The Day Dixie Died: The Battle of Atlanta

by Gary Ecelbarger

  The sight of the rout spurred on the Union attackers, but most of Brigadier General James A. Smith’s Texans behind the fleeing cavalrymen remained, as did the two artillery batteries supporting them. What they viewed satisfied even the most hard-bitten veterans about their romanticized visions of combat. “Line after line of the enemy came into sight,” remembered William J. Oliphant of the 6th Texas, “and as the blue columns advanced toward us in perfect formation, with bright flags flying and bayonets flashing in the sunshine they presented what, under different circumstances might have been a beautiful spectacle.” The Texans and their artillery support marred the beauty of that spectacle. Together they pummeled the assaulting Union infantry. The Texans on the right initially fell back amid the confusion created by the panicked cavalry. They rallied and realigned to face southward, perpendicular to the main line to cover the southern portion of the hill vacated by the fleeing cavalry.18

  As the Texans faced the void, the Yankees filled it. The 16th Wisconsin Infantry, the southernmost attacking regiment, chased after the fleeing Alabamans and Georgians and Texans who had abandoned the southern crest of Bald Hill. Corporal James G. Wray of the 16th Wisconsin vividly recalled what he saw atop that hill:

  As we went up in the works I saw most of the Rebs get up out of the ditch and run away. Their works were a ditch about three feet wide and the same depth, with the dirt thrown up in front about two feet high so that a man could stand upon the ditch and see over the front. A few laid down in the ditch and let us capture them. [Henry] L. Phillips of our company must have been looking at the Rebs who were running away, for when he jumped over the works he landed on top of a Reb, and from the scramble they made I think it was quite a shock to both of them.19

  The impetus of the Union charge carried them to the crest of the hill. “[W]e found ourselves on a level field, with nothing larger than a cornstalk for protection,” asserted a Wisconsin soldier, “but onward we went through the most murderous fire that any men were ever in, cutting our men down by the dozens; but we carried the works, jumping right in among them, and charging some fifty rods after them.” The Badgers descended the hill on its western side and soon struck a second line of works that pinned them down in front as Smith’s Texans blazed into their flank and rear.20

  General Force quickly recalled the Wisconsin men back to the hill where his brigade lines had united as they attempted to force the Confederates to abandon the high ground entirely. The grapple that ensued was so intense as to defy the type of distance fighting the opposing lines had grown accustomed to, particularly over the past two years. According to a witness, “Bayonets and musket butts, sabers and revolvers, even fists and feet were used in that dreadful struggle.” North and South fought hand to hand on the hilltop. At one point a Wisconsin soldier cursed at a wounded Texan at his feet. The dispute ended when—according to Captain Foster of the 24th Texas—Private Joel Harrison of his company “ran up to [the] Yank … put the muzzle of his gun to his back and blew him up.”21

  The slugfest produced an appalling number of dead and wounded men without an early and appreciable result. The casualty tallies over a very short time reflected the grisly nature of the contest waged on and near that hill. The 16th Wisconsin suffered over 130 casualties in fifteen minutes—nearly a quarter of the regiment that initiated the charge. The 12th Wisconsin on their flank fared worse with the loss of 150 officers and men. The Illinois men in the second line suffered nearly 50 casualties in those first fifteen minutes. After losing 140 members of his brigade to Union artillery before the infantry charge, General Smith counted an additional 45 men who were placed hors de combat.22

  The action waged back and forth for possession of the high ground, but Force’s brigade had gained enough of a toehold to attempt to secure the position against Rebel counterassaults. As the two Southern batteries rolled westward to a safer position, a Union battery began its ascent to the unfinished earthworks. That additional show of strength failed to dissuade Cleburne’s men from giving up the field altogether. Cleburne had committed Smith’s brigade in the contest, but regiments from his other two brigades reinforced the Texans as they attempted isolated rallies to reclaim their lost ground. The consolidated 24th/25th Texas lost its commander, Lieutenant Colonel William N. Neylund, with a thigh wound during their second charge