31. Bejiing had attempted to consolidate its reputation as a proponent of revolution in the Third World by convening a secret meeting of Asian Communist Parties in Guangdong province in September 1963. Ho Chi Minh was in attendence. At the conference, Zhou Enlai promoted revolutionary struggles in rural areas throughout the region. See Chen Jian, “China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975” in Peter Lowe (ed.), The Vietnam War, p, 164. For editorials published in Hanoi during and after the December meetings in Moscow, see Smyser, Independent Vietnamese, pp. 71–72. Smyser surmises that this visit took place at Soviet invitation. In a new year’s message to the Soviet people, Ho Chi Minh praised the successes of the USSR in building a modern, technologically advanced socialist society, but obliquely noted that the national liberation struggle was succeeding around the world and more countries were gaining freedom from imperialist oppression—see Toan Tap I, vol. 9, pp. 626–27.
32. Ho Chi Minh, “Bao cao tai hoi nghi chinh tri dac biet” [Speech at special political conference], in Toan Tap I, vol. 9, pp. 661–81. His closing remarks to the conference, contained in ibid., pp. 682–83, praised the delegates for their unity of spirit and determination.
33. For a good example of Ho’s Nhan Dan articles, see the article dated May 29, 1964, in ibid., pp. 735–38. On Americans’ fear of death, see the meeting of December 9, 1963, in BNTS, vol. 8, p. 492.
34. The first PAVN units apparently left in September or October and arrived at the end of the year. See Gareth Porter, “Coercive Diplomacy,” p. 13. I have seen no evidence about Ho Chi Minh’s role in reaching the decision. According to one source, however, in late September he advised his colleagues that they should prepare to deal with the worst-case scenario, since the U.S. plot to destroy North Vietnam was a strategical and not a tactical decision—see the Politburo meeting of September 26, 1964, in BNTS, vol. 9, p. 130.
35. In his conversation with Mao Zedong, which took place in mid-August, Le Duan informed his host that the DRV intended to send one division of PAVN troops to the South. He also confirmed that the initial decision to attack the U.S. warships in the Tonkin Gulf had been made by the local commander on the spot. Mao responded that according to information available to Beijing, the U.S. charge that a second attack had taken place was based on misinformation in Washington. See “Mao Zedong and Pham Van Dong, Hoang Van Hoan,” meeting of October 5, 1964, in Odd Arne Westad et al., 77 Conversations Between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina, 1964–1977 (Washington, D.C.: Cold War International History Project/The Woodrow Wilson Center, 1998), p. 74; also see fn 117.
36. See Vietnam Documents and Research Notes, document 67 (September 1969), p. 7. According to another source, Moscow promised to support a general offensive in South Vietnam should it prove necessary—see Gareth Porter, A Peace Denied: The United States, Vietnam, and the Paris Agreement (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1975), p. 23. The Russian scholar Ilya Gaiduk contends that three senior leaders of the DRV—Le Duan, Pham Van Dong, and Vo Nguyen Giap—had agreed to seek a restoration of the traditional evenhanded balance in relations with China and the Soviet Union: comment by Ilya Gaiduk at the LBJ Library Conference on the Vietnam War, October 17, 1993.
37. The directive is contained in Nhung su kien lich su Dang [Important events in the history of the Party] (Hanoi: Su that, 1976), vol. 3, p. 315. Polish diplomat Mieczyslaw Maneli has said that Hanoi pteviously avoided attacks on Americans in order to avoid provoking Washington; he claims Ho Chi Minh was opposed to the use of indiscriminate terrorism as a means of realizing national objectives: see Maneli, War of the Vanquished, p. 156. As a young foreign service officet at the U.S. Embassy in South Vietnam at the time, I had my own personal experience with the rapid turnover of governments in Saigon. On a Friday early in 1965 I left the country for a weekend in Bangkok. On Saturday a coup overthrew the government in Saigon. On Sunday, the new leaders were themselves evicted from power. I returned on Monday to discover that I had missed an entire government in the short life of South Vietnam.
38. Le Duan, Thu Vao Nam, letter to Xuan [Nguyen Chi Thanh], of February 1965, p. 96. Ho’s comment on Binh Gia appeared in an article in Nhan Dan, January 7, 1965.
39. For an insightful analysis of Soviet policies during this period, see Ilya V. Gaiduk, “The Soviet Policy Dilemma in the Vietnamese Conflict,” in Lloyd C. Gardner and Ted Gittings, eds., Vietnam; The Early Decisions (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1997), pp. 207–18. For Zhou Enlai’s visit to Hanoi in March, see 77 Conversations, pp. 77–78.
