The Super Summary of World History

by Alan Dale Daniel

  Italy’s industrial base was unprepared for war because of outdated methods and machinery. Italian industry had no capacity to produce the quantity of military equipment needed, and it struggled with changes to new manufacturing methods. Thus, Italian troops fought with outdated and difficult to fix equipment. In the North African campaign photos of Italian tanks often show sandbags piled all over them. This was necessary because Allied projectiles easily penetrated the armor. Men saddled with outdated poor quality weapons are seldom highly motivated warriors.

  Japan adopted modern industrial methods of design and production before 1910; thus, Japan began the war with excellent weapons of their type. The Japanese “long lance” torpedo (twenty-one inch, oxygen propelled) was the war’s best, and Zero fighters excelled in 1941 (note these are naval developments). A few powerful families (the zaibatsu), following Japanese military directions, operated the Japanese industrial base; however, the Imperial Army was slow to innovate. During the war, Japan failed to develop new weapons or new methods of production. The Kamikaze concept [235] grew out of desperation to make do with out-of-date aircraft that were good for nothing except ramming American ships. Why the Japanese failed to develop newer aircraft, rifles, machine guns, and tanks is difficult to understand. Japan’s industrial giants had two or more years to design and deploy newer weapons before the US bombing campaign became a factor.

  The Japanese built excellent ships throughout the war. What the Japanese needed to do was build sufficient merchant shipping to supply their war needs. All of their important raw materials and much of their food came from the south by ship. When American subs began sinking large numbers of cargo vessels Japanese shipbuilders failed to replace the losses. Prewar Japanese planning ignored protection for merchant shipping. For the first six months of the war, because of defective American torpedoes, little damage was done to Japan’s merchant marine; however, after correcting the malfunctions, US submarines extensively damaged the Japan’s cargo fleet. As this disaster unfolded Japan’s leaders ignored the problem. They delayed using the convoy system, failed to develop adequate anti-submarine warfare methods, and did not commit enough ships to protect their vital merchant fleet.

  We should note here that industrial and military cooperation between the Axis partners was nil. If Japanese plans for the Long Lance torpedo had made it to Germany before the war the course of the conflict could have changed dramatically. If Japan had adopted German anti-shipping submarine warfare methods the Pacific War would have grown much harder for the Allies.

  England’s industry performed well, especially its aircraft industry. England produced the Lancaster, one of the best bombers of WWII, as well as many other superb aircraft. The LST, conceived and designed in England, was built in the United States, showing the knack of the two allies to work closely together toward common goals. The P-51 Mustang was an aircraft that both the United States and England contributed to designing and constructing. Cooperation among allies at this level within the industrial base is phenomenal, and a key reason the Allies won the war. English industry turned out enough freighters, rifles, aircraft, and the like to keep them in the war. The US could, and did, produce these items in such superabundance it became a war-winning factor all by itself.

  The Crucial Years

  1939 to 1942

  The early days of the war were critical because decisions made then caused nearly irreversible impacts on future events and operations. We have discussed many critical decisions above, but note how many were made early in the conflict. Once in place, decisions can take on a life of their own becoming impossible to reverse. I like to think of these as foundational decisions. Allied victory was constructed on excellent foundational decisions early in the war. By contrast, the Germans and Japanese made especially poor foundational decisions. Hitler’s decision to start the war was partially based on an economic problem. His mishandling of the Germany economy placed it on bankruptcy’s edge, and only a conquest with the attendant plunder of raw materials, slave labor, and perhaps precious metals could save it and him. That was a foundational decision of the first order, and very stupid.[236]

  North Africa

  1940 to 1943

  The tank battles in North Africa’s deserts became the stuff of legend. Tanks in the desert are somewhat like ships at sea. Aircraft rule the sea, and the same is true in the desert. The side with air superiority held an unbeatable advantage. Early on the air forces were near equals, but once the Allies gained air superiority it was over.

