by Ian Hughes
It is surprising to note that Aetius, who had now twice been in opposition to Placidia (425 and 432), was allowed to retire to his own estates after losing the battle rather than being either executed or exiled.74 There are at least two possible reasons for this. One is that Aetius had very powerful supporters who were prepared to stand by him. Rather than alienate these men, Placidia and Boniface agreed that Aetius should be allowed simply to retire. A second is that a large part of the army was still loyal to Aetius. By allowing Aetius to retire, Placidia, and especially Boniface, may have hoped to allow Aetius’ forces to integrate more easily with the victorious army under Boniface.
Whichever it was, one major factor is conspicuous: it was assumed that Aetius would remain true to his word to retire. This implies that both Placidia and Boniface accepted an oath that Aetius would not continue to fight. Furthermore, it appears that Aetius accepted his defeat graciously and also accepted Boniface’s word that he would be safe. It would appear that Aetius, despite the defeat, did not instantly fear for his life and so either flee into exile or commit suicide. The fact that these two opponents seemed to trust each other in any way is quite remarkable.
Not long after the battle, the situation changed. With the death of Boniface his son-in-law Sebastian ‘inherited’ the post of comes et magister utriusque militiae.75 Unfortunately, it would appear that he was unwilling to allow Aetius to remain at large in Italy. Sebastian’s supporters – or possibly followers of Boniface angry at his death – made a sudden attack on Aetius’ home in an attempt to kill him.76 Aetius fled to Rome, possibly in an attempt to seek support. When this was not forthcoming, at least on the scale needed to defend himself, he escaped and travelled, via Dalmatia and Pannonia, to the lands of the Huns (see Map 6).77
433
Aetius arrived at the court of the Hunnic king Rua.78 His long-standing friend again agreed to help him, although upon what terms are unclear. It is possible that Aetius agreed to recognize Hun control of territory that they were already occupying in Pannonia, or that he took with him a sum of gold that, along with his friendship, sufficed, or that he agreed to an alliance and, less likely, to the payment of subsidies. It is possible that it was a combination of all three of these factors. Unfortunately, there are no details in any of our sources, and all suggestions about the terms agreed are speculation, not fact.79
Following the agreement, Aetius returned to the West.80 Although it is often assumed that he was accompanied by a large force of Huns, this is nowhere specifically stated in the sources and it is also possible that he was simply accompanied by an embassy that threatened war if he was not restored to his former position. The threat of an attack by the Huns may have been enough to intimidate Placidia into accepting Aetius’ return.81 Aetius was restored to his previous position as comes et magister utriusque militiae without having to fight a battle, although a cryptic mention in the Gallic Chronicle of 452 suggests that Sebastian was preparing to fight Aetius by summoning Visigoths to his aid.82
Yet there is one further factor in Aetius’ quick return to power. We have only a few glimpses into the character of Sebastian, and these come from later in his life. Although ‘an able advisor and an active soldier’, he later allowed his men to engage in ‘piratical’ activities.83 It is possible that his conduct during his brief role as senior general resulted in Sebastian losing popular support very quickly in Rome and Ravenna, so that when the news arrived that Aetius was being supported by the Huns and was on the point of return, the army refused to support Sebastian, who was thus in no position to face Aetius. Although speculation, this would explain Aetius’ rapid return to power.
Aetius quickly re-established himself in the court at Ravenna. One of his first acts was to secure the dismissal of Sebastian, who sought refuge in Constantinople.84 He was also now in a position to continue the diplomatic activity that he had begun prior to Boniface’s recall from Africa. At an unknown date in 433 Censurius returned from his embassy to the Sueves and Aetius was able to ratify a new peace treaty, including an exchange of hostages between the Sueves and the Gallaecians.85 When Censurius returned it would appear that he was accompanied by bishop Symphosius, who is otherwise unknown, who attempted to reach an agreement with Aetius. The nature of the discussions is unclear, but it is most likely to have been an attempt by Hermeric, king of the Sueves, to gain a military post in the higher hierarchy of the empire. Unfortunately for Hermeric, the petition failed.86
For Aetius, the disaster of losing the Battle of Rimini had been completely reversed. There was now no military figure of any standing capable of opposing him in the West. In 424 he had been a rebel against Valentinian III and Galla Placidia. By 433 he was in a position to achieve total dominance of the Western Roman Empire, but on both of these occasions he had needed the support of the Huns to retain his power.
