The Sieges of Alexander the Great

by Stephen English

  Curtius’ narrative is replete with rhetoric and anecdotal material, as with the other vulgate sources. Curtius does, however, present us with valuable topographical information that is so often missing from Arrian, such as the width of the Hydaspes River, the islands in the river, the island upon which Alexander mistakenly landed, the slippery ground after the rains and the plain where the final battle occurred.12 Curtius tends to pay little attention to tactical movements, and more to individual aristeia (courage, bravery etc.), and is therefore of lesser use in a tactical study than Arrian, but still can not be ignored.

  Curtius is not primarily interested in the characters of the various protagonists in the way that Plutarch is, but on occasion his narrative does tend in this direction (too much for our purposes at least). At Gaugamela, for example, Curtius’ objective is to highlight the activities of the principal characters, Alexander, Darius and Parmenio, the latter of whom he accuses of gross dereliction of duty, and not to provide a coherent narrative of events. His account of this particular battle is, therefore, problematic to say the least.

  All of our sources like to present Alexander as the Homeric hero, but perhaps Curtius is more guilty of it than others. The story found in Curtius (although interestingly not Arrian) of Batis being dragged around the circuit of the city behind Alexander’s chariot is an intriguing one.13 The Homeric story presents Achilles dragging Hector’s corpse behind his chariot, but here Batis is still alive.

  Curtius does, occasionally, give us a useful insight into Alexander’s thinking by means of a discussion of character. During the siege of Tyre, for example, Curtius presents us with a picture of a depressed Alexander, a man undecided whether to continue with the siege, or to abandon it; his decision to stay, coming only with the arrival of the Cypriot fleet.14 This is almost certainly another instance of Curtius misunderstanding his sources. It is likely that Alexander considered leaving to campaign elsewhere as he did at Halicarnassus, but not that he considered abandoning the siege altogether as Curtius suggests.

  Arrian is usually the source that looks to remove or reduce blame from Alexander in the event of things not going according to plan, but on occasion Curtius is just as apologetic. During the siege of Tyre, for example, Curtius places the expedition against the Arabs before the assault by the fire ship. This seems an obvious device to remove any blame from Alexander by having him away from the siege on expedition in the Lebanese Mountains at the time of this disastrous counter-attack by the Tyrians, only to have him return, restore order and redouble efforts to construct the mole, this time with proper defences in place.

  The general picture presented here of Arrian providing technical details, whilst the vulgate focuses on personalities, is far from universally true. At Tyre, for example, Arrian’s account lacks depth and tends to focus on personalities rather than technical detail, and although it does provide us with a reasonable chronology of events, the account is brief and much must have been missed or omitted; that is to say nothing of evident errors discussed earlier. Curtius’ account on the other hand is shorter, but contains a greater amount of technical information. On this occasion, Curtius’ source is evidently the superior one, probably Cleitarchus. Curtius’ narrative shows enough similarities with Arrian and Diodorus for us to conclude that Cleitarchus was not Curtius’ only source. Much of the technical detail in Curtius’ narrative must have been provided by a technically proficient eye witness.

  Elsewhere in his work, Curtius cites three sources: Cleitarchus, Timagenes and Ptolemy.15 Neither Cleitarchus nor Timagenes are likely to have been the primary source for any battle narrative (although Cleitarchus can probably be considered to be Curtius’ primary source overall), and an examination of commonalities with Arrian, who is undoubtedly based upon Ptolemy, shows that he was not Curtius’ main source either; although there are enough commonalities to suggest that he did indeed have access to Ptolemy’s account. Curtius’ attitude towards Parmenio provides us with some clues as to his main source; in places he follows a tradition that is favourable towards Parmenio, whilst being hostile towards Menidas, who was heavily implicated in Parmenio’s murder, although there is undoubted criticism of Parmenio also.16

  Curtius’ picture of Alexander himself is also rather different from that which would have been found in Callisthenes. Alexander is depicted as gnashing his teeth in frustration and rage at the escape of Darius, but Curtius perhaps goes too far in describing Alexander as indecisive and prone to panic. This presentation of Alexander tallies nicely with the often-positive picture presented of Parmenio, as noted above. Curtius links his occasionally-negative picture of Alexander with an improbable description of the whole Macedonian army as also being prone to panic.

