After the capture of Sangala, Alexander marched ever further into India. The Hydaspes had been fought probably in May, and the further campaigning had taken another month. Much of this time had been spent in monsoon rains and floods in an unknown land with no end in sight. It is no surprise at all that the army had finally had enough, and refused to go any further. The revolt was not the end of the campaign, however, as Alexander decided to take a circuitous route back to Babylon rather than travel through friendly (already conquered, that is) territory. His intention was to continue to expand the Empire in the process.
The City of the Mallians
Immediately after the revolt on the Hyphasis River, where Alexander agreed to march no further east, the army marched back to the Hydaspes and an enormous fleet was quickly constructed (not far short of 2,000 vessels!) to transport some of the army down river. The remainder marched on land along the banks on either side of the river. After three days sail, the fleet reached a prearranged point where Hephaestion and Craterus, the respective commanders on each bank, had been ordered to halt their advance, and the fleet did likewise. The host paused at this point for two days to gather provisions and await the arrival of Philip, who had evidently been campaigning elsewhere. A couple of days further down the river, news reached Alexander that the Mallians and Oxydracae were preparing resistance to his passage. These were the most warlike of the Indian tribes of the region, and Curtius tells us they could put more than 100,000 men in the field. However exaggerated these figures are we can safely assume they these two tribes represented a formidable opponent for Alexander.240 Alexander, as always, was simply incapable of resisting the challenge that these tribes presented, and he hastened into their territory with the intention of catching them while they were still making preparations for his advance, although his informant had told him that they had already secured their women and children in their strongest fortresses.
Alexander divided the army, as had by now become very familiar. Nearchus sailed south with the fleet to the borders of Malli territory. Craterus and Philip led a large column down the west bank of the river whilst Hephaestion and Ptolemy were to take separate columns down the east bank three days apart. The main striking column was, of course, led by Alexander himself: the hypaspists, Peitho’s taxis, half of the Companion Cavalry and Alexander’s new favourite unit, the Dahae horse archers.241 The small lightly armed fast moving columns that Alexander created during and after the Indian campaign were significantly different from those previous to it. The Agrianians and archers had been a standard addition to any flying column; both are here ignored in favour of the Dahae horse archers. Alexander seems to be utterly enamoured of these new troops. They had more flexibility and firepower than the Cretan archers, and proved far more operationally useful to Alexander.
The location of the city of the Malli is unknown, partly because of the changing course of the various rivers that feed the Indus in the region over the centuries. It seems likely, however, that their territory lay either side of the Hydraotes River, and some distance from the confluence of the Ascines River, generally to the northeast of the modern city of Multan.
This flying column marched directly towards the capital city of the Malli, across the Sandar-Bar desert, taking the Mallians utterly by surprise from the north. The campaign against the Malli on the Hydroates was brutal and, by this time, very predictable.242 Civilians in the area that were caught in the open were slaughtered without mercy. This was a terror campaign like that conducted in Sogdiana a couple of years previously. It is difficult to see what Alexander hoped to achieve by these tactics, other than repression of the populace by a campaign of fear (which may have been goal enough for him).
The first fortified position that Alexander encountered in the region chose resistance. Perhaps as a direct result of Alexander’s terror campaign, they feared what would happen to them if they surrendered. After all, how much worse could their fate be if they resisted and failed? Alexander approached the unnamed position and immediately surrounded it with his infantry. The defenders could, apparently, see that sapping operations had begun against the walls. We can presume that there was an unmentioned delay where Alexander probably ordered the construction of a stockade, as at Sangala previously. This delay would have allowed the sapping operations to get underway, as much preparation was no doubt required in the early stages of these engineering activities.
The infantry were close enough for the walls to be peppered with missile fire, perhaps also from smaller artillery pieces that had been brought along for the purpose. This, coupled with the evident sapping operations, persuaded the defenders to abandon the outer walls and fall back to the inner stronghold of the fortification. The Indians continued to resist vigorously, and with some measure of success. On one occasion a small party of Macedonians broke into the inner fortress, and they were fallen upon by the defenders, twenty-five being killed before the remainder managed to escape.
The initial attempt on the inner fortress had met with only limited success, so Alexander ordered full-scale sapping operations to begin, and scaling ladders to be used as the assault continued unabated. We have no clue in the sources as to how long it took the sapping to be effective, but before long a tower was brought down along with a section of the walls, exposing the interior of the fortress. There is a hint in Arrian of the lack of motivation felt by the rank and file that would soon almost cost Alexander his life. Arrian tells us.243
Alexander, ahead of his men, was up (on the collapsed section of wall) in a moment, and stood there alone, a conspicuous figure, holding the breach. The sight of him struck shame into his troops, so up they went after him in scattered groups.
