Delphi Complete Works of Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Illustrated) (Delphi Ancient Classics Book 79)

by Dionysius of Halicarnassus

  [3] He asked them also to bear in mind that states are not overthrown by those who are poor and without power, when they are compelled to do justice, but by the rich and such as are capable of administering public affairs, when they are insulted by their inferiors and fail to keep justice. And even if those who were to be deprived of the benefit of their contracts were not going to harbour any resentment but would submit with some degree of meekness and indifference to their losses, yet even in that case, he said, it would be neither honourable nor safe for them to gratify the poor with such a gift, by which the life of the community would be devoid of all intercourse, full of mutual hatred, and lacking in the necessary employments without which cities cannot be inhabited, since neither the husbandmen would any longer sow and plant their lands, nor the merchants sail the sea and trade in foreign markets, nor the poor employ themselves in any other just occupation.

  [4] εἰς ἅπαντα γὰρ ταῦτα τοῖς δεομένοις ἀφορμῆς οὐδένα τῶν εὐπόρων τὰ ἑαυτοῦ χρήματα προήσεσθαι: ἐκ δὲ τούτων φθονήσεσθαι μὲν εὐπορίαν, καταλυθήσεσθαι δὲ φιλεργίαν, κρείττω δὲ μοῖραν ἕξειν [p. 240] τοὺς ἀκολάστους τῶν σωφρόνων, τοὺς δ᾽ ἀδίκους τῶν δικαίων καὶ τοὺς σφετεριζομένους τἀλλότρια τῶν φυλαττόντων τὰ ἴδια. ταῦτα δ᾽ εἶναι τὰ ποιοῦντα διχοστασίας ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ ἀλληλοφθορίας ἀπαύστους καὶ πᾶσαν ἄλλην κακῶν ἰδέαν, ὑφ᾽ ὧν αἱ μὲν εὐτυχέστατα πράξασαι τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ἀφῃρέθησαν, αἱ δὲ τῆς χείρονος μοίρας τυχοῦσαι πανώλεθροι διεφθάρησαν.

  [4] For none of the rich would throw away their money to supply those who needed the means of carrying on any of these occupations; and in consequence wealth would be hated and industry destroyed, and the prodigal would be in a better condition than the frugal, the unjust than the just, and those who appropriated to themselves the fortunes of others would have the advantage over those who guarded their own. These were the things that created seditions in states, mutual slaughter without end, and every other sort of mischief, by which the most prosperous of them had lost their liberty and those whose lot was less fortunate had been totally destroyed.

  [1] παντὸς δὲ μάλιστα σκοπεῖν αὐτοὺς ἠξίου καινὴν καθισταμένους πολιτείαν, ὅπως μηθὲν εἰς αὐτὴν παρελεύσεται πονηρὸν ἔθος, πολλὴν ἀνάγκην εἶναι λέγων ὁποἶ ἄττ᾽ ἂν ᾖ τὰ κοινὰ τῶν πόλεων ἐπιτηδεύματα, τοιούτους γίνεσθαι τοὺς τῶν ἰδιωτῶν βίους. ἔθος δ᾽ εἶναι οὐδὲν κάκιον οὔτε πόλεσιν οὔτε οἴκοις τοῦ καθ᾽ ἡδονὰς ἀεὶ ζῆν ἕκαστον καὶ τοῦ πάντα συγχωρεῖσθαι τοῖς ἥττοσιν ὑπὸ τῶν κρειττόνων, εἴτε πρὸς χάριν εἴτε πρὸς ἀνάγκην: οὐ γὰρ ἀποπληροῦσθαι τὰς ἐπιθυμίας τῶν ἀφρόνων τυγχανούσας ὧν ἂν δεηθῶσιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἑτέρων εὐθὺς ὀρέγεσθαι μειζόνων καὶ εἰς ἄπειρον προβαίνειν: μάλιστα δὲ τοῦτο πάσχειν τοὺς ὄχλους: ἃ γὰρ καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸν ἕκαστος αἰσχύνεται πράττειν ἢ δέδιεν ὑπὸ τοῦ κρείττονος κατειργόμενος, ταῦτ᾽ ἐν κοινῷ γενομένους ἑτοιμότερον παρανομεῖν προσειληφότας ἰσχὺν ταῖς ἑαυτῶν γνώμαις ἐκ τῶν τὰ ὅμοια βουλομένων.

