Aetius Attila’s Nemesis

by Ian Hughes

It may also have been at about this time that news arrived in Orleans that the Huns had invaded. Anianus, the bishop of the city, realized that Orleans would be a target for the Huns, since it was the last major city denying them access to the Goths in Aquitania. Anianus therefore travelled to Arles to meet Aetius and request aid for the city.57 With Aetius’ assurances that he was now advancing to join with the Goths and face Attila in battle, Anianus left Arles and returned home.

  Although Attila was roaming Gaul unhindered, there was one major factor that was to prove to be his undoing. Aetius had the advantage of interior lines of supply, as well as the logistical support of the Western Empire. Early in the year Aetius had ordered Ferreolus, the praefectus praetorio Galliarum (Praetorian Prefect of Gaul), to organize the collection of supplies and equipment at pre-designated locations.58 With supplies assured, the allies (with the exception of the Goths) joined forces, almost certainly at Arles. This is the most logical place for them to collect, since the Huns were threatening locations in the north or east of Gaul, and it is almost certain that Aetius had ordered that supplies be collected at the city ready for the upcoming campaign. The move would also allow the Goths and Burgundians to be supplied by the imperial government: as they gathered and began the march to confront the Huns, Ferreolus’ logistical abilities kept the Romans and their allies supplied with the necessities needed for the campaign.59

  In direct contrast, Attila’s coalition was forced to rely on plundering the local areas for supplies. Although a viable means of support, they did not have large reserves of supplies and so could not afford to either be blockaded or to have their lines of retreat cut off. Any such occurrence would result in the army quickly being reduced to starvation and of having to surrender to Aetius. Attila could not afford to be surrounded.

  The Siege of Orleans

  Eventually, Anianus’ fears came to be realized. Even as Aetius travelled to Toulouse to join with Theoderic, Attila’s forces arrived at Orleans and began to lay siege to the city.60 Deploying battering rams and doubtless other siege-engines, Attila’s men began their assault.61 There are two different accounts of the siege, and by combining them it is possible to gain a clearer view of the event. The city was under heavy siege and the Huns were preparing their forces when ‘four days’ storm of rain’ hampered their attempts to take the city.62 However, after the rain had cleared, on 14 June they launched an attack that breached the walls and they prepared to take the city.63 At this moment, the armies of the West arrived.64 With his forces dispersed and doubtless concerned about his supplies and line of retreat, Attila immediately called off the attack and retreated from the city.65

  Although the story has undoubtedly been embellished by the ancient chroniclers, and the end of the siege dramatically embellished to enhance the story, it is clear that the siege of Orleans was a close-run thing. It is only thanks to the speedy arrival of the allies that the Huns were stopped from entering and plundering the city. Moreover, Hunnic success would have left the route into the Gothic heartlands open. With the Huns at large in his own territories it is uncertain whether Theoderic would have remained loyal to Aetius or changed sides and joined Attila in order to spare his people from attack. Whatever the case, the siege of Orleans proved to be the high point of Attila’s attack on the West. Unwilling to chance being cut off from his way home and blockaded, Attila retreated towards the Rhine with the allies in hot pursuit.

  The Pursuit

  Having been forced to raise the siege, Attila retired in front of the Romans and their allies. The direction his forces took implies that he was aiming to retreat from Gaul, or at least outdistance the pursuit in order to reform and prepare a fresh plan for the campaign. Unfortunately for Attila, this was not to be. Five days after the end of the siege Attila arrived at Troyes. The city was unprotected and could be easily taken and sacked by the Huns. It is claimed in the Acta Sanctorum that it was only the saintly actions of Lupus, the Bishop of Troyes, who pleaded with Attila to spare the city that it was saved from destruction. However, although Lupus probably met Attila outside the city, it was not the bishop’s pleas that saved Troyes. Attila would have been more intent on the actions of the pursuing allies than on Troyes’ plight. Although Troyes was undefended and easy to attack, the allies were in close pursuit, and Attila could not spare the time for sacking the city, which would have resulted in large numbers of his men losing discipline and no doubt getting drunk. The loss of time in reordering his forces after the sack might have been a worry, but even more was the prospect of his disorganized and dispersed forces being attacked by the Romans and their allies as the Huns sacked the town.66

  Yet there was one other factor. Troyes was on the River Seine. As Attila’s forces gathered on the nearby plains known as the Campus Mauriacus and awaited the daybreak, Attila himself was no doubt aware that there was little chance of him escaping with his troops unhindered across the river.67 Furthermore, he needed to safeguard the plunder he had already taken. Leaving the spoils behind would have demoralised his men and damaged his prestige. He could afford neither.

