Aetius Attila’s Nemesis

by Ian Hughes

  Chapter 15

  Attila’s Invasion of Italy

  In late summer or early autumn Attila returned home to find that contrary to expectations the East had been fighting ‘vigorously against the Huns in the Balkans’.1 However, his grievances against the East were small compared with his need to restore his aura of invincibility. Over the winter months between 451 and 452 Attila spent his time consolidating his position at home and preparing for a return to the fray. He will have been heartened by the news that the western allies had gone their separate ways and may have known that there was – or appears to have been – little contact between the victors. He began to look at the options for the new year.

  In Gaul, Thorismund began the process of cementing his rule. However, in one respect at least he appears to have been dissatisfied. His father had been killed fighting as an ally of the Romans and he himself had been close to death. Yet there is no record of any agreements between Aetius and Thorismund, either extending Thorismund’s dominions in Gaul or rewarding him with an imperial position. It is likely, though improvable, that Thorismund was offended by the apparent lack of gratitude of the emperor. Like Attila, he began to make his plans for the new year, his aim being to establish himself as his father’s heir despite having several brothers as rivals. He may also have started to look at ways to put pressure on Aetius for the rewards he felt he deserved. In the north, the new Frankish king settled down to rule, and the survivors of the contingent from Armorica no doubt returned home confident that their part in the victory would be acknowledged by the empire.

  Back in Italy it was finally accepted that most of the landowners dispossessed by the Vandals’ conquest of Africa were not going to be allowed by Gaiseric to return and regain all of their lands. As a result, Valentinian arranged for them to be leased lands in Sitifensis and Caesariensis (see Map 12) as compensation, with full inheritance rights.2

  Whilst these measures were being implemented Aetius would have been focusing on the recruitment and training of recruits to replace the losses in the battle. This may not have been as difficult as in previous years: the Battle of the Catalaunian Plains was the first recorded major defeat of the Huns and it is certain that Aetius’ reputation as a general and a leader of men now reached new heights. The glory of winning such an unexpected victory, coupled with the large amount of booty taken from the field of battle, probably resulted in there being a small increase in the number of volunteers for the army. With the Goths and the Franks as allies and with Attila running home defeated, Aetius will have felt a certain sense of security when looking forward to the new year. He may even have begun making plans for limited reconquests of ‘lost’ areas, hoping in this way to begin the process of restoring the empire’s financial ability to survive.

  452

  Militarily, all seemed well as the campaign season of 452 began. There was no sign of a Hunnic backlash against the defeat and affairs in Gaul appeared to have settled. The Vandals in Africa remained peaceful and were adhering to the treaty of 442. Overall, Aetius will have been pleased with his position. However, domestically there remained the problem of famine in Italy. No doubt Aetius used alternative resources for grain, such as Gaul, Sicily and the merchants of the East, much as he had done following the fall of Africa in 439, which may have helped to alleviate the problem. However it is unlikely that these temporary measures were a solution, especially since conditions in Gaul and Sicily may not have been ideal either. His priority at the time was the provisioning of Rome, since if the inhabitants of Rome rebelled due to famine he and Valentinian would be put under extreme pressure by the population.3

  The Invasion of Italy

  Unfortunately for Aetius, Attila was determined to avenge his defeat and regain his aura of invincibility.4 The fact that he had been defeated could easily lead to internal unrest in the Hunnic empire. Furthermore, there was also the possibility that the victorious Aetius in the West and the new regime of Marcian in the East would cooperate militarily to oppose him. Yet in one respect, Attila had a great advantage: he realized that the alliance between Aetius and Thorismund had been forged only thanks to his own invasion of Gaul. Intelligence from the West, possibly from Franks unhappy with their new young king, may have informed Attila of how close the Goths had been to remaining neutral during his invasion of Gaul. Attila correctly assumed that if he attacked Italy the Goths would not join in the defence and so he would only have to face the forces of Aetius.5 Yet it took Attila a long time to gather his troops together ready for another invasion of the West. This was doubtless in part due to the losses he had suffered in Gaul, a hypothesis reinforced by the fact that, for this second invasion, he did not leave troops behind to pin down the forces of the East.6

