The Day Dixie Died: The Battle of Atlanta

by Gary Ecelbarger

  In Georgia the Army of the Tennessee was not operating alone. Since the fall of 1863 it moved and fought as a collective unit called the Military Division of the Mississippi. The district was named for a major river as were the three armies under its umbrella—the Army of the Tennessee, the Army of the Cumberland, and the Army of the Ohio. Major General William T. Sherman led that army group, a command of seven infantry corps, nearly two corps of cavalry, and 250 cannons. It was a formidable Union force approaching 100,000 officers and men.3

  Sherman had taken over many of the duties left by Ulysses S. Grant, who had departed during March of 1864 to head east as a lieutenant general in charge of all the Union armies in the field. Sherman’s promotion carried him from the immediate command of the Army of the Tennessee, a position he had taken once Grant was chosen to head the armies in the Western theater in the fall of 1863, to overall command of the Military Division of the Mississippi. Consequently, throughout the Atlanta campaign of the spring and summer months of 1864, command of the Army of the Tennessee belonged to Sherman’s replacement—Major General James Birdseye McPherson.

  McPherson was the darling of all the Union armies in the field—at least in the eyes of the two men who mattered the most: Grant and Sherman. He came to Grant’s army in the winter of 1861–1862 (several months before it was officially called the Army of the Tennessee) and served initially as his chief engineer. By the end of 1862 McPherson had risen from lieutenant colonel to major general and held the helm of Grant’s XVII Corps. The corps was active and successful throughout the Vicksburg campaign and even though “Mac” was overlooked for promotion after Grant was elevated, he was awarded command of the Army of the Tennessee upon Sherman’s ascension to Grant’s position in March of 1864.

  MAJOR GENERAL JAMES BIRDSEYE MCPHERSON, U.S.A.

  The third commander of the Army of the Tennessee, McPherson overcame a shaky start at Resaca at the initiation of the Georgia campaign to bring his army to the outskirts of Atlanta in the third week of July. Engaged to marry a Baltimore belle named Emily Hoffman, his wedding was postponed by the campaign for Atlanta. (Courtesy of MOLLUS-Massachusetts, USAMHI, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.)

  The command of an army was the appropriate reward and a seemingly perfect fit for McPherson, the ultimate “A” student of the Army of the Tennessee. McPherson had graduated first in his West Point class of 1853, a class including the likes of Major General John M. Schofield (in charge of the Army of the Ohio), Major General Philip Sheridan (soon to be in charge of the Union forces in the Shenandoah Valley), and Confederate General John Bell Hood, who stood in his path to Atlanta. Schofield claimed that McPherson was not overly inventive, but “his was the most completely balanced mind and character with which I have ever been intimately acquainted.…” The stress of war had begun to prematurely gray the beard of the thirty-five-year-old Ohioan, but McPherson was otherwise the model of health and fitness. McPherson fit his uniform well. He stood erect, close to the 6' mark, fully bearded with a pleasant face. McPherson was attractive in intellect, personality, and appearance.4

  He was also taken. McPherson was engaged to Emily Hoffman, a Baltimore belle whom he met at a party in San Francisco during the spring of 1859. Miss Hoffman was twenty-five years old when he met her, young and beautiful, blessed with dainty features and striking blue eyes. It appears that they fell in love at first sight, but the war postponed their wedding, which they had planned for 1861. Just three days after he sailed away from her in August of that year, McPherson poured his heart and soul out to her. “You cannot imagine how much I miss you, though each hour is adding to the distance which separates us,” he wrote en route to New York from San Francisco. “But I thank Heaven every day and hour of my life, dearest Emily, that there are invisible cords stronger and more enduring than any ever made by hands which bind me to you; cords which will withstand the fury of the tempest, the rude shock of battle, and the allurements of an active, exciting life, and cause me to return to you with a heart overflowing with love and devotion.”5

