Party leaders hoped that such measures would raise the enthusiasm of poor peasants and encourage their participation in the war effort. On June 4, 1953, Radio Vietminh broadcast a letter allegedly sent from a peasant woman to Ho Chi Minh:
During the French domination, my children and I lacked rice to feed ourselves and clothes to clad us. My children had to rent out their services and I continued to live from day to day by collecting potatoes and by digging the ground for roots.... At the end of 1952, the peasants began the struggle against dishonest and nasty landlords.... It is thanks to you that we now have such an easy life and we shall never forget it.15
For militant elements, however, such measures were still inadequate, because the number of landless peasants in liberated areas, although steadily dropping, constituted up to 15 percent of the population. At a national conference on agriculture held in November, Truong Chinh proposed a tougher policy and submitted the draft of a new land reform law that would lead to the confiscation of the land and property of virtually the entire landlord class.
Ho Chi Minh’s attitude toward the proposal has never been entirely clear, although it is likely that he had argued against any land reform program that would be so stringent that it would alienate moderate elements throughout the country. In any event, the manpower needs of the revolution ultimately prevailed. In a speech to the DRV National Assembly a few weeks after the November agriculture conference, Ho conceded that in past years government policies had been too solicitous of the views of the landlord class and not enough of the concerns of peasants. The next month, a new land reform law ordered the enforcement of rent reduction regulations, while extending the confiscation of landholdings to the entire landlord class. Landlords classified as politically progressive would be compensated for their loss by government bonds, but would still be compelled to give up all farmlands beyond the amount needed for their personal livelihood. Those convicted of tyrannical practices were to be punished. The objective of the new legislation was not only to win peasant support, but also to destroy the lingering power of the gentry in rural areas. While the program included provisions for the reeducation of landed elements not considered guilty of crimes against the people, in practice such provisions were often ignored by zealous cadres at the village level. For the first time since the Nghe Tinh revolt in 1930–31, the Party had decided to unleash the specter of class war in the countryside.16
In January 1953, Dwight D. Eisenhower entered the White House as the thirty-fourth president of the United States. Ike had campaigned on a platform that called for a “rollback of communism,” and leading members of his Republican Party had been critical of the loss of China and the stalemate in Korea that represented the Asian legacy of his Democratic predecessor. In his State of the Union address delivered in early February, Eisenhower had little to say about Indochina, simply noting that the Korean War was “part of the same calculated assault that the aggressor is simultaneously pressing in Indochina and Malaya, and of the strategic situation that manifestly embraces the island of Formosa and the Chinese Nationalist forces there.”17 But during talks held with visiting French Prime Minister René Mayer at the White House in late March, the new chief executive indicated that he would be willing to increase U.S. military assistance to the French, but only if the latter demonstrated the will to adopt a more aggressive approach in seeking total victory in Indochina.
The French, however, had long since abandoned any such intention. As early as December 1949, General Carpentier had warned President Vincent Auriol that the best that could be hoped for was a political solution. The French withdrawal from the border region the following year reflected a tacit acceptance of Carpentier’s gloomy outlook, and although the assignment of General de Lattre de Tassigny to command French forces in Indochina in late 1950 led to brief hopes for a triumph over the forces of communism in the region, after his departure and replacement by General Salan a year later French generals and politicians alike were reduced to seeking a political settlement.
To receive U.S. assistance in improving the French military position in advance of a negotiated settlement, however, it was necessary for the French to provide assurances that they would indeed adopt a more aggressive approach in Indochina. The task of persuading the White House to increase U.S. military aid fell to a newly appointed commander in chief of the FEF, General Henri Navarre. Then chief of staff of French NATO forces in Europe, Navarre was by no means Washington’s first choice as a replacement for Salan, since he brought with him a reputation for caution and even indecisiveness. After his appointment, Navarre attempted to allay such suspicions by adopting an ambitious strategy (known popularly as the Navarre Plan) to seize the initiative in the fighting in Indochina.
Mayer’s ploy of appearing to adopt an aggressive stance in Indochina had only limited success in Washington, where suspicion of French intentions was now chronic. In early August 1953, an article in Life magazine harshly criticized the French effort in Indochina and asserted that the war was “all but lost.” But the new administration in Washington felt that it had little choice. Reluctantly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff gave their approval to the Navarre Plan, and in September the Eisenhower administration signed a new aid pact increasing U.S. aid to the FEF. The prognosis in Paris, however, was far from promising. Mayer’s own defense minister, René Pleven, warned that Navarre’s plan was unrealistic, and in July the U.S. Embassy in Paris reported that the French government had rejected the general’s request for twelve battalions, which would have had to be transferred to Indochina from Europe. Public support in France for the war was now rapidly melting away, and when the news of the aid agreement was announced in Paris on September 29, critics charged that French blood was to be exchanged for American dollars.18
The Navarre Plan was not scheduled to take effect until the spring and summer of 1954. In the meantime, French forces would adopt a defensive policy, while shoring up their positions in the Red River delta and other key areas of the country. One of those areas was the far northwest, the area that had been occupied by Vietminh units in the fall of 1952 as a jumping-off point for their attacks in Laos. In November 1953, in response to an order from Paris to protect the Laotian capital of Luang Prabang from the enemy threat, Navarre decided to occupy the fort at Dien Bien Phu, a small district capital in a remote mountain valley of Vietnam near the Laotian border, as a means of disrupting Vietminh links with central and northern Laos. The town had previously been seized by the Vietminh during their offensive in the northwestern region. Now French paratroopers landed in the valley to take it back.
