The Sieges of Alexander the Great

by Stephen English

  The Indians now realized the difficulty of their position. They had once again lost the high ground with the tactical advantage that it afforded the Macedonians, as well as the fact that the bridge was close enough that Alexander could bring his artillery to bear. From this point it was only a matter of time for the defenders. The Indian resolve crumbled and they sent envoys to Alexander to sue for peace. Arrian tells us that they expected to be able to draw out the discussions until night fall when they intended to abandon their position and melt away into the surrounding mountains. Alexander was now used to this Indian tactic of abandoning a hopeless position, and he expected them to do just that. He therefore stationed a number of hypaspists along the only escape routes off the plateau, and, at a pre-arranged signal, ordered them to fall upon the escaping Indians that very night. Alexander was now left in possession of a fortress that even Heracles had failed to conquer.

  The rapidity of the construction of the bridge is yet another testimony, if one were needed, to the quality of Alexander’s engineers. They were constantly called upon to make the impossible a reality, and in remarkably short periods of time. The bridges that were constructed in Sogdiana, and here at Aornus, only took a few days; modern engineers would find it difficult if not impossible to match these feats, even though they were temporary structures.

  At Aornus Alexander put the lives of his irreplaceable men at risk on a whim. He could easily have isolated the Rock at little cost in manpower and moved on, but ego, or perhaps pride, would not allow this. The local story of Heracles’ failure to capture the Rock was all the incentive he would have needed, much like with the Gordian Knot in Asia Minor, or the later crossing of the Gedrosian Desert in emulation of Queen Sisigambis, Alexander simply did not possess the will to resist a seemingly impossible challenge.

  After the fall of Aornus, Alexander marched to Embolima where he received a report that the brother of Oxyartes, Erices, had blockaded a narrow pass on the road towards India with a force of some 20,000 men and 15 elephants.230 Curtius tells us, advancing quickly with apparently only the slingers and archers, he dislodged the defenders from the pass and scattered them. This is an example of Curtius’ exaggeration, or simply a mistake. Alexander commanded no more than 2,000 archers and slingers, and it seems unlikely, to say the least, that these missile troops, with no back up of heavy infantry or cavalry, could have carried a pass commanded by a force ten times its size.

  After crossing the Indus River, Alexander entered Taxila. Almost immediately he was met by King Taxiles who brought Alexander some much needed supplies. Alexander’s next stop was the Hydaspes River and a set-piece cavalry battle with Porus that is described in the forthcoming volume The Field Campaigns of Alexander the Great.

  Following victory at the Hydaspes River, Alexander resumed his march east towards the Indian Ocean, after first leaving Craterus evidently to construct a further series of outposts in Porus’ realm.231 These were military stations intended to keep order in this newly-conquered territory. Alexander had no idea if the territory would remain loyal after he left, and posts such as these were set up all across the east of this new empire.

  Arrian tells us of a series of campaigns against some thirty-seven cities in the area between the Hydaspes and Acesines, east of Porus’ kingdom, although he gives us no detail of them and we can learn nothing of Alexander’s siege techniques as a result. Of these thirty-seven cities, the smallest apparently contained around 5,000 people, the largest more than double this. That the numbers are exaggerated hardly seems worth mentioning, but the fact is that the campaigning continued apace. Along with a number of minor campaigns, the only one deserving of mention is the siege of Sangala.

  Sangala

  Alexander’s intelligence network had informed him that an independent Indian tribe called the Cathaei were, along with some others, preparing to resist. Alexander immediately set off in their direction and, after a two day march, found himself in the vicinity of the city of Sangala, at the town of Pimprama, which was ruled by the Adraistae. The city of Sangala had a reputation for being strongly fortified, and the Cathaei of being formidable warriors. Alexander by now considered India to be his territory, even the areas where he had not yet been, and any resistance was an affront to his rule and must, therefore, be crushed. They were also supported in their defiance of Alexander by two other tribes, the Oxydracae and the Malli.