  [67.1] But, above all, he advised them, in instituting a new form of government, to take care that no bad custom should gain admittance there. For he declared that of whatever nature the public principles of states were, such of necessity would be the lives of the individual citizens. And there was no worse practice, he said, either for states or for families, than for everyone to live always according to his own pleasure and for everything to be granted to inferiors by their superiors, whether out of favour or from necessity. For the desires of the unintelligent are not satisfied when they obtain what they demand, but they immediately covet other and greater things, and so on without end; and this is the case particularly with the masses. For the lawless deeds which each one by himself is either ashamed or afraid to commit, being restrained by the more powerful, they are more ready to engage in when they have got together and gained strength for their own inclinations from those who are like minded.

  [2] ἀπληρώτους δὲ καὶ ἀορίστους ὑπαρχούσας τὰς τῶν ἀνοήτων ὄχλων ἐπιθυμίας ἀρχομένας ἔφη δεῖν κωλύειν, ἕως εἰσὶν ἀσθενεῖς, οὐχ, ὅταν ἰσχυραὶ [p. 241] καὶ μεγάλαι δύνωνται, καθαιρεῖν. χαλεπωτέραν γὰρ ὀργὴν ἅπαντας ἔχειν τῶν συγχωρηθέντων στερομένους ἢ τῶν ἐλπιζομένων μὴ τυγχάνοντας.

  [2] And since the desires of the unintelligent mob are insatiable and boundless, it is necessary, he said, to check them at the very outset, while they are weak, instead of trying to destroy them after they have become great and powerful. For all men feel more violent anger when deprived of what has already been granted to them than when disappointed of what they merely hope for.

  [3] παραδείγμασί τε πολλοῖς εἰς τοῦτ᾽ ἐχρήσατο πόλεων Ἑλληνίδων ἔργα διεξιών, ὅσαι μαλακισθεῖσαι δι᾽ ἀκαιρούς τινας ἀφορμὰς καὶ πονηρῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἀρχὰς ἐφεῖσαι παρελθεῖν οὐκέτι παῦσαι καὶ ἀνελεῖν αὐτὰ δύναμιν ἔσχον: ἐξ ὧν εἰς αἰσχρὰς καὶ ἀνηκέστους ἠναγκάσθησαν προελθεῖν συμφοράς. ἐοικέναι τε τῷ καθ᾽ ἕνα τὸ κοινὸν ἔφη, ψυχῇ μὲν ἀνδρὸς ἀνάλογον ἐχούσης τι τῆς βουλῆς,

  [3] He cited many examples to prove this, relating the experiences of various Greek cities which, having become weakened because of certain critical situations and having given admittance to the beginnings of evil practices, had no longer had the power to put an end to them and abolish them, in consequence of which they had been compelled to go on into shameful and irreparable calamities. He said the commonwealth resembled each particular man, the senate bearing some resemblance to the soul of a man and the people to his body.

  [4] σώματι δὲ τοῦ δήμου. ἐὰν μὲν οὖν τῆς βουλῆς τὸν ἄφρονα δῆμον ἄρχειν ἐῶσιν, ὅμοια πείσεσθαι αὐτοὺς ἔφη τοῖς ὑποτάττουσι τὴν ψυχὴν τῷ σώματι καὶ μὴ κατὰ τὸν λογισμόν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὰ πάθη ζῶσιν. ἐὰν δ᾽ ἄρχεσθαί τε καὶ ἄγεσθαι τὸν δῆμον συνεθίζωσιν ὑπὸ τῆς βουλῆς, ταὐτὸ ποιήσουσι τοῖς ὑποτάττουσι τῇ ψυχῇ τὸ σῶμα καὶ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, ἀλλὰ μὴ

  [4] If, therefore, they permitted the unintelligent populace to govern the senate, they would fare the same as those who subject the soul to the body and live under the influence, not of their reason, but of their passions; whereas, if they accustomed the populace to be governed and led by the senate, they would be doing the same as those who subject the body to the soul and lead lives directed toward what is best, not most pleasant.

  [5] πρὸς τὸ ἥδιστον τοὺς βίους ἄγουσι. βλάβην δὲ μεγάλην οὐδεμίαν ἀπέφαινε συμβήσεσθαι
τῇ πόλει, ἐὰν οἱ πένητες ἀγανακτοῦντες ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ συγχωρηθῆναι σφίσι τὴν χρεοκοπίαν μὴ θελήσωσιν ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς τὰ ὅπλα ἀναλαβεῖν, ὀλίγους τινὰς εἶναι λέγων παντάπασι τοὺς μηδὲν ὑπολειπομένους ἑαυτοῖς ἔξω τοῦ σώματος, οὓς οὔτ᾽ ὠφέλειάν τινα παρέξεσθαι τῷ κοινῷ θαυμαστὴν [p. 242] ὅσην παρόντας ταῖς στρατείαις, οὔτε βλάβην ἀπόντας: ὑπομιμνήσκων αὐτούς, ὅτι τὴν ἐσχάτην ἀπελάμβανον ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις χώραν οἱ τοὐλάχιστον ἔχοντες τοῦ βίου τίμημα, καὶ ὅτι προσθήκης μοῖραν ἐπεῖχον οὗτοι τοῖς ἐν φάλαγγι τεταγμένοις, καταπλήξεως ἕνεκα τῶν πολεμίων συνόντες, οἷα δὴ μηδὲν φέροντες ὅπλον ὅτι μὴ σφενδόνας, ὧν ἐλάχιστον ἐν ταῖς μάχαις εἶναι ὄφελος.