  In the early summer of 452 Attila invaded Italy.7 His course took him through Illyricum and across the Julian Alps into the north-east corner.8 In the previous year Aetius had been expecting Attila to invade Italy, yet Prosper claims that this invasion was a ‘complete surprise’.9 This has usually been accepted, but analysis has disputed the claim.10 The main reason why the claim has been accepted is the statement that Aetius ‘failed to make use of the barriers of the Alps’.11 In some ways this makes sense militarily – a determined defence of the passes at the mountains would have caused Attila serious losses and may have caused him to turn back. Yet the impression is actually false. Although applicable to high mountain ranges, the theory does not apply to the Julian Alps, which are lower and easier to traverse than their northern counterparts.12 In the past, attempts to defend these passes had ended in defeat, especially as the defences that were in place, the Claustra Alpium Juliarum (Fortifications of the Julian Alps), were lightly held and mainly intended to halt barbarian raids that had penetrated into Illyricum from the east.13 Knowing that in the height of summer the mounted and fast-moving Huns would easily outflank his positions, Aetius probably decided not to attempt a forward defence, but rather to retreat and call on reinforcements from the west. In the meantime he probably reinforced the garrison of Aquileia, which would be the first city reached by the Huns.

  Map 15. Attila’s Invasion of Italy

  Towards the end of June Attila did indeed reach Aquileia. Over fifty years earlier, in 401, the Gothic leader Alaric had invaded Italy and, having no knowledge of siege warfare and believing that Aquileia was too strong to attack, had simply bypassed the city.14 In contrast, Attila had the ability to capture cities and he appears to have thought it unwise to bypass Aquileia, possibly since the garrison would be in a position to threaten his lines of communication, his rear and to block his return home. In contrast, Alaric had had no desire to return to Illyricum. Attila immediately began a siege using a variety of siege engines.15 Attila will have hoped for a quick siege, much as had happened to many cities in Gaul the previous year.16 If so, he was to be disappointed: ‘He pressed the siege there long and hard . . . from within the bravest of Roman soldiers withstood him.’17 Attila’s need for a very fast campaign was thwarted by the defenders of Aquileia. Instead, in the middle of a famine in Italy he found himself besieging the city for three months.18 Eventually, his army began to lose heart and think of home, but Attila noticed that the storks that nested in the city were carrying their young away.19 Seeing this as an omen, he ordered his troops to renew the assault, and either in late August or early September the city fell to the Huns. In anger at its resistance, Attila and his troops savagely plundered it, although Jordanes’ claims that no trace of the city was left are false.20

  Despite the fact that Attila was in the north east of Italy, Aetius continued to address the problems of famine, issuing an edict to ensure the arrival of animals in Rome to feed the population.21 However once the scale of Attila’s invasion became known, Prosper claims that Aetius ‘believed his only hope lay in a full retreat from Italy’, but that a ‘sense of shame’ stopped this proposal.22 Prosper does not state where Aetius would have retreated to, and, indeed, there were very few places left in the West where the Roman em
peror would be safe. The only possibility is that Aetius was intending to take Valentinian to Constantinople and there to seek the support of the Eastern Emperor Marcian to provide an expedition to retake Italy.

  Although Prosper’s claim is usually dismissed or ignored, given later events, it is clear that Aetius was in contact with Marcian, and the episode would make sense if Aetius was convinced that he would be unable to face Attila in battle without external help. Consequently, it is possible to suggest that Aetius did in fact send messengers to Marcian asking for help and mooting the possibility of exile for himself and Valentinian should Attila overrun Italy. Fortunately for Aetius, Marcian agreed to send help as soon as he could.23 Even more fortunately, the defenders of Aquileia gave Aetius the breathing space he needed to organize his forces.