  Plutarch

  Plutarch was a famous biographer who wrote a series of parallel ‘lives’ of famous Greeks and Romans, every Greek being paired with a Roman counterpart; Alexander being paired with Julius Caesar. All of Plutarch’s lives survive, bar two: Epaminondas and Scipio. Plutarch wrote towards the end of the first century and the beginning of the second century AD, although the exact dates of his life are not known with certainty. He was a Greek, originally from Chaeronea, but, like Arrian, he had also been granted Roman citizenship. The primary problem with Plutarch is that he was writing biography and not history: he usually favours stories that illustrated some character trait in his subject, even if the historicity of the event was dubious, such as the taming of Bucephalus episode.

  Plutarch’s stated aim, to write biography and not history, shows a fine appreciation of the differences between the two. He should not be criticised too strongly by historians for failing to provide a great deal of information that is useful in reconstructing narrative, as this was not his purpose. The lack of useful information in Plutarch is even more acute for the military historian, as he shows almost no appreciation for tactical terminology and its use. He does, however, sometimes refer to sources that others do not. At the Hydaspes, for example, Plutarch’s account of the battle is based almost entirely on ‘Alexander’s letters’,17 although other sources are cited. These include Onesicritus and Sotion, as well as ‘most writers’ when he clearly does not wish to divulge his source specifically. Given his lack of interest in strategy and tactics, he is of little use to military narratives except in occasional points of detail, or references to non-standard sources such as the ‘letters’.

  Pompeius Trogus

  Much like Diodorus, Pompeius Trogus wrote a world history, but unlike Diodorus, little survives. Trogus was a romanized Gaul originally from Vasio and, like the rest of the vulgate, used Cleitarchus heavily, although he also relied upon Timagenes. One of the main reasons that Trogus does not survive is the success of the much-abbreviated, and evidently of far poorer quality, epitome of Justin. Historians typically refer to this source as being ‘Justin’ rather than ‘Pompeius Trogus’ specifically because of that success, and I have followed that tradition throughout this work.

  Attitudes to Parmenio

  Some of the key differences in our surviving sources, and indeed in the primary sources that they relied upon can be found in the attitudes to the elder statesman Parmenio. He is sometimes presented as the wise old general acting as a foil to the youthful exuberance of Alexander, but more often, particularly by Arrian, as being overly cautious and lacking the same heroic vision of the king.

  There are five instances in Arrian where Alexander considers (however briefly) and then rejects the advice of Parmenio.18 The first of which is a dialogue that occurred at the Granicus. What ensued is only reported in Arrian and Plutarch; a debate between Alexander and Parmenio as to the best course of action. Parmenio apparently advised waiting until the morning. He believed the Persians, who were greatly inferior in infantry, would withdraw and the Macedonians could get across the river unopposed early the following day. He also, apparently, emphasized the difficulties of the terrain. Both sources have Parmenio’s advice being rejected out of hand by Alexander with very little serious c
onsideration.

  This is part of a much-used, and often discussed, device of (particularly) Arrian to have the overly-cautious Parmenio’s advice rejected by the bold and heroic Alexander. Diodorus has no such debate, but his account of the battle is as if the advice were acted upon. We must note that Ptolemy was fighting in roughly the same area as Alexander, the right wing, and so Ptolemy was probably also glorifying his own role in the battle as well as that of the king, and not simply criticizing the overly-cautious Parmenio. He may also simply have had less knowledge of events on the left, and chosen to concentrate on events that he was directly involved in. At the Granicus, Callisthenes was Arrian’s source for at least the debate with Parmenio. Callisthenes is known to have been hostile to Parmenio and is probably the source for all five of the dialogues between Alexander and the old general that show him as being too cautious and set him against Alexander’s youthful heroism.

