The Super Summary of World History

by Alan Dale Daniel

  Figure 64 American Dual Offensives Against Japan

  By 1943 US Navy carrier forces had combined their air units for overwhelming aerial assaults razing Japanese air power on the island fortresses. Then the fleet sailed up and disgorged the troops who took the island. These actions punctured Japanese assumptions about defending their empire. The fact that the Americans quickly took heavily defended Pacific islands shocked Japan’s high command. Japan confronted an enemy doing the impossible, and doing it very well. The Japanese commander at Tarawa had stated that, “A million men could not take this island in a thousand years” (or something close to that), but the US Marine Second Division took it in three days. To be fair, the Japanese commander never heard of Amtracs (boats with tank treads). If he had known his confidence might have ebbed.

  Tarawa

  We will use Tarawa as an example of Pacific island assaults. For adequate reconnaissance of the Marshall Islands, the next target, Tarawa’s airfield was necessary. Weeks before the US Marines landed on Tarawa long-range B-24 Liberator bombers cratered the island and its runways. This bombing effectively ended air threats to the US Navy.

  The Japanese possessed a critical terrain advantage—a coral reef surrounded the island about eight hundred yards from the beach that could stop the Higgins[296] boats. To overcome this defensive advantage the marines decided to employ tracked landing vehicles (LVT-1: Landing Vehicle Tracked), which could climb over the reef and continue to the shore. The marines discovered one hundred new LVT-2s in San Diego that were larger, faster, and carried a heaver payload than the LVT-1s. An all-out effort was undertaken to get these boats to Tarawa before the landing. They made it in the early morning hours on the day of the invasion. One hundred twenty-five LVTs assaulted Tarawa of which ninety were lost (72% casualty rate), but without them the invasion would have failed.

  The Japanese planned a fleet counterattack (Hei Operation 3) once they determined the US Navy’s next objective, but the Japanese high command was guessing where the blow would fall. They failed to envision the United States mounting two simultaneous offensives, one already underway in the South Pacific, and another through the Central Pacific. To prepare for the expected offensive, Admiral Koga, Japan’s chief of naval operations since Yamamoto’s death, concluded the Central Pacific activity was a feint, and moved 173 carrier aircraft and several cruisers to Rabaul in the South Pacific. On November 5 and 11, US Carriers launched two large raids on Rabaul, shooting down about 100 Japanese aircraft and damaging several cruisers. The loss of so many carrier pilots ended all counterattack plans. At the time, no American knew the impact of these raids, but they were critical to the success of the Gilbert’s (Tarawa) operation.

  Figure 65 Betio (Tarawa) Map

  A surfeit of errors plagued the Tarawa assault. Some of the important failings were: the naval command ships were too far away and unable to receive needed information or see the action; the fleet’s big guns were fired at a low angle and failed to demolish enemy pill boxes or bunkers which required plunging fire to destroy; marine radios were not waterproof causing nearly all to fail; and there was insufficient firepower at the squad level (flamethrowers and machine guns). A lot more went wrong, but this list is a sample of the problems.

  The first two waves in Amtracs got ashore with acceptable losses; however, the low tide stopped the Higgins boats at the reef. The marines who were stuck at the reef had to either wait there under scalding enemy fire for an Amtrac to take them in, or attempt to wade ashore in chest deep water while receiving fearsome enemy fire. The Japanese 75mm dual-gun anti-boat cannons, along with the heavy 13mm machine guns, fired accurately and with devastating effects on the LVTs and the Higgins boats. Marine unit cohesion disappeared as men struggled ashore separated from their squads or companies without officers, radios, heavy weapons, or the ability to communicate with other units. Small packets of men under continuous fire huddled against a log seawall that was sticking up along the landing beaches a few feet from the ocean. LVTs burned all along the beach, splintered Higgins boats wallowed at the reef, and Japanese gunners scythed men down trying to wade ashore from the reef.