Once the men were shamed into attacking, Alexander quickly captured the city. Some of the Indians, not wishing Alexander to take their possessions, set fire to their houses, and many were caught and killed. In all, around 5,000 Indians died, and only a handful were taken alive. We have no reports of women and children in the city. Perhaps they had been previously evacuated to a stronger position.
Upon the fall of this fortress, Alexander rested his troops for a day, probably also to try and restore some of the evidently flagging morale, before advancing against the remaining Malli cities. Alexander found that the closest Mallian towns were deserted and that the populations had fled into uninhabited regions. There seemed little point in following them, and so, after another day’s rest, he continued along the river in the direction of the principle Mallian city (after sending word back to the fleet to send forward the light infantry to join him). Much to Alexander’s great disappointment, he found the capital city also deserted with the inhabitants having withdrawn across the Hydroates River. Upon approaching the river, however, he found them massed on the opposite bank showing every sign of opposing his crossing.
The light infantry that Alexander had requested had not yet arrived, and he was only in command of cavalry. Yet, without even pausing for breath, he charged straight into the river to engage the enemy. As soon as the Indians saw Alexander’s headlong charge into the river they began to withdraw with the intention of moving to safer ground. Once they realized that Alexander commanded no infantry at all, and that the river was seriously disrupting his charge, they began to reform with the intention of opposing his crossing. Their force was substantial and numbered some 50,000, according to Arrian; Alexander commanded a mere few thousand cavalry. This is an excellent example of Alexander’s arrogance getting the better of him. He was attacking at a serious disadvantage in terms of both numbers and troop types (having no infantry at all). He also had charged straight into the river without even allowing his cavalry units time to reform after their rapid advance from the Malli capital. He did manage to regain his composure before what would have been an almost inevitable disaster, however, and kept the cavalry manoeuvring just out of range of the enemy archers. It could have been that he was simply seeing if the Indians would flee at the sight of his cavalry charge, instead of this being an actu
al attempt at combat. The light-armed infantry, specifically the Agrianians and archers, quickly caught up to the cavalry at the river, and the heavy infantry appeared in the distance; this was enough to force the Mallians to retire to the relative protection of a nearby city, which was heavily fortified, Alexander quick on their heels, to await the inevitable siege.244
As soon as Alexander’s cavalry arrived at the city, they were ordered to surround the fortifications and ensure nobody gained access, or were able to leave. When the infantry came up at a slightly slower pace, they replaced the cavalry and completely surrounded the walls. A temporary, and presumably rather small, stockade was erected and Alexander then ordered the men to stand firm in their positions. Arrian tells us that there were two reasons that the siege operations did not begin immediately: lack of remaining daylight and that the troops were rather tired from their long march and the crossing of the river.
The following morning, once the infantry were in place and rested, the assault began. Scaling ladders were used and we can presume sapping operations also, given that they had occurred in every recent siege operation with great success. As the Mallians had done during the previous siege, they abandoned the outer ring of defences quickly and retired to the inner fortifications; these Alexander invested without delay. Alexander, at the head of an infantry unit, wrenched a gate from its hinges and penetrated into the town far in advance of Perdiccas and his infantry taxis, which was encountering greater resistance than Alexander had done. Once they had breached the outer walls, they saw that the inner fortress was heavily defended, and both Alexander and Perdiccas sent for scaling ladders and ordered sapping operations to begin against these inner walls, again exactly on the same format of the previous siege. The men had not bothered to carry scaling ladders, probably because of a certain lack of enthusiasm to climb up them in the face of concerted opposition. Here we see again the flagging enthusiasm of the infantry that we also saw a week or so earlier at the previous Malli stronghold. They had expected to be travelling home after their mutiny, and Alexander’s response to it, but it was evident to them now that Alexander was continuing to campaign just as he had done previously. What makes this reluctance to continue fighting more surprising is that it was largely from the hypaspists, the elite of the heavy infantry, those who were always relied upon to conduct the most difficult operations (such as the naval assault on Tyre). Arrian tells us that:245
The men with the scaling ladders were not quick enough to satisfy Alexander; in his impatience he snatched one from the fellow who carried it and with his own hands reared it against the fortress wall; then, crouched under his shield, up he went.
Alexander was accompanied by only his shield bearer, Peucestas (with the shield of Achilles looted from his tomb at Troy), Leonnatus, an officer, and Abreas, a hand-picked soldier. Only these four had climbed the ladder onto the wall of the inner defences.
Alexander fought wildly and forced back the defenders from his area of the battlements; many Indians lay dead at his feet. He was so successful that the Malli did not dare to approach him, and the four stood alone on top of the battlements in full view of both attackers and defenders. Alexander realized the danger of his very exposed position. He could be picked off by an archer at any moment, and the infantry outside were still showing little enthusiasm to join him atop the battlements. He then leapt down into the inner fortress with only his three colleagues around him. He was now completely surrounded by Indians and in a very dire position indeed.
