by Ian Hughes
Although sometimes overlooked, in the context of the time the military campaigns of Aetius and the spiritual campaign of Germanus can be interpreted as a ‘careful co-ordination of the political and military policies of Felix and Aetius with the ecclesiastical activities of [Pope] Celestine’.36 Although tempting, the idea must remain open to doubt. The activities of Germanus may possibly have been initiated by the Pope, but it is more likely that the two missions in 429 and 435 were instigated by the islanders. Furthermore, the pressure on the frontiers and in Gaul was such that the policies and actions of Felix and later Aetius would appear to have been reactive rather than proactive. As a result, it is probably better to see these activities as separate and linked to ‘external’ activity rather than being the formulated policies of the military and spiritual leaders working in tandem to regain control of the west.
Patricius
Upon returning from the wars against the Burgundians, Aetius received the greatest confirmation that his position was secure, at least for the time being and as long as he was being successful. On 5 September 435 he was honoured with the title patricius.37 This is not surprising. Although opposed by Placidia up to the death of Boniface, Aetius had shown that he was determined to maintain his position, probably since he thought he was the best man for the task.
Although Placidia may have been loath to appoint Aetius as patricius, it would have been difficult for her to refuse: he was clearly the only general with power at the time, and whatever she thought of him, realistically she could not do anything else. On the other hand, his record was actually quite good. Since 425 he had fought in two civil wars, ‘drawing’ the battle in 425 and losing to Boniface in 432. But these were his only failures. He had also fought seven campaigns against barbarians within the empire, winning them all. His energy and willingness to fight almost certainly marked him out from most of his contemporaries and set an example moulded on the guides set by Constantius III and, to a slightly lesser degree, by Stilicho.38
Yet despite the fact that Aetius had obtained the title of patricius against the odds and could be expected to be fiercely jealous of his titles and power, it should be noted that he was now mentally secure in his position: secure enough to allow other individuals to use the title patricius. When this happened Aetius – and possibly Constantius III before him – adopted a more grandiose title: in the case of Aetius, magnificus vir parens patriusque noster instead of the more modest patricius noster.39 As the empire became more desperate in its attempts to survive and the West disintegrated, the most powerful individuals were striving to invent ever more complex titles with which to emphasise their importance.
436
No doubt the celebrations concerning the title of patricius lasted for a long time. As a result, it was not until the new year that Aetius prepared to meet the fresh challenges that awaited him. The first of these was that Theoderic, king of the Goths, ‘confounded the peace agreements and seized many towns in the vicinity of their settlements, attacking the city of Narbonne most of all’.40
At the same time, the Burgundians were again attacked by the Romans. Although the reference to a second war against the Burgundians by Hydatius is sometimes seen as a doublet, simply repeating the war of 435, the information given by Prosper confirms that this was a second war:41
At the same time Aetius crushed Gundichar, who was king of the Burgundians and living in Gaul. In response to his entreaty, Aetius gave him peace, which the king did not enjoy for long. For the Huns destroyed him and his people root and branch.
Prosper, rather than dating the conclusion of the war to 437, keeps the information under one entry, a relatively common occurrence in the chronicles.42 Yet information in Hydatius also suggests that the war was not begun by Aetius:43
The Burgundians, who had rebelled, were defeated by the Romans under the general Aetius.
