The Complete Idiot's Guide to Middle East Conflict

by Mitchell G. Bard, Ph. D.

  In 1977, Congress prohibited U.S. companies from cooperating with the Arab boycott. When President Carter signed the law, he said that the “issue goes to the very heart of free trade among nations” and that it was designed to “end the divisive effects on American life of foreign boycotts aimed at Jewish members of our society.”

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  Hieroglyphics

  The League of Arab States, or Arab League, was formed in Cairo on March 22, 1945, for the purpose of securing Arab unity. Because of inter-Arab rivalries, the League has generally been unable to pursue a consistent agenda beyond general opposition to Israel. Even that issue became a source of tension when Egypt signed its peace treaty with Israel in 1979. Although unanimous decisions of the council are supposed to be binding on all members, individual states have often gone their own way.

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  The blacklisting process has always been arbitrary. It is unclear whether boycott officials collect any evidence at all before placing an individual or company on the blacklist. In addition, no two countries have identical lists, and six countries—Algeria, Mauritania, Morocco, Somalia, Sudan, and Tunisia—do not enforce the secondary boycott.

  The objective of the boycott was to isolate Israel from its neighbors and the international community, as well as to deny it trade that might be used to augment its military and economic strength. Although it undoubtedly hurt Israel’s development, the boycott failed to undermine Israel’s economy to the degree intended.

  A different kind of embargo, however, was imposed by Egypt that was more direct and threatening to Israel’s survival. And it was one that would provoke a second Arab-Israeli war.

  The Least You Need to Know

  The imperial powers continued to influence events in the Middle East, but individual countries became increasingly independent.

  King Abdullah of Transjordan annexed the West Bank and the Old City of Jerusalem. He was assassinated, and his grandson Hussein succeeded him.

  Israel created a parliamentary democracy, and its population doubled in three years as hundreds of thousands of immigrants, particularly from the Arab countries, returned to their homeland.

  The shooting stopped, but the Arabs imposed economic boycotts on Israel.

  Chapter 13

  War Over Suez

  In This Chapter

  Israel loses a friend in the White House

  The Aswan Dam bursts

  Israel sweeps through the desert

  Ike takes a stand

  On paper, Israel had won an improbable victory in 1948 and, in the years immediately afterward, continued to see itself as a small, beleaguered nation. Israel’s neighbors, however, remained convinced the new state had expansionist aims that threatened them. Some of this could perhaps be chalked up to political rhetoric for domestic consumption, designed to stir up the masses and unite them behind the nation’s ruler. For many Arabs, however, the fear of Israel was quite real.

  To Muslim fundamentalists, the Jewish state was a cancer in the Islamic body that could not be allowed to spread. And for the Arab nationalists, led by Egyptian President Nasser, Israel was like a Western dagger in the Arab heartland that had to be excised. In the 1950s, the nationalists dominated the Arab world, and Nasser was determined to lead them to a victory over Israel and its imperialist supporters.

  A Not-So-Colossal Agreement at Rhodes

  In the fall of 1948, the UN Security Council called on Israel and the Arab states to negotiate armistice agreements. Egypt resisted until Israel routed its army and drove the Egyptians to El Arish in the Sinai. At that time, the British were ready to defend Egypt under an Anglo-Egyptian treaty. Rather than accept the humiliation of British assistance, however, the Egyptians met the Israelis at Rhodes and negotiated an armistice agreement.

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  Mysteries of the Desert

  UN mediator Ralph Bunche brought the Israelis and Arabs together for bilateral talks at Rhodes. He warned that any delegation that walked out of the negotiations would be blamed for their breakdown. By the end, all the nations that had invaded Israel, except Iraq, signed armistice agreements. Bunche received the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts.

