Special Forces (Ss) (2001)

by Tom - Nf Clancy

  In the same way, Phillips and his 7th SFG personnel built up a base of people, equipment, and opportunities to test their new ideas. Over several years, 7th SFG acquired computers, software, networking equipment, and other bits and pieces, and built the kind of command-and-control facilities SFC sees itself running in the future.

  A key goal was to equip a testbed group-level headquarters with a maximum load of computers, communications, and networking equipment, and turn it loose in an actual field exercise. This test headquarters would control several widely separated SF battalions during the exercise (which itself would be imbedded in a larger theater-level training event), and would make maximum use of satellite communications links and a network of linked computers in a “mission control” configuration. In this way, the workload of a large, theater-level SF operation could be simulated, and the new planning and operational concepts and equipment evaluated.

  The first test exercises were called Relampago Rojo-1 and -2 (Rl and R2 for short)103 and they were run in 1997. These exercises had built up a base of experience for the coming larger event, which would be known as R3. R3 would take place in late February and early March of 1999 in the southeastern United States; it would try to fully implement the three major concepts described earlier: eliminating stovepipes, reducing friction, and improving connectivity; and it would include several extremely intense SF operations, both multinational and joint. Active-duty, reserve, and National Guard units would be involved, as well as components from every part of SOCOM. And all of these would be formed into the SOF component of a larger Joint Task Force (JTF) ... though with an unusual and innovative twist. While the larger conventional units of the JTF (carrier battle groups, amphibious units, etc.) would be operating elsewhere, the testbed SOF component headquarters would itself act as a mini-JTF.

  After SOF units—acting as the lead elements—entered a hypothetical crisis area, the conventional units would arrive and take their orders from the SOF component commander (a reversal in policy from the usual U.S. joint operations doctrine, in which the SOF component is subordinate to the JTF commander). In fact, since the SOF commander probably has SF ODAs or other units on the ground already in the area, he is probably better qualified than the JTF commander to control the early days (at least) of a crisis. With his eyes and ears already in place, the SOF commander would relay close to real-time data back to higher headquarters, allowing for a smoother flow of conventional units into the theater, prior to handoff of the JTF command responsibilities to a normal headquarters structure.

  At the close of our initial meeting, Colonel Phillips invited me to join him during the R3 exercise, to observe for myself (I’d act as an honorary Observer/Controller). I quickly accepted.

  R3 turned out to be one of the most complex and difficult exercises I’ve experienced.

  Relampago Rojo-3: A Unit/Task Breakdown

  Though R3 was conceived to be primarily an experimental exercise, the concept was to be implemented within the context of a large, conventional force-on-force Joint Task Force Exercise (JTFEX) being run by USACOM.104 This larger event (known as JTFEX 99-1) was being run to certify the USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) carrier battle group (CVBG), USS Kersarge (LHD-3) Amphibious Ready Group (ARG), and 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit—Special Operations Capable (MEU [SOC]) ready for their upcoming Mediterranean cruise.107 This operation was being conducted off Puerto Rico and the Atlantic coast, and had already been running for several weeks. At the same time, a number of fleet units from NATO, as well as U.S. Army and Air Force units, were taking advantage of the huge training opportunity represented by JTFEX 99-1. R3 would derive its scenario from the larger exercise, and would operate as a component of the overall JTFEX plan. The basic breakdown of forces for JTFEX 99-1 is shown in the table below.

  A map showing the layout of forces and locations of missions during Relampago Rojo-3 in 1999.

  RUBICON, INC, BY LAURA DENINNO

  Joint Task Force Exercise 99-1 Unit Organization

  As you can see, the SOF component is contained in Combined Task Force (CTF) 958. This is the force that would make up the bulk of the units involved in R3.

  The R3 emblem at the entrance to the Battlestar control center. R3 was designed to provide planning data on how to apply computer and network technology to twenty-first-century Special Operations.