Hydatius’ claim that the Burgundians had ‘rebelled’ may refer to the war of 435, but it is just as likely that he is noting that in 436 the Burgundians had rebelled against the recently signed treaty.44
The reason for the combined rebellion is unknown. Yet given the context it is possible, although unfortunately impossible to prove, that the reason for the renewal of war was Gothic and Burgundian discontent with the peace treaties of 426 and 435 respectively. Since Gundichar had ‘entreated’ Aetius for peace, it is almost certain that the treaty of 435 was to the detriment of the Burgundians, and so unhappiness may have continued to fester. Yet the fact that war again erupted so quickly is surprising, unless there was an external stimulus. The cause may have been an alliance in 436 between the Goths and the Burgundians, probably proposed by the Goths, instigated by their respective unhappiness with the extent of Roman domination. It is also feasible to conjecture that the Goths had been preparing for this war for a long time. It is feasible that the envoy to the Sueves named Vetto, who had in 431 travelled to Gallaecia, was attempting to enrol the Sueves in a general uprising of ‘barbarian nations’ within the Western Empire.45
It is also within the realms of possibility, although extremely uncertain, that it was in 436 that Theoderic arranged an alliance with the Vandals in Africa. This would ensure that no Vandal troops would be sent to Gaul to support the Romans against the Vandals and Burgundians. To cement the alliance Theoderic’s daughter, who is unfortunately not named, was married to Gaiseric’s son Huneric.46 Although the dating and true nature of this event is uncertain, and it may be dated to 431 alongside the similar attempt to enrol the Sueves by Vetto, it is at this date that the circumstances would best fit such an alliance.47
Although the rebellion may primarily have been caused by a desire to renegotiate the earlier treaty, a secondary cause may have been Theoderic’s attempts to establish himself as the dominant political leader in his new kingdom. In a later entry dated to 439, Prosper states that Vetericus was ‘considered loyal to our state and renowned for the frequent demonstration of his skill in war’.48 Vetericus is otherwise unknown, but was most likely a Gothic noble who had decided to take employment with Rome rather than serve under Theoderic. The reason for his choice, and his opposition to Theoderic, is unspecified, but may be the result of a disagreement with Theoderic’s policies. As a result Vetericus may have left the Gothic area and taken service with Rome as a result of his opposition to Theoderic. His desertion of Theoderic and his taking part in the war on the Roman side would explain his ‘loyalty’ to Rome. It may also be evidence that not all Gothic nobles were happy with Theoderic’s leadership and may have resented his attempts to force them to obey him.
The Gothic and Burgundian Rebellion
Possibly taking advantage of the fact that the Romans were distracted by events in Armorica, the new rebellion broke out.49 The two simultaneous rebellions forced Aetius on to the defensive. During 436 Litorius was completing the suppression of the Bacaudic revolt in Armorica, probably with the Gallic army, and it would appear that Aetius was using the praesental forces to simply contain the combined Gothic and Burgundian rebellion. Unwilling to face the Goths with his thinly stretched forces and so leave other areas open to attack by the Burgundians, Aetius was forced to remain inactive whilst the Goths moved into Roman territory and laid siege to Narbona (Narbonne).50 The rest of 436 was spent ensuring that the rebellion did not spread and that the Goths and Burgundians did not break out from their already-conquered areas to spread devastation around Gaul and possibly Italy.
Aetius and the Huns
However, Aetius was not idle. He could not afford to allow the Goths to become independent in any way, shape or form. If the Goths were allowed to break the treaty they had agreed with Rome, Rome would lose both the revenues that the Goths currently enjoyed as well as their military service. The loss of both money and service, along with the need to garrison permanently the suddenly unfriendly frontier with the Goths, would stretch the resources of the empire to breaking point.
Accordingly, Aetius dispatched at least one emissary in the hope of receiving hel
p in Gaul. For over a decade he had received support from the Huns whenever it was needed, especially in 424 and more recently in 433. Furthermore, analysis of the years between and after these events illustrates that the army of the West now had a large number of Huns fighting alongside the Roman army. However, rather than receiving small numbers of reinforcements, Aetius realized that a larger force was necessary. Although the dating is uncertain, it is very likely that it was in 436–437 that he formally ceded parts of Pannonia near to the River Save to the Huns.51
The formal cession of territory in Pannonia was not in reality actually giving away land ruled by Rome. Priscus does not say ‘the whole of Pannonia’ but ‘the part of Pannonia close to the River Save which became subject to the barbarian by the treaty with Aetius’: the treaty only alienated marginal lands along the borders to the Huns. In 427 Felix had led a campaign to evict the Huns from Pannonia, but it is clear that in the intervening period they had simply re-crossed the river to graze their herds again.52 By formally allocating lands they already controlled in reality to the Huns, Aetius was able to boost the political power of Rua. In response, Rua agreed to lead his main army against the Burgundians as soon as the weather allowed.
