Even if liberals detest the Crusades, however, there is no good reason for many of today’s Muslims to care about them, and there is no evidence that they think about the subject at all. So why does bin Laden still invoke the term? As we will see in later chapters, bin Laden uses the term “Crusaders” to mean something entirely different from the knights who rode with Richard the Lion Heart. Some liberals will continue to cite those medieval Christian campaigns to discredit the war against terrorism, but their argument that contemporary Islamic radicals are legitimately incensed about the Crusades is without merit.

  They’re angry about colonialism. Many on the cultural left, like Edward Said, attribute Muslim rage to the still-fresh wounds of Western conquest and subjugation. Said laments the plight of “the ravaged colonial peoples who for centuries endured summary injustice, unending economic oppression, distortion of their social and intimate lives, and a recourseless submission that was the function of unchanging European superiority.”17 But if the Islamic radicals are smoldering over Western colonialism, why would they launch their attacks now, a half century after colonialism ended and the Europeans went home? Let’s recall that European colonialism in the Middle East was relatively brief, and with the exception of the French in Algeria, the Europeans didn’t rule directly but through surrogates. After World War I, the British and the French established a series of protectorates and mandates in countries like Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Morocco, and the Sudan. The French effectively controlled Lebanon and Syria, and the British were the de facto rulers in Transjordan and Iraq. Naturally many Muslims disliked European dominance, but if today’s Muslims are so angry about their countries being ruled indirectly for decades, why aren’t the Asian Indians even more incensed about being ruled directly for centuries? Yet there is a lot of anti-Western sentiment in the Muslim world and very little of it in India.