  The Adraistae offered Alexander no resistance and the following day he rested his men before setting off for Sangala. The Cathaei and their allies had taken up a position on a hill in front of the city and awaited Alexander’s approach. The hill was steep and some of the sides were difficult for an attacking force to easily climb. To further strengthen their position the defenders had set up a temporary palisade of carts which formed a triple ring around the central mound of the hill. This was in effect three separate walls so that if the attackers got past the first, a second and third manned wall awaited them. Their intention was to break the Macedonian infantry’s formation as they passed through or over the outer carts, thus allowing the defenders to fall upon a disorganized enemy. Alexander did what he always did: in the words of Arrian, ‘Alexander modified his tactics to suit the circumstances’.232

  Instead of blindly attacking the defenders with an immediate frontal assault, Alexander used the same tactic that had been so successful only weeks earlier at the Hydaspes: he opened the battle with his Dahae horse archers firing upon the defenders from a distance. This time it was to prevent the defenders attacking Alexander’s forces whilst they were still deploying. Arrian again, as at the Hydaspes, mentions Cleitus as a cavalry commander. His hipparchy had evidently performed well enough at the Hydaspes for him to be promoted to its permanent command. Arrian also mentions the ‘special cavalry hipparchy’ in conjunction with Cleitus’ cavalry command. This special hipparchy, I would argue, was that which Cleitus had commanded at the Hydaspes. If this is the case then it was the cavalry that were recruited in Bactria and Sogdiana that he had commanded briefly in that region after they had joined Alexander. Cleitus was evidently transferred from this hipparchy to another one, presumably one whose hipparch had been killed at the Hydaspes. The fact that the Persian cavalry were still closely linked to Cleitus is in recognition of his special bond with those troops, having commanded them in the Bactria/Sogdiana region, as well as at the Hydaspes. This special cavalry hipparchy can not have been the agema, as Arrian uses that term specifically of that unit; they were something different from the normal troops and can only have been the Persians formerly commanded by Cleitus.

  After the Dahae had covered the advance of the army successfully, Cleitus’ new hipparchy was ordered to the right wing, as described by Arrian:233

  he brought Cleitus’ mounted regiment and the special cavalry round to the right wing of his army, with the guards and Agrianians in close touch… before his dispositions were complete, the rear-guard, both horse and foot, arrived on the scene; the cavalry was used to strengthen the wings, and the additional infantry units to increase the solidity of the phalanx.

  Alexander also seemingly employed a second line, as in his set-piece battles, although he would not have expected to have need for such a device. The only major difference between Sangala and the earlier set-piece battles was the strength of that rear guard. This guard was not a tactical requirement of the battle as there was almost no possibility of the enemy breaking through the Macedonian lines, but a large reserve was employed simply because the front line would have been very short, and there was not enough space to locate all of the front line troops in their usual positions. The one thing that this does tell us is that Alexander’s army at Sangala was of a more significant size than during some of the earlier sieges. This was not simply some flying column, although his inability to completely surround the town during the second phase of the siege tells us that the entire army was not present. We have no information as to where the secondary columns were campaigning, but that is not so unusual. The sourc
es are almost always Alexander-centric in their approach, understandably.

  The Macedonian order of battle before Sangala, therefore, shows a very traditional pattern; heavy infantry in the centre, the hypaspists and Agrianians to their right and cavalry (as well as detachments of archers) on both wings, almost exactly the same as the set up in almost every military encounter in Alexander’s career.

  Alexander moved to the right of the army, again as was tradition, and took command of the cavalry in that sector. He had noticed that the defensive palisade of wagons was slightly more widely dispersed opposite the cavalry of the right, and the hill less steep there than in other areas, so a cavalry attack was possible. After seeing this potential weakness (although it could, of course, have been a trap to entice the Macedonian cavalry to attack a fortified position at a significant disadvantage), Alexander began the advance with the cavalry. Alexander did not make straight for the gaps in the defensive line, but used his horse archers to move along the line in an attempt to lure out the defenders, a tactic that was so common during his career, and usually worked. On this occasion, however, they did not bite. The defenders clambered onto their carts and met the Dahae arrows with arrows of their own, but did not venture beyond the protection of their improvised palisade.