  Active campaigning kept the two lovers apart for nearly three years. McPherson confessed to Sherman his love for her while the generals wrapped up affairs in Vicksburg late in the winter of 1864. In an effort to help out his friend, Sherman arranged for McPherson “to steal a furlough” late in March of 1864. McPherson arranged to travel to Baltimore to the Hoffman home where he planned to marry Emily. That was a coup in itself because the Hoffman family—particularly Emily’s mother—were passionate Southern sympathizers who swallowed their aversions to allow a Union army commander into their home to wed one of their own. But telegrams sent by Sherman interrupted McPherson’s plans while traveling north—one announcing his promotion to army command and the other ordering him to northern Alabama to help plan the Georgia campaign. When the frustrated and heartbroken McPherson arrived from the postponed wedding, Sherman empathized. “Mac,” he told him, “it wrings my heart but you can’t go now.” Sherman followed up by personally writing to Emily Hoffman to smooth over the ruffled feathers and to assure her that McPherson was worth the wait.6

  The problem for McPherson was that his performance at the initiation of the Atlanta campaign did not exemplify a confident commander. McPherson’s letters home reveal his own self-doubts at the time, confessing to his mother, “I have a much greater responsibility than I desire.”7 His overbearing sense of caution captured him at a moment when the Union needed a risk taker for a swift and victorious end to the campaign. That was exhibited at the opening of the campaign, just west of the town of Resaca on May 9. Instructed to hustle his army through Snake Creek Gap and cut the rail line in the rear while Sherman’s other two armies demonstrated in the gaps of Rocky Face Ridge against General Joseph E. Johnston’s Army of Tennessee (Confederates named their armies for regions, not rivers), McPherson marched the Army of the Tennessee (at that time consisting of two corps totaling 25,000 men) through the mountain pass and placed the men within striking distance of the Western & Atlantic Railroad and the town of Resaca, several miles south of Johnston’s Confederates and guarded by only 4,000 troops. McPherson had at least 6,000 men deployed on the hills overlooking that poorly defended locale.

  If McPherson deployed and charged his men upon Resaca that day, brushing away the overmatched force there and taking control of the railroad and the town, the Southerners would have been trapped in a vise closing upon them from the north and south without a good avenue for escape. The campaign could have—and perhaps should have—ended with McPherson’s offensive, but he vacillated and eventually gave in to his caution, pulling his men back several miles into the gap rather than charging them one mile upon the town. It was a very costly decision, for General Johnston was able to use the railroad and pull his Confederate army unimpeded down to Resaca where they fought three hard days to keep possession of the town from May 13–15. He escaped southward to fight again and again, playing the game of maneuver with Sherman all the way to the outskirts of Atlanta. General Sherman realized McPherson’s error even before the battle began. “Well, Mac,” said Sherman upon greeting McPherson three days after the latter’s cautious decision and one day before the battle, “you have missed the opportunity of a lifetime.”8

  Indeed he did miss a golden opportunity, but the incident would not sway McPherson from that proclivity. He never admitted that as a mistake at all and would continue to prefer caution over what he deemed as recklessness. Although the opening “inaction” at Resaca irked Sherman and caused him to label McPherson as “timid,” the fact was that McPherson had a strong case to not commit his men to an assault against a region he knew to be defended, but was unaware of the strength of that defense. The cavalry that was supposed to be his eyes as well as the force that actually cut the railroad never reached his advance. Approaching darkness that day convinced McPherson to follow Sherman’s written contingency “to draw back four or five miles, to Snake Creek Gap, make it secure, and wait for orders.” That is exactly what he did. His West Point c
lassmate, John Schofield, felt compelled to defend his friend against Sherman’s allegations. “McPherson was a subordinate in spirit as well as in fact, and cannot fairly be charged with timidity for not attempting what he was not ordered to do, and what, in fact, was no part of the plans of his superior so far as were indicated in his orders.”9

  Affected by Sherman’s rebuke to open the campaign, McPherson and his army had performed well since then, beginning with the Battle of Resaca where they seized and held hills formerly belonging to the Confederates and forced Johnston to withdraw over the Oostanaula River. Two weeks later the XV Corps inflicted over 1,000 casualties upon an ill-fated assault by a division of Confederates at the Battle of Dallas, Georgia, the only Union victory in five days of battles in a region called the “Hell Hole.” McPherson and his army continued to flank and press throughout the month of June, suffering a rare and temporary setback at Kennesaw Mountain on June 27.

