The Exile

by Adrian Levy

  117.  Most of the time, Amal’s children were looked after by Khairiah and Seham, who bombarded Zakariya with questions he could not answer.

  118.  CNN Wire Staff, “Bin Laden Relatives Want Probe and Proof of Death,” CNN, May 12, 2011.

  119.  Author interviews with bin Laden family members. Also see Omar’s interview, “Bin Laden’s Son Urges Talks to Bring Peace,” Today, NBC, January 22, 2008, www.youtube.com/watch?v=70pVaSceP08.

  120.  Omar found the burial at sea of his father “unacceptable humanely and religiously,” and he threatened “to follow that crime through the American and international justice [systems] in order to determine the true fate of our vanished father.” However, since he could not go to Pakistan in person for fear of being arrested, he vented his anger through Zakariya.

  121.  The last possible location the CIA had ever shared with the ISI was “when a person supposedly resembling OBL was sighted in Darosh, Chitral”—man who turned out to be the bin Laden lookalike in 2007. Abbottabad Commission report.

  122.  Abbottabad Commission report.

  123.  General Pasha told the Abbottabad Commission that Pakistan was “a very weak state and also a very scared state … It all boils down to corrupt and low grade governance. There is apathy at every level, in every sector of national life.” During his sessions before Ashraf Qazi, he complained that lies and untruths about ISI culpability in the Osama saga had been allowed to fester because of the “deafening silence” of the political leadership. The degree of anger that had arisen in the military when Prime Minister Gilani had asked who in the military and security establishment had given Osama bin Laden a six-year visa “could not be described.” According to General Pasha, the ISI needed more power, not less. However, Pasha’s case suffered a crushing blow when Admiral Mike Mullen used his final address to the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee in September 2011 to accuse the ISI of supporting Al Qaeda and exporting terror, and described the outlawed terrorist Haqqani network as “a veritable arm of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency.”

  124.  Officially, the commission’s findings remain mired in legal arguments.

  125.  Rob Crilly, “Mike Mullen: Pakistan Is Exporting Terror,” Daily Telegraph, September 22, 2011.

  126.  By the following week, the White House and Pentagon were also on board, with Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications Benjamin Rhodes writing to Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Doug Wilson. “We are trying to have visibility into the UBL projects and this is likely the most high profile one,” wrote Rhodes. “Would like to have whatever group is going around in here at the WH [White House] to get a sense of what they’re doing/what cooperation they’re seeking.”

  127.  A full list of supporting documents and transcripts of these discussions can be found at Judicial Watch Press Room, “Judicial Watch Obtains Stack of Overlooked CIA Records Detailing Meetings with bin Laden Filmmakers,” August 28, 2012, www.judicialwatch.org/press-room/press-releases/judicial-watch-obtains-4-to-5-inch-stack-of-overlooked-cia-records-detailing-meetings-with-bin-laden-filmmakers/.

  128.  Ibid.

  129.  Ibid.

  130.  Ibid.

  131.  Ibid.

  132.  Ibid.

  133.  Ibid.

  134.  Ibid.

  135.  Ibid.

  136.  Steve Coll, “The Spy Who Said Too Much,” New Yorker, April 1, 2013.

  137.  Dating from September 2006 to April 2011, the letters had been authored by bin Laden and top Al Qaeda leaders, including Abu Yahya al-Libi, Adam Gadahn (Azzam the American), and Atiyah. Individual letters are available here: www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/letters-from-abbottabad-bin-ladin-sidelined. Author interviews with Nelly Lahoud, New York, April 2014, and Will McCants, Washington, D.C., April 2014.

  138.  David Ignatius, “Osama bin Laden, a Lion in Winter,” Washington Post, March 18, 2012.

  139.  Author interviews with Bruce Riedel, Washington, D.C., 2014–2015.

  140.  Jane Mayer, “Zero Conscience in Zero Dark Thirty,” New Yorker, December 14, 2012.

  141.  Senior military figures said the president had made dishonorable disclosures that had damaged the U.S. military’s ability to operate. Details of the raid had been released too quickly. Such a hasty unburdening had not left any time to exploit intelligence recovered from the compound. Retired CIA case officers joined the chorus of disapproval, saying that recruiting local assets was a sensitive task at the best of times but would be virtually impossible in future thanks to the identification of key Pakistani assets such as Dr. Shakil Afridi.