40. For Ho Chi Minh’s reaction to the U.S. air strikes, see BNTS, vol. 9, p. 130. His February warning about the United States is in ibid., p. 197. For the resolution issued at the end of the Eleventh Plenum, see Mot so van kien, vol. 1, pp. 311–27. Ho Chi Minh spoke at the opening of the meeting, but his contribution to the debate is not clear. From the sources available he appears to have supported the prevailing approach—see BNTS, vol. 9, pp. 215–17. Ho was especially concerned to prepare the population of North Vietnam for the sacrifices ahead and suggested the convening of a special political conference to mobilize support for the new line—see ibid., pp. 207–9.
41. Ho’s interview with the Japanese journalist is contained in Toan Tap I, vol. 10, pp. 79–84 (see especially p. 82). Was the ambiguity in Hanoi’s peace terms over the timing of the U.S. withdrawal deliberate, or a consequence of divergent views in Hanoi and the NLF leadership? I have long been inclined to believe the former, on the grounds that the timing and scope of peace talks were probably viewed as an affair for the Party leadership to determine. But it is worthy of note that in December 1965 Ho Chi Minh complained that it was important that announcements by the NLF must be coordinated with those of the DRV in order to present a unified position. Perhaps he was expressing irritation in Hanoi that the NLF sometimes adopted diplomatic positions without first consulting Party leaders in the North. See BNTS, vol. 9, pp. 338–39.
42. Le Duan, Thu Vao Nam, letter of May 1965; see also George Herring, ed., The Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War: The “Negotiating Volumes” of the Pentagon Papers (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1983), pp. 42–44.
43. Meeting of Liu Shaoqi with Le Duan, April 8, 1965; Mao Zedong with Ho Chi Minh, May 16, 1965; Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping with Ho Chi Minh, May 17, 1965, all in 77 Conversations, pp. 85–87. Ho’s visit to China in May was treated as a brief vacation to celebrate his birthday—see BNTS, vol. 9, pp. 244–45; HZYZ, p. 250; and Vu Ky, Bac Ho viet di chuc [Uncle Ho writes his testament] (Hanoi: Su that, 1989), pp. 44–45. For an analysis of the relationship between China’s policies in Vietnam and the Cultural Revolution, see the introductory comments by Odd Arne Westad in 77 Conversations, pp. 8–20.
44. Meeting of Zhou Enlai with Ayub Khan, April 2, 1965, in 77 Conversations, pp. 79–85. Also see Chen Jian, “China’s Involvement,” pp. 368–69. For Edgar Snow’s inrerview with Mao Zedong, see Truth About Vietnamo-Chinese, pp. 35–36, and Edgar Snow, The Long Revolution (London: Hutchinson, 1973), p. 216.
45. Chen Jian, “China’s Involvement,” pp. 380–81. According to Odd Arne Westad, Lin Biao’s famous article was actually a collective effort—see 77 Conversations, p. 10.
46. 77 Conversations, p. 90.
47. For his views on conditions for negotiations, see the Politburo meetings of December 1965, in BNTS, vol. 9, pp. 338–53. It is interesting to note that Ho considered the most important reason to bring an end to the U.S. bombing campaign was to facilitate the shipment of troops and matériel to the South—see the Politburo meeting of October 18, 1966, in ibid, pp. 485–86. On demonstrating Hanoi’s firmness, see the Politburo meeting of July 31, 1965, in ibid, pp. 280–81. On promoting the peace movement in the United States, see the Politburo meeting of December 30, 1965, in ibid, pp. 350–51.
48. The date of Ho Chi Minh’s conversation with Zhou and Deng is not clear from the context, but it probably took place in May 1965. For Le Duan’s speech responding to the Lin Biao article, see William J
. Duiker, The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam, 2d ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996), pp. 269–70. For other discussions between Chinese and North Vietnamese leaders on their tense relationship, see Zhou Enlai and Le Duan et al., April 13, 1966; Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai with Pham Van Dong, April 10, 1967; and Deng Xiaoping with Le Duan, September 29, 1975; all in 77 Conversations, pp. 90, 104, and 195. In a conversation with a visiting Vietnamese delegation in April 1967, Zhou Enlai conceded that in the past the CCP had followed erroneous advice from Soviet leaders like Joseph Stalin, but he insisted that in the end they had learned to rely on their own instincts.
49. For a brief overview of the abortive peace feelers, known as Operation Marigold, see George C. Herring, LBJ and Vietnam: A Different Kind of War (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1994), pp. 104–7. Also see the Politburo meeting of December 11, 1965, cited in BNTS, vol. 9, p. 336. A Vietnamese version of Ho’s letter is in Toan Tap I, vol. 10, pp. 461–62.