  The constant maneuvering, skirmishing, and battling gained McPherson more experience. By July 20 he was veteran of eight battles and at least twice as many skirmishes in his past fourteen months as a corps and army commander. His army was not big, but it was formidable and had made an impact throughout the past two months in Georgia. The Army of the Tennessee fought and marched the first half of the campaign with merely five divisions of the XV and XVI Corps. The XVII Corps completed its detached duties in Alabama and arrived in June, boosting McPherson’s strength to 30,000 officers and men, and 1,750 artillery horses pulling 96 cannons (by comparison the Army of the Cumberland had nearly twice as many men and 35 more cannons).10

  Still, the compactness of the Army of the Tennessee enabled it to serve as the most mobile component of Sherman’s department. It was known as the “Whip-Snapper”—the army that conducted the huge sweeping marches while the other two held the Confederates in place. Throughout the campaign of maneuver against Johnston in Northern Georgia, Sherman ordered the Army of the Tennessee to conduct the flanking marches designed to get around the Confederate front and attack the sides and rear to prevent the ungodly casualties seen 500 miles north with Grant combating Lee head on in the battles of the Wilderness, Spotsylvania, and Cold Harbor. The cunning Johnston never allowed his flank to be completely turned but it certainly was not for a lack of trying on Sherman’s part. The Army of the Tennessee was counted on at times to march over 15 miles a day on consecutive days, and instantly deploy into battle formation and fight at a moment’s notice—no mean feat.

  The “Whip-Snapper” role served those soldiers of the Old Northwest well. It is exactly how they found themselves 6 miles east of Atlanta on July 20 and closing in minute by minute. Just three days earlier they stood on the north bank of the Chattahoochie River, set to embark upon another grand sweep to challenge the Confederate defense of Atlanta from the east as the other two armies struck from the north and northeast. On July 17, McPherson crossed his army over the Chattahoochie at Roswell, 21 miles northeast of Atlanta, on a bridge constructed by the XVI Corps several days before. The Federals covered close to 20 miles that day and spent the following day destroying the Georgia Railroad between the stunning monolith called Stone Mountain and the railroad town of Decatur. Here, McPherson was acting on Sherman’s directive to prevent the Confederates from bringing in any reinforcements and provisions on the rail line to strengthen the army protecting Atlanta. That was the second of four rail lines leading into Atlanta that was under Union control and McPherson’s army made sure the Georgia Railroad was a dead line. Truman G. Tuttle of the 26th Iowa briefly explained to his hometown newspaper how he and his comrades accomplished the mission, “We took up the ties, piled them in cords with the rails across and then fired the ties, then bending the rails and making them useless.”11

  The head of McPherson’s army marched into Decatur on Tuesday night, July 19, and continued to proceed unabated through the town the following morning. “This is a very old, dilapidated, wooden town, of perhaps 400 inhabitants,” determined an Iowan in the ranks; “it was certainly the most forlorn looking place we have seen for a long time.” An Illinois soldier concurred about the miserable appearance of Decatur but was buoyed by a specific attraction in the town. “I saw a couple of right pretty girls,” he wrote, but he had no time to talk to them. Even before noon most of the army had cleared through Decatur and proceeded westward to Atlanta, guiding along the Georgia Railroad.12

  An Illinoisan in Decatur caught a rare glimpse of the high command of the Army of the Tennessee, a sighting he recorded in his diary:

  In afternoon Gens. Dodge & McPherson & Logan conversed together in the streets of the town. Dodge rather nervous—McPh. cool as could be & smiling as ever & Logan silent and twirling his moustache, which is long enough to reach behind his ears.13

