The Sieges of Alexander the Great

by Stephen English

  The artillery was assembled, mounted on the earthwork, and brought into action. Long stretches of the wall suffered damage, saps were dug at various points, the earth removed unobserved by the enemy, until in many places the wall, having nothing to support it, collapsed and fell.

  Once Alexander had recovered from his wound, and once the mines and machines were in place, the final stage of the siege began. The wooden supports in the mines were set ablaze, the catapults began their volleys and the rams were moved up against the walls. In relatively short order the mines collapsed, bringing several stretches of the walls down with them.176

  Much as in every siege, once a gap appeared in the wall Alexander began a concerted assault, although evidently not with his crack troops. Initially, there was an artillery and missile barrage on the walls close to the toppled section to soften up the defenders for the final assault. After this barrage, Alexander made the first assault; this evidently made some progress, but the Arab mercenaries were fighting for their lives and managed to repulse the Macedonians’ first assault. Alexander’s sub-commanders gathered together their men for a second mighty assault, and again the Arab defenders, who by now would have been significantly outnumbered, fought off the Macedonians and forced a second withdrawal. A third attempt by the Macedonians met with the same fate, but by this time the Arab defenders would have been exhausted and seriously overmatched. The Macedonians appear to have wasted no time in organizing a fourth assault, this time by the elite hypaspists and the heavy infantry:177

  Alexander brought into action the main body of the heavy infantry on all sides of the town, the wall, already under-mined, was battered down or widely breached where artillery had already done its work, so that it was now an easy matter to get ladders on to the shattered defences, and thus force an entry.

  Once the ladders were in position, or troops were standing opposite a breach in the wall, the attackers apparently vied with each other to be the first to enter the city and claim their prize. The first man into the city was an otherwise unknown Neoptolemus, a member of the Companion Cavalry who must surely have been fighting on foot at this point. Alexander really was, it seems, using his elite troops, whatever their usual designation. These elite troops succeeded where earlier assaults had failed; the result of the Macedonians gaining access to the city was all too predictable. Terrible slaughter and looting ensued until every appetite of the invaders was sated.

  The story found in Curtius,178 although perhaps revealingly not Arrian, of Batis being dragged behind Alexander’s chariot, whilst still alive, around the circuit of the city is an intriguing one:

  Alexander’s anger turned to fury, his recent successes already suggesting to his mind foreign modes of behaviour. Thongs were passed through Betis’ ankles while he still breathed, and he was tied to a chariot. Then Alexander’s horses dragged him around the city while the king gloated at having followed the example of his ancestor Achilles in punishing his enemy.

  The Homeric original to the story presents Achilles dragging Hector’s corpse behind his chariot, but here Batis is still alive; the incident here seems unusual in the context of Homer but not unbelievable.179 The most we can say is that such an act would have appealed to Alexander’s sense of kinship with Achilles. The absence of this story from our other sources is puzzling, except to say that incidents that a flattering source may have considered unworthy of Alexander could easily have been omitted.

  The mad dash that was the end of the siege is seemingly uncharacteristic of the Macedonians. During the final stages, however, when booty was there for the taking and the Macedonians were about to fall upon the civilian population, with all of the horrors that entailed, it was probably all but impossible for Alexander to maintain any kind of discipline, as we saw at Thebes. Perhaps the real surprise is that some cities were left standing after being taken by force by the Macedonians (or indeed by any ancient army).

  As a result of its capture the city suffered badly, but had recovered enough that by 315 it was able to attempt a resistance to Antigonus. The inhabitants of the city were not so lucky; the women and children being sold into slavery and most of the male defenders were slaughtered in the final assault.180 As at Thebes before it, this act evidently raised considerable sums for the Macedonian coffers, although the money was not a prime motivating factor by 331. Alexander soon after sent his former tutor 500 talents of frankincense and 100 talents of myrrh.

  The siege of Gaza could be described as a relatively straightforward affair; the fortress was not built on a precipitous outcropping of rock as at Pir-Sar, nor was it built in another topographically defensible location such as the island city of Tyre. Nevertheless, Gaza was strongly fortified and on a rocky outcrop and was defended by a motivated and extremely capable force of around 10,000 Arab mercenaries, and was therefore not an easy siege; the three month duration is testimony to that. The siege of Gaza also presents us with a situation virtually unique in Alexander’s career, a city built on sand or soft rock, rather than hard granite-like rock. This topography allowed Alexander to perform sapping operations that we only see one other time during Alexander’s early career. These sapping operations were ultimately a fundamental part of the fall of the city. As at Tyre a few months earlier, Alexander was presented with a situation that required a novel solution, and he was not found wanting. Along with this relatively new tactic, we see old ideas employed to great effect. As noted several times, Alexander’s key tactic was always to attack from multiple directions simultaneously. At Gaza he achieves this by employing what could be called an interrupted circumvallation with artillery pieces located on the various mounds around the circuit, along with the use of rams and siege towers in the intervening gaps (and of course ladders were possible). Complementing the siege engines was the final ingenious element of the mining operations. Gaza, like Tyre before it, shows Alexander to be a commander who was highly capable of creating innovative tactics when the need arose, or the situation allowed for it.