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  After 1949, the Arabs insisted that Israel accept the borders set down in the 1947 partition resolution (see Chapter 9) and repatriate the Palestinian refugees before they would negotiate an end to the war they had initiated. This was a novel approach that they would use after subsequent defeats: the doctrine of the limited-liability war. Under this theory, a country can go to war and try to win everything in the comfortable knowledge that, even if it is defeated, the leaders can insist that the boundaries be returned to what they were before the war.

  Israelis Miss Truman

  The Israelis were disappointed by the Arabs’ refusal to recognize Israel’s existence after the 1948 War of Independence. They were discouraged further by the policies of the new Eisenhower administration in the United States, which ranged from apathetic to hostile.

  After the 1948 war, Truman had initiated a modest foreign aid program for Israel, but Eisenhower quickly reduced the amount. Worse, throughout his term, he used aid as a lever to extract concessions from the Israelis when they engaged in activities he objected to, as in 1953 when payments were suspended to force Israel to stop work on a hydroelectric project on the Jordan River that Syria protested about to the UN because it diverted water to Israel. Eisenhower also refused to sell arms to Israel to avoid upsetting the Arabs, whose assistance he wanted to help contain communism.

  The new president also showed little tolerance for Israeli policies. When Israel formally moved the foreign ministry and other government institutions to Jerusalem, which the new state had declared as its capital (as it had been in the Jewish state of ancient times), Eisenhower criticized the decision and refused to move the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv (where it remains today). The justification for the policy was that the UN partition resolution had called for the internationalization of the city, yet Israel had taken the unilateral step of declaring it the capital. The Arab world was already furious that Israel had taken this step, and the administration feared its relations with Arab states would be jeopardized if the United States were to recognize Israeli sovereignty over the city.

  Nasser Leaves Israelis in Dry Dock

  Egypt had maintained its state of belligerency toward Israel after the armistice agreement was signed. The first manifestation of this was the closing of the Suez Canal to Israeli shipping.

  On August 9, 1949, the UN upheld Israel’s complaint that Egypt was illegally blocking the canal. UN negotiator Ralph Bunche declared, “There should be free movement for legitimate shipping, and no vestiges of the wartime blockade should be allowed to remain as they are inconsistent with both the letter and the spirit of the armistice agreements.”

  On September 1, 1951, the UN Security Council ordered Egypt to open the canal to Israeli shipping. Egypt refused to comply.

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  Sage Sayings

  The Arab people will not be embarrassed to declare: We shall not be satisfied except by the final obliteration of Israel from the map of the Middle East.

  —Egyptian foreign minister Muhammad Salah al-Din

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  The U.S. Can’t Contain Itself

  In the United States, a new Middle East policy began to take shape that would influence American decision makers for the remainder of the century. Eisenhower concluded that the Middle East was vital to American security interests because its oil reserves were critical to the economies of western Europe and the United States. Protection of this resource from internal or external threats, therefore, became of paramount importance. The greatest danger in the view of the Eisenhower administration was the Soviet Union, so U.S. policy throughout the 1950s was primarily shaped by the effort to contain communism.

  Eisenhower and his secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, believed that the Arab nations all agreed with their assessment of the Communist threa
t to the region, and that the only obstacle to a regional alliance against the Russians was the continuation of the Arab-Israeli conflict. In truth, most Arab rulers were not overly concerned with the Soviets and viewed the Zionists as the real expansionist power. They were more concerned with rivalries among themselves. The Arab states often played the superpowers off against each other in an effort to win concessions from one or the other. And nations such as Egypt and Syria eventually aligned themselves with the Soviets against the United States to win financial and military aid.

  One Arab ruler stood in the middle of everything—the inter-Arab rivalries, opposition to Western imperialism, Eisenhower’s bid to create a regional alliance, and the perpetuation of the war with Israel. That man was Egyptian president Gamel Abdel Nasser.