  [5] He showed them that no great mischief would befall the state if the poor, dissatisfied with them for not granting an abolition of debts, should refuse to take up arms in its defence, declaring that there were few indeed who had nothing left but their persons, and these would neither offer any remarkable advantage to the state when present on its expeditions, nor, by their absence to do any great harm. For those who had the lowest rating in the census, he reminded them, were posted in the rear in battle and counted as a mere appendage to the forces that were arrayed in the battle-line, being present merely to strike the enemy with terror, since they had no other arms but slings, which are of the least use in action.

  [1] τούς τ᾽ οἰκτείρειν τὴν πενίαν τῶν πολιτῶν ἀξιοῦντας καὶ βοηθεῖν τοῖς μὴ δυναμένοις διαλῦσαι τὰ χρέα παραινοῦντας ἔφη δεῖν ἐξετάζειν, τί ποτε τὸ πεποιηκὸς ἦν αὐτοὺς ἀπόρους κλήρους τε παραλαβόντας, οὓς οἱ πατέρες αὐτῶν κατέλιπον, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν στρατειῶν πολλὰ ὠφεληθέντας, καὶ τὰ τελευταῖα ἐκ τῆς δημευθείσης τῶν τυράννων οὐσίας τὴν ἐπιβαλοῦσαν μοῖραν λαβόντας: ἔπειθ᾽ οὓς μὲν ἂν ὁρῶσι τῇ γαστρὶ καὶ ταῖς αἰσχίσταις ἐζηκότας ἡδοναῖς καὶ διὰ ταῦτ᾽ ἐκπεπτωκότας ἐκ τῶν βίων, αἰσχύνας τῆς πόλεως νομίζειν καὶ βλάβας, καὶ μέγα τῷ κοινῷ κέρδος ὑπολαμβάνειν, ἐὰν ἑκόντες ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως ἀποφθαρῶσιν: οὓς δ᾽ ἂν αἰσθάνωνται διὰ πονηρὰν τύχην ἀπολωλεκότας τοὺς βίους, ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων τούτους [p. 243]

  [68.1] He said that those who thought it proper to pity the poverty of the citizens and who advised relieving such of them as were unable to pay their debts ought to inquire what it was that had made them poor, when they had inherited the lands their fathers had left them and had gained much booty from their campaigns, and, last of all, when each of them had received his share of the confiscated property of the tyrants; and after that they ought to look upon such of them as they found had lived for their bellies and the most shameful pleasures, and by such means had lost their fortunes, as a disgrace and injury to the city, and to regard it as a great benefit to the common weal if they would voluntarily get to the devil out of the city. But in the case of such as they found to have lost their fortunes through an unkind fate, he advised them to relieve these with their private means.

  [2] εὖ ποιεῖν. ἄριστα δὲ τοῦτο καὶ γινώσκειν καὶ ποιήσειν ἔφησε τοὺς συμβεβληκότας αὐτοῖς καὶ βοηθήσειν αὐτῶν ταῖς τύχαις αὐτοὺς ἐκείνους οὐκ ἀναγκασθέντας ὑφ᾽ ἑτέρων, ἀλλ᾽ ἑκόντας, ἵν᾽ αὐτοῖς ἡ χάρις ἀντὶ τῶν χρημάτων καλὸν ὀφείλημα περιῇ. κοινὴν δὲ ποιεῖν τὴν βοήθειαν ἅπασιν, ἧς ἐξ ἴσου μεθέξουσιν οἱ πονηροὶ τοῖς χρηστοῖς, καὶ μὴ ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων τινὰς εὖ ποιεῖν, καὶ ὧν τὰ χρήματα ἀφαιροῦνται, τούτοις μηδὲ τὰς ὑπὲρ τῶν εὐεργεσιῶν καταλιπεῖν χάριτας, ἥκιστα τῇ Ῥωμαίων ἀρετῇ προσήκειν.