  Crossing the river by bridge would take a very long time, and there was a good chance of his forces being attacked by the pursuing allies. Attila decided that this was the place where he was going to stand and face them. Possibly the allied force outnumbered the Huns slightly, as Attila, who had shown himself perfectly happy to take aggressive action in the past, acted very defensively as soon as the combined Roman–Visigoth army came close.

  * The events in this reconstruction, especially those relating to 450, are based upon the primary sources. However, readers should be aware that the majority of these sources are undated, and so open to different interpretations. Furthermore, the accuracy of some of the sources, especially Jordanes, is open to question. For more details, see the Introduction.

  Chapter 14

  The Battle of the Catalaunian Plains

  In the afternoon of 19 June 451 Aetius’ forces finally caught sight of the Hunnic army. For an unknown reason his Frankish allies clashed with the Gepids before darkness fell. In a brief but savage engagement neither side could gain the advantage and the onset of night brought the fighting to a halt. Although Jordanes claims that 15,000 men died in this encounter, it is certain that these figures are vastly inflated.1 However, the clash was proof to Attila that on the following day Aetius would not balk from fighting a set-piece battle.

  On the morning of 20 June 451 the two armies prepared for battle.2 Its location is unknown, although many suggestions have been proposed. The difficulty lies in the vague terms used by the sources. Jordanes, Hydatius and the Chronica Caesaraugusta note that the battle was fought on the ‘Catalaunian Plains’.3 However, the Gallic Chronicler of 511 locates it on the Mauriac Plain, which is echoed by the Consularia Italica, Gregory of Tours and the Lex Burgundionum.4 Theophanes writes simply that Attila was defeated at the River Lygis (Loire).5 On the other hand, the claim by Malalas that Attila was defeated on the River Danube is certainly mistaken.6 Nothing has yet been proved decisively.7

  Soothsayers

  According to Jordanes, Attila was in doubt as to the outcome of the battle, so decided to ‘inquire into the future through soothsayers. These men examined the entrails and bones of cattle and foretold disaster for the Huns.’8 However, they also announced that the leader of the enemy would fall, and Attila took this to mean that Aetius would be killed. Although it is likely that Attila sought the advice of soothsayers, as this was a common feature of non-Christian societies because forecasting the future could often influence the morale of the army, the detail given is of doubtful accuracy. Instead, its inclusion in the text may be Jordanes’ method of emphasising Attila’s barbarity, since he took part in a pagan ritual that was no longer relevant to the Christian Romans. Unfortunately, without corroborating evidence, it is unlikely whether the truth will ever be known.

  The Deployment

  The only detailed description we have of the battle is that given by Jordanes.9 Al
though in most cases Jordanes needs to be used with care, the fact that this is the only description of the battle forces reliance on his account, yet the end result can be confusing.

  For example, the traditional account followed by most modern historians has the Visigoths attacking a hill on the right flank and dominating the battle from there.10 This is mirrored in other writers and has become accepted. Its origins are unclear, but the following extract may give a clue as to its source. It is a translation of Jordanes:

  Now this was the configuration of the field of battle. It rose [on one side] [sic] into a decided undulation which might be called a hill.