  The foot soldiers of the Army of the Tennessee exhibited strong faith and trust in their generals. Solid at brigade and division commands, the army’s three corps commanders all had proven records of success throughout the Georgia campaign and the Vicksburg campaign before it. That was particularly fortunate for the army, for none of the corps commanders had solid military education or experience prior to the war. Only Major General Grenville Dodge of the XVI Corps could claim that he was a cadet—but not at West Point (instead from Norwich University). He had no military experience between his education and the war, serving as a civil engineer. Major General John Logan of the XV Corps was a company officer during the Mexican War, but his unit stayed in Santa Fe and never went to the battle front. He and Frank Blair (XVII Corps) were renowned politicians prior to 1861, not military men. Nevertheless, all three were outstanding corps commanders and all three had a strong bond with General McPherson.

  It all went so smoothly for the Union rank and file that more than a few began to harbor the notion that McPherson could march unopposed into Atlanta that very Wednesday. That was Sherman’s expectation. At noon he received a cavalry report insisting that the Confederate army had evacuated Atlanta and that demoralized Confederate militia was all that remained there. That afternoon Sherman learned that report was totally erroneous. The Army of the Ohio was victimized by an artillery barrage as they crept toward Atlanta. Southern prisoners brought inside Union lines confirmed that a corps opposed them. General Thomas and the Army of the Cumberland came under attack at 4:00 P.M. in an engagement called the Battle of Peachtree Creek. Two different corps of Confederate infantry battled the army for hours, launching attacks up the center and attempting to strike the flanks of the Army of the Cumberland.14

  Unable to advance from the north and northeast, Sherman counted on General McPherson and the Army of the Tennessee to find a weakness in the Confederate defense. Sherman accounted for all of the corps belonging to the Confederate Army of Tennessee. McPherson’s men should not be opposed by a significant force, but Sherman’s intelligence had failed him before and it surely would again. However, one bit of intelligence became very important to him and confirmed rumors that had trickled into the lines. Sherman had known since Tuesday, July 19, that Joseph Eggleston Johnston no longer was in charge of the Army of Tennessee. He had been ousted by Confederate President Jefferson Davis two days earlier. “It is true Johnston is relieved and gone east,” Sherman assured a subordinate; “I have seen a copy of his order of farewell to his troops. Hood is in command and at Atlanta.”15

  General John Bell Hood had become the fourth commander of the Army of Tennessee in seven months, rising from corps command where he had led throughout the Atlanta campaign. Hood had earned laurels for one facet of warfare—he was a tenacious combat officer. Hood made his mark and a name for himself in the Army of Northern Virginia fighting under General Robert E. Lee in 1862 and 1863 where he sparkled on the offensive at Gaines’s Mill, Manassas, Antietam, Gettysburg, and Chickamauga. Whether the battle was a Confederate win or loss, Hood’s attacks were memorable for their ferocity and impact. On three battlefields, Hood’s assaults were so decisive as to produce or assure a Confederate victory. No one leading troops for
the North or the South, whether serving in the East or the West, hit an opponent harder than John Bell Hood.

  That fearless skill on the offensive fueled Hood’s meteoric rise of four grades from colonel to brigadier general to major general to lieutenant general and to the top Confederate rank of general—all in just a little over two years. He could also claim the youngest age to earn his final two ranks, having celebrated his thirty-third birthday at the end of June. On the other hand, Hood’s aggressiveness paid a heavy toll on his body. His right arm had been shattered by shrapnel at Gettysburg. He was able to keep it from the surgeon’s amputating saw, but the limb was limp and lifeless. His entire left leg was gone—including the thigh—a necessary loss to save his life after a Yankee bullet shattered his femur at Chickamauga. Nearly 8 out of every 10 soldiers who had their leg surgically removed at the hip like Hood did died from complications of the procedure. Hood’s death-defying feat was only matched by his ability to resume command in just six months.

  GENERAL JOHN BELL HOOD, C.S.A.

  Taking command of the Army of Tennessee on July 18, 1864, Hood was one of the most aggressive generals in the Civil War. That reputation was earned while Hood served under General Robert E. Lee in the Army of Northern Virginia. (Courtesy of MOLLUS-Massachusetts, USAMHI, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.)