  After the successful capture of Gaza, Alexander continued southwest into Egypt to complete the strategy that he had set out at Halicarnassus: that of reducing the Persian fleet by capturing its naval bases and denying it safe haven. In reality, the strategy was now moot as Alexander was effectively in control of the Persian fleet after the desertions to his banner during the siege of Tyre and afterwards. Alexander’s real intention in capturing Egypt was to prevent the possibility of leaving potentially-hostile territory in his rear as he was about to advance into the Persian heartlands, but also to secure the breadbasket of Egypt. Alexander always took great care over logistics as demonstrated by the almost total lack of supply difficulties noted in the sources during his career, with the obvious exception of the Gedrosian Desert disaster. Alexander also had a yearning (pothos) to visit the oracle at Siwah, although when he first developed this is unclear and it may not have been a significant motivation for the invasion, perhaps only occurring while in Egypt.

  Alexander set out for Egypt soon after the capture of Gaza was complete, leaving the usual numbers of troops as a garrison with the intention of repairing the city and maintaining it as it always had been, a sentinel guarding the entry (or exit in the case of revolt) to Egypt. The siege engines, so destructive and instrumental in the previous twelve months, would have been dismantled for transport and probably sent back to Tyre to await Alexander’s return from Egypt and the campaign into the Persian heartlands. They likely would not have accompanied Alexander as he would not have expected resistance, and their presence in the baggage train would have slowed him down significantly. Alexander’s intelligence network would no doubt have told him that Egypt was unlikely to resist his advance, and would see him as a liberator from Persian despotism. This proved correct and the Macedonians were welcomed, Alexander being recognized as Pharaoh. The implicit assumption of divinity that went along with this status would no doubt have particularly pleased the king.

  After a brief stay, which is of historical but no military
interest, Alexander retraced his steps, marching on Tyre for a second time. The rebuilding work was in full swing, but Alexander had evidently ordered the mole to be left in position, and it is still visible today as the causeway connecting the former island to the mainland.

  Alexander now had no reason to delay the final showdown with his Persian rival any longer: the hunt for Darius was now on. Alexander marched northeast into the heartland of Persia. After a stunning victory at Gaugamela in 331 (analyzed in my forthcoming volume The Field Campaigns of Alexander the Great), Alexander found himself lord of Asia, the new Great King. Alexander then spent time mopping up the great cities of the Persian heartlands, none of whom offered resistance. The only campaign of note was the forcing of the Persian Gates. Although, not technically a siege, it should be examined because it does contain many similarities.

  Persian Gates

  After a brief delay sacking Uxii villages, Alexander divided his forces, as was to become his usual practice as he entered this new region. The mercenary and allied troops, together with the baggage train, were left under the command of Parmenio to travel towards Persepolis via what Arrian describes as the ‘carriage road’. Although this was the main route to Persepolis, it was not the quickest; Alexander chose the direct but less-used route over the mountains, and he made good time as the slowest elements of the army had been left behind with Parmenio.

  Ariobarzanes had taken up a defensive position in the pass known as the Persian Gates, and had taken the time to prepare his position well. He had built a wall across the narrow pass and had men stationed on the heights to either side. Alexander advanced upon the gates slowly and with extreme caution, taking five days to travel the final 30km, evidently aware of the dangers and expecting an attack of some kind.181 Alexander’s first response upon seeing the wall shows an uncharacteristic lack of style, imagination, thought or preparation. Almost immediately, he launched a frontal assault. It could be that he attempted the same tactic as had worked against the Uxii previously, to terrify them into retreat without the need for battle. Alexander was not facing Uxii villagers, however, but Persian infantry. Whilst the Persians did not possess first-class infantrymen, they certainly had greater discipline than the Uxii, and they had the advantage of a well-prepared defensive position; the Persians held their ground. The frontal assault was an unmitigated disaster. Missiles rained down upon the attackers from the heights to either side, as well as from those defending the wall. The Macedonians quickly fell back in disorder, leaving behind their dead in the pass.182 One can only imagine the fury that Alexander must have felt at this humiliation. Defeat was extremely rare in Alexander’s career, but the blame here lies squarely upon his shoulders. Even within this fury Alexander was evidently rational enough, or had good enough counsel, to realize that a further frontal assault would not fare any better, and a different strategy must be found. Despite the failure of the assault, Alexander had evidently at least managed to engage the enemy directly as he had managed to capture a small number of the defenders. These were now interrogated (or perhaps local hill farmers were questioned). After this interrogation, a secondary path was revealed – the parallels with Thermopylae hardly need mentioning.

  Alexander was informed by the prisoners that the pass was narrow and difficult to traverse. Upon hearing this, he instructed Craterus to remain behind with his own taxis and that of Meleager, along with some archers and cavalry, whilst he would set off along the mountain pass. Craterus was instructed to launch a further frontal assault only when they were sure that Alexander was behind the Persians. Arrian claims the remainder of the troops travelled with Alexander through the pass.