  142.  Bissonnette’s book was published in September 2012.

  143.  Bissonnette interview with NBC News, November 2014.

  144.  “SEAL’s First-hand Account of Bin Laden Killing,” 60 Minutes, broadcast September 9, 2012; transcript published online on September 24, 2012. www.youtube.com/watch?v=djCuC5E32bM.

  145.  Matthew Cole and Anna R. Schecter, “Who Shot Bin Laden? A Tale of Two SEALs,” NBC News, November 6, 2014.

  146.  Dan Lamothe, “Navy SEAL Who Wrote bin Laden Raid Book Must Pay Government at Least $6.8 Million,” Washington Post, August 19, 2016.

  147.  Matthew Cole, “Navy SEAL Turns Over Picture of bin Laden’s Body, Faces Investigation of Business Ties,” Intercept, January 19, 2016.

  CHAPTER TWELVE

      1.  Author interviews with Mahfouz Ibn El Waleed, Nouakchott, December 2014, January and June 2015.

      2.  In his speeches, al-Zawahiri used to describe Osama as the man who said “no” to America.

      3.  Slahi was one of thirty-one prisoners processed in August 2002. See Mohamedou Ould Slahi and Larry Siems, Guantánamo Diary (New York: Little, Brown, 2015). See also Slahi’s interrogation summary at “Gitmo Files,” Wikileaks, wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/760.html.

      4.  Those who remained included Al Qaeda shura members Saif al-Abdel Abu al-Khayr al-Masri, Abu Mohammed al-Masri, Thirwat Shihata, and three of Zarqawi’s former deputies, Abu Qassem, Sari Shibab, and Khalid al-Aruri.

      5.  Photos were shown to the authors by Mahfouz.

      6.  When Fatima asked if they could leave, the compound director allowed her to call her brothers Omar and Abdullah. They promised to do everything they could to reunite the family. Author interviews with bin Laden family members.

      7.  The picture was obtained by the authors from Zakariya in February 2012; see authors’ article written under the pseudonym Julian Thompson for reasons of security: Julian Thompson, “Bin Laden Told His Children: ‘Go to the US and Live in Peace,’ ” Sunday Times (London), February 12, 2012.

      8.  Author interviews with Mahfouz.

      9.  In July 2016, Hamzah bin Laden released an audiotaped speech entitled “We Are All Osama” calling for Muslims globally to avenge his father’s death. Released by As Sahab, translated into English by the SITE Intelligence Group. Hamzah uses this phrase to describe his father in the message. Also discussed in author interviews with Mahfouz.

    10.  Ibid.

    11.  Mark Mazzetti, “C.I.A. Drone Is Said to Kill Al Qaeda’s No. 2,” New York Times, August 27, 2011.

    12.  Jay Solomon, “U.S. Sees Iranian, al Qaeda Alliance,” Wall Street Journal, July 29, 2011.

    13.  Ibid. “Mr. Khalil is based in Iran and has been operating there under an agreement with Iranian authorities since 2005.” Per the U.S. Treasury Department.

    14.  This was a deliberate attempt on the part of the United States to put the Ahmadinejad regime under pressure to give up its remaining Al Qaeda “guests.”

    15.  Abu al-Khayr al-Masri was accused of having played a role in the 1998 embassy attacks and was wanted in Egypt and the United States. Both Saif and Abu Mohammed a
l-Masri had been on the FBI’s Most Wanted Terrorist list since its inception in 2001. Saif was also wanted in Egypt for his role in the assassination of Anwar Sadat. Thirwat Shihata, Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri’s deputy in Egyptian Islamic Jihad, had received two death sentences in absentia for alleged terrorist activities in Egypt. The two Jordanians—Zarqawi’s brother-in-law Khalid al-Aruri and Zarqawi’s long time aide Sari Shihab—were sought internationally for their roles in terrorist attacks in Iraq and Jordan.

    16.  Initially via the escorts and drivers, who worked at both sites and passed on simple messages, disguised as greetings from the wives.

    17.  “While we were in there, we could grab our letters and letters written to or from those still inside the compound,” he said.

    18.  In an attempt to persuade him to think more positively about the overland option, he was taken on an official sightseeing trip to Urmia in the far northwest of Iran, where he enjoyed a lavish meal with the escorts at a restaurant within sight of the Turkish border. “We found diplomats and foreigners, officials from the Kurdish region whose cars were carrying Iraqi plates,” he said. But the trip did nothing to change his mind. He was flying out or not going at all.

