Field Marshal: The Life and Death of Erwin Rommel

by Butler, Daniel Allen

  4 July

  Unfortunately, things are not going as I should like them. Resistance is too great and our strength exhausted. However, I still hope to find a way to achieve our goal. I’m rather tired and fagged out.

  5 July

  We’re going through some extremely critical days. But I’m hoping to see them through. Gause is in trouble again with concussion (shell burst) and Bayerlein will probably have to replace him for a while. Our buildup of strength is very slow. It’s not easy to have to hold on like this, only 60 miles from Alexandria. But it, too, will pass.179

  But it didn’t pass. On July 10, Auchinleck opened a limited attack along the coast road, at a small ridge known as Tel el Eisa, directed specifically at the Italian Sabratha Division, and for the next six days, the fighting along the ridge would be near non-stop, ending only on July 16 with one final lunge to take the ridge by the 26th Australian Brigade. This action dismayed Rommel for two reasons: it marked the beginning of Auchinleck’s new strategy of pressing the Italian units as hard as possible, because he was convinced that they were suffering from low morale (not true) and that the Germans alone lacked the strength to hold on to their side of the line at El Alamein (quite true)—“writing down” Italian troop strength would only make the Afrika Korps itself weaker in relation to Eighth Army. Rommel had no way to counter this. More devastating, however, was the loss of Leutnant—now Hauptmann—Seebohm’s radio intercept unit in the early hours of the attack. The intelligence which Seebohm had consistently and accurately provided had been literally priceless, and with the loss of Seebohm and his unit, Rommel’s single best intelligence source vanished.

  The initiative was now, at least temporarily, in Auchinleck’s hands, and his next attack on the Italians began on July 14, in the center of the Alamein line, where the Pavia and Brescia Divisions were digging in opposite the west end of Rusweisat Ridge. Bungled communications and poor coordination between armor and infantry left two New Zealand brigades exposed to a counterattack by the Italians, who forced the surrender of one complete battalion that had been stranded on a ridgeline. Auchinleck ordered the 2nd and 22nd Armoured Brigades to move up to support the New Zealanders; General der Panzertruppe Walther Nehring, who had taken command of the Afrika Korps when Crüwell was captured at Gazala, sent in his two panzer divisions to attack the British armor. For three days the fight for the western end of Ruweisat Ridge raged back and forth, until on the evening of July 16, Nehring acknowledged that the Afrika Korps was overmatched and withdrew.

  There was a flaw in Auchinleck’s new strategy, however, that could have harsh consequences for his soldiers should he press it too hard: assuming that the Italians were demoralized and easy pickings was a mistake, which the 9th Australian Division, the heroes of the defense of Tobruk in 1941, learned to its regret. A night attack against the Trento and Trieste Divisions, after some initial success, was bloodily repulsed, one entire battalion of Australian infantry being overrun in a counterattack by troops of the Trento. It was incidents like these which caused Rommel, who took an almost childish glee in puncturing the pretenses of senior Italian officers and officials, and who would later be accused of blaming all of his ills in North Africa on poor showing of the Italian Army, to most emphatically assert

  . . . that the defeats which the Italian formations suffered at El Alamein in early July were not the fault of the Italian soldier. The Italian was willing, unselfish and a good comrade, and, considering the conditions under which he served, had always given far better than the average. There is no doubt that the achievement of every Italian unit, especially of the motorized forces, far surpassed anything that the Italian Army had done for a hundred years. Many Italian generals and officers won our admiration both as men and soldiers.180

  If the Italian Army fought with less competence, assurance, and elan than did the Wehrmacht, it was not, Rommel declared, the fault of the average soldati. He was very explicit about where to place the blame:

  The cause of the Italian defeat had its roots in the whole Italian military and state system, in their poor armament and in the general lack of interest in the war shown by many of the leading Italians, both officers and statesmen. . . . [T]he Italian command was, for the most part, not equal to the task of carrying on war in the desert. . . . The training of the Italian infantryman fell far short of the standard required by modern warfare. His equipment was so utterly bad, that for that reason alone, he was unable to stand his ground without German help. . . . Rations were so bad that the Italian soldier frequently had to ask his German comrade for food. Particularly harmful was the all-pervading differentiation between officer and man. While the men had to make shift without field-kitchens, the officers, or many of them, refused adamantly to forgo their several course meals. Many officers, again, considered it unnecessary to put in an appearance during battle and thus set the men an example. All in all, therefore, it was small wonder that the Italian soldier, who incidentally was extraordinarily modest in his needs, developed a feeling of inferiority which accounted for his occasional failure in moments of crisis.181

  The situation that now obtained along the El Alamein line was one of a curious sort of equilibrium. The tactical skill of the Axis forces was insufficient to overcome Eighth Army’s numerical superiority, while Eighth Army’s advantages in numbers could not counter its enemy’s superior tactics. As he had been in the weeks before Gazala, Rommel was once more in a race against time, one which he knew he must ultimately lose if he didn’t strike as hard and as quickly as possible. He believed he could muster the strength for one last great attack. Reinforcements had been sent from Germany and Italy—the 164th Light Infantry Division, the Fallschirmjäger-Brigade Ramcke, one of the parachute units originally designated for the now abortive Operation Hercules, and the Italian Littorio Division, Italy’s last armored unit, which had been thrust into combat within days of its arrival in North Africa and acquitted itself well in the process. But it wasn’t enough, Rommel knew, if Auchinleck were allowed the time to bring up his new units and begin training them properly in the wiles and ways of desert warfare.

  Auchinleck was determined to keep Rommel off balance. The German commander was not confiding his plans to either Rome or Berlin, so Ultra was providing no insights into Rommel’s intentions, but Auchinleck knew his man well enough to understand that allowing Rommel to bide his time undisturbed until he was ready to make his move was a very bad idea. In order to keep the pressure on Panzerarmee Afrika, Auchinleck ordered another series of limited attacks, hoping to drive Rommel even farther back from the Ruweisat Ridge while at the same time retaking Tel el Eisa in the north—and inflicting as much damage as possible to the panzers.

  The attacks began on July 22; they were hurriedly planned and poorly coordinated, and as a consequence the Eighth Army came out rather second-best on the whole. In the north the Australians were able to eventually retake Tel el Eisa after an extraordinary effort, but in the center the British made no headway whatsoever, and suffered disproportionately heavy losses in the process. By the end of July Auchinleck was ready to admit that Eighth Army was exhausted; offensive operations were postponed indefinitely while the Alamein defenses were further strengthened. Fresh divisions were on their way to Alexandria, along with hundreds of replacement tanks and artillery pieces; there was no need for further penny-packet bickering with Rommel: when Auchinleck deemed his forces sufficiently strong, he would hit Panzerarmee Afrika hard enough to drive it right out of Egypt and across Libya. He had proven once that he could do it: when Eighth Army was ready, he would do it again.

  Naturally, Rommel had other ideas, but events would dictate that a rematch à la Crusader would not take place. Auchinleck well knew that he was not a favorite of Churchill’s, or the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), General Sir Alan Brooke. Brooke’s disfavor was particularly important, as his position gave him the authority to determine which general officers held commands, and which ones sat on the sidelines. Brooke, one of the mor
e elusive personalities of the Second World War, fancied himself a military genius, which he most manifestly was not—his great wartime talent was his ability to manage Winston Churchill—while in fact being a prime example of the worst effects of the First World War on professional officers’ concepts of strategy and operations. A career artillery officer, mentally Brooke was a plodder, haunted by the carnage of the Western Front in the Great War, obsessed with avoiding anything that resembled a repeat of that charnel house. He was better at retreating than advancing, and in retrospect he appears to have been frightened of imaginative, independent-minded officers. This latter proved to be Auchinleck’s undoing, as he had insisted back in March that he could not leave Egypt in order to attend a conference in London at Churchill’s behest. The prime minister, who liked to fancy that the Army’s generals came and went at his beck and call, took exception what he regarded as Auchinleck’s impertinence, and even before the Gazala debacle began to consider replacing “the Auk.” Brooke fed Churchill’s animosity, believing that command of Eighth Army was the perfect posting for one of his own protegés. Auchinleck informed London that in his considered opinion Eighth Army would not be ready for a major offensive until mid-September at the earliest, and no amount of bullying by Churchill and Brooke could persuade him to change his mind and begin the offensive prematurely. The prime minister and the CIGS agreed that it was time for Auchinleck to go. He was relieved as the commanding officer of Eighth Army as well as the Commander-in-Chief Middle East on August 8. That same day, Lieutenant General Bernard Montgomery, Brooke’s friend and long-time subordinate, was given command of Eighth Army.