  Whilst Aetius was negotiating with the East, which given the distances involved probably took up to at least two months, Attila successfully stormed Aquileia and then led his forces deeper into Italy. Advancing further into Venetia and Liguria, he besieged and sacked Mediolanum (Milan) and Ticinum (Pavia).24 According to Paul the Deacon, at the same time – the actual chronology is unknown – Attila also sacked Concordia, Altinum (Altino) and Patavium (Padua). Paul goes on to say that the Huns in addition attacked Vicetia (Vicenza), Verona, Brixia (Brescia) and Pergamum (Bergamo?).25 It is unclear whether these cities were actually sacked, since Paul’s phrasing is somewhat ambivalent. However, it is possible to conclude from the wording that Concordia, Altinum and Patavium were sacked, and that the territories of Vicetia, Verona, Brixia and Pergamum were ravaged, although the cities themselves remained untouched.

  In Milan it is claimed by Priscus that Attila saw a painting of the Roman emperors on golden thrones with ‘Scythians lying dead before their feet’, over which he ordered a painter to paint ‘Attila upon a throne and the Roman emperors heaving sacks upon their shoulders and pouring out gold before his feet’.26 Although the origin of the story is unknown, it is possibly true, as it would accord with what we assume of the temperament of Attila from the sources.

  It is unknown at this time what Aetius was doing or where he had positioned the Roman forces. As he was awaiting reinforcements from the East, it is possible that he was in one of the ports on the eastern coast of Italy. If this is the case, it was almost certainly Ravenna.

  The other options were that Aetius, recognizing that he could not defend the valley of the River Po against the mobile Huns, resolved to defend Rome, especially as the ongoing famine would have made supplying a large army difficult. He may also have hoped that the Huns would be demoralized by a long siege of Aquileia and withdraw.27 As a final note, it was traditional Roman tactics to attack large enemy forces within the empire when the barbarians were on the way home laden with loot and so more likely to fight.

  If any of these scenarios are applicable, then it is possible that Aetius positioned his forces in Bononia (Bologna). This not only covered the major routes to the south of Italy – it also covered the crossing of the Apennines, via the Via Flaminia Minor leading directly to Rome. If Attila decided to attack Ravenna, Aetius would also be in a position to fall on his unprotected rear. In this way, Aetius could ensure that Attila’s activities were confined to the north of Italy. Furthermore, if the Huns began to retreat, he was in a good position to harass them as they left Italy.

  However, Attila and his men were not having everything their own way: ‘The Huns . . . were victims of divine punishment, being visited with heaven-sent disasters: famine and some kind of disease.’28 Attila had made the mistake of invading Italy when the region was suffering from a failure of the harvest. Outside the walls of Aquileia his men had been suffering the effects of the siege, mainly hunger due to a shortage of provisions and probable a disease, such as dysentery, which affected armies that were stationary for too long a time.29 Attila’s strategy had no doubt been aimed at a very quick campaign, as had happened in Gaul: he had not organized the ‘substantial logistic support’ needed to supply the army during what, in the event, turned out to be a series of sieges.30

  Passing into the valley of the River Po did not help in any significant way. Although provisions for the horses would have been easier to secure, with the inhabitants having little food of their own the Huns were unable to secure provisions without sacking cities and looting the imperial granaries. After they had penetrated as far as Ticinum, Attila faced a dilemma. At this point the lack of supplies was probably being very keenly felt. The only options were to either return home or attempt to cross the northern Apennines and so march down the Via Aurelia to Rome. According to Priscus, Attila’s followers pointed to the fate of Alaric after he had sacked the ‘Eternal City’ in 410, fearing that Attila, like Alaric, would die if he sacked Rome.31 Although Attila was probably superstitious, if he had wanted to he could easily have ignored this advice. However, things were not that simple. The Huns were suffering from hunger and sickness. Furthermore, it is probably at around this time when news arrived that Marcian had sent forces out of Illyricum to attack the practically defenceless homes of the Huns.32

  Aetius and Aetius

  At about the same time Aetius himself had received reinforcements from the East. Unfortunately, there is confusion around the source of this information. Hydatius writes that:

  The Huns ... were victims of divine punishment, being visited with heaven-sent disasters: famine and some kind of disease. In addition, they were slaughtered by auxiliaries sent by the emperor Marcian and led by Aetius, and at the same time they were crushed in their settlements by both heaven-sent disasters and the army of Marcian.