  Alexander’s opening gambit had failed, but it was not a decisive failure as it had cost him little in terms of manpower. Another tactic, however, was evidently required to break through the defences. This failure did not delay Alexander for long, as soon as the cavalry units reached the safety of their original position in the line (so as to avoid confusion of deploying infantry through the still-moving cavalry units), Alexander’s superiority in numbers allowed him to surround the wagons with his heavy infantry in order to attack the carts from all sides.234 Once the infantry were in position, the king dismounted, joined them and immediately began another assault. Curtius tells us that the unorthodox defensive tactics of the Cathaeans caused some disarray among the Macedonians, but he overplays the situation somewhat.235 When the assault began, the outer defences were no match for the Macedonian heavy infantry, and the Cathaei were quickly driven back to their second line of carts. As was their plan, the defenders immediately rallied upon gaining the second layer of defence and set themselves up to oppose Alexander’s continued advance. Their discipline in reforming upon gaining the safety of the second ring of carts speaks volumes as to their training, and of their tactical plan of defence in depth.

  The effect of a ring of carts was that, every time the defenders were driven back, their defence became more stout as they were defending a smaller circuit; it also meant that the defenders became increasingly fierce in their resistance as they could see only one more layer to fall back upon before they had nowhere to retreat to. With the fall of the first ring, the defenders were now in a closer order and the Macedonians had lost the advantage of moving in unbroken formations across open ground (albeit hilly open ground). In order to regain some of the initiative, Alexander had the outer ring of carts removed to the base of the hill so that the Macedonians could advance upon the second ring without having to cross a barrier first.

  As the Macedonians pressed the inner rings, the fighting became more brutal and casualties would have been higher on both sides than during the attack on the outer ring. Despite this, the defenders were also quickly driven back from the second ring, but they did not withdraw to their ‘keep’, the final inner ring of carts. The Cathaeans in fact withdrew to the relative safety of the town, after suffering significant losses. Alexander rested his troops the remainder of the day. Falling back to the city was entirely sensible on the part of the Cathaei. They had failed to hold the carts against the Macedonians and throwing away their lives would be futile; much better to live to fight another day behind the greater (and permanent) defences of the city. Despite this, the defenders had lost up to 8,000 men in their defence of the hill, although this figure cited by Curtius probably refers to the total losses for the campaign, rather than this opening sequence.236

  The following morning Alexander ordered the city to be surrounded as best he could, although he did not possess enough troops to allow a complete encirclement. The only gap in the infantry line was opposite a lake close to the city. The waters of the lake were shallow enough to be able to cross, and Alexander anticipated that the Indians might try and escape as they had done in earlier sieges when their situation became hopeless. To prevent this, on the far side of this lake, Alexander stationed his cavalry who were instructed to patrol the area, thus effectively sealing the only gap in the line. Alexander’s guess proved correct and under cover of night (Alexander apparently spent the entire day setting up his circumvallation) the defenders slipped out of the city to attempt to cross the lake. Many of the Indians were caught completely by surprise by Alexander’s cavalry patrols and were slaughtered as they tried to escape. The Indians quickly realized what was happening and those who survived recovered their wits rapidly enough to make it back to the transient security of the town.