  Figure 54 Southern Approaches to Europe

  Mussolini declared war on the Allies hoping to gain a Mediterranean empire. By attacking Egypt from Italy’s Libyan bases on June 10, 1940, and invading Greece through Albania on October 28, 1940, Mussolini fumbled the ball in the end zone. As both invasions turned disastrous, Hitler bailed Mussolini out by directing German units into the Balkans and North Africa. At Greece’s request, the British sent an expeditionary force; but, the Germans quickly rolled up another victory conquering Greece and Crete in the bargain (at a high cost). Hitler also delayed the invasion of the USSR by a few weeks. Whether or not this influenced the war is still debated (more on this later).

  After the initial Italian assault in North Africa, British forces drove the Italians back through Libya and captured large numbers of troops and equipment. Mussolini was embarrassed, and it looked as if Britain would soon own North Africa from Egypt to Tunis. Unable to suffer this, Hitler sent a small force to help the Italians in 1940. From this decision the legendary Afrika Korps was born. Their leader, the intrepid General Erwin Rommel, went on the offensive right away. The Germans and their Italian partners soon pushed the English back into Libya, threatening their port redoubt at Tobruk. Back in London Churchill fumed while sending reinforcements, along with demands for new offensive efforts.

  Rommel, one of the war’s great generals, consistently bewildered the British in North Africa. He commanded a small military force having so few good tanks it seems miraculous he won at all, much less for so long. The key was his tactical ability. Rommel attacked using combined arms methods mixed with surprise and just enough audacity. He positioned his antitank guns and artillery to support armored assaults. His anti-tank guns included the fearsome 88mm antiaircraft gun adapted to an antitank role. The 88mm could rapidly chew up any group of tanks, thus giving the Afrika Korps an edge in all engagements. On defense, he made the English run a gauntlet of antitank fire before engaging his armor. The English, never absorbing the gist of this, continually attacked without proper artillery or antitank support. Eventually, British General Montgomery used combined arms methods to beat Rommel, but the real key to Montgomery’s victories was overwhelming force. Hitler missed his chance to capture the Suez Canal by failing to reinforce Rommel long before El Alamein, but Hitler consistently refused to reinforce success and just as consistently reinforced failure.

  The British took the offensive again in 1942, driving Rommel back toward his start points; but, even though outnumbered he was not to be out-generaled. He struck back at the first opportunity and drove the English east once again, this time conquering Tobruk in 1942. With the fall of Tobruk, Rommel captured some thirty-five thousand enemy troops and a first-rate port. Rommel was eager to press on to Cairo. Nevertheless, there was a rub—supplies.

  Rommel’s superior was General Kesselring,[237] in charge of the entire Mediterranean theater of war, and he wanted to halt Rommel’s advance near Tobruk. Kesselring needed all available resources to assault Malta, a small island in the middle of the Mediterranean Sea, controlled by the British, and lying directly across Afrika Korps supply lines. This tiny island caused the Axis enormous problems because English subs and aircraft operating from there ravaged Rommel’s supply lines, often sinking one-half of the shipping bound for North Africa. The Italians worried about shipping losses and the Germans worried about the loss of supplies—especially fuel. The hardworking Allied code breakers knew the sailing time and course of Axis convoys
traveling from Italy to North Africa, and this information allowed the despoiling of Italian shipping. (Think on what could happen if the Germans intercepted this much information about Allied convoys! Could one-half of the ships bound for Britain have been lost?)[238]

  Rommel wanted Cairo, the key to Egypt, Suez, and perhaps the entire near east. Rommel’s reasoning was straightforward. The English were defeated and were on the run. A tight pursuit, pushing them hard, could result in breaking their army, thereby allowing German forces to win Cairo and the Suez Canal.[239]