Although interpretations differ and many see the cession of Roman territory as ‘un-Roman’, it is clear that as de facto leader of the West Aetius was determined to maintain his personal ties with the Huns. They in turn responded by providing him with the foederati and other troops he needed to maintain himself in power. Furthermore, it is possible that Aetius was using the Hunnic foederati to offset the lack of new recruits being provided by the imperial court, and especially the Senate. It is feasible that Aetius was becoming increasingly reliant upon the Huns to help bolster his own rather precarious military position within the empire. Without their aid, the lack of recruits would severely limit his freedom of action. By accepting the reality of the Huns’ penetration of Pannonia, Aetius ensured that for a long time his armies in the West would continue to be supported by Hunnic allies.
437
The siege of Narbonne by the Goths continued over the winter of 436–437. Fortunately for Aetius, at the end of 436, or possibly early in 437, Litorius was finally able to capture Tibatto, leader of the bacaudae.53 With their main leader captured and their other leaders either captured or killed, the rebellion in northern Gaul collapsed.54 Litorius was at last free to move south.
Narbonne was by now in the last stages of the siege, since the inhabitants were starving. Marching through the Auvergne district, Litorius arrived unexpectedly outside Narbonne.55 Caught by surprise in their siege positions and unable to form a coherent battle line, the Goths were quickly routed.56 Fortunately for the inhabitants of Narbonne, every man in Litorius’ army had been ordered to carry two measures of wheat, which was now used to ease the problem of starvation in the city.57
However, Litorius’ limitations were also exposed during this campaign. On the march through the Auvergne some of the Huns in his army broke away and plundered the region until stopped by a force led by Eparchius Avitus,58 a Gallic senator of distinguished family who had become a favourite of the Gothic king Theoderic during the 420s.59 He had served in the army under Aetius during the campaigns against the Norici and Iuthungi in 430–431, after which Aetius may have promoted him to be magister militum per Gallias, although this is uncertain.60 He would appear to have been in control of forces stationed near to the Gothic siege lines at Narbonne, possibly in an attempt to restrict their ability to forage and so limit their capacity to maintain the siege indefinitely. He defeated the renegade Huns in a battle near Clermont before joining Litorius, probably shortly after the latter’s entry into Narbonne.61
It may appear surprising that Litorius did not halt his advance and turn to deal with the Huns, yet given the fact that the city of Narbonne had been under siege for a long time he may have thought that raising the siege was of more importance than losing the element of surprise. He decided not to waste time bringing the Huns back under control. Furthermore, he might have lost the advantage of surprise if he had turned to deal with the Huns and allowed news of his arrival to reach the Goths.
At roughly the same time as the siege of Narbonne was being raised, the Huns under Rua arrived in Gaul and attacked the Burgundians. The attack was devastating: according to Hydatius, 20,000 Burgundians were slaughtered, including the king.62 Although no doubt the numbers were exaggerated, the scale of the defeat is echoed by the Gallic Chronicler, who notes that ‘almost the entire people with their king were destroyed’.63 This historical event may be the origin of the Nibelungen cycle, upon which Wagner later based his epic Der Ring des Nibelungen.64
Spain and Northern Gaul
Yet it would appear that the confusion and war in southern Gaul had resulted in further attacks and rebellions. In Spain the Sueves resumed their attacks on the native inhabitants. Censurius and Fretimund, who is otherwise unknown, were sent as ambassadors, but this time it would appear that Aetius was unwilling to rely on politics alone.65 It is probably at this date that Aetius sent an unknown commander into Spain with orders to defeat the Sueves. Jordanes notes that Aetius had been successful, since by ‘inflicting crushing defeats he had compelled the proud Suevi and barbarous Franks to submit to Roman sway’.66 Furthermore, Merobaudes in his first surviving panegyric alludes to Aetius’ successes in Spain.67 It should be noted, however, that this campaign is otherwise unrecorded and of dubious dating.