  A few days would pass before Rommel became aware of this change of command. In the meantime, he was concentrating his energies on rejuvenating the panzerarmee: the German and Italian workshops were doing yeoman duty in repairing damaged tanks, trucks, and armored cars, and the Italians were exerting themselves to make certain that the vital convoys carrying fuel and ammunition reached Tripoli, Cavallero and Kesselring both going so far as to assure Rommel that they would resort to extraordinary measures if need be in order to supply the Axis forces. But the biggest problem at the moment was sickness among the troops, followed closely by the constant harassment by the Desert Air Force.

  2 August 1942

  Dearest Lu,

  All quiet, except for intense air activity against my supply lines. I’m thankful for every day’s respite we get. A lot of sickness. Unfortunately many of the older officers are going down now. Even I am feeling very tired and limp, though I have got a chance to look after myself a bit just at the moment. Unfortunately, the railway from Tobruk to the front is not yet in operation. We’re waiting for locomotives. Holding on to our Alamein position has given us the severest fighting we’ve yet seen in Africa. We’ve all got heat diarrhoea now, but it’s bearable. A year ago I had jaundice and that was much worse.

  5 August 1942

  Trouble with supplies. Rintelen does little in Rome and constantly lets himself be hoodwinked, [believing] the Italian supplies are working excellently.

  10 August 1942

  Kesselring was here yesterday. We reached agreement over what is to happen. Now it’s a question of making full use of the few weeks to get ready. The situation is changing daily to my advantage.182

  In typical Rommel fashion, he understated the severity of his own condition: he was teetering on the edge of physical and emotional exhaustion, his blood pressure was inordinately low, and the gastric problems which intermittently plagued him most of his life became increasingly severe. He had already decided that the attack on the Alamein line would take place at the end of August, now there was doubt in Africa and Berlin that he would be fit to lead it. Sometime around August 20 he suffered a near-collapse; on Hitler’s direct order, a Professor Horster was dispatched to the panzerarmee headquarters, where he concluded that while a temporary recovery might be achieved in North Africa if Rommel were to dramatically reduce his workload, but if there were to be a complete recovery, the field marshal needed a prolonged stay in a more moderate climate, i.e. Germany.

  24 Aug. 1942

  Dearest Lu,

  I was unable to write again yesterday. I’m now well enough to get up occasionally. But I’ll still have to go through with the six weeks’ treatment in Germany. My blood pressure must be got properly right again some time or other. One of the Führer’s doctors is supposed to be on his way. I’m certainly not going to leave my post here until I can hand over to my deputy without worrying. It’s not yet known who is coming. I’m having another examination today. It’s some comfort to know that the damage can probably all be cleared up. At the rate we’ve been using up generals in Africa—five per division in eighteen months—it’s no wonder that I also need an overhaul some time or other.183

  Leutnant Berndt, the propaganda officer, took it upon himself to be considerably more forthcoming with Lucie about her husband’s condition:

  26 Aug. 1942

  Dear Frau Rommel,

  You’ll no doubt be surprised at hearing from me from Africa. . . . The reason for my letter is to inform you about the state of the Marshal’s health. Your husband has now been 19 months in Africa, which is longer than any other officer over 40 has stood it so far, and, according to the doctors, an astonishing physical feat. After the rigors of the advance, he has had to carry the immense responsibility of the Alamein front, anxiety for which has for many nights allowed him no rest. Moreover, the bad season has come again.