  Hodgkin, 1892, Vol. 2, 127

  The fact that the phrase ‘on one side’ has been added leads to the conclusion that all of the modern interpretations of the battlefield are based upon this addendum, although the author does not state his source and so it cannot be traced further back. However, both the original Latin and the translation of Jordanes’ account do not support this reconstruction, so is worth quoting:

  Convenere partes, ut diximus, in campos Catalaunicos. Erat autem positio loci declivi tumore in editum collis excrescens. Quem uterque cupiens exercitus obtinere, quia loci oportunitas non parvum benificium confert, dextram partem Hunni cum suis, sinistram Romani et Vesegothae cum auxiliariis occuparunt, relictoque de cacumine eius iugo certamen ineunt.

  Jordanes, Getica, 39 (196–197)

  The armies met, as we have said, in the Catalaunian Plains. The battle field was a plain rising by a sharp slope to a ridge, which both armies sought to gain; for advantage of position is a great help. The Huns with their forces seized the right side, the Romans, the Visigoths and their allies the left, and then began a struggle for the yet untaken crest.

  Translation CC Mierow

  Therefore, discounting the earlier interpretations, the battlefield appears to have been a plain dominated by a ridge across its centre, not by a hill, although the ridge was higher in some places than others (see Plate 30). Having reached this conclusion, the rest of the passage from Jordanes is easier to interpret, although there are still one or two points that are uncertain.

  As already noted, Jordanes claims that the Huns ‘seized the right side, the Romans, the Visigoths and their allies the left’. If Jordanes’ use of ‘right’ and ‘left’ refers to ‘east’ and ‘west’ respectively, which is a simple conclusion from both his phrasing and from the allies’ line of advance, the Huns were on the east of the plain and the allies on the west, with the ridge crossing the battlefield near the centre. Yet this sentence gives us evidence that Jordanes’ account needs to be treated with caution. The Huns are the enemy, and the appearance of other tribes as their allies – especially the Ostrogoths – is unwelcome to Jordanes. In direct contrast, Jordanes focuses on the Visigoths almost to the exclusion of the Romans. This demonstrates Jordanes’ bias: the work is a history of the Goths, both branches, and so the appearance of the Ostrogoths on the side of Attila is downplayed and that of the Visigoths overplayed in order to boost their status. This needs to be borne in mind throughout the analysis of the battle.

  Catalaunian Plain 1 Deployment

  Attila arrayed his forces with himself and his Huns in the centre. The Ostrogoths, and possibly some of the minor allies, were placed on Attila’s left wing specifically to face the Visigoths, as Attila had faith in their king Valamir and his brothers Thiudimer and Vidimer. The Gepids, and possibly some other allied troops, appear to have been on the right wing under the Gepid king Ardaric.

  The tactics of Attila appear to have been remarkably simple and based on the assumption that Aetius would adopt the traditional Roman deployment of cavalry on the flanks and infantry in the centre. In this scenario, Attila’s whole army was to advance to the top of the hill, and then the two flanks, under his most trusted subordinates, would charge at the enemy cavalry whilst the Huns used their traditional tactics to pin the enemy infantry in the centre and cause as much confusion as possible with a hail of missiles. At the point where one or both flanks of the alliance broke, the Huns would then be in a position to put pressure on the remaining enemy, and possibly be able to follow the retreating Romans and so turn the flanks of the centre. The enemy would then collapse, leaving the Huns to pursue, a tactic at which they excelled.

  Unfortunately for Attila, Aetius was not a typical Roman general. The western allies deployed with the Visigoths taking the right wing, with Theoderic in charge of the extreme right and Thorismund in charge of the troops next to the centre. Aetius and the majority of his Roman and other allied troops took the left wing. Sambida and the Alans were in the centre, possibly with a stiffening of Roman troops. Jordanes claims that the Alans were placed in the centre, ‘thus contriving with military caution to surround by a host of faithful troops the man in whose loyalty they had little confidence. For one who has difficulties placed in the way of his flight readily submits to the necessity of fighting.’11

  Although this interpretation is usually accepted at face value, in reality it has little to recommend it.12 The major difficulty is that the Alans were not surrounded. Once battle began, the troops on either side of the Alans would be more concerned with the opposition, as would any troops stationed to support the Alans. On the contrary, the deployment suggests that Aetius was unworried, as otherwise by placing the Alans in the centre Aetius was taking a great risk. Should they rout, the Roman lines would be divided and each sector easily dealt with piecemeal. As will be seen, Aetius’ trust was vindicated. Rather than a realistic attempt to evaluate the truth, Jordanes was almost certainly attempting to minimize the role of the Alans and contrast it to that of the Visigoths, the main object of his writing.