  All the planning had gone wrong. The Japanese survived the naval and air bombardment; their guns were intact and firing accurately; hundreds of Japanese machine guns and cannons hammered at the marines; and the command structure ashore was disorganized. The commanders offshore lacked information. There was little or no communication even among the men who had reached the island, so assaults were uncoordinated. The Japanese suffered as well since the naval bombardment cut their communications, destroyed several key emplacements, and stunned the defenders; nevertheless, they successfully rallied and were directing enormous volumes of heavy and accurate fire onto the landing forces. The US Marines were in big trouble. The plans were useless now. In war, plans often fall apart leaving the troops alone to gain victory by their sacrifice. The marines on Tarawa, as individuals, determined to press forward into hell itself in search of triumph.

  Slowly, with gallantry and fearlessness beyond comprehension, the US Marines inched forward. Marines by the hundreds died trying to reach that beach, but the United States Marine Corps kept coming. Once at the seawall, surviving men found enemy fire raining down, death everywhere, blinding smoke, confusion, and a lack of control. A couple of privates were all that remained of platoons. Corporals were in charge of the remains of companies. None of this mattered; the US Marines continued exchanging blows with the enemy. Tiny groups of men facing a torrent of enemy fire were scaling the sea wall and fighting inland. At Green Beach, the single remaining Sherman tank, name Colorado in marine scrawl, moved forward clearing a path for men to move inland. As the day wore on a recipe for catastrophe was cooking up. Disjointed units pinned on the beach without sufficient cover, stripped of heavy weapons, without communications between themselves or their ships, and lacking supporting fire, were facing their doom if the enemy counterattacked.

  Then, a miracle. Before the first day was over, a group of Japanese standing atop a bunker was vaporized by naval gunfire. That group included the commander of the island, Rear Admiral Shibasaki and his staff. The Japanese were now without their top officers. This event was critical to the outcome of the battle.

  As night descended the disorganized marines prepared for a counterattack aimed at driving them into the nauseating blood stained sea only a boot’s length away in places. Over one thousand Japanese and several tanks were available for the counterattack. A determined Japanese effort that first night, supported by tanks, could have destroyed the marines. The attack never came. Killing the Japanese commanders prevented the order from being given and probably saved the invasion. Over the next two days the marines completed the bloody capture of the island, enduring a well-planned counterattack during the night of the second day. When it was over, 997 marines and 30 navy corpsmen died taking the island, and 4,183 Japanese died in its defense. On this tiny rock in the vast Pacific, over five thousand men died battling for an airstrip.

  This was a foretaste of the storm battles to come as the United States crossed the Central Pacific. Studies by the US Navy concerning errors at Tarawa changed future operations, lowering casualties in upcoming battles; yet, the cost was persistently high as each island invasion relentlessly devoured lives. Stunned by the swiftness of the American victory at Tarawa, the Japanese high command failed to effectively respond. By island hopping and a coordinated dual advance across the Pacific the United States kept the Japanese high command wondering where to commit their resources; and the Imperial Navy often guessed wrong. The Japanese expanded their defense zone too far, and being overstretched damaged their ability to respond to US initiatives.

  After the seizure of the Gilbert Islands the United States used the bases to reconnoiter the islands in the Marshalls. Kwajalein was the next target of the Central Pacific campaign. Prior to the fleet move to the Marshalls, US Army, Air Force, and Navy carrier aircraft swept the islands free of Japanese air power, dest
roying 92 of 110 Japanese aircraft in the area. Using new firing methods, including plunging fire from battleships, the US Navy bombardment devastated Kwajalein. After Kwajalein, the Japanese abandoned the doctrine of a shoreline defense and opted for in-depth defenses in future battles.

  Figure 66 Marines at Tarawa

  Marianas and New Guinea

  In May of 1944 the United States attacked the Marianas which included the islands of Saipan, Guam, and Tinian. These were large islands with tough in-depth defenses, but the speed of the US advance precluded the proper and complete preparation Japan desired. At Saipan, fighting through difficult landings and rugged terrain, the US Army and Marine Corps pushed Saipan’s desperate defenders back. The Saipan struggle ended with a Bonsai attack by 3,000 Japanese troops that initially overwhelmed American lines and resulted in 650 US Marine dead. The fatal charge ended Japanese resistance on the island by July 9, 1944. On Guam, the Japanese chose to assault US lines repeatedly, thereby destroying their units. Japanese Imperial forces finally retreated into the jungle interior to continue their resistance. After intense jungle fighting, Guam was secured by August 8, 1944.

