The Super Summary of World History

by Alan Dale Daniel

  5) The emergence of super nationalist terror organizations sponsored by desperate nations such as Serbia. The Serbs possessed extensive desires with few resources. Thus, they turned to terrorist activities, such as assassinations, to create chaotic circumstances possibly benefitting Serbia—which in fact happened. It was one of these Serb backed terrorist organizations, the Black Hand, that killed Archduke Ferdinand.

  6) A dramatic change in German political philosophy took place in 1897 after Kaiser Wilhelm II took power and decided to expand German military power on land and at sea, plus acquire additional colonies, thus upsetting the balance of power in Europe.

  The direct cause of the Great War was the murder of Archduke Ferdinand, next in line to the crown of Austria, and his wife Sophie by the Black Hand, a terrorist organization sponsored by Serbia. After the assassination and the discovery that Serbia sponsored the student murderer Gavrilo Princip, Austria sent Serbia several written absolute demands; however, Serbia rejected a few. Austria gave the Serbs 48 hours to respond, and the pressure of time limited the diplomat’s ability to gather the parties for talks. Serbia asked and received from Russia assurances saying if Austria attacked Serbia, Russian mobilization and war on Austria would follow.[170] Austria, meanwhile, contacted Germany and the Kaiser responded he would support Austria if Russia declared war. Russia contacted France and France told Russia they could count on the alliance (again unconditioned), and France promised to declare war on Germany if Germany mobilized against Russia.[171]

  Encased in all this maneuvering were several unseen problems. Austria asked Germany to support their position against Serbia. Diplomats always condition responses to achieve flexibility; however, the German Kaiser’s response was yes, and without conditions. Being no diplomat, the Kaiser’s response put Germany in a poor position, forfeiting all ability to leverage its uninhibited partner toward moderation. Moreover, the Kaiser answered before knowing the demands Austria sent to Serbia. A most unwise move since the Austrian demands were quite harsh. Serbia must reject the worst demands or forfeit national honor (a big no no in 1914). The unlimited German promise freed Austria to declare war if any demand suffered rejection. The 48-hour Austrian time limit for Serbia’s response denied the Great Powers time to arrange negotiations to avert war. In addition, several heads of state were absent from their capitols and were hard to reach. Worse, the underlings left in charge apparently desired war. Russia’s growing strength convinced the German military to recommend war before Russia grew any stronger. We now know the Germans and Austrians were working together to start a war against Serbia, so diplomatic actions that would stop the march to war were rebuffed by Germany. Austria’s foreign minister, Leopold von Berchtold, despised Serbia, and he pressed for war to end Serbian expansionist policies. With Germany’s backing he hoped to demolish the Serbs, but Russia had to stay out for Austria to win. Russia had backed down before when faced with a joint Austrian—German front and Berchtold hoped for a repeat, but this time it was different. Russia’s military told the Tsar that a limited mobilization was impossible and unwise, plus the Tsar wanted to avoid another humiliation at the hands of the Germans, so he ordered a full mobilization. France failed to encourage Russia to moderate its actions. For example, if Russia had initiated a limited mobilization the nervous German plans would not require action. Finally, there was the Schlieffen Plan.

  The von Schlieffen Plan

  Germany’s major problem involved a threatened two-front war against France in the west and Russia in the east. The alliance of France with Russia specifically sought to keep Germany under control; unfortunately, the desired cautious mindset failed to appear. Instead, desperate plans became a necessity in the German mind because of the dual alliance. The German General Staff came under immense pressure to find a way to win a two-front war rather than avoid it at all costs. The result of German thinking became the famous von Schlieffen Plan. The plan required Germany to attack France at the very outset of war with a colossal assault while a few troops moved east to hold back the Russian tidal wave until France capitulated. Thereafter, Germany’s focus could shift to Russia. The built-in predicament entailed the need for an instant attack in the West. Everything depended on knocking France out of the war before Russia mobilized and moved its considerable numbers of troops to the front. Realizing England might join France, the plan’s need for speed increased exponentially. France must be defeated within six weeks, before significant help arrived from England or Russia. Germany’s plan confirmed its desperation, as well as carrying numerous grave risks and false assumptions.