The note in Jordanes also points to a further war, this time with the Franks. As is usual, the events described are extremely difficult to confirm or to date, yet it is known from Salvian that at some time prior to 440 the Franks had attacked Gaul and captured Cologne and Trier.68 It seems that another force had been sent by Aetius to face the Franks in the north and had defeated them. However, it is possible that due to the ongoing war with the Goths the campaign against the Franks was merely one of containment, and that the Franks were not actually evicted from Roman territory at this time, since the dating and context of this war are very difficult to establish.
Valentinian and Licinia Eudoxia
Aetius was not present during the campaigns against either the Goths or the Burgundians. Instead, he was involved in a series of major diplomatic coups with regard to the East. In 437 he travelled east to Constantinople with Valentinian for Valentinian’s marriage to Licinia Eudoxia, daughter of the Eastern Emperor Theodosius II, in October 437.69
The party arrived in Constantinople on 21 October 43770 and appears to have included Merobaudes and Sigisvult, who at this date may have been magister equitum, and so the most senior military figure behind Aetius, although the date of Sigisvult’s appointment is insecure.71 However, it is certain that he must have held an important position due to the events that then occurred.
The marriage took place on 29 October 437.72 In an attempt to ensure continuing good relations, to foster a sense of the continuing unity of the empire, but mainly in the spirit of sharing engendered by the marriage, as part of the marriage celebrations Theodosius made major political concessions to the West. In the spirit of goodwill and rejoicing, Aetius was granted his second consulship.73 At the same time, Sigisvult was made a consul.74 This was an exceptional occurrence, since it was traditional that one consul was nominated by the West and one by the East. The allocating of both consulships to the West was a major concession and is almost certainly connected with the marriage.75 It is also evidence that by 437 the regime of Valentinian and Aetius in the West was seen as being successful by the East, a concept that is reinforced by Socrates when he states that Valentinian had ‘made the western regions safe’.76 The achievements of Valentinian and Aetius were highly appreciated.
Furthermore, in a continuation on the theme of awarding ‘Eastern’ posts to the West, it is possible, but by no means certain, that at the same time Merobaudes was declared patricius by Theodosius, almost certainly on Aetius’ recommendation, although the post was in the East and was no doubt only honorar
y.77
Gaiseric
Yet amidst all of the rejoicing and happiness, the first signs of a coming catastrophe were appearing in the West. In 437 Gaiseric, King of the Vandals, began to persecute the Catholic priests in his dominions in Africa.78 Despite the Catholic sources’ dismay at such actions, it is almost certain that other Christians in Africa would have found the treatment of the Catholic Christians ironic, since it was only twelve years previously, in 425, that a persecution of non-Catholic Christians in Africa and an empire-wide ban on non-Catholics in cities had been ordered by Valentinian.79
Nor was this the only sign of the storm to come: ‘In the same year barbarian deserters of the federates took to piracy.’80 Although the meaning was no doubt obvious to contemporaries, this is now a very cryptic entry, which could mean many things. However, given the context and with the benefit of hindsight, the entry almost certainly refers to the Vandals. Gaiseric, having learned of the revolt in Gaul, and possibly having arranged a marriage alliance with the Goths, was intent on expanding the boundaries of his proto-kingdom, or at least of enriching himself in order to pay his comitatus. It is likely that he ordered members of the Vandal aristocracy to begin raiding the West using the ships already used for the crossing to Africa, hence the reference to ‘deserters’ and ‘piracy’. The move would allow his kingdom to gain in wealth, but at the same time if necessary he would be able to deny involvement to the Roman government, declaring that these ‘pirates’ were ‘deserters’. He could also claim to his Gothic allies that he was doing something to help the war effort. Using these methods Gaiseric could benefit from the raids, test the readiness of the West to punish further aggressive action, avoid responsibility for the attacks if the West proved too strong, and show faith with his allies.