Aetius’ return and total dominance of political and military affairs had a negative aspect for at least two people. One was the young Emperor of the West. In 433 Valentinian ‘came of age’ – being fourteen – but there was little prospect of his learning how to function as emperor on his own.87 The other was Valentinian’s mother Placidia. She had raised Boniface to power in opposition to Aetius, but in the end Aetius had been triumphant. With her loyal supporter Boniface dead, Placidia doubtless had serious concerns for the future, especially in the matter of Aetius’ ambitions.
* Events in the years 430–439 are extremely confusing and open to very different interpretations. To help simplify the narrative, at this point the text will be divided annually in order to make the analysis easier to follow.
Chapter 8
Undisputed Leadership
Sebastian, Boniface’s son-in-law, had been removed from office and had fled into exile. Restored to power, Aetius now made a quite startling political move: almost immediately upon his return he married Pelagia, Boniface’s widow. This was allegedly upon the advice of Boniface himself, and it gave Aetius control of Boniface’s name, his wealth and his bucellarii.1 This implies that despite their political opposition, there does not appear to have been any deep-rooted animosity between Aetius and Boniface – simply a question of earlier divided loyalties. This hypothesis has one further major implication: if Boniface had approved of his son-in-law taking power Aetius would certainly have been either exiled or killed. It would seem that Boniface felt that Aetius was more fitting to lead than Sebastian. The fact that Sebastian was so easily removed from his position suggests that this low opinion had quickly come to be shared by the people of Rome.
Pelagia herself was probably a Goth and had been brought up as an Arian. Although she converted to Catholic Christianity before her marriage to Boniface, it was alleged that she had had their daughter baptized by an Arian priest.2 Whatever the circumstances surrounding the new marriage, she appears to have been loyal to Aetius, even ‘praying assiduously’ for his return from war in 451.3
Sadly, there is no mention of what happened to Aetius’ first wife, the daughter of Carpilio. The fact that Boniface allegedly advised Pelagia to marry Aetius implies that she had died by this time.4
The marriage may have been useful to Aetius in another way. Pelagia’s origin as a ‘Gothic princess’ may have given him useful connections to the Gothic nobility.5 As well as marrying Pelagia, Aetius also bought all of Boniface’s property.6 This combination ensured that no one else could aspire to replace Boniface and so challenge Aetius.
434
All of these developments took time, and it is likely that Aetius spent the whole of the year 434 arranging his marriage, adjusting to his new role as sole military leader, settling affairs in Italy, negotiating with Placidia and Valentinian, appointing trusted men to positions of power and beginning the process of linking all of the various offices of state to himself.7 He also dispatched political embassies to a large number of people in an attempt to establish peace in at least some quarters of the West.
In many cases the negotiations failed. The outbreak of yet anoth
er civil war and the recall of large numbers of troops to Italy, coupled with the ensuing lack of military activity elsewhere, had resulted once more in the various barbarian tribes both within and outside the empire testing the limits of Roman power by attempting to expand their spheres of influence, nominally by supporting one of the two sides in the civil war. The quelling of these invasions and uprisings would take up most of Aetius’ time for the next few years.
435
However, in one area Aetius had an early success, and one that would potentially give him the breathing space he needed to begin the recovery of the West. In 434 he had sent Trygetius to negotiate terms with the Vandals. Trygetius was a man of some importance and had previously been comes rei privatae in 423.8 In the years since 431 and Boniface’s campaigns against the Vandals, Aspar, the Eastern magister militum, had been conducting a campaign of containment.9 It is a testament to his skills that, despite being defeated by the Vandals in his first battle, the Vandals do not seem to have been able to make any permanent settlements in Africa. This can be compared to Gaiseric’s ability to defeat Boniface on two separate occasions.