  [2] Their creditors, he said, not only understood this best, but would attend to it best, and would themselves relieve their misfortunes, not under compulsion from others, but voluntarily, to the end that gratitude, instead of their money, might accrue to them as a noble debt. But to extend the relief to all alike, when the worthless would share it equally with the deserving, and to confer benefits on certain persons, not at their own expense, but at that of others, and not to leave to those whose money they took away even the gratitude owed for these services, was in no wise consistent with the virtue of Romans.

  [3] ὑπὲρ ἅπαντα δὲ ταῦτα καὶ τἆλλα, δεινόν τι καὶ οὐκ ἀνεκτὸν εἶναι Ῥωμαίοις τῆς ἡγεμονίας ἀντιποιουμένοις, ἣν διὰ πολλῶν πόνων οἱ πατέρες αὐτῶν κτησάμενοι τοῖς ἐκγόνοις κατέλιπον, μὴ κατὰ προαίρεσιν μηδὲ πεισθέντας μηδ᾽ ἐν ᾧ προσῆκε καιρῷ τὰ βέλτιστα καὶ τῷ κοινῷ συμφέροντα πράττειν, ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ ἑαλωκυίας τῆς πόλεως ἢ προσδοκώσης τοῦτο πείσεσθαι παρὰ τὸ δοκοῦν ἑαυτοῖς πράττειν, ἐξ ὧν ὠφέλειαν μὲν οὐδεμίαν ἢ μικράν τινα κομιδῇ λήψονται, κακῶν δὲ κινδυνεύσουσι τὰ ἔσχατα παθεῖν.

  [3] But above all these and the other considerations, it was a grievous and intolerable thing for the Romans, who were laying claim to the leadership — a leadership which their ancestors had acquired through many hardships and left to their posterity — if they could not do what was best and most advantageous for the commonwealth also, by their own choice, or when convinced by argument, or at the proper time, but, just as if the city had been captured or were expecting to suffer that fate, must do things contrary to their own judgment from which they would receive very little benefit, if any, but would run the risk of suffering the very worst of ills.

  [4] μακρῷ γὰρ αὐτοῖς εἶναι κρεῖττον ἃ κελεύουσι Λατῖνοι πράττειν ὡς μετριώτερα ὄντα καὶ μηδ᾽ εἰς πεῖραν ἐλθεῖν πολέμου, ἢ τοῖς μηδαμῇ μηδὲν χρησίμοις συγχωρήσαντας ἃ παρακαλοῦσιν ἀνελεῖν τὴν πίστιν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ἣν ἱεροῦ κατασκευῇ [p. 244] καὶ θυσίαις διετησίοις οἱ πατέρες αὐτῶν ἔταξαν γεραίρεσθαι, μέλλοντας σφενδονητῶν συμμαχίαν ἐπὶ τὸν πόλεμον προσλαμβάνειν.

  [4] For it was far better for them to submit to the commands of the Latins, as being more moderate, and not even to try the fortune of war, than by yielding to the pleas of those who were of no use upon any occasion, to abolish from the south the public faith, which their ancestors had appointed to be honoured by the erection of a temple and by sacrifices performed throughout the year — and this when they were merely going to add a body of slingers to their forces for the war.

  [5] κεφάλαιον δὲ τῆς γνώμης ἦν αὐτῷ τόδε: τοὺς μὲν θέλοντας τῶν πολιτῶν κοινωνεῖν τῆς ἐκ τοῦ πολέμου τ�
�χης ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς δικαίοις, οἷς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστος, παραλαμβάνειν ἐπὶ τὰ πράγματα: τοὺς δὲ κατὰ συνθήκας ὁποίας δήποτε ἀξιοῦντας ἀναλαμβάνειν τὰ ὅπλα περὶ τῆς πατρίδος, ὡς οὐδὲν εἰ λάβοιεν ὠφελήσοντας, χαίρειν ἐᾶν. εἰ γὰρ τοῦτο μάθοιεν, εἴξειν αὐτοὺς ἔφη, καὶ παρέξειν σφᾶς αὐτοὺς τοῖς τὰ κράτιστα περὶ τοῦ κοινοῦ βουλεύουσιν εὐπειθεῖς. εἰωθέναι γὰρ ἀεί πως τὸ ἀνόητον ἅπαν, ὅταν μέν τις αὐτὸ κολακεύῃ μεγάλα φρονεῖν, ὅταν δὲ δεδίττηται σωφρονεῖν.

  [5] The sum and substance of his advice was this: to take for the business in hand such citizens as were willing to share the fortune of the war upon the same terms as every other Roman, and to let those who insisted upon any special terms whatever for taking up arms for their country go hang, since they would be of no use even if they did arm. For if they knew this, he said, they would yield and show themselves prompt to obey those who took the wisest counsel for the commonwealth; since all the unintelligent are generally wont, when flattered, to be arrogant, and when terrified, to show restraint.