  Kesselring analyzed the issues differently. He knew Axis logistics (supply) problems were severe in the Mediterranean, and he deeply understood supplies were fundamental to winning any war, especially a war so heavily dependent on tanks and aircraft (both gas hogs).[240] Kesselring recognized the extended supply lines of the Afrika Korps could be their undoing. The British fell back on shorter supply lines, while the German supply lines stretched ever longer. English air power consistently increased, threatening to gain air superiority, and opening the lengthy German supply lines to air attack. Malta must be taken or the Axis faced disaster on the deserts of North Africa. A stop at Tobruk, permitting resource diversions for Malta’s conquest, was critical for supply line protection. Once the supply lines were secure, Rommel could advance on Cairo or defend Tobruk. Hitler decided it was “on to Cairo,” so Rommel kept his meager resources, and Britain kept Malta. German supplies were interdicted at ever-increasing rates even as Hitler refused critical reinforcements for Rommel. This was the key decision in North Africa. On such decisions, the fate of the world often turns.

  El Alamein

  June to October 1942

  Rommel drove eastward until he confronted a new English line north of the Qattara Depression near the tiny railroad stop of El Alamein. The British general Auchinleck decided to forego other defensive positions and retreat to El Alamein, thereby gaining time for preparing a decisive defensive line. The depression, a sinkhole in the desert impassable by tanks or mechanized units, caused a shrinking of the battlefield to a narrow strip of land between the depression and the coast. Up until this point, the armies fought on an open desert without a southern flank. Anchoring defensive positions on the coast protected the northern flank, but the southern part of any position was just hanging in the air. Rommel made good use of this, and his panzers liked rounding the exposed flank to smash it in thus causing many British retreats. Anchoring both the northern and southern flanks ended the dashing war of maneuver Rommel used so well. Instead, Rommel faced a position requiring frontal assaults and static fighting, much like World War I, wholly favoring the English.

  Upon arriving at El Alamein, Rommel realized that giving the English preparation time was not a good idea; so he launched a strong frontal attack on General Auchinleck’s forces with his combined German and Italian army in June of 1942. This was the First Battle of El Alamein, and it was the deciding battle in North Africa. It was now, before the arrival of massive British reinforcements, the Afrika Korps enjoyed its best chance of breaking through the tired and demoralized British.

  Rommel’s major problem was the disparity in forces. He controlled eight infantry divisions and four armored consisting of 96,000 men including 56,000 Italians; however, only two of the armored divisions were German panzers. The other two were Italian units with outdated tanks. On paper, Rommel could muster 582 tanks, but only two hundred of them were reliable panzers. To make matters worse, the Axis air forces possessed less than five hundred aircraft. The British Eighth Army fielded 150,000 troops in seven divisions, three armored divisions of 1,114 tanks, 1,000 artillery pieces, supported by 1,500 aircraft, and they had dug-in positions to defend along with exact intelligence on Rommel and his army. A simple review of the forces makes one wonder how the Germans could succeed under any scenario. To win when the forces are lopsided, maneuver is essential; and at El Alamein maneuver was subtracted from victory’s equation. Rommel nearly succeeded anyway. In his estimation, one ridge stood between him and knocking the British out of this ideal defensive area, but that one ridge held against Rommel’s exhausted men and dwindling supplies of fuel and ammunition. The defenders of Ruweisat Ridge, a medium rise of land in the middle of the battlefield, stopped the Third Reich and one of its best generals. Not for the last time, lack of supplies played a key role in the defeat.

  For less than appropriate reasons, Churchill replaced Auchinleck with General Montgomery.[241] As fall arrived in the desert, Rommel grew seriously ill and left for hospitalization in Europe.[242] Meanwhile, Montgomery had assembled 220,000 troops, 1,351 tanks, 1,500 aircraft, and over 900 artillery pieces. In tanks and aircraft, the English had a 3 to 1 or better advantage.[243] Montgomery was finally ready, Rommel was hospitalized, and the Germans were unaware the assault was about to begin. Montgomery’s timing was perfect (The code breakers again? Absolutely). Montgomery timed his attack to coincide with Allied landings in French North Africa—far behind Rommel. No matter what occurred at El Alamein, the Germans were in a vise and retreat would be compulsory after the North African landings.[244] El Alamein was a total English victory and a debacle for the Afrika Korps. It’s back broken, it retreated across 1,500 miles of harsh desert with the British Desert Air Force pounding them every step of the way. North Africa fell to the Allies in May 1943. German and Italian prisoners of war exceeded 275,000, and over one-half were German. These veteran troops were irreplaceable.