  The plan required an attack through neutral Belgium followed by an encirclement of French forces near Paris. The great wheeling movement required enough force and coordination to smash French forces manning the north of France, then charge south toward Paris, and finally rotating east to capture France’s military in a pocket. What a tall order! The plan also called for allowing French forces attacking Germany at the frontier to advance during the first few days of the war, thus pulling them away from the main attack and deeper into the German pocket. Oddly, French Plan 17 called for this very attack into German territory. Imprudently, the German military staff took no notice that attacking neutral Belgium guaranteed England would declare war, as England ensured Belgium’s neutrality. This is another indication of how desperate von Schlieffen perceived Germany’s situation.

  The German plan did not address failure. There was no plan B. Everything depended on defeating France within six weeks.[172] For a general staff to shun planning for possible failure is inexcusable. If the plan failed, as everyone knew it might because it required a number of great gambles, Germany’s future depended on improvisation rather than a well researched backup plan. Because of this lack of foresight Germany went forward under a gross assumption that the plan must succeed. A close examination of the failure alternative might have convinced even the most hardened general that peace trumped war in this instance. Failure predestined Germany to fight on two-fronts against the massive Russian army to the east and a very good set of armies to the west. The consequences of a British naval blockade and the resulting lack of supplies and food was obvious. Peace was by far the best course of action; nevertheless, peace failed to pass muster. Worse yet for Germany, a new set of German generals significantly changed the Schlieffen Plan.

  Mobilization

  Austria resolved on war with Serbia and mobilized, declaring war on July 28, 1914; then Serbia called on Russian support, and Russia mobilized. Germany then mobilized, thus leading to a French mobilization. England stayed out at this point. If England had continued to stay out, history might have changed course dramatically. As France mobilized Germany struck immediately because of the von Schlieffen plan’s speed requirements. Germany crashed through neutral Belgium and England immediately entered the war. England sent its army to France very quickly, and gave significant aid to France at the key moment of the German assault.

  Due to the reasons listed above, the great powers of the day stumbled into an all out war no one wanted. None of the great powers would survive intact. Austria-Hungary ended up broken up; the Turkish Empire ceased to exist; Germany lost territory, economic power, and prestige;[173] England gained colonies but lost a generation of young men and its financial underpinnings; Russia lost its government and its national soul to an evil beyond all calculation; and France lost a generation in the trenches as well as its financial foundations. Serbia suffered assault and defeat. Serbia lost the least and gained the most considering its culpability in inaugurating the avalanche of doom. The Black Hand murderers achieved their goal of an independent Slav state (Yugoslavia). The assassin Princip is still considered a hero in Serbia. In short, the terrorists won and everyone else lost.

  A short summary of events: Serbia murders Archduke Ferdinand of Austria, Austria makes demands on Serbia, Russia backs Serbia, Germany backs Austria, France backs Russia, Austria attacks Serbia, Russia mobilizes, Germany attacks France through Belgium,
England enters war. Even this sounds complicated.

  Deciding Factors (in order of importance):

  1. The British Blockade of Germany and its allies. This devastating blockade prevented any kind of material, including food, from reaching Germany or its allies. Even the Ottoman Empire suffered. Syria claimed the loss of one-half million people due to starvation from the blockade. Cut off from its traditional food sources in Russia, Austria-Hungary’s agricultural system began to collapse in 1917 increasing starvation in their nation. In the end, England starved the Germans and their allies into submission. Even after Germany agreed to the armistice, Britain continued the blockade while thousands of civilians starved to death needlessly (and people wonder why the Germans started WWII).