50. BNTS, vol. 9, pp. 437–38; Jean Sainteny, Face à Ho Chi Minh (Paris: Seghers, 1970), p. 190.
51. For information on the stilt house, see Noi o va lam vice cua Chu tich Ho Chi Minh tai phu chu tich (Hanoi: Ho Chi Minh Mausoleum, 1984), p. 9.
52. Vu Ky, Bac Ho Viet Di chuc, pp. 35–36.
53. The trip is recounted in ibid, pp. 38–48. Some of the Confucian (and Mencian) phrases quoted by Ho Chi Minh included “Fear not poverty, only fear injustice,” “People are the root of the country,” and “The interests of the people come first, those of the country come next, and those of the king come last.” Ho demonstrated equal respect for the fifteenth-century Vietnamese scholar-patriot and wax strategist Nguyen Trai. In February 1965 he visited the shrine to Nguyen Trai at Con Son and spent considerable time at Trai’s tombstone. According to Vu Ky, Ho had deep respect for Nguyen Trai’s dedication to duty and his commitment to the cause of Vietnamese independence.
54. The source for this curious story is Quan Yan’s “Tao Zhu ji mi” [The riddle of Tao Zhu], Xinan junshi wenxue [Xinan Military Literature] (Chengdu) no. 72 (1995), pp. 53–55. Tao Zhu served as Party chief in Guangdong before being purged during the Cultural Revolution. It was there that he became closely acquainted with Ho Chi Minh. From the context, I have set the date for this incident to the spring and summer of 1966. According to this article, Ho probably wanted a companion from Guangdong because he still cherished the memory of his first wife, Tang Tuyet Minh. Other sources provide no explanation as to why the tole could not have been played by a Vietnamese. The Chinese government had gone to the trouble of locating three possible candidates before dropping the idea. On hearing about the project, Zhou Enlai had expressed concern that it could arouse anti-Chinese feelings within the Vietnamese Party leadership in Hanoi.
55. Ho’s message to the Vietnamese people, “Con co gi gui hon doc lap tu do” [Nothing is more important than independence and freedom], was printed in Nhan Dan—see Toan Tap I, vol. 10, pp. 374–77. Also see Quan Yan, “Tao Zhu,” p. 55.
56. Giu yen giac ngu cua Nguoi [Preserving Ho’s remains] (Hanoi: Quan doi Nhan dan, 1990).
57. BNTS, vol. 10, pp. 40–41, 93–95, 111. Ho Chi Minh’s letter to Johnson in March is reproduced in Toan Tap II, vol. 12, pp. 230–32. For a discussion of the diplomatic exchange, see Herring, LBJ and Vietnam, pp, 108–11.
58. BNTS, vol. 10, pp. 156–57, 159; Giu yen, pp. 16–17. Fidel Castro has reportedly told acquaintances that on several occasions during his final years, Ho had to be physically restrained from joining groups about to depart for the South—see the article by Michael Salmon in Vietnam Today (April 1980), p. 2.
59. BNTS, vol. 10, p. 195.
60. Vu Ky, Bac Ho viet di chuc, p. 71 ; Hoang Van Hoan, A Drop in the Ocean: Hoang Van Hoan’s Revolutionary Reminiscences (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1988), p. 334.
61. The Chinese had been advising their North Vietnamese allies to adopt a tough position on negotiations since the expansion of the war in 1965. During discussions on the issue in April 1968, Zhou Enlai warned Pham Van Dong that the Têt offensive had not been a decisive victory and that, in appearing anxious to open peace talks, Hanoi had lost the initiative to Washington. In a talk with PRC Foreign Minister Chen Yi in October, Le Duc Tho pointed out that the DRV had erroneously followed Chinese advice to compromise at the Geneva conference in 1954. See meetings of Zhou Enlai with Pham Van Dong, April 13 and 17, June 29, and October 17, 1968, in 77 Conversations, pp. 123–29, 137–38, 140.
62. Testament du President Ho Chi Minh (Hanoi: Central Committee of the Vietnamese Communist Party, 1989),
63. Gin yen, pp, 17–18. To deal with the heat, Ho ordered a palm leaf cut for his use as a fan. To avoid confusing his leaf from those of his colleagues, he burned the letter “B” [Bac?] on the leaf.
64. Ibid., pp. 19–20.
EPILOGUE | From Man to Myth
1. The quotation from India is cited in Ho Chi Minh (Hanoi: Social Sciences Commission, 1989), p. 82. The Uruguayan editorial appealed in the journal People (Montevideo) on September 4, 1969. Both newspapet teports are quoted in The World Praises and Mourns President Ho Chi Minh (Hanoi: Su that, 1976). The Soviet reaction is cited in Kobelev, p. 236.