  All this has, in the nature of things, not failed to leave its mark, and thus, in addition to all the symptoms of a heavy cold and the digestive disturbances typical of Africa, he has recently shown signs of exhaustion which have caused great anxiety to all of us who were aware of it. True, there is no immediate danger, but unless he can get a thorough rest some time, he might easily suffer an overstrain which could leave organic damage in its train. The Führer has been informed, and it has been agreed that he will receive a long period of sick leave in Europe once the future of this theatre has been decided. Until that time, we will do everything we can to make his life easier and to persuade him to look after himself. We prepare and keep handy everything he needs for his health. I have installed a small kitchen and obtained a good cook. Fresh fruit and vegetables arrive by air daily. We fish, shoot pigeons, obtain chickens and eggs, etc., in order to keep his strength up.

  This sort of “mothering” is not of course particularly easy with the Marshal and he has to know as little about it as possible. Being the man he is, he would deny himself any extra rations. . . . There is no cause for worry. All he needs is a lengthy rest in Europe at some time in the fairly near future, and that is already arranged. . . .

  As for his personal safety, I shall, in the event of further operations, once again do everything possible to safeguard it, for every one of us, officers and men, would be ready to die for the Marshal. . . .184

  Rommel rallied to the point where Professor Horstner gave a qualified endorsement to his remaining in North Africa, saying “C-in-C’s condition so far improved that he can command the battle under constant medical attention. Nevertheless, essential to have a replacement on the spot.” When pressed on this last point, Rommel recommended that General Heinz Guderian be given command of Panzerarmee Afrika in his own absence, but when he sent this request to Berlin, it was denied with a terse, “Guderian unacceptable.” That seemed odd to Rommel, but he passed it off, there being so many other matters requiring his immediate attention.185

  29 Aug. 1942

  Dearest Lu,

  Tension is growing here. Conferred yesterday with the Commanding Generals. General Värst is back and has taken over his division again. He commanded particularly well and with great dash back in the January fighting. He was, of course, wounded very early in the great May battle. My health is now very good again and I hope to stand up well to the lively days ahead. Gause will be staying at H.Q. this time and Westphal will come with me. I can’t see Gause keeping
it up much longer. He’s been having constant headaches ever since that day at the beginning of June when the British gave us such a terrible pounding with their bombs and artillery. I hope it will be better for him in Europe.186

  Rommel’s final throw of the dice to break the El Alamein line and reach Alexandria would begin on August 30, 1942. His plan was deceptively simple, as it relied on the much-superior tactical coordination between armor, infantry and artillery the Axis units possessed over their British counterparts. (Whatever senior Italian generals might or might not have done, Italian company- and field- grade officers, as well as their men, had learned a lot while fighting alongside the Germans.) In the north, three Italian infantry divisions, supported by the 164th Light Division, would attack the British defensive box at El Alamein, the strongest and best-sited of the three main boxes in the Alamein line. This attack would pin down the three British divisions in and around El Alamein, and hopefully draw Eighth Army’s reserves toward it, for the main thrust of Rommel’s attack would be going in further to the south. There the Afrika Korps and the Italian XX Motorized Corps would punch through the British lines, turn north and roll up the rest of Eighth Army.

  Eighth Army’s new commanding officer, Lieutenant General Montgomery, was content to implement the plans that Auchinleck had created for such an eventuality. The three divisions posted around El Alamein would hold fast, while 2nd New Zealand Division, positioned south of the Ruweisat Ridge, would gradually yield ground as the Axis armor advanced against a deliberately thinned-out screen of infantry further south. Unknown to Rommel, the now-reconstituted 7th Armoured Division and the 8th Armoured Brigade were sitting well back from the front, where they would wait for the Afrika Korps to turn north to outflank the Alamein Line. They would be the hammer—the 22nd and 23rd Armoured Brigades, sitting along the Ruweisat Ridge, would be the anvil. As soon as the German and Italian armor was engaged on the ridge, the hammer would fall.