  After setting up his positions the previous day, and successfully luring the Indians into his carefully-laid trap, he ordered the construction of his own double stockade around the city, and increased the patrols around the lake to ensure no Indian managed to escape alive. Alexander had delayed the onset of the siege to allow his siege train to arrive; at that point the bombardment could begin and the city be taken. It still had not arrived, however, and there was no information as to when it was due. Alexander also learned from an Indian deserter (we can only assume there must have been a steady stream of them at this point), that the remaining defenders were planning to make another attempt to cross the lake and escape the following night. Upon hearing this news of the impending second breakout attempt, Alexander ordered Ptolemy to take up a position close to the lake with the hypaspists, archers and Agrianians to prevent any Indians escaping. Alexander went on to say, according to Arrian:237

  The instant, he [Alexander] said to Ptolemy, you see them at it, stop them, and order the trumpeter to sound the alarm. On this signal, the rest of you officers will take your men promptly to the scene of the action, wherever the trumpet calls you. And, mark you, I shall be there myself.

  Similar orders would have been given to all of the officers as it is implied that Alexander was anticipating a breakout somewhere, and he was preparing for the possibility that the Indian deserters were wrong in claiming it would be across the water, as previously.

  To prepare his position, Ptolemy gathered some of the carts that the Cathaei had used in the defence of the hill several days before, and stationed them at random intervals along the route that he anticipated the Indians would take as they slipped out of the city. The intention was that these would act as obstacles in the darkness (evidently it was cloudy, and therefore very dark) and would cause confusion amongst those attempting to escape. This also tells us that the route to the lake must have been hidden from the city by some obstacle, perhaps a copse of trees, or the defenders would have known the carts were there, and the potential confusion would have been partially obviated. Ptolemy also ordered that the stockade be extended around the full circumference of the city closing the gap that had existed between the city and the lake. This construction work was completed quickly and entirely under cover of darkness.

  Alexander’s Indian deserters proved correct: some time in the early hours of the morning, at the fourth watch by Roman reckoning, the gates that faced the lake were opened and the defenders began to slip out. Ptolemy and the hypaspists were in perfect position, however. Once they were out of the city, and could not easily slip back in as with the first attempted breakout, Ptolemy ordered the trumpets to be sounded, and they began to advance upon the Cathaei. The Indians’ expected escape route was already blocked by carts and the hastily-constructed stockade. The presence of these unexpected obstacles coupled with the hypaspists falling upon them, resulted in tremendous confusion and panic within the Indian ranks. The Macedonians showed no mercy.
Arrian noted that they were ‘cutting down every man who managed to struggle through between the carts’. We can only assume, although this is never explicitly stated, that women and children would also be amongst those trying to escape their expected fate once the town fell. These would likely have received much the same treatment as distinguishing between them at night would have been very difficult. The Indians, realizing that they had failed again in their attempts to escape managed to get back to the city, at a loss of some 500 of their number.238

  At around the time of the second attempted break out, or perhaps shortly afterwards, Porus arrived with his remaining army of ‘the rest of his elephants and 5,000 Indian troops’.239 Given that we know that Alexander captured all of the elephants left alive after the Hydaspes, Porus must not have committed his entire reserve to that battle. The arrival of these reserves coincided with Alexander’s engineers having completed the construction of the siege engines that they had been working upon, as well as perhaps the arrival of some siege equipment with Porus. These siege engines were brought up into a position where they could begin the bombardment of the walls. During what must have been a couple of weeks between Alexander’s arrival, and the arrival of Porus, Alexander’s engineers were busy. They had been working on building siege engines, and completing the double stockade. They had also evidently been conducting sapping operations beneath the city walls. We can assume this only because as soon as Alexander’s siege engines were in place (but before they began firing) a large stretch of wall collapsed because of this sapping. At this collapse, Alexander signalled a general assault around the whole circuit of the city. Areas were the walls had collapsed were stormed, and scaling ladders were used at other points, causing what remained of the defenders to spread themselves out, reducing the numbers able to defend the breach. Once a breach had been made the fate of the city was sealed, and it fell to the Macedonians shortly afterwards. Arrian tells us that up to 17,000 Indians were killed and over 70,000 captured, as well as 500 cavalry and 300 war chariots. It hardly needs to be said that these numbers seem exaggerated, but whatever the real figures, the siege had been bloody and the defenders suffered badly. Alexander lost 100 men with over 1,200 wounded.