  As US amphibious forces fought for the Central Pacific, Australian and US Army troops were conquering New Guinea. Using code decrypts, MacArthur avoided Japanese strong points and landed in areas where US forces could set up a defense and cut off the isolated Japanese units. The campaign in New Guinea went on from 1942 through 1945, much of it fought by Australian troops under the worst possible conditions. The fighting was intense, bloody, and merciless. Japanese forces fought determined battles even when outnumbered and in poor tactical positions. General MacArthur never gave the tough Australians their due, mainly because he would not get all the credit for their accomplishments. Nonetheless, they were vital to Allied victory in the Pacific.

  Figure 67 New Guinea & Rabaul Offensives

  Storming the well-defended Central Pacific islands was costly for the marines and the army, but the advance was swift. The navy-marine-army team moved from Tarawa to Saipan in the Marianas in about eight months against stiff enemy opposition. In just a few months, between November of 1943 and July of 1944, Japan lost vast amounts of its empire, and the Philippines were now ripe for invasion. The losses of Guam, Tinian, and Saipan in the Marianas were demoralizing blows to the Japanese empire. Admiral Nagumo[297] was in charge of Saipan’s defense. After the US Marines gained the shore he radioed Tokyo, saying, “Hell is upon us,” and he did not mean his troops on Saipan. Nagumo knew that B-29 aircraft would start bombing the home islands as soon as airfields were constructed in the Marianas. And the American Seabees worked fast.

  Japan knew the Marianas must be held or disaster would ensue. Their fall would cut off oil, rubber, and other war supplies to the homeland from the conquered Southern Pacific areas. Capturing those resource rich regions was the reason Japan started the war. Japan’s Imperial Navy planned an all out air attack on the US fleet to protect the islands. On June 19 and 20, 1944, Japanese Combined Fleet attacked the US fleet, fighting the Battle of the Philippine Sea. During the engagement the US Navy lost 123 aircraft (80 percent of the crews were recovered), and the Japanese lost approximately 600 aircraft and 3 fleet carriers. Japan’s losses were heavy due to a poor plan and green pilots. After the battle, only thirty-five Japanese aircraft were fit for action. The losses Japan suffered at the Battle of the Philippine Sea were irreplaceable. It was over for the Japanese Imperial Navy. At Leyte Gulf the Japanese navy would sortie out once more, but the carriers were bait, and the surface ships were on a suicide mission.

  The Philippines—The Return of the USA

  On 15 September 1944, just prior to the invasion of Leyte in the Philippines, the marines and army landed on the islands of Peleliu and Angour respectively. The battle for Peleliu and Angour lasted two months and cost an inordinate number of American lives. This landing was a Philippine invasion covering operation to secure the Allied flank from attack. Admiral Halsey thought the Japanese were too weak for offensive action from this quarter and recommended cancellation; unfortunately, the Joint Chiefs allowed the operation to continue. On Peleliu, the Japanese implemented a new plan for defense they would adhere to for the remainder of the war. The Japanese defenders settled into well prepared deep-cave positions and awaited the attackers. No suicide attacks, counterattacks, or aggressive maneuvers to hurl the enemy into the sea. Winning entailed killing the maximum number of Americans and nothing else. The best way to accomplish this goal was to avoid exposure to massive American firepower by digging in and forcing the enemy to assault well prepared positions. Fighting on Peleliu decimated the First Marine Division. The battles before Peleliu were bad, but every battle after Peleliu became horrific. Japan’s new tactic significantly drove up the cost of war.

  Figure 68 US Assault on the Philippines 1944

  American forces under General Douglas MacArthur began operations to retake the Philippines by landing at Leyte Island at the midpoint of the island group on October 20, 1944. This landing precipitated the Battle of Leyte Gulf (see below). Japan was well aware that holding the Philippines was essential, and months of hard fighting were required to secure the central Philippines. In January of 1945, the US Army landed on the main island of Luzon and advanced to the capital, Manila, which was recaptured in March after a cruel struggle. Fighting in the mountains of Luzon north of Manila went on until the end of the war, but the harbor and capital were in US hands again after protracted difficulties with Manila’s defenders.

