On this occasion, French intelligence sources were correct. Beginning in December, Vietminh units gradually assembled in the mountains surrounding the French base at Dien Bien Phu, while thousands of civilian porters were mobilized to transport ammunition and heavy artillery pieces from the Chinese border into the area. As one participant later recounted it to an American journalist:
We had to cross mountains and jungles, marching at night and sleeping by day to avoid enemy bombing. We sometimes slept in foxholes, or just by the trail. We each carried a rifle, ammunition, and hand grenades, and our packs contained a blanket, a mosquito net, and a change of clothes. We each had a week’s supply of rice, which we refilled at depots along the way. We are greens and bamboo shoots that we picked in the jungle, and occasionally villagers would give us a bit of meat. I’d been in the Vietminh for nine years by then, and I was accustomed to it.28
To bring about favorable battlefield conditions necessary to realize a satisfactory peace settlement at the conference table, Chinese military assistance increased substantially over the next several months. According to Chinese sources, more than 200 trucks, 10,000 barrels of oil, over 100 cannons, 60,000 artillery shells, 3,000 guns, and about 1,700 tons of grain were shipped to the Vietnamese forces dug in around Dien Bien Phu. To encourage Chinese advisers in Indochina to seek a major victory, Zhou Enlai sent the following message: “In order to bring about a victory in the diplomatic field, we may need to consider whether we can achieve some dramatic victories in Vietnam such as took place prior to the armistice in Korea.” Ho Chi Minh, for one, needed no persuading. In a letter to Vo Nguyen Giap in December, he declared: “This campaign is a very important one, not only militarily, but also politically, not only for domestic reasons, but for international ones as well. So all of our people, all of our armed forces, and the entire Party must entirely unite to get the job done.”29
For Ho and his colleagues, the question had now become not whether, but how, to attack the French post. The newly cautious Vo Nguyen Giap argued for a plan that would wear down the enemy, using his artillery to destroy the small airstrip in the valley and cut off French sources of supply. Vietminh troops could then gradually neutralize French firepower and seize enemy strong points along the perimeter of the base one by one. According to Vietnamese sources, General Wei Guoqing, the senior Chinese adviser, argued for a different approach, advocating a lightning assault based on the “human wave” tactics that had been used with initial effectiveness by PLA units against United Nations troops in Korea.30
The first Vietminh assault on Dien Bien Phu was launched in mid-January. The Vietminh had managed to assemble a total of thirty-three battalions of regular troops, comprising nearly 50,000 combatants, in the mountains around the base. They confronted an enemy numbering about 16,000 men. In addition to their regular forces, the Vietminh had more than 55,000 support troops and nearly 100,000 transport workers. Many of the latter were women from the provinces of central Vietnam who had to pass through enemy-held areas in the Red River delta to reach their staging area near the Chinese border. This “long haired army” then carried artillery pieces and other war matériel over hundreds of miles through difficult terrain to the area around the base. Each transport worker carried an average of thirty pounds of provisions ten miles each night over rough mountain trails. Although most of the supplies consisted of petroleum and ammunition, there was also large artillery from the Soviet Union, carried piece by piece from the Chinese border at Lang Son, a distance of more than 200 miles.31
In the beginning stages of the battle, the attackers followed the Chinese advice to use “human wave” tactics, but the casualties suffered were so heavy that by the end of January, the Vietnamese high command (at the urging of Beijing) reevaluated the situation and decided to switch to a more cautious approach. In the course of the next several weeks, Vietminh troops dug a network of several hundred miles of shallow trenches to enable them to advance steadily but surely toward the outlying French defense works without being exposed to the enemy’s firepower. In the meantime, a series of tunnels was dug into the mountain slopes surrounding the besieged fortress. Artillery brought piece by piece by porters from the Chinese border and then assembled on the spot was installed inside the tunnels; it could then be moved rapidly between locations, thus preventing French gunners in the fort below from zeroing in on the source of the shelling.32
At first, supplies and reinforcements were shipped to the defenders by airlift, but eventually the airfield on the outskirts of the base became virtually unusable because of heavy shelling by the enemy. Planes landing on the airstrip to unload their cargo were almost immediately destroyed by a Vietminh artillery barrage launched from the surrounding mountains. Soon, French pilots were reduced to making a hasty pass over the valley and dropping supplies and new troops by parachute. Eventually, Vietminh firepower became so concentrated that troop reinforcements coming in that way were often dead before they hit the ground.