  NATO, Schmato

  Eisenhower set out to build a mini-NATO alliance in the Middle East to contain the Soviets in that region in much the same way the alliance was designed to keep the Soviets out of Europe. The pro-Western regimes in Turkey and Iraq were sympathetic and joined what became known as the Baghdad Pact in 1955. Great Britain, Iran, and Pakistan joined later that year, creating the Middle East Treaty Organization, which later became the Central Treaty Organization.

  The United States wanted Egypt to be a part of the alliance as well and was prepared to offer Nasser arms and aid if his country joined. The British opposed such a move because the Egyptians were continuing to harass British troops in the Suez Canal zone. After the British and Egyptians negotiated a deal on Suez a short time later, however, the Americans sent aid to Egypt.

  Despite the entreaties and the aid, the Egyptians were not willing to join the Baghdad Pact. In fact, Nasser actively opposed it and did everything in his power to undermine the alliance, which he saw as a continuation of Western interference in Arab affairs and a limitation on their independence. Partly out of fear of further alienating Nasser, the United States decided not to join the Baghdad Pact, thereby reducing the pact’s prestige, influence, and military capability.

  Certain U.S. officials continued to hope that Nasser could be won over and offered him promises of arms. When those promises were not immediately fulfilled, however, Nasser began to look to the Soviet Union for help.

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  Tut Tut!

  The United States had made some efforts to improve Arab-Israeli relations. From 1953 to 1955, a special envoy, Eric Johnston, worked on a plan for sharing the water of the Jordan River. The Israelis were willing to go along with it, but the Arabs weren’t, largely on the grounds that although it would benefit them, it would also benefit Israel. The experience should have been a lesson to the Eisenhower administration about the intractability of the dispute, but it wasn’t.

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  Dam It

  The U.S.–Egyptian relationship was further complicated by Eisenhower’s offer in 1955 to help build the Aswan Dam. The dam was to be constructed above the town of Aswan near the Sudanese border to collect water from the Nile to provide electric power and increase the cultivable area for Egyptian farmers. The Americans thought the project would create a U.S.–Egyptian friendship, help the Egyptian economy, make Nasser more popular at home, and enable him to make peace with Israel. Nasser saw things differently. His view was that the project would give outsiders too much influence over his economy, and that the cost of the project would leave him with no money to purchase weapons.

  Negotiations continued for roughly a year, during which time the Egyptian government recognized the People’s Republic of China, which undermined Eisenhower’s desire to isolate Communist China. He also continued to act belligerently toward Israel, and threatened to turn to the Soviet Union for the money to build the dam. Ultimately, Nasser decided to accept the American offer of assistance with the Aswan Dam in July 1956. By this time, however, the Egyptian’s actions had alienated Eisenhower and members of Congress—many of whom had not been too keen on the idea of such an expensive long-term project in the first place. To Nasser’s dismay, he learned on July 19 that the United States was formally withdrawing its offer.

  A few days later, responding to what he considered an insult to Egyptian dignity, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal with the intention of using the money Egypt would collect to pay for the construction of the Aswan Dam. The Canal had been built in 1869 and was privately owned by a French company. Although an agreement was later reached on compensation for the shareholders and the right of France and Great Britain to use the canal, both nations were furious with Nasser’s action and considered it a threat to their interests. The United States also condemned Nasser, but cautioned its allies against any military reaction.

  The Fedayeen Unleashed

  Prior to nationalizing the Suez Canal, Nasser began to import arms from the Soviet Bloc to build his arsenal for a confrontation with Israel. In the short term, however, he employed a new tactic to prosecute Egypt’s war with Israel. He announced it on August 31, 1955: “Egypt has decided to dispatch her heroes, the disciples of Pharaoh and the sons of Islam, and they will cleanse the land of Palestine…. There will be no peace on Israel’s border because we demand vengeance, and vengeance is Israel’s death.”