While General Navatre was attempting to put the first phases of his own strategy into effect, Vietminh strategists had drawn up their own plan of operations for the 1953 campaign. At a meeting of the Central Committee held early in the year, Party planners had decided to avoid an open confrontation with enemy forces for the foreseeable future, while continuing to seek to locate vulnerable points in the enemy’s defensive shield, notably in Laos, Cambodia, and the far northwest. This strategy had not changed throughout the course of the year, even after it became clear that Navarre had decided to concentrate his own forces in the Red River delta to reduce the Vietminh threat to the region around Hanoi. Vo Nguyen Giap had proposed a major operation in the delta with the ultimate objective of seizing Hanoi and Haiphong, but Chinese advisers argued for a more cautious strategy focused on the mountainous northwest. Ho Chi Minh backed the Chinese suggestion, and the Politburo approved it in September. This plan was scheduled to be confirmed at a meeting of the VWP Central Military Committee held in November.19
News of the French occupation of Dien Bien Phu arrived at Vietminh headquarters just as military commanders were preparing to present to the Central Military Committee their plans for an attack on the French post at Lai Chau, the isolated French military post in the mountains about thirty miles directly to the north of Dien Bien Phu. To the Vietminh leadership, Navarre’s gambit opened up promising possibilities, as well as
risks. Although the French seizure of Dien Bien Phu posed a severe threat to their communications links with northern Laos, a Vietminh reoccupation of that base could have a significant impact on French morale and set the stage for further advances during the coming year. The area also offered a number of strategic advantages. Located more than two hundred miles from Hanoi, it would represent a severe problem for the French in their efforts to provide supplies and reinforcements.
On the other hand, if an attack at Dien Bien Phu were to be launched, it would be the first time that the Vietminh had tried to wage a direct assault on a base strongly defended by French forces. Still, it was located in a mountain valley and was close enough to the Chinese border and to Vietminh headquarters in the Viet Bac to permit the shipment in substantial quantities of Chinese matériel. After a careful deliberation of the options and with apparent encouragement from Chinese advisers and their superiors in Beijing, on December 6 Party leaders decided to shift the focus of their efforts in the 1954 campaign to Dien Bien Phu. During the remainder of the year, Vietminh leaders began to infiltrate three newly organized main-force divisions into the mountains around the town, while other units advanced into northern Laos to provide a diversion and force the French to scatter their forces.20
Why had Chinese leaders suddenly decided to urge their Vietminh allies to engage in what promised to be a major confrontation with the French? After all, the decision to mount an assault on Dien Bien Phu would require a substantial increase in the quantity and quality of Chinese assistance; a key to success would be the ability of Vietminh artillery to reduce or even stop the French from bringing reinforcements and supplies into the area as the fighting intensified. Although Beijing had been providing assistance to the Vietminh in their struggle for power for three years and undoubtedly saw advantages in meeting China’s international obligations as well as protecting its vulnerable southern border against imperialist control, in recent months Chinese leaders had begun to shift the focus of their thinking. In July, a cease-fire had taken effect on the Korean peninsula. The cost of intervention by the PLA in Korea had been high, and there were now signs that Chinese leaders had decided to seek improved relarions with the West in order to reduce the threat of future conflicts and enable the government to shift scarce resources to a new five-year plan. In the new environment, Mao Zedong’s apocalyptic vision of an inevitable war with imperialism in Asia lost its force. In an interview on August 24, Chinese Premier and Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai declared that “other questions” could be discussed in connection with a possible peace conference to bring a definitive end to the conflict in Korea. In December he had broached with members of an Indian delegation the idea of a mutual agreement based on what eventually came to be known as the “five principles of peaceful coexistence” among states. Washington had responded with its own subtle signal when Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, in a speech to the American Legion in early September, implied that the United States was willing to consider a negotiated agreement to bring an end to the conflict in Indochina.21
Interest in bringing an end to the Indochina conflict was also rising in Moscow. New Soviet Prime Minister Georgy Malenkov, who had emerged as the dominant figure on the scene after the death of Joseph Stalin in March, had strong reasons to seek improved relations with the West, including a burgeoning defense budget that diverted scarce funds from needed economic projects. In late September, the USSR suggested the convening of a five-power conference aimed at reducing international tensions. A few days later, China followed suit.