As the situation became more perilous, the French turned in desperation to the United States for assistance. In mid-March, Paris sent General Paul Ely to Washington to request U.S. air strikes to relieve the French garrison and protect it from the threat of collapse. There was some support for the idea from Admiral Arthur Radford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and from Vice President Richard Nixon, who in a private conversation with French Ambassador Henri Bonnet on April 28 declared “that he entirely shared the point of view of Admiral Radford and that he favored a massive intervention by U.S. aircraft to save Dien Bien Phu.” But President Eisenhower, whose appetite for engaging in land wars in Asia had been diminished by the inconclusive engagement on the Korean peninsula, was reluctant to introduce U.S. combat forces into Indochina without guarantees that the battle would henceforth be waged on a multinational basis, and on condition that the French would promise ultimately to grant full independence to all three states of Indochina. In a trip to London and Paris, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles found that neither the British not the French would agree to U.S. conditions; Eisenhower thereupon refused the French request for air support and, while continuing to explore the possibility of U.S. intervention, reluctantly set his sights on achieving a satisfactory settlement at the peace table.33
In early May, the Vietminh penetrated the outer defenses of the fort at Dien Bien Phu and began to shell the French redoubt within. According to Chinese sources, at the last minute the confidence of Vietminh war planners began to waver as the result of heavy casualties and the threat of U.S. intervention, but with strong encouragement from Beijing they ultimately decided to storm the fort in a bid for total victory. The final assault took place on May 6 when, in Vo Nguyen Giap’s somewhat laconic description, “our troops launched an offensive from all directions, occupied the enemy’s headquarters and captured the whole enemy staff.” The French defeat had been total. More than 1,500 of the defenders had died, 4,000 were wounded, and the remainder were taken prisoner or listed as missing. About 70 managed to escape and made their way back to the French lines. Vietminh losses were even heavier, with more than 25,000 casualites, of whom nearly 10,000 were killed in action.34
On May 7, the day following the final surrender of the French base at Dien Bien Phu, peace talks on resolving the Indochina conflict opened as scheduled in Geneva. In attendance at the meeting were delegations from France, the DRV, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, China, and the United States, as well as representatives from the Bao Dai government and from the royal governments, now officially known as associated states, of Cambodia and Laos. DRV leaders, reflecting Ho Chi Minh’s earlier warning that victory would not come easily, approached the conference warily, but felt that it offered an opportunity for a major advance in the struggle for complete national reunification.35
At the opening session of the conference, the French delegation stated its conditions for a settlement, calling for a regroupment of the armed forces of both sides under the supervision of an international control c
ommission. Pham Van Dong, chairman of the DRV delegation (as he had been in Fontainebleau in 1946), accepted the French proposal for a cease-fire before a settlement of political issues, but in all other respects his demands (drawn up by the Politburo) differed markedly from those of the French. He demanded international recognition of the sovereignty and full independence of all three countries of Indochina, the withdrawal of all foreign troops (meaning, of course, the French), and the holding of free elections to be supervised by local authorities. In addition, he demanded that representatives of the revolutionary movements in Laos and Cambodia (known popularly as the Pathet Lao and the Khmer Rouge, respectively) be seated at the conference table as legitimate representatives of the people of both countries. In an almost contemptuous gesture, Dong agreed to examine possible future membership in the French Union, based on free will and a recognition of the economic and cultural interests of the French in the three Indochinese states.
Paris was in no position to drive a hard bargain. French intelligence sources openly predicted that, in the face of a vigorous Vietminh assault, Hanoi could fall. Opinion in Washington was equally pessimistic. At a briefing given at a meeting of the National Security Council on May 8, CIA Director Allen Dulles estimated that with five thousand trucks, the Vietminh should be able to move their troops from Dien Bien Phu to the Tonkin delta within two or three weeks’ time. Although French armed forces in the delta numbered nearly 200,000, as compared with 76,000 Vietminh regulars, the French were plagued by low morale and enclosed in fixed strong points surrounded by a hostile or indifferent population. As for the Vietnamese National Army, created by the Bao Dai government after the signing of the Elysée Accords, General Navarre dismissed them as “rabble.”36
However, the DRV faced a serious problem of its own at Geneva: the mood of its allies. Although Vietminh representatives had met with their Chinese and Soviet counterparts before the conference to formulate a common negotiating strategy, it had become clear that neither Moscow not Beijing was eager to back the Vietminh in a continuation of the war, not were they willing to give blanket support for Vietnamese demands. Both, in fact, had their own security interests in mind at Geneva, and were anxious to avoid a possible confrontation with the United States. After the preliminary skirmishing came to an end, it was obvious that both Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov and China’s chief delegate at Geneva, Zhou Enlai, favored a compromise based on the division of Vietnam into two separate regroupment zones, one occupied by the Vietminh and the other by the Bao Dai government and its supporters. Moreover, after initially supporting Vietminh views on Laos and Cambodia, Foreign Minister Zhou made it clear to Pham Van Dong that China did not support the DRV demand for the seating of Pathet Lao and Khmer Rouge delegates as the legitimate representatives of the Laotian and Cambodian peoples. That issue, Zhou warned, could scuttle prospects for a settlement and lead to direct U.S. intervention in the war. Better, he believed, to accept the neutralization of both states under their existing royal governments. As an inducement to bring about DRV acceptance, Zhou agreed to insist on the necessity of providing the Pathet Lao forces with a regroupment zone after the close of the conflict. With evident reluctance, Pham Van Dong agreed.37
Many years later, Vietnamese official sources would claim that Zhou Enlai’s behavior at Geneva was motivated by China’s desire to assimilate Laos and Cambodia into its own sphere of influence. Although there is little evidence to confirm this, it seems likely that Beijing viewed these two countries as crucial to its own security needs in the region and therefore may not have wished to see the Indochinese federation put into effect. Still, at the time, perhaps the main motivation was the more urgent objective of preventing the collapse of the peace talks and the future possibility of the establishment of U.S. bases in both countries. It was certainly in those terms that Zhou urged Dong to accept a compromise on the issue, a point of view that was strongly supported by the Soviet delegation.