  Alexander waited for the cover of darkness, and then set off for the alternative route. After a night march of around 20km, Alexander took the decision to divide his forces further. He took with him one taxis of heavy infantry, the Agrianians and archers, along with the Royal ile of Companions and one double squadron of cavalry.183 With these troops Alexander turned and moved towards the pass. The remaining troops were probably ordered to bridge the Araxes River that would need to be crossed in order to gain access to central Persia.184 These troops probably were not used as a third column against the defenders, as the passes were narrow and large numbers of troops were already operating with difficulty in the area. The idea of a three-pronged attack is attractive, but if the pass and the terrain was as difficult as we are led to believe, then I think it is more plausible that Alexander realized that he had taken too many troops with him through the pass as it was. His intention, therefore, was to reduce the numbers that would be involved in the final assault to only the elite. Whatever the purpose of Amyntas’ detachment, it is certain that Alexander led the assault in person.

  The action at the gates probably occurred over two consecutive nights, with Alexander showing considerable caution in avoiding the Persian scouting parties that were no doubt at work in the area. Once he was ready for the final assault, he came down upon the defenders from the northeast destroying two forward fortifications and falling upon the wall.185 The attack was signalled by the use of a salpinx, a trumpet-like instrument, which acted as the signal for Craterus to attack down the gorge. The Persians were caught totally by surprise by the two-pronged attack. There were few places to run or hide for the Persians, although Ariobarzanes and a small group of horsemen and infantry did manage an escape. Ariobarzanes fled to Persepolis where he was refused entry; he died in an engagement with the advancing Macedonians shortly afterwards, fighting the foreign conqueror to the last.186

  In this capture of another fortified position, hardly lasting long enough to warrant the term ‘siege’, Alexander once again shows a genius for rapid and silent movements of large bodies of men in order to maintain the element of surprise. We also see Alexander, once again, using the two-pronged approach of attacking the enemy from more than one direction. This has to be balanced, however, against Alexander’s serious lack of judgement at the initial assault; to sacrifice men so needlessly when his usual flanking tactic was so readily available (once the pass had been identified) is puzzling. We can only assume that he felt the defenders would retreat immediately upon seeing his advance, as the Uxians had done.

  After forcing the Persian Gates, Alexander made for Ecbatana. Before heading off into what would become the northeast frontier of his new empire, Alexander spent some time reorganizing his army and dealing with some internal difficulties (for example, the murders of Philotas and Parmenio). Up to this point in the campaign Alexander had been in territory that was foreign but not unknown to him, as Greeks had been trading and working in the western Persian Empire for generations; the region he was about to enter was a different story, however.

  Chapter 6

  The Northeast Frontier: 330–327

  The Bactrian campaign began slowly, with Alexander wintering his troops (330/29) in the southern Helmand province, which was, in terms of food supply to the eastern satrapies, as Egypt was to the west. After securing Hyrcania, a little known region between Ecbatana and Bactria, Alexander marched on the province of Bactria. Ancient Bactria was as far removed, topographically and socially, from the Greek world as one can imagine. The soaring mountains of the Hindu Kush and the Pamir ranges surrounded Bactria on three sides. The west to northwest was bordered by the deserts of modern Turkestan, through which runs the Oxus River (Amu Darya) on its way to the Aral Sea. This was terrain that was entirely alien to Alexander, and indeed any Greek. No longer would Alexander be facing large armies in massive set-piece battles. From this time forward, at least until he reached India, he would be facing an entirely-new form of combat: that of guerrilla warfare. Alexander would now face small-scale ambushes and rapid strikes against his forces. He faced an enemy that knew it could not defeat him in battle, and was wise enough not to try. The Bactrians were well aware of their own strengths, and had had enough reports from the western satrapies as to be well aware of Alexander’s too, and constantly attempted to pick and choose their battles i
n order to maximize their own strengths and minimize their weaknesses. The natives, probably over centuries of warfare, had devised an alternative means of fighting that used the very land of Bactria to its fullest advantage.

  The initial phase of the campaigns in Bactria and Sogdiana are fascinating as well as complex, and will be examined in The Field Campaigns of Alexander the Great; but they do not see Alexander conducting typical siege operations and so are not relevant here. After Gaza in 332, the first siege Alexander was able to conduct was that of the Sogdian Rock, probably in the summer of 328, a gap of almost four years.

  Sogdian Rock/Rock of Arimazes

  Alexander’s apparent strategy of militarizing the Sogdian frontier culminated with the construction of a series of garrison settlements in what is now called Tadzhikistan. Alexander moved east through the region and towards the Hissar Range separating east and west Sogdiana, occupying strongholds as he went, but with only minor resistance until he reached the Sogdian Rock, or as it was sometimes known, the Rock of Arimazes, probably in the summer of 328.187 The rock was some 6,000m high and 30km in circumference. The fortress boasted sheer cliffs on all sides, and Oxyartes evidently felt the fortress was impregnable as he had sent his family to the rock for their own safety. Arrian described the Sogdian Rock as the ‘last stronghold in Sogdiana’. The Sogdian Rock was heavily defended: a total of 30,000 natives are reported to have taken refuge within its walls.188 The fortress was well stocked with food, and there was enough snow on the heights that could easily be converted into drinking water. Therefore the fortress was unlikely to be starved into submission.