    19.  “Key Al Qaeda Agent Younis al-Mauritani Captured in Pakistan,” National (United Arab Emirates), September 6, 2011, www.thenational.ae/news/world/south-asia/key-al-qaeda-agent-younis-al-mauritani-captured-in-pakistan; also Younis’s Mauritanian security file, Nouakchott security services, author copy.

    20.  Abdel Bari Atwan, After Bin Laden. (London: Saqi Books, 2012)

    21.  Ibid. Al-Zawahiri, who released a statement about the Arab Spring, claimed, “Oh how great are these days we are living.”

    22.  Mahfouz told this story in detail to the authors over multiple interviews in Nouakchott. He also said, “I was not hurting him or killing him but I’m just trying to recover my rights.”

    23.  Ibid.

    24.  Yussef Al-Shuli, “Terror in America (29) Al Jazeera Interview with Top Al-Qa’ida Leader Abu Hafs ‘The Mauritanian,’ [Mahfouz Ibn El Waleed],” Al Jazeera, December 14, 2001. Middle East Media Research Institute. Retrieved October 23, 2012, groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/soc.culture.usa/b4XqGY82ZtU

    25.  In June 2011.

    26.  This letter was addressed to AQIM leader Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud.

    27.  Details of payments made via Iran can be found in “Treasury Designates Al-Qa’ida Supporters in Qatar and Yemen,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, December 18, 2013: www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2249.aspx. The money went through Yasin al-Suri and the Iran network, who had been briefly jailed in Evin to satisfy the U.S Treasury. See al-Suri’s profile at “Wanted: Yasin al-Suri,” Rewards for Justice, U.S. Department of State, www.rewardsforjustice.net/english/yasin_al_suri.html.

    28.  Will McCants, The ISIS Apocalypse: The History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State (New York: St. Martin’s, 2015).

    29.  This move led some U.S. commentators to describe him as “the new bin Laden.”

    30.  “Mapping Militant Organizations: Islamic State,” April 4, 2016, web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/1. See also Noman Benotman and Roisin Blake, “Jabhat al-Nusra, a Strategic Briefing,” Quilliam Foundation, www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/jabhat-al-nusra-a-strategic-briefing.pdf.

    31.  McCants, The ISIS Apocalypse.

    32.  Thomas Joscelyn, “Al-Zawahiri Eulogizes Al Qaeda’s Slain Syrian Representative,” Long War Journal, April 4, 2014. Also author interviews with Abu Qatada, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, and Huthaifa Azzam, Amman, Jordan, December 2016.

    33.  See Saif al-Adel’s eulogy of his close friend Abu Khalid, published August 2015, cited in Thomas Joscelyn, “Al Qaeda Insider Returns to Twitter, Discusses Group’s Global Leadership,” Long War Journal, March 16, 2016.

    34.  For more on Toubasi see Mona Alami, “The New Generation of Jordanian Jihadi Fighters,” Sada, February 18, 2014; and Suhaib Anjarini, “How Jordanians Came to Dominate al-Nusra Front,” Al-Akhbar, January 16, 2015.

    35.  SITE Intelligence Group, “Abu Musab al-Suri’s Military Theory of Jihad,” translated and published in 2011, news.siteintelgroup.com/blog/index.php/about-us/21-jihad/21-suri-a-mili.

    36.  “Al Nusra Leader: Our Mission Is to Defeat the Syrian Regime,” Al Jazeera, May 28, 2015.

    37.  McCants, The ISIS Apocalypse. See also Joscelyn, “Al-Zawahiri Eulogizes Al Qaeda’s Slain Syrian Representative.”

    38.  “Osama bin Laden’s Feuding Wives,” Daily Mail, March 30, 2012.

    39.  Author interviews with bin Laden family lawyer Aamir Khalil, June 2014.

    40.  FIR No: 3/2012, 01/03/2013, author copy. They were also accused of “deceitfully concealing their true identity and even did not disclose to concerned hospital staff when they gave birth to their children in Pakistan.”

    41.  On February 16, 2012, Zakariya submitted an appeal to the chief justice of Pakistan. “I put between your hands the issue of Osama bin Laden’s family (children and women) who passed upon their illegal disappearance in Pakistan more than eight months with Pakistani authorities despite they are innocent, and which consider against all the human rights and justice laws in the world.”

    42.  Author interviews with Rehman Malik, Islamabad, February 2012 and June 2014; Zakariya al-Sadeh, Islamabad, February 2012; and bin Laden family lawyer, Aamir Khalil. Also author interview with the female FIA officer who had accompanied the women, Rawalpindi, June 2014.