  The question then remains concerning Aetius’ use of the Alans. It is often forgotten at this point that Aetius was a man with a deep knowledge of Hunnic strategy and tactics due to his time amongst them as a hostage and his continuing employment of them as foederati and bucellarii. Although speculation, the chances are that he foresaw that the Huns would deploy using a standard formation, especially since they were being assisted by large numbers of subject troops and this would help to avoid confusion. If this is the case, then Aetius must have predicted the deployment and placed the Alans in the centre for a purpose.

  It is likely that Aetius was using his knowledge of the Huns against them. Knowing that they would deploy their own forces, comprised mainly of horse archers, in the centre, Aetius deployed the Alans – whose troops used roughly the same tactics – to face them. Rather than being faced by a solid block of relatively immobile infantry in the centre, Attila found himself faced by the mobile and highly skilled Alans. Furthermore, these men had been fighting alongside the Romans for many years and knew how to fight effectively as their allies. Unable to use the Huns’ standard hit-and-run tactics in the centre, Aetius will have hoped that Attila would be confused about which course to take. This would give him time to destroy Attila’s flanks.

  With this in mind, Aetius’ deployment makes complete sense. He hoped that the Alans would be able to at least hold the Huns in the centre, if not beat them to the crest of the hill. However, the two strongest divisions were on the flanks, and there can be little doubt that he was intending for these troops to deliver the fatal blow to the Huns and their allies.

  There is one other, highly debatable, possibility to be borne in mind. Aetius, like all educated Romans of his day, would have been taught by use of the classics. Amongst these were the works of Polybius and Livy. It is not impossible that Aetius, aware of the Huns’ probable deployment, had decided to emulate two of the great generals of the past: Hannibal, one of the great enemies of Rome, and Scipio Africanus, Hannibal’s opponent. In 216 BC at the Battle of Cannae Hannibal had turned the flanks of the Roman army and surrounded them.13 At the Battle of Ilipa in 206 BC Scipio Africanus had outmanoeuvred a Carthaginian army before attacking its flanks and routing its centre.14 By destroying Attila’s flanks and surrounding his centre, the Visigoths on the right and t
he Romans on the left could possibly advance to the vicinity of the Hunnic camp, so copying the earlier strategies. Additionally, the tactic would trap the Huns and so negate their greatest advantage: their mobility. This is speculation of the highest order, but it is often forgotten that the classic works that still survive were copied because they were popular and people read them. This is as true of late antiquity as it is today. Although the concept that the Romans of the late empire would utilize the tactics of a bygone era remains conjecture, and is not usually considered by modern historians, it must remain a possibility.

  With a ridge between them, both Aetius and Attila would have known the tactical advantage of possession of the crest. With this in mind, it is surprising that the battle began ‘about the ninth hour of the day’ (early to mid afternoon). The late start is allegedly due to the fact that Attila was scared by the omens and decided to wait: if the battle should prove to be a disaster, in this way darkness would cover the retreat of the Huns and allow many of them to escape.15

  This does not, however, explain why Aetius did not make the first move. The likelihood is that both generals realized that a pre-emptive attempt to attack without a proper deployment could lead to disaster. Both sides had troops capable of making fast attacks on isolated and unsupported formations. Therefore, a combined assault would be necessary to win the battle.

  Furthermore, any aggressive move by small groups could easily lead to confusion amongst their own armies. Both armies were comprised of large numbers of troops with little experience of working together and without a common language. Deployment would take a long time. In addition, there were troops on opposite sides who spoke the same language, so care and accuracy of deployment would avoid the risk of troops attacking their own allies. As a result, both generals chose to slowly deploy their troops ready for battle. The deployment was crucial: thanks to language difficulties and the lack of joint training, both sides would find changes difficult to make.