  JOHN D. GRESHAM

  R3 would incorporate many of the features of NTC and JRTC rotations, including standard scenario terms and assumptions: The operating area included the “fictional” island of Cortina, and Koronans were the “bad” guys. (There were other “fictional” additions and complications, which I am ignoring to avoid confusion.)

  For R3, the JSOTF would have to deal with two major near-simultaneous crisis situations. The first involved weapons of mass destruction in northwest Florida, near Eglin AFB. Here SCUD-type missiles with WMD (chemical) warheads were being prepared. An extensive SOF effort would be required to destroy the threat. Guidance from the JTFEX 99-1 CINC was to prosecute this effort aggressively, to prevent any enemy use of WMDs on allied forces planning to operate along the eastern seaboard.

  The second situation was a growing insurgent effort by Koronan forces on the island of Cortina (in reality Louisiana, Mississippi, and Arkansas, with most of the activity at Fort Polk, Louisiana), highlighted by the ethnic cleansing of some villages and an emerging chemical weapons threat. This mission would require the prosecution and destruction of the insurgents and their WMD stockpiles, as well as the repatriation of the local residents into their homes and villages. This meant that a full-spectrum SOF effort would be required from all the participants, including Special Reconnaissance (SR), Direct Action (DA), Civil Affairs (CA), and Humanitarian Relief (HR) missions.105

  To accommodate these various jobs, SOCOM had provided the R3 leadership with a variety of SOF units and personnel.106 These included:• Commander, Task Force (CTF) 958—Normally, a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) headquarters would be a theater-level headquarters operation; it would be commanded by an O-7 (Army or Air Force brigadier general or rear admiral); and would be assigned minimally a full SFG and other SOF units (helicopters, transport aircraft, Rangers, SEALs, etc.). For R3 (because it was an experiment), the 7th SFG headquarters functioned as the JSOTF, and Colonel Ed Phillips as the JSOTF commander. CTF 958 was based at Camp McCain, Mississippi.

  • Commander, Task Force (CTF) 958.1—The Army SOF forces operated under an organization known as CTF 958.1. Technically called the Army Special Operations Task Force (ASOFTF), CTF 958.1 was also played by Colonel Phillips and the 7th SFG headquarters staff, based at Camp McCain.

  • Commander, Task Force (CTF) 958.1.1—The first of the two SF units assigned to the R3 exercise was the 1st Battalion of the 7th Special Forces Group (1st/7th SFG). Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Mike Adams, 1st/7th SFG would operate out of Forward Operating Base (FOB) 71 at Fort Polk. For R3, the SF soldiers from 1st/7th SFG were to be reinforced with a company of infantry from the Bolivian Army.

  • Commander, Task Force (CTF) 958.1.2—The other SF unit assigned to R3 was 1st Battalion of the 20th SFG (1st/20th SFG) from the National Guard. They would work from FOB 201 at Fort McClellan, Alabama, which was near home for many of the guardsmen of the 20th. Lieutenant Colonel Paul Roberts commanded CTF 958.1.2 during R3.

  • Commander, Task Force (CTF) 958.2—Along with Army SOF personnel, other services contributed to R3. One of these was the Navy Special Warfare Command, which controls SEAL teams and their Special Boat Squadrons (SBSs). Operating as CTF 958.2, the Navy Special Warfare Task Group was composed of units from Navy Special Warfare Group Two (NSWG-2) and SBS-2 out of Little Creek, Virginia. They supplied SEALs and boats to support littoral SOF operations during R3. (Colonel Phillips did not, in fact, command these forces, but their comms were linked through the JSOTF center to the JTFEX command, thus putting more stress on the system—desirable as part of the experiment.)

  • Commander, Task Forc
e (CTF) 958.3—Along with naval and ground SOF units, R3 also required aviation muscle to accomplish its goals. Because this might involve flying units from Army, Navy, and Air Force commands, a Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC) headquarters was established as CTF 958.3. Known as the Joint Special Operations Aviation Command (JSOAC), CTF 958.3 was based at Camp McCain with the JSOTF center.