  Before the siege of Halicarnassus began in earnest, we have another debate between Parmenio and Alexander as to the wisdom of offering a naval battle. This is significantly different from the other such debates: here Alexander is portrayed as the pragmatic and cautious party, in opposition to Parmenio’s rash and impetuous suggestion. It is perhaps unwise to pass judgment on Parmenio at this point, as we have no indication as to exactly what plan he proposed, although it would probably have been more sophisticated than a simple battle between all available forces.

  At Gaugamela, Parmenio is treated favourably by Diodorus, a fact which presents a number of problems. This treatment decreases the likelihood that he was influenced by the negative sentiment in Callisthenes. It could be argued that the prominent place of the Thessalian cavalry in both Diodorus and Plutarch suggests a commonality of source; but I think it more likely that, in the absence of specific passages that are obviously from the same source, their prominent role in both is simply a reflection of actual events. That is to say that they in fact did have a significant role in the battle, and Diodorus and Plutarch are simply honestly reflecting this.

  The incident of the call for help by Parmenio at the Battle of Gaugamela, just after Alexander had begun the pursuit of Darius, is also interesting. Again, it shows no malice towards Parmenio at all by Arrian or his source, but simply presents a picture of the Thessalians in genuine difficulty asking for help. Diodorus, in common with Arrian, simply presents Alexander’s response without comment, unlike Plutarch and Curtius who note Alexander’s frustration at the request. Interestingly, along with Diodorus’ attributing no blame to Parmenio for this incident, he also attributes no blame to Alexander. Diodorus’ account of this particular battle is far less useful than Curtius or Arrian, but should not be ignored as it provides some corroboration of other sources in some key details.

  On a final note, I have tried to avoid being dogmatic in my approach to the sources; it is certainly true that Arrian seems to be the most reliable of the surviving material, but I have not used him to the exclusion of any of the other sources, including non-literary material where appropriate. The vulgate tradition can offer much that is of interest to the military historian, and where they disagree with Arrian it is a mistake to always assume that they are incorrect.

  Chapter 1

  Siege technology

  For much of early Greek history the defenders in any siege situation almost invariably had the upper hand. Walls were generally fairly strong and the only real mechanisms that an attacking army had available were ladders, primitive rams, occasionally sapping (although, surprisingly, this does not seem to have been too common), betrayal and starvation. During a siege where scaling ladders were, effectively, the major means of attack, it is not surprising that most sieges were unsatisfactory, at least from the perspective of the attacking force. Frequently sieges turned out to be lengthy affairs and were won and lost by attrition or betrayal. Successful diplomacy was vital during the classical and archaic periods for a besieger to achieve success, and was raised to a virtual art form by Philip. Philip II, the father of Alexander the Great, was once quoted as saying that he could capture any city as long as he could get a mule laden with gold to the gates. This is a strong indication of the power of bribery and betrayal as a tool for a successful besieger. This situation changed radically with the invention of an entirely new weapon of war: the catapult.

  Catapults

  The catapult, as we would understand it, is one of those technological advances that have a clear and precise date and location for its invention. It was invented in Syracuse under the auspices of Dionysius I in, or very near to, 399. Earlier references have sometimes been argued, but are not convincing.19 Diodorus is the first historian to describe the new invention in detail; he tells us in that year ‘the entire city became one great arsenal’.20 It seems that Dionysius gathered from all over Sicily the finest engineers of the day to construct for him vast quantities of the most modern pieces of military technology. As well as manufacturing current pieces of technology, these engineers and artisans were almost certainly also to undertake research and development work into other entirely new forms of armaments. From this research work the catapult was first developed. Diodorus goes on to tell us that21:

  He (Dionysius I) gathered skilled workmen, commandeering them from the cities under his control, and attracting them by high wages from Italy and Greece, as well as Carthaginian territory. For his purpose was to make weapons in great numbers and every kind of missile, and also quadriremes and quinquiremes… not only was every space, such as the porticoes and back rooms of the temples as well as the gymnasia and colonnades of the market place crowded with workers, but the making of great quantities of arms went on. In fact the catapult was invented at this time in Syracuse… a natural consequence of the assembly in one place of the most skilful craftsmen from all over the world.