The French occupation of Dien Bien Phu, then, took place just as Chinese leaders (like their Soviet counterparts) were making the decision to launch a peace offensive to bring about a negotiated settlement in Indochina, and a reduction in tensions between the PRC and the United States. A Vietminh victory at Dien Bien Phu could lead to increased tensions in the area, tempting the United States to intervene directly. On the other hand, it could also stimulate antiwar sentiment in France and set the stage for a peace agreement that would be favorable to the Vietminh, and to the interests of China as well. For Beijing, the gamble was worth the risk.22
While Ho Chi Minh and his colleagues were undoubtedly grateful to China for offering increased assistance to their projected campaign in the northwest, the reaction in Vietminh headquarters to the flurry of interest expressed in major world capitals for a negotiated peace in Indochina must have been cautious. In the opening months of the war, when Vietminh forces were manifestly weaker than those of their opponents, Ho had tirelessly promoted the cause of a compromise settlement. As the conditions on the battlefield improved, and it became clear that the French no longer sought a total victory, however, it is likely that enthusiasm among Vietminh leaders for such a compromise declined. In remarks to the visiting French Communist Léo Figuères in March 1950, Ho stressed that although Party leaders were amenable to a negotiated settlement, they were not willing to make major concessions. Truong Chinh was even more hostile. In a speech on the sixth anniversary of the founding of the DRV given in September 1951, he warned that the DRV should not be lured into negotiations and insisted that it was necessary to “extirpate every opportunist’s illusion of peace negotiations with the enemy.” When Paris sent out feelers on a compromise agreement at the end of 1952, they were ignored by the DRV. As late as September 1953, the Soviet news agency Tass reported that in a speech on the eighth anniversary of the formation of the DRV, Ho Chi Minh had declared that peace could come about only as the result of victory.23
A few weeks later, however, Vietnamese Party leaders decided to go along with the proposal of Moscow and Beijing to seek a political settlement. In an interview held on October 20 with a correspondent from the Swedish journal Expressen, Ho declared that his government was willing to attend an international conference to bring about a peaceful settlement in Indochina. “If the French government wish to have an armistice and to resolve the question of Vietnam by means of negotiations,” he declared, “the people and government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam are ready to examine the French proposals.” The interview was widely reported in the world press. Shortly after, Beijing made explict its agreement in an editorial in People’s Daily. According to a U.S. diplomatic source in Saigon, Ho’s offer of peace talks caused “confusion, consternation, and outright fear” among Vietnamese non-Communists in Saigon,24
Ever the realist, Ho Chi Minh was aware that a negotiated settlement was one of the options for bringing about an end to the war. The decision by the United States in July 1953 to seek an end to the conflict in Korea was a comforting sign that the imperialists were willing to grant concessions when they faced major difficulties; the news had undoubtedly aroused hopes within the Vietminh movement that a similar result might be achieved in Indochina. But in a speech to a group of intellectuals in the Viet Bac a few weeks later, Ho had warned his audience that it should have no illusions that peace would come easily. Like the Americans, the French would not be willing to grant major concessions at the peace table unless they were defeated on the battlefield. The enemy, he warned, “is trying to trick us by dropping bait in the water; if we rush in like a school of fish and forget to be alert to defend ourselves, they will easily defeat us.” It was therefore important to be vigilant and continue the struggle, even if the United States should decide to enter the conflict.25
Under the circumstances, even as he expressed his willingness to enter peace talks, Ho must have felt some misgivings for, as he pointed out to colleagues in a meeting held in November, conditions for a complete victory were not totally ripe. At the same time, the attitude of the USSR and China was a source for concern, Soviet support for the Vietnamese war of national liberation had always been lukewarm, and thus not much was probably expected from Moscow. But firm assistance from the PRC was a crucial component in the Vietminh strategy, and any indication that Beijing was preparing to compromise on the issue for the sake of its own national interests would have deepened the worry lines on
the foreheads of Ho and his colleagues in the Viet Bac.26
On the other hand, Ho Chi Minh was aware that the Vietminh were in no position to continue their protracted struggle without the full backing of the Chinese. It would not be the first time that he had accepted the necessity of a compromise in order to fight again another day. For their part, Moscow and Beijing hardly needed Vietnamese concurrence to pursue their own national security needs. At a conference held in Berlin early in 1954, delegates for the major powers reached agreement that another international conference should be convened at Geneva in April to discuss issues relating to world peace. Much to the discomfiture of the Eisenhower administration, Indochina, along with the situation in Korea, was to be placed on the table for discussion. In March, a DRV delegation traveled to Beijing to consult with Chinese officials on hammering out a common strategy at Geneva. Shortly after, a Vietnamese delegation led by Ho Chi Minh visited Bejing and Moscow to formulate a joint negotiating strategy with Soviet and Chinese leaders. Basing their advice on experience derived from negotiations with the United States to bring an end to the conflict in Korea, the latter warned the Vietnamese to be “realistic” in their expectations at Geneva.27
Two days after the announcement of the upcoming conference at Geneva, French intelligence sources learned that Vietminh units in upper Laos were heading east in the direction of Dien Bien Phu. Although Vietnamese operations were under way in other areas—in Cochin China, in the Central Highlands, in Laos, and in the Hanoi–Haiphong corridor—by early March captured documents revealed to the French that a major Vietminh offensive in the northwest was imminent and that it would be synchronized with the upcoming negotiations in Geneva. There were additional indications that Chinese military assistance to the Vietminh had dramatically increased, thus improving the latter’s prospects for victory.
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