  • Commander, Task Force (CTF) 958.4—In addition to U.S. units, R3 also involved SOF personnel from Great Britain. While I was asked not to take too great an interest in their participation, the United Kingdom Special Forces Task Group (UKSFTG, operating as CTF 958.4) contributed personnel and equipment from the Special Air Service (SAS).

  • Commander, Task Force (CTF) 958.5—To provide JSOTF with some serious striking power, SOCOM provided the services of A Company from the 1st Battalion of the 75th (1st/75th) Ranger Regiment. These would come from Hunter Army Airfield, Georgia, and would be flagged as CTF 958.5.

  When all of the pieces were laid out, they looked like this:

  R3 Special Operations Unit Organization

  The concepts being tested in R3 would be proved or disproved at the SCUD hunt at Eglin AFB, Florida, and at the counterinsurgency/humanitarian effort at Fort Polk. And each of these was designed to simulate the information workload for an entire Special Forces Group (a point to keep very firmly in mind).

  From the time the exercise would begin Phillips and his JSOTF staff would have less than two weeks to plan out these two major operations and to get the forces to their operating areas. At the start of the exercise, most of the R3 SOF units were still at their home bases, awaiting the tasking that would come out of the R3 control center that was even then still being built. While the units and their commanders had a general idea of what would be happening, the details of the operations were kept from them. This was designed to simulate the real-world uncertainties that go with any military operation, and would keep people on their toes throughout R3. It would be an ambitious set of tasks.

  In terms of actual tasking, the JSOTF team had two basic missions to perform. The first would be to conduct the search and destruction of enemy SCUD missiles and their launchers at Eglin AFB with the 1st Battalion of the 20th (1st/20th) SFG. 1st/20th would establish a FOB 201 at Fort McClellan, which would act as their home base, and would be supported by a variety of joint SOF aviation and ground units. The plan was for 1st/20th to insert a number of SR teams into the area of Eglin AFB, which would locate a number of simulated SCUD transporter erector launchers (TELs). Once the TELs had been targeted, the SR teams would provide Terminal Guidance with laser designators onto the targets, which would then destroy the launchers with fire from U.S. Air Force (USAF) AC-130 Spectre gunships.

  The second mission, which would be run nearly simultaneously, would be more complex. At Fort Polk, the 1st Battalion of the 7th (1st/7th) SFG would be tasked to establish FOB 71. Their mission was to liberate a village north of the main post at the JRTC live-fire range at Peason Ridge. There, insurgent troops had driven out the local villagers (“ethnic cleansing” on a small scale) in order to utilize the town as an assembly area for chemical land mines and other WMDs. The plan was for 1st/7th to insert SR teams into the Peason Ridge area, and then to reconnoiter the town (known as Merrill Village) and surrounding areas. Once the area was under surveillance, A Company of the 1st Battalion of the 75th (A/1st/75th) Ranger Regiment would be parachuted into the area by USAF Special Operations MC-130 transports supported by AC-130 gunships. When safely on the ground, the Rangers would assault the village, with a primary mission of killing or capturing all the insurgent troops. Once Merrill Village was secured, the Rangers would hand off control to a multinational ground task force of 1st/7th Special Forces soldiers and troops from Bolivia. This force would then set up a secure perimeter around the town, clear any antipersonnel hazards (mines, booby traps, etc.), and make it ready for the return of the displaced villagers (being played by JRTC roleplayer personnel). The mission would then continue for several more days, allowing the SF/Bolivian task force to practice their humanitarian relief and civil affairs skills.

  Both missions were much like “normal” SOF missions that might be run anywhere in the world. The difference was this: In R3 both missions would occur at the same time and be run out of a single JSOTF command center at Camp McCain (roughly two hundred miles from each event). SFC was looking to learn whether the new command-and-control system could actually handle the tremendous quantity of information flowing through it, and whether the greater connectivity created by improved communications systems would not only increase the flow of info, but create a greatly improved situational awareness both for the command center and for the guys in the field. The command center would act as a clearinghouse for planning, support, and intelligence, and would push necessary information and services down to the teams planning their missions. And it was hoped that much of the “stovepiping” that slows down SF operations could be eliminated, making the entire mission planning and execution more efficient and less time consuming.