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  Ask the Sphinx

  In 1953, Israel created a secret unit to retaliate against the fedayeen. It infiltrated their bases and struck both preemptively and vengefully. Unit 101, as it was known, was led by Ariel Sharon, who would later gain greater fame for his exploits on the battlefield, his controversial role as defense minister during Israel’s war in Lebanon, and his most recent post as prime minister.

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  These “heroes” were Arab terrorists, or fedayeen (see Chapter 6), trained and equipped by Egyptian intelligence to engage in hostile action on the border and infiltrate Israel to commit acts of sabotage and murder. The fedayeen operated mainly from bases in Jordan so that Jordan would bear the brunt of Israel’s retaliation, which inevitably followed. The terrorist attacks violated the armistice agreement provision that prohibited the initiation of hostilities by paramilitary forces. Nevertheless, it was Israel that was condemned by the UN Security Council for its counterattacks.

  The escalation continued with the Egyptian blockade of the Straits of Tiran, Israel’s only supply route with Asia, and Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal in July 1956. On October 14, Nasser made clear his intent: “I am not solely fighting against Israel itself. My task is to deliver the Arab world from destruction through Israel’s intrigue, which has its roots abroad. Our hatred is very strong. There is no sense in talking about peace with Israel. There is not even the smallest place for negotiations.”

  Ominously, less than two weeks later, on October 25, Egypt signed a tripartite agreement with Syria and Jordan, which placed Nasser in command of all three armies.

  Canal Collusion

  Eisenhower had successfully persuaded the British and French not to attack Egypt after Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal in July. When the agreement on the canal’s use proved reliable over the succeeding weeks, it became more and more difficult to justify military action. Still, the French and British desperately wanted to put Nasser in his place and recapture their strategic asset.

  The French had grown increasingly close to the new Israeli government, politically, diplomatically, and militarily. The alliance with France proved to be crucial for Israel in the years to come. The French became Israel’s primary source of arms for roughly a decade and provided the key elements that ultimately allowed Israel to develop a nuclear capability. The British attitude toward Israel had hardly changed from the mandatory period. Residual bitterness over the nearly three-decade-long battle fought with the Zionists, combined with the ongoing alliance with Jordan, discouraged any shift in policy.

  The French concluded, however, that they could use Israel’s fear of Egyptian aggression and the continuing blockade as a pretext for their own strike against Nasser. The British couldn’t pass up the chance to join in.

  The three nations subs
equently agreed on a plan whereby Israel would land paratroopers near the canal and send its armor across the Sinai Desert. The British and French would then call for both sides to withdraw from the canal zone, fully expecting the Egyptians to refuse. At that point, British and French troops would be deployed to “protect” the canal.

  From Israel’s perspective, the continued blockade of the Suez Canal and Gulf of Aqaba, combined with the increased fedayeen attacks and the belligerence of recent Arab statements, made the situation intolerable. Rather than continue to fight a war of attrition with the terrorists and wait for Nasser and his allies to build their forces up sufficiently to wage a new war, Israel’s prime minister David Ben-Gurion decided to launch a preemptive strike. The backing of the British and French, he thought, would give him cover against the opposition of the United States. He was wrong.

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  Sage Sayings

  Israel and barium make quite a combination.

  —Eisenhower’s remark while in the hospital for a checkup, after warning Ben-Gurion not to go to war

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  Back to the Desert

  On October 29, 1956, Israel attacked Egypt. The following day, Israel’s ambassador to the United Nations, Abba Eban, catalogued the provocations to the Security Council:

  During the six years during which this belligerency has operated in violation of the Armistice Agreement, there have occurred 1,843 cases of armed robbery and theft, 1,339 cases of armed clashes with Egyptian armed forces, 435 cases of an incursion from Egyptian controlled territory, 172 cases of sabotage perpetrated by Egyptian military units and fedayeen in Israel. As a result of these actions of Egyptian hostility within Israel, 364 Israelis were wounded and 101 killed. In 1956 alone, as a result of this aspect of Egyptian aggression, 28 Israelis were killed and 127 wounded.