  2. The Failure of the Schlieffen Plan. Germany staked everything on the Schlieffen Plan. After it failed, Germany fought a war on two fronts, eventually proving the pre-war prediction of certain defeat. After the failure of the Schlieffen Plan, Germany needed to consider offering peace even if the terms were unfavorable. Years of slaughter followed but still failed to change the course of the German nation.

  3. The Entry of the United States into the War on the Allied Side. Once again, like Britain, if the USA had remained neutral, the world’s future might have transformed. With no intervention by the USA, WWI might have continue stalemated; thus, requiring all sides to consider some kind of negotiated peace where everyone “lost.” Senator Warren Harding, a future US president, led the Republicans in arguing against entering the war but failed to convince the public or the Democrats who controlled Congress.

  4. The Code Breakers. England was reading Germany’s codes consistently, leading directly to the deciphering of the Zimmerman Telegram bringing the United States into the war. The code breakers knew beforehand everything the German High Seas Fleet was doing, enabling them to block any move to destroy or significantly damage the English fleet. The code breakers also warned the Allied generals of coming German offensives. Overall, the Allied code breakers were a key war-winning factor (just like WWII).

  5. Allied Technological and Tactical Developments. The invention of the tank and combined arms warfare (tanks, aircraft, artillery, and infantry all working together as a team) broke open the Western Front leading directly to the defeat of Germany. In addition, the invention of the convoy system and new detection devices destroyed Germany’s undersea offensive, which was their last chance to break England. Allied aircraft became much better as the war progressed giving the Allies control of the air, another key component in winning on the Western Front.

  The War Begins

  The war began with Germany executing its Schlieffen Plan, which violated the neutrality of Belgium. The English then entered the war because of this neutrality violation and straight away landed troops in France. Meanwhile, the French were positioning their troops improperly. Under the French Plan 17 they planned an immediate attack on the German frontier, thus, inadvertently putting themselves into the German sack. Germany’s generals had changed the Schlieffen Plan by positioning more units on the German frontier where the French attack took place. The French attack suffered heavy losses followed by a retreat. This was not what Schlieffen had wanted. Von Schlieffen placed only a few German troops on the frontier because he wanted them driven back. The French drive would continue if they thought they were winning, making it impossible to reposition their troops fast enough to prevent their encirclement. Critically, since the French attack experienced a bloody repulse, the French units were in position to move swiftly by rail to meet the German advance on Paris. This rapid repositioning of their forces saved France. Quickly retreating Allied units from the Belgian frontier caused confusion near Paris, allowing the German advance to nearly reach the city. But, similar confusion in the German forces resulted in a wide gap between units at a key location on the German front. Allied reconnaissance aircraft spotted the gap near the River Marne, and the British launched an attack into this gap threatening the entire German advance. In a series of engagements on the River Marne the combined French and English forces defeated the Germans and “saved” France in the Miracle of the Marne.

  The word “saved” is in quotes because “salvation” meant a long cruel war for France. Millions of additional Frenchmen died due to the Miracle of the Marne. If the German plan had achieved success the war could have been mercifully short thereby saving millions of lives. Until the next war anyway.

  Figure 49 The Schlieffen Plan

  The German plan failed for many tactical reasons, including: lack of coordination between advancing German armies; stiff resistance by the small, but extremely professional, British Army; too few German troops on the critical right wing; too many German troops at their frontier; the swift repositioning of French frontier forces; the German High Command stripping troops from the right wing for the Eastern Front before concluding the critical encirclement of French forces; the Allied decision to immediately abort French Plan 17 and reposition the troops; the German field commanders allowing a gap to develop between their divisions; the Allies quickly locating the gap with air reconnaissance and immediately attacking into the gap.