  Hyd. s.a. 452–453

  The wording of this statement could have been clearer. What makes it harder to interpret is the fact that by 452 there was a second Flavius Aetius, this time a general in the East. Some historians have conflated the two Aetiuses, seeing them as a single individual.33 However, it is clear that there were two men: the Eastern Aetius was Praetorian Prefect of the east in 425 when the Western Aetius was in Gaul.34 Furthermore, the Eastern Aetius was present at the sixth session of the Council of Chalcedon on 25 October 451 when the Western Aetius was still dealing with the fallout of Attila’s invasion of Gaul.35 The Eastern Aetius was clearly the East’s nominee for Consul in 454, possibly as a reward for his campaigns against the Huns in the previous two years. Finally, there are two inscriptions referring to Aetius in Syria, one dating to after the death of the Western Aetius.36

  The reason for the confusion, other than the identical name of the two generals, is Hydatius’ account. Hydatius lived in Spain and his information coming from the East would have been late and confusing to him. He knew that Aetius, the western patricius, had received reinforcements from the East. He was also told that Aetius had led troops into the Hunnic homelands. Due to the mixed-up nature of the tale, and uncertain that the two men were separate individuals, it is likely that Hydatius’ wording was ambiguous in order to cover his own confusion.

  As a result of these deliberations, it is possible to propose that Marcian sent two armies out of the East. The first was a smaller force that was sent to reinforce Aetius in Italy. With these Aetius put pressure on the Huns as they retired across northern Italy. The second force was led by the Eastern general Aetius and invaded the homeland of the Huns in an attempt to weaken them and also to force them to leave Italy to defend their homes.37 If this interpretation is accepted, it allows for an easier reading of the passage and also a clearer interpretation of events, especially with regard to Attila’s decision to leave Italy without fighting Aetius.

  With the news that Aetius had been reinforced from the East, Attila was certain that his chances of negotiating with the emperor were over. He began the withdrawal from Italy, which was very slow due to the number of wagons carrying the booty and the large number of captives being forced to march away from their homes. In the meantime, once the reinforcements arrived, Aetius was in a position to put further pressure on the Huns to leave. As they re-crossed north
ern Italy towards the east Aetius and his men were able to harass their rear, destroy any stragglers that were lagging behind and attack any foraging parties sent out from the main host.

  Pope Leo

  When Attila and his men reached the territory of Ambuleium in Venetia and were crossing the River Mincius, a tributary of the River Po, envoys arrived from Valentinian.38 The nature and result of this embassy has been the subject of controversy ever since.

  The story begins with Prosper, who is supported by Victor Tonnensis, the Chronicle of Cassiodorus and Priscus.39 Accompanied by Trygetius, Vir Praefectorius – the same man who had negotiated the treaty with the Vandals in 435 – and Avienus, who had been consul in 450, Leo met Attila:

  The king received the whole delegation courteously, and he was so flattered by the presence of the highest priest that he ordered his men to stop the hostilities and, promising peace, retired beyond the Danube.

  Prosper, s.a. 452, tr. Maenchen-Helfen

  During the course of the Middle Ages this story was magnified until now it is almost totally altered. For example:

  When Attila marched on Rome, Leo went out to meet him and pleaded for him to leave. As Leo spoke, Attila saw the vision of a man in priestly robes, carrying a bare sword, and threatening to kill the invader if he did not obey Leo; Attila left. As Leo had a great devotion to Saint Peter the Apostle, it is generally believed the first pope was the visionary opponent to the Huns. When Genseric [sic] invaded Rome, Leo’s sanctity and eloquence saved the city again.

  http://saints.sqpn.com/pope-saint-leo-the-great/August 2010