  The first catapult, called the gastraphetes, or belly-bow, was a simple device. It was essentially a bow, although it was larger than that which a man could draw using his strength alone. A ratchet mechanism was added to allow the draw string to be drawn further back, and to keep it in position longer than could be achieved by a man holding a bow string in position. To load the weapon, one end was braced against the stomach of the user (hence the name), and the other against the ground or a wall. Both hands were then used to draw back the bow string and hook it to one of the teeth of the ratchet where it sat awaiting the weapon being fired. This early artillery was, essentially, little more than a large crossbow, although it should not be easily dismissed as it was from this weapon that the later ballistae were developed. The bow section of the gastraphetes was also slightly different from regular design, as it had to withstand greater stresses than a normal bow. In order to achieve this, the bow was constructed of a compound design. A compound bow would have been made up of three distinct layers. The core of the bow would have been wood, as with a regular weapon. On the inside (the side facing the operator) was glued a layer of horn, providing considerable strength, far greater than a simple wooden bow would have been capable of. On the outside of the device (the side facing the enemy) was glued a layer of sinew. These two diverse materials were both vital to the operation of the bow. The horn essentially resisted compression, and the sinew resisted stretching, and both snapped back into their rest position with considerable force when the tension on them was released. The result of this was that the bow would be under considerable stress when drawn back and ready for firing, and would always seek to return to the rest position.22 The tactical uses of the gastraphetes were limited, as the arrow was placed loose in a groove at the front of the device and, therefore, the gastraphetes could only be aimed horizontally or upwards. The weapon could not be aimed downwards because the arrow was likely to slide out of the groove. The gastraphetes, therefore, was of no use in defending a fortification when the operator would be on a wall or in a defensive tower; it was only of use in assaulting a fortified position.

  Early catapults spread from Sicily to Greece at an unknown date in the fourth cent
ury. It is far from clear how quickly these new non-torsion catapults spread to the mainland, or how widespread they became at an early date. A significant turning point certainly occurred in 354 when Philip was first beginning to become involved in the affairs of Thessaly. He met, and was quickly defeated by, Onomarchus of Phocis. The latter achieved this success by the use of a quite brilliant stratagem. Onomarchus lured the Macedonians into a horseshoe-shaped canyon where they could use catapults stationed out of reach on the cliff tops of the canyon walls. It seems unlikely that the Macedonians possessed artillery before this point because this incident had a significant impact on Philip, prompting him to instruct his engineers to construct siege engines, and no doubt to conduct research into better and more powerful designs. Developments in Macedonia were apparently slow, as the Macedonian siege train had had little impact anywhere until the siege of Perinthus in 340, some fourteen years later. Even by this time Diodorus only records arrow-shooting catapults as being in the possession of Philip; Arrian adds to this the key point that ‘Macedonian stone-throwers do not appear until Alexander’s attack on Halicarnassus some years later’.23

  Macedonian engineers were apparently slow to develop the new technology, and perhaps Philip’s patronage was rather less generous than we may otherwise have presumed. It would appear, however, that this slow pace of development was echoed throughout the Greek world. There appears to have been a fairly considerable delay between the invention of the gastraphetes and the discovery of the principle of torsion; this is essentially where the propulsive force is provided by the twisting of some material, such as sinew, hair or rope, rather than a bow (which can be described as a non-torsion engine). The first torsion catapult was probably similar in some ways to the gastraphetes. Its overall design was similar, the string was drawn back, this time by the use of a mechanical mechanism rather than manpower, its overall appearance was similar to a crossbow, but instead of a bow at the front it had two arms. In essence it looked as though the bow had been cut in two at the centre, with the centre point of each half anchored on to a frame. This new design also incorporated a certain amount of extra wood in the framework of the device to cope with the extra stress that the machine would be subject to, especially at the front end where the two struts were attached to the frame. This device was capable of firing either an arrow or a small shot over a much greater distance than the simple non-torsion compound bow.