  Hammering Toward Victory—The Pacific

  The Pacific: 1944 to 1945

  By the end of 1944 in the Pacific, America was winning in the Philippines and threatening to cut the supply line of oil and other war making materials back to Japan. The capture of Saipan put the home islands within reach of America’s mighty B-29 bombers. Japan had lost the war;[298] however, the Japanese Military held a different view. The military believed Japan might be saved from invasion; therefore, they would continue fighting. The Americans and British had demanded unconditional surrender for all Axis forces since the Casablanca Conference. To the Japanese this meant America would depose their emperor, which was wholly unacceptable. They would die to the last man, woman, and child to preserve the emperor, their god on earth. The unconditional surrender pledge by Roosevelt at Casablanca, made to reassure the Soviets that the West would not make a separate peace with Hitler, backfired when considered against the backdrop of Japanese history and culture. Nothing would make Japan fight on more assuredly than a threat to remove their emperor.

  Because of the importance of the Philippines, and the Allied threat to Japan’s supply lines if captured, the Japanese fleet made one more attempt to strike at American naval supremacy. On October 23 to 26, the Japanese launched the last of their sea power toward the American landings at Leyte Gulf.

  The Japanese plan was complex, but it wisely took into account the aggressiveness of the US Navy.

  Battle of Leyte Gulf—the Philippines

  The key element of the Japanese plan was for its carriers, devoid of aircraft, to sail in from north of the Philippines as bait for the US Carrier fleet. (The Japanese Northern Force) The hope was that the US Navy, and its powerful carrier task force, would sail north to battle the carriers. Then two powerful surface forces would converge on the landing areas. Coming from the south, through the Surigao Strait, was a Japanese force of two large battleships, a cruiser, and four destroyers. (The Southern Force) From the north, through the San Bernardino Strait, came Japan’s force of five battleships, twelve cruisers, and thirteen destroyers. (The Central Force) The Central and Southern Forces were to converge on Leyte Gulf where the US Transports were located and blast them to bits. Attacking transports was a new tactic for the Japanese. They began to see the importance of supplies and, at last, focused their energy on destroying those vital elements of American power.

  The plan went better than expected for the Japanese. The Americans, under Admiral Halsey, did ch
ase the Japanese carriers, the San Bernardino Strait was left open, and the powerful Japanese Central Force sailed through and made for the landing zone at Leyte. Everything was set for a total Japanese victory, in that the cargo ships at the beach were unprotected. But, along the way to the landing zone, the Japanese encountered a diminutive force of small jeep carriers and destroyer escorts off Samar that was supplying close air and sea support for the troops ashore. The sudden appearance of Japanese cruisers and battleships caused great alarm among the little ships.

  Commander of the central force, Admiral Kurita, then blew it by ordering a general attack. He had mistaken the escorts for the larger fleet carriers. In a display of courage beyond belief, the US destroyers counterattacked the Japanese fleet with their tiny five-inch guns and deadly torpedoes. Aircraft from the escort carriers attacked the Japanese ships with machine guns and antipersonnel bombs. During the fight, three US destroyers and three of the escort carriers were sunk. The much larger and stronger Japanese fleet lost three heavy cruisers. The remaining US vessels were escaping when they noticed the Japanese had turned north, away from the landing zone. What happened? Admiral Kurita had ordered his force north to regroup. After gathering his ships, he made a stunning decision. Kurita, concerned about the US Fleet’s return from their wild goose chase, decided to retreat through the San Bernardino Strait![299] This decision defies all reason. Kurita knew his ships would be of no use later. His ONLY viable course of action was to continue and destroy the American transports and supplies at Leyte.

  Meanwhile, the Japanese Southern Force approached Surigao Strait. The Americans were forewarned[300] and awaited the Japanese in the darkness at Surigao. US Admiral Oldendorf laid the perfect trap. As the trap was sprung the Japanese ships were wrecked by concentrated fire from numerous destroyers, cruisers, and the old battleships of Oldendorf’s line.[301] Meanwhile, the decoy Japanese carrier force lost two carriers from American aircraft attacks. Looking at what was accomplished by the successful deception of the Northern Carrier Force, the Japanese plan should have succeeded. If Kurita had destroyed the transports and the supplies it would have spoiled the US capacity to remain on Leyte.