  General Kesselring knew the ultimate question of victory or defeat for Germany would not be answered in North Africa; however, total defeat in North Africa could unduly influence the true arena of decision—the USSR. Delay would equal success, but it required a well-thought-out defense in the rugged mountains of Tunis, Malta being in Axis hands, and more air power and sea support. An expensive undertaking, but such a strategy might have added a year to the Allied efforts in North Africa. It is entirely plausible that Kesselring, a master of defensive warfare, could have achieved this goal; nevertheless, he would not get the cooperation of the Fuehrer.

  The USSR

  June 1944 to August 1945

  Barbarossa

  Hitler invades the USSR on the same month and day Napoleon invaded Russia, June 22, 1812. This time it was 1941. The result was the same; the destruction of the invading army and its delusional leader, but how it came about was much different. The scale of conflict in the USSR was so immense that anything coming before it, or after, simply fades away in comparison. Millions of men were fighting across thousands of miles of terrain with every device of war available to them. Innumerable numbers of men, aircraft, tanks, trucks, horses, wagons, artillery, and a profusion of other equipment pushed the campaigns forward. Moreover, this war was personal. Hitler and Stalin despised one another and the governmental systems each man controlled. Murder and torture were commonplace. This was industrialized war set to the tune of uncompromising ideologies. Chaos was upon the world, and chaos had a name—Operation Barbarossa.

  Hitler doomed his armies before his invasion was underway. Dread gripped the German generals upon Hitler’s announcement that an invasion of the USSR was set for launch in April or May of 1941. Britain remained unconquered, their navy and nation still intact, and her forces were trying to capture North Africa. How could Hitler even contemplate such a move since it would result in a two-front war?[245] Ever since Chancellor Bismarck’s time, Germany knew it was trapped between the power of Russia in the east, and France and England in the west. Because Germany was a central European land power, the generals understood war with the USSR and England would force expenditures of men and materials on two fronts simultaneously, thereby fatally diluting Germany’s combat power.

  Orders being what they are, the German general staff dutifully drew up plans for the invasion and used war games to study them.[246] The plans were revised until they satisfied the general staff. In these initial plans, the German staff officers made Moscow the principal objective of the invasion. Taking Moscow would disrupt Russia
n command and control systems, because Moscow was the transportation and communication hub of the nation, and taking Moscow would make troop movements from one battlefield to another difficult.

  The original OKH (German army headquarters) plans called for a drive on Moscow with large forces. Plan 1 used army group center to push to Moscow with smaller but ample forces moving to take Leningrad. In OKH plan 2, the drive to Leningrad employed fewer units, and the campaign for Moscow was even larger. Adolf Hitler dismissed both plans and made up his own plan—which was not war gamed or deeply scrutinized by knowledgeable military men. The Fuehrer’s plan targeted Leningrad by removing large numbers of troops from the critical Moscow drive; thus, vital disconnects began between Hitler and his Wehrmacht army headquarters over the grand strategy. By the way, Hitler’s planning headquarters was OKW. Yep, there were two planning organizations, and Hitler disliked OKH because they had the temerity to argue with him.

  Hitler made these demands late in time, and the generals could not dissuade him from this unstudied course of action. Why he demanded these changes is unknown, but Hitler often thought in economic terms rather than military terms. Gaining valuable raw materials such as oil, or cutting off others from the same, often weighed on his mind. The generals concerned themselves with demolishing the enemy’s army as quickly and efficiently as possible. OKH (army headquarters) detested Hitler’s plan, and, when time came to order the armies forward, they often shunned Hitler’s wishes and surreptitiously kept Moscow as the prime objective. Later in the campaign, Hitler completely absorbed the general’s functions and began moving forces himself, and in detail, confusing the goals of the invasion. The lethal decision changing the carefully planned offensive was another dreadful foundational decision which was irreversible.