With the issue of Laos and Cambodia resolved, the conference temporarily adjourned while the French and DRV delegations turned their attention to details connected with the settlement in Vietnam. In private military talks with the French, Vietminh delegates had made it clear that they wanted a contiguous territory for a regroupment zone for their troops and followers consisting, among other things, of the entire Red River delta, including Hanoi and Haiphong. (“We must have Hanoi, we must have outlets,” said one senior Vietminh negotiator). The French were reluctant to concede the loss of Hanoi, but implied that if such were the case, they would want in return a free hand in the south and at least a temporary enclave in the north to complete the evacuation of troops and civilians from the delta.
The debate thus began to center on the dividing line between the two regroupment zones, and how the overall agreement would be enforced. At first Pham Van Dong demanded a line drawn at the Thirteenth Parallel, while the French held forth for a line just south of the Red River delta, much farther to the north. To police the agreement, DRV delegates wanted local supervision only, while the French (supported by the United States) called for the creation of an international control commission under the auspices of the United Nations.
While the French and DRV delegations at Geneva skirmished over these details, Zhou Enlai left by plane for Beijing to consult with Mao Zedong and other government leaders. En route he made a brief stop in India, where he solicited the support of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru for the Chinese positions at the conference. To reassure Nehru, who was increasingly nervous about the possibility that all of Indochina might soon come under Communist rule (and thereby fall under the domination of China), Zhou promised that all Vietminh troops were to be withdrawn from Laos and Cambodia, and that both countries would be permitted to have independent governments of their own choosing. As for the situation in Vietnam, he assured the Indian leader that the DRV would respect any future division of Vietnam into two separate zones, declaring that communism was “not for export.” In a communiqué issued after the series of meetings, the two leaders reaffirmed their support for the concept of the five principles of peaceful coexistence as the proper basis for international relations within Asia and throughout the world.38
After a short stop in Rangoon, where he exchanged similar views with Burmese Prime Minister U Nu, Zhou Enlai returned to Beijing, and then proceeded directly to Liuzhou, Zhang Fakui’s onetime headquarters in south China, where he met with Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap. The meeting received little publicity. A press statement issued later by the New China News Agency said only that “the Prime Minister Zhou Enlai and President Ho Chi Minh had a complete exchange of views on the Geneva conference, the question of the restoration of peace in Indochina, and related questions.” According to recently released Chinese sources, however, Zhou successfully persuaded Ho of the need to reach a compromise settlement at Geneva to avoid a direct U.S. intervention in the war. The two leaders agreed on the Sixteenth Parallel as an acceptable dividing line between the two regroupment zones. They further agreed on the acceptability of establishing non-Communist governments in Laos and Cambodia, provided that a small regroupment zone be set aside for the Pathet Lao. Ho also consented to issue a joint statement that future relations among the three countries of Indochina would be governed by the five principles of peaceful coexistence. In return, Zhou Enlai promised China’s continued support and assistance for the DRV. In aid agreements signed in Beijing on July 7, China committed to a substantial increase in trade and economic assistance. Official sources in Vietnam were terse in reporting the results of the meeting. The Party newspaper Nhan Dan noted cryptically that “the restoration of peace in Indochina cannot be uniquely decided by one side.”39
After brief consultations in Beijing, Zhou Enlai returned to Geneva, where the conferees wrapped up the remaining issues; the treaty was signed early in the morning of July 21, 1954. The agreement would be supervised by an International Control Commission, composed of India, Canada, and Poland. A nonbinding political
declaration attached to the cease-fire called for consultations between the governments in the two regroupment zones, and national elections to unify the country to be held in two years. The final sticking point was an agreement to establish the dividing line between the two regroupment zones at the Seventeenth Parallel. When Pham Van Dong appeared reluctant to accept the compromise, Zhou argued that giving French Prime Minister Pierre Mendès-France a means of saving face was a small price to pay for obtaining the final departure of French troops. “With the final withdrawal of the French,” Zhou promised, “all of Vietnam will be yours.”40
From the point of view of Ho Chi Minh and his colleagues, however, there were some ominous developments shortly after the close of the conference. The Eisenhower administration had observed the course of the talks at Geneva with misgivings and had decided not to accept the terms of a settlement unless at least a part of the future Vietnam remained secure under a non-Communist government. Because the provision for the eventual unification of the entire country by national elections to be held in 1956 opened up the possibility of a total Communist victory, Washington indicated that it would not give its approval to the political declaration, not would it commit itself to support the Geneva Accords themselves. The Bao Dai delegation followed suit and refused to assent to the political declaration, arguing that the decision to divide the country had been made by a colonial power and against the will of the Vietnamese people. A few days after the close of the conference, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles announced at a press conference that the United States would now begin to foster the development of the non-Communist states of South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. It was hardly a good omen for the prospects of future national elections.
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