    43.  Author interview with Tabani, Islamabad, June 2014.

    44.  Ibid.

    45.  For illegally entering Pakistan.

    46.  “Pakistan Deporation of Bin Laden’s Family Delayed,” Asharq al-Awsat, April 18, 2012.

    47.  Rob Crilly, “Osama’s Widows and Children ‘Shown’ in Video,’ ” Daily Telegraph, April 10, 2012.

    48.  And who had been promoted soon after to Karachi Corps commander, a powerful position that was thought to have bought his silence

    49.  “Saudi Arabia Accepts Bin Laden’s Family ‘on Humanitarian Grounds,’ ” Asharq al-Awsat, April 28, 2012. Government sources in Riyadh said that bin Laden’s widows had been allowed to enter the country from a “humanitarian” standpoint, adding that they were confident that they and the children were not involved in Al Qaeda operations.

    50.  Author visit to house.

    51.  “Pakistan Doctor in Bin Laden Case Called Corrupt, Womaniser,” Asharq al-Awsat, May 29, 2012.

    52.  “Ex Lawyer of Bin Laden Hunt Doctor Killed in Pakistan,” Al Jazeera, May 18, 2015.

    53.  Author interviews with Brigadier Syed Amjad Shabbir, private secretary to General Pasha, Islamabad, 2014–2015. Before he retired, a judicial commission into the Memogate affair released its final conclusions and found that former ambassador Husain Haqqani had been its “originator and architect.” By then he was out of reach in Washington, working for a think tank and preparing a book.

    54.  “Muammar Gaddafi’s Spy Chief Senussi Arrested in Mauritania,” Daily Telegraph, May 17, 2012.

    55.  Quotes in this section from author interviews with Mahfouz.

    56.  Ibid.

    57.  Undated copy of Osama bin Laden’s will. Recovered from Abbottabad, declassified and released by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence [hereafter ODNI] in March 2016, www.dni.gov/index.php/resources/bin-laden-bookshelf.

    58.  His brother Sidi Ould Walid gave a statement to the local press: “My brother was interrogated multiple times and his release indicates he is no longer seen as a threat.”

    59.  Author inter
views with Abu Ghaith’s closest friend, Mahfouz. Also interviews with bin Laden family members.

    60.  Abu Ghaith described some of this journey in his subsequent statement to the FBI, author copy. Bin Laden family members also recounted Fatima’s journey.

    61.  Special Agent Michael S. Butsch and Deputy U.S. Marshall Brian T. McHugh asked questions; author copy of interrogation transcript.

    62.  “U.S. Transfers Suspected Senior Al Qaeda Member to Mauritania,” Reuters, June 1, 2013.

    63.  Author interview with Stanley Cohen, legal counsel to Sulaiman Abu Ghaith, New York, October 2014.

    64.  Ibid.

    65.  For conspiracy to kill Americans, providing material support to terrorists, and conspiring to do so.

    66.  This set a precedent in which the foreign policy objectives of several of Syria’s neighbors would be fought out on Syrian territory.

    67.  This statement was issued on June 15, 2013.

    68.  Thomas Joscelyn, “Report: Former Head of Al Qaeda’s Network in Iran Now Operates in Syria,” Long War Journal, March 25, 2014.

    69.  Murad Batal al-Shishani, “Syria’s Surprising Release of Jihadi Strategist Abu Mus’ab al-Suri,” Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Monitor 10, no. 3 (February 10, 2012). See also Bill Roggio, “Al Qaeda’s American Propagandist Notes Death of Terror Group’s Representative in Syria,” Long War Journal, March 30, 2014.

    70.  Thomas Joscelyn, “Islamic State of Iraq Leader Defies al-Zawahiri in Alleged Audio Message,” Long War Journal, June 15, 2013.

    71.  “Hadith Authenticity of Black Flags Hadith from Kitab Al Fitan,” www.ummah.com/forum/showthread.php?408221-Hadith-Authenticity-of-Black-Flags-Hadith-from-Kitab-Al-Fitan.

    72.  For details of these payments, who made them, and how they were funneled from Qatar through Iran to Syria, see “Treasury Designates Al-Qa’ida Supporters in Qatar and Yemen.”

    73.  Liz Sly, “Al-Qaeda Disavows Any Ties with Radical Islamist ISIS Group in Syria, Iraq,” Washington Post, February 3, 2014