Once inside the fortress, he put his back to the wall and made ready to fight. A party of Indians came at him, and he cut them down; their commander rushed forward, all too rashly, and he, too, fell. First one, then a second, who tried to approach him he stopped with a well aimed stone. Others pressed within striking distance, and fell victims to his sword. After that none ventured again to attack him hand-to-hand; keeping their distance, they formed a half-circle round where he stood and hurled at him whatever missiles they had or could find.
Abreas was shot in the face and killed, and Alexander too was injured by an arrow that penetrated his corslet and entered his chest, piercing a lung. Alexander soon collapsed from blood loss; Peucestas continued to fight standing astride the fallen king and holding forth the shield of Achilles. Leonnatus stood back to back with Peucestas and both fought desperately to protect their fallen king.246
The remainder of the Macedonian army on the outside of the inner wall were so dismayed for the safety of their king, and so ashamed at their own lack of courage, that they immediately grabbed hold of as many ladders as they could and began scaling the walls in their droves. Scaling ladders in the ancient world were a rather rickety affair, and too many men attempted to climb them simultaneously; this caused most to simply collapse under the weight.
The hypaspists, by now, were frantic and tried every means of getting over the walls. Some drove stakes into the clay of the walls and dragged themselves up, others stood on the shoulders of their colleagues (indicating, along with Alexander’s leap into the city from the walls, that they were not precipitously high). As soon as any man gained the walls, they leapt into the city in order to protect their prone and unconscious king. A fierce battle ensued with successive Macedonians holding their shields over Alexander. Many died on both sides in these few desperate minutes. Quickly, although it must have seemed like hours, the hypaspists still outside of the walls managed to force open the main gate, and they began to pour into the inner fortress to come to the aid of Alexander; the carnage all around was terrible. Once the main gates were open, the defenders had no chance and the real butchery began: every living soul in the city was slaughtered in a massive act of revenge.247 Alexander’s actions at the city have subsequently become almost legend, but they hide a number of key issues. The army was clearly losing all enthusiasm for continued conquest, and it was only by increasingly-rash acts that Alexander was able to keep them motivated.
The siege of the city of the Mallians was to be Alexander’s last major campaign, and it was one that almost cost him his life. From this point, until his death the following year, the campaigns were minor affairs, and not conducted personally by Alexander, given his grave injury. As his final military act, the siege shows at once his bravery and recklessness. Alexander always led from the front. He was always the first to engage the enemy; be that as commander of the Companion Cavalry or the first over a wall during a siege operation. These were characteristics that have given him an enduring legacy but could so easily have cost him his life much earlier, perhaps at the Granicus during the famous incident where he was almost beheaded. We also see in this siege (and also earlier at Sangala) that the Macedonians were utterly tired of constant conflict. They had been promised a journey home, and they could only see endless warfare in front of them. Alexander, had he lived, would soon have had to increasingly rely on native Persian troops such as the 30,000 ‘Successors’, as well as Persian cavalry that he was using more and more. We can only imagine how his tactics would have changed to accommodate the changing structure of the army.
Following the disastrous and infamous march through the Gedrosian Desert, Alexander headed for Susa. There he summoned a number of satraps and troops that were ultimately executed for some quite heinous crimes; Alexander was attempting to restore order and discipline, and at the same time sending a message that he was still in charge. From Susa, the army was divided into several columns, all of which ultimately headed for Babylon where he died in 323.
Alexander the Great was a commander who had mastered the art of adapting a relatively small series of successful tactics to any new situation that he encountered. The tactic of attacking the enemy in more than one direction simultaneously, for example, was, we might imagine, more suited to set-piece battles like Issus or Gaugamela, but repeatedly in sieges he used this tactic in a truly masterful way. At Tyre he attacked from the mole and from aboard ship, and at Gaza he attacked every part of the defences to spread the defenders out as thinly as p
ossible. During set-piece battles Alexander always tried to fight on terrain of his choosing by luring the enemy out of their prepared positions; during siege warfare he frequently tried the same by luring the defenders out.
Throughout his career Alexander demonstrated repeatedly that he was the ancient world’s most innovative and adaptable commander, and this is particularly demonstrated during his career as a besieger. The constant innovation and reaction at Tyre is fascinating to read, particularly given that Alexander was on the back foot for much of the time but eventually developed (or adapted) a winning tactic by acquiring a new fleet.
Alexander’s set-piece battles are fascinating and will be examined in the succeeding volume, but his sieges arguably give us a better opportunity to examine his tactics closely and his ability to adapt and improvise not just at the outset of a military encounter, but constantly as prevailing circumstance developed.
Alexander advanced the art of siegecraft further and faster than any previous commander had done. No citadel or fortress, no matter how well defended by man or nature, was capable of standing against him: this aspect of his career is worthy of careful study for that very fact alone.
The Sieges of Alexander the Great Page 21