  The strategic cause of failure: the plan’s timetable proved far too ambitious. The timetable was the plan’s key feature, and if the timetable failed the plan failed. Foot soldiers could not hope to keep the plan’s timetable. After the Germans left their jump-off points they advanced on foot. Marching men trying to cover the given distances faced an impossible task. The heat of summer, the lack of supply transport, stiff resistance by British and French troops, and a lack of coordination made victory, for mere mortals, unattainable. The lack of radio communications made the problem of coordinating movement overwhelming. The plan could solve these concerns only by striking with such crushing force that all problems of coordination, timing, and distance fell before the sheer weight of the assault. If enough troops were available to stop counterattacks, keeping the momentum on the attacker’s side, it might have worked, although it would have taken more than the planned six weeks. Von Schlieffen designed in this extra strength; however, less skillful generals changed the equation by decreasing strength in the attacking armies while increasing defensive strength in the wrong places.[174] After the Germans faltered, the French and English forces counterattacked effectively causing the Germans to withdraw. The Germans entrenched in defensive positions, blocking Allied counterattacks. The entrenchments then lengthened, soon extending from the English Channel to Switzerland, creating the ultimate front without a flank.

  Momentarily think on this: if WWI caused WWII, then WWI becomes history’s most important war. Thus, the Schlieffen Plan is history’s most important plan, and the Battle of the Marne the most important battle. The reasoning is flawed due to numerous disconnects, but it is easy to argue the position.[175] By arguing against or for such propositions we gain a better understanding of history. Comparisons deepen understanding.

  Stalemate in the West

  The Germans failed to destroy France and possessed no plans for this result in the west. The Allied problem was that Germany held a large part of France containing quality resources and many French citizens. The Western Allies reasoned that the Germans could just sit where they were. France could not allow such an outcome, so frontal attacks against well-fortified positions seemed to be a necessity (recall there was no flank). The Germans assumed the same and took pains to deepen and strengthen their positions. For three years, the power of these defenses proved impossible to overcome. [176]

  Figure 50 Trench System, from English Army Manual 1914

  The Maxim gun, the first reliable machine gun, was a main instrument for trench defense. The machine guns of World War I, invented by H. Maxim (thus the name) in 1884, fired about six hundred rounds per minute (ten rounds per second), and were so heavy it took several men to move, maintain, and shoot them; however, they also decimated attacking troops. The Germans protected their machine guns until the Allied artillery stopped firing, then
set up the guns to drench the advancing troops with bullets. The howitzer artillery piece, a defensive and offensive machine, fired a projectile at high angles while out of sight (behind a hill for example) for a long distance. New shells exploded in the air scattering great quantities of fast flying, hot, steel fragments (shrapnel) capable of killing numerous men in an instant. These new machines of war erased men’s lives by the millions as they advanced across the open, muddy, barbed wire covered ground of No Man’s Land.[177]

  Following 1914, the Western Front settled into doomed and nightmarish Allied attacks against excellent defensive fortifications held by the Germans. During the next three years, the front hardly moved in spite of countless sacrifices by hundreds of thousands of troops. The Battle of the Somme, a combined British and French attack on German trenches in July 1916, lasted four and one-half months. When the ordeal ended, British casualties totaled approximately 420,000, French 205,000, and German 500,000; and, the attack failed to reach objectives set for the first day. At Verdun, a million men died, while positions hardly changed.[178] These battles were typical for the Western Front.

  the Western Front

  The French and British generals, such as Nivelle for France and Haig for Britain, kept frontally attacking the perfectly dug-in Germans. After achieving nothing, and scratching their heads for a moment or two, they demanded more men and attacked just as before, notwithstanding some minor adjustments (more men, more artillery). The next attack will do it, they promised their political overlords; nevertheless, the only difference was higher piles of dismembered dead. Alarmingly similar results hardly worried the military leaders. As shredded bodies and splintered bones piled up civilian governments in England and France began asking their generals embarrassing questions. The responding generals said the Germans were suffering many more casualties than the attacking allies; thus, with each offensive victory grew closer. Liars. If insanity is doing the same thing over and over while expecting different results, these generals qualify as insane. And the political leaders were stupid and timid. Of course, the politicians were being lied to, but they needed to dig out the truth. Widespread incompetence is verified by the politicians accepting the general’s statements without analysis while the grim reaper prospered.