  While there would be many “artificialities,” R3 would provide enough information to let Special Forces Command know if what was being tested had merit in the real world.

  Camp McCain, Mississippi, February 21st

  My journey to R3 started with a road trip into the heart of old Dixie. Driving toward Camp McCain, the site of the testbed headquarters, I passed through towns and villages with haunting names—Selma, Meridian, and Granada (where I stayed)—all mileposts on the great civil rights marches of the 1960s. Camp McCain is an Army National Guard base in northern Mississippi, and normally home to a battalion of tanks and other armored fighting vehicles, along with a company of the 20th SFG. But for the next few weeks, it would host the leadership of the 7th SFG and other units of Special Forces Command. Here would be situated what Colonel Phillips dubbed the “Battlestar,” the concrete realization of the vision for the R3 SF mission control center.

  The headquarters was set up near the National Guard billeting area (where the headquarters staff would be housed), in what normally is the base mess and recreational complex. Here 7th SFG troops had built up a Joint Special Operations Task Force headquarters, including a simulated force protection perimeter, though there would be no OpFor units to attack them here (those limited resources would be reserved for the actual field operations). Senior officers take such matters quite seriously these days, even if the threat is only “imagined.” Many senior SOF and SF generals would be passing this way in the weeks ahead, and anything less than a full-blown force protection scheme would not do.

  After receiving a security badge, I was led into the compound. Since I would spend the exercise flagged as a JRTC O/C, I’d have a “God‘s-eye view” of the entire exercise. This placed on me certain responsibilities. For instance, I had to be careful in conversations with all personnel that were “in play.” Loose lips might give one side or another an unrealistic advantage and skew the results of the exercise. Fully appreciating my enhanced status as an observer, I went into the center.

  The weather was raw and cold (it would snow before the day was out). Inside the security tent, my old friend Major Tom McCollum, the USASOC public affairs officer greeted me and led me inside the perimeter. For this exercise, Tom was acting out the role as the R3 JSOTF PAO, and would take part as a roleplayer in a number of the coming actions.

  We went first to the headquarters support center, where day-to-day paperwork and other administrative tasks were handled. There I was given a cup of coffee, and then got a quick update from Tom as I waited for Colonel Phillips, who was to show me around. The 7th SFG personnel had arrived several days earlier, and had constructed this center in just two days. In addition to the Battlestar itself, smaller “feeder” centers had also been set up in other rooms to support intelligence, planning, communications, and other functions within the headquarters.

  After a few minutes, Colonel Phillips came in and began his tour.

  As w
e moved through the centers for communications, planning, and other functions, it became clear that Special Forces Command had committed a significant percentage of their deployable communications, computer, and networking resources to R3. Outside were enough satellite communications vans and antennas to support a conventional Army division or corps headquarters. Almost as impressive was the networking gear for these communications channels, all being routed into a custom-built local area network (LAN). Every important headquarters function, from e-mail to reconnaissance satellite tasking, would flow through this LAN, making it key to the success or failure of the R3 exercise.

  The Battlestar operations center during R3. Much like a space mission control center, the Battlestar is designed to provide Special Operations leaders with a clearer picture of downrange operations.

  JOHN D. GRESHAM

  The JSOTF headquarters also sported some unusual additions—a space filled with stacks of Styrofoam sheeting and plywood, for instance. This material would become terrain models to support planning and briefings for the major R3 missions ... and an important component of yet another experiment. The hope was to run some of the various R3 operations without the traditional full dress rehearsals that SOF units prefer. Phillips and his men planned to run a few of these missions after only “virtual” rehearsals, extensively using video teleconferencing and limited face-to-face meetings between unit commanders. Called Operation Rock Drill, these “virtual” conferences would simulate the pulling together of widely separated SOF units from around the world, throwing them into a fast-breaking crisis.