Over the winter months of 434–435 Trygetius managed to convince Gaiseric that a peace treaty was preferable to continuing the war, and on 11 February 435, at Hippo, a treaty was announced. The Vandals were given ‘a part of Africa to live in’.10 As a reward for his efforts in Africa, Aspar was awarded the post of consul for the year 434. Despite being an Eastern general, in recognition of his services to the West he was the West’s nomination.11
It is unfortunate that we do not have any clear indication of the actual terms of the treaty with the Vandals. Procopius claims that in return for land in ‘Libya’, the Vandals agreed to pay a yearly tribute and Huneric, son of Gaiseric, was sent as a hostage to Ravenna.12 Yet as Procopius makes no other mention of a treaty, it is certain that he has conflated the treaty of 435 with the later treaty of 442 (see Chapter 12).13 Although some of the details given might be an accurate representation of the treaty of 435, which these were is unknown. It should be noted, however, that Procopius’ statement that the Vandals were given only some areas in Africa, and not Africa Proconsularis itself, certainly relates to the earlier treaty.
Alongside Procopius, Prosper states only that the Vandals were given ‘a part of Africa’.14 As a result, modern interpretations of the specific territories allocated differ. For example, there is the claim that the Vandals were given ‘Numidia and the Mauretanias’.15 Another hypothesis is that they were given ‘the province of Africa – except the city of Carthage – the province of Byzacena, and a part of Numidia’.16 A further suggestion is that they were allocated territories ‘probably along the coast of Numidia’.17 They might even have gained control of ‘large areas of Numidia and Mauretania Sitifensis, including Calama and Sitifis’.18
These differing suggestions can lead to confusion, yet it is possible that slightly more detail can be inferred from a later entry by Prosper, where he notes that: ‘[Gaiseric] persecuted some of our bishops, of whom the most famous were Possidius, Novatus, and Severianus.’19 This entry is supported to some degree by the Novels of Valentinian.20 It has been suggested that Possidius was bishop of Calama, Novatus of Sitifis, and Severianus of Cera.21 This implies that the Vandals were settled in parts of Mauretania Sitifiensis, Numidia and Africa Proconsularis, but beyond this the exact nature of their settlement is unknown.22
Map 8. The Vandal Settlement of 435
The references to the treaty also imply that Gaiseric was given an official post within the empire, since he appears to have had the rights of a military commander and Roman official to order ecclesiastical affairs.23 The suggestion is possibly supported by a famous passage in Victor of Vita:
In his cunning duke Geiseric [Geiserici ducis], intending to make the reputation of his people a source of dread, ordered then and there that the entire crowd was to be counted, even those who had come from the womb into the light that very day.
Victor of Vita, 1.2
Although the majority of interest in the passage concerns Victor’s claim concerning the number of Vandals who crossed to Africa, it is interesting to note that he calls Geiseric Geiserici ducis (dux, duke), not rex or a similar Latin term.24 The most likely explanation for this is that in the treaty of 435 Geiseric, following the example of previous barbarian leaders such as Alaric, had demanded an official post as part of the peace agreements. He was given the title dux, probably with responsibility for the areas of Africa allocated to the Vandals. Victor, who hated the Vandals, used his title anachronistically to highlight the treacherous nature of Geiseric in later ‘invading’ Roman territory as a Roman officer. If this hypothesis is true, then it is almost certain that the Vandals were given land and billets according to traditional Roman methods.25
The treaty would appear to be similar in many respects to that accorded to the Goths in Aquitaine in 419, where the Goths were given territory in return for military service as foederati. However, there was one major exception: due to the weaker status of the empire Gaiseric, unlike Theoderic, appears to have been given a military post.26 However, it should be remembered that this is only conjecture based on very limited evidence.
Despite the appalling circumstances, the peace treaty was a welcome piece of news, since when the information arrived in Italy Aetius was already campaigning against the Burgundians in Gaul. It would appear that during the confusion of Aetius’ return to power the Burgundians had seized the opportunity to raid one of the Belgic provinces.27 However, it is likely that another main cause for the war, as with the other tribes in the west, was the slow spread of Burgundian families into deserted agricultural areas nominally under the control of the empire.
Whilst in Gaul Aetius received news of a major rebellion. In ‘Farther Gaul’ an individual named Tibatto was leading a bacaudic revolt of servitia (the ‘servile order’).28 The origins and nature of the revolt are unknown. Although many different theories are possible, it is most likely that it was part of the slow fragmentation of Gaul that had been occurring since the start of the fifth century. The slow drift of northern Gaul away from imperial control may have resulted in a desire in those areas to set up their own government to govern their affairs without the need to pay taxes or to consult with the emperor. However, there was little or no aristocratic support for the rebellion, and the army remained loyal. As a result, the uprising is classed in the sources merely as ‘bacaudic’ rather than being seen as a revolt.
Fortunately for Aetius, help was near to hand. Litorius, who was either already a comes rei militaris or who was promoted to the post specifically for the campaign, was sent to Armorica to put down the bacaudae.29 It is possible that even at this early date Litorius was appointed as magister militum per Gallias, but unfortunately the only source for this period is Prosper, who simply calls Litorius comes.30 Taking with him a contingent of Huns, Litorius headed north.31
With matters in hand, Aetius continued his campaign against the Burgundians, probably using only the praesental army of Italy, estimated at around 28,500 men.32 After a very fast campaign the Burgundians were crushed and their king, Gundichar, forced to agree to a treaty favourable to Rome.33 Unfortunately, later events would show that the campaign did not quell the spirit of rebellion amongst the Burgundians. One possible reason for this is that, due to the tumultuous state of affairs in the West, Aetius may have rushed the negotiations for the treaty and so imposed terms that were far too stringent on the Burgundians.
In the midst of the wars in the West, Aetius had one small piece of good news concerning the internal politics of the empire. On 30 July 435 a statue of Merobaudes was erected in the Forum of Trajan, built at Aetius’ suggestion (according to Merobaudes as thanks for his earlier panegyric). The inscription on the base of the statue has survived:
Dedicata III Kal(endas) Aug(ustas) conss(ulibus) dd(ominis) nn(ostris) / Theodosio XV et Valentiniano IIII // [Fl(avio) Merob]audi v(iro) s(pectabiili) com(iti) s(acri) c(onsistori
i) / Fl(avio) Merobaudi aeque forti et docto viro tam facere / laudanda quam aliorum facta laudare praecipuo / castrensi experientia claro facundia vel otiosorum / studia supergresso cui a crepundiis par virtutis et elo / quentiae cura ingenium ita fortitudini ut doctrinae / natum stilo et gladio pariter exercuit nec in umbra / vel latebris mentis vigorem scholari tantum otio / torpere passus inter arma litteris militabat / et in Alpibus acuebat eloquium ideo illi cessit in praemium / non verbena vilis nec otiosa hedera honor capitis / Heliconius sed imago aere formata quo rari exempli / viros seu in castris probatos seu optimos vatum / antiquitas honorabat quod huic quoque cum / augustissimis Roma principibus / Theodosio et Placido Valentiniano rerum dominis / in foro Ulpio detulerunt remunerantes in viro / antiquae nobilitatis novae gloriae vel industriam / militarem vel carmen cuius praeconio gloria / triumfali crevit imperio
CIL VI 1724 v.2 = ILS 2950= Hubner 748
The text states that Merobaudes was renowned as both a warrior and a poet. Moreover, in an unrelated text Hydatius implies that other statues were erected to Merobaudes.34 Although many of these others may also have been erected at the instigation of Aetius, some at least were doubtless proposed by the Senate without his involvement. The acclamation given to Merobaudes no doubt was taken by Aetius to be a reflection of support for his regime: after all, Merobaudes was clearly one of Aetius’ more powerful supporters and had written and delivered the earlier panegyric for him in 432.
Britain
Whilst these developments had been taking place on the continent, Britain was once again being converted to Pelagianism. In response, probably in 435, Germanus, Bishop of Auxerre, was sent to Britain for the second time, winning back the converts and this time taking the preachers of Pelagianism to exile on the continent.35