2. Duan’s speech is contained in Testament du President Ho Chi Minh (Hanoi: Central Committee of the Vietnamese Communist Party, 1989), pp. 57–64.
3. See Giu yen giac ngu cua Nguoi [Preserving Ho’s remains] (Hanoi: Quan doi Nhan dan, 1990), pp. 36–39, 92–93. According to an account by the Australian journalist Malcolm Salmon, as soon as news of Ho’s death arrived in Moscow, Soviet leaders called Hanoi to emphasize the importance of taking immediate action to pteserve his remains. Because the Politburo had not yet decided whether to build a mausoleum, Soviet specialists flew in to carry out the preservation procedure before a decision to erect a mausoleum had actually been reached. In the meantime, the body was kept on ice. See Malcolm Salmon, “Memories of Ho Chi Minh,” Vietnam Today, April 1980, p. 3.
4. For the construction of the mausoleum, see Giu yen, pp. 95–122. For the comments of Hue-Tam Ho Tai, see her “Monumental Ambiguity: The State Commemoration of Ho Chi Minh,” in K. W. Taylor and John K. Whitmore, eds., Essays into Vietnamese Pasts (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, 1995), p. 281.
5. Facsimiles of the original Vietnamese-language versions and French-language translarions of Ho Chi Minh’s testament are contained in Testament du President Ho Chi Minh. Also see Bui Xuan Quang, “The Publication of Ho’s Last Will: Background to Deception,” Vietnam Commentary (March–April 1990), pp. 4–6. Professor Quang, citing an article by Hoang Van Hoan, charges that Le Duan did not even inform his colleagues in the Politburo of the existence of earlier, untouched versions of Ho’s testament and showed them only a typed version that he had witnessed and signed.
6. See Our President Ho Chi Minh (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Press, 1970), pp. 188–95. For one example of the decision to perpetuate his ideas, see Nghien cuu tu tuong Ho Chi Minh [Studying the thought of Ho Chi Minh], 2 vols. (Hanoi: Ho Chi Minh Institute, 1993).
7. For a btief description, see “The Ho Chi Minh Museum,” Vietnam Courier (May 1986), p. 6. In a visit to Hanoi shortly before completion of the museum, I had the good fortune of making the acquaintance of several craftsmen from Czechoslovakia who were working on some of the displays inside the building. They told me that although the official intent was to portray the evils of twentieth-century capitalist society, in their own work they had sought surreptitiously to portray a more positive impression of the times. For a comment, see Hue-Tam Ho Tai, “Monumental Ambiguity,” p. 283.
8. Vo Nguyen Giap was dropped from the Politburo at the Fifth Party Congress in 1982. He was later given a position as chair of a committee to promote technological development.
9. This “devil’s bargain” was clearly asserted in the new constitution approved in 1991. See Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Constitution (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1992).
10. Testament, p
p. 5–10, Hoang Van Hoan’s article in Beijing Review, September 14, 1981, and Vu Ky, Bac Ho viet di chuc [Uncle Ho writes his testament] (Hanoi: Su that, 1989).
11. Charles Fenn, “Trial Run to Doomsday,” pp. 238–39 (manuscript provided by Charles Fenn).
12. Extrait du Journal l’Union Française, May 20, 1947, in dossier labeled “Ho Chi Minh 1947 à 1948,” in SPCE, Carton 370, CAOM. Also see Vincent Hugeux, “Entretien avec Vu Thu Hien,” Politique Internationale, no. 77 (Autumn 1997), p. 272, and Miec-zyslaw Maneli, War of the Vanquished (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 153.
13. I was interested to discover on a recent trip to Hanoi that some Vietnamese scholars have fallen victim to the same myth of Ho’s special attachment to the United States. When some of them asked me why Presidents Roosevelt and Truman had not replied to Ho Chi Minh’s letters requesting recognition of the DRV, I reminded them that Joseph Stalin had not answered Ho’s appeals either. It is significanr that Ho Chi Minh’s many articles criticizing various aspects of American society, written of course under a pseudonym, have never been translated into English.
14. Nong Due Manh has denied these rumors, but he concedes that his mother, a member of the Tay ethnic minority, served as Ho’s servant after the latter’s return to Vietnam during the early 1940s. Coincidentally, as chairman of the Standing Committee of the National Assembly, Nong Due Manh had earned the reputation as a conciliator who was able to persuade his colleagues to accept compromise. This, of course, was one of Ho Chi Minh’s best-known characteristics. For the remark about the need for myths, see Olivier Todd, “The Myth of Ho Chi Minh: Height of Misinformation,” Vietnam Commentary (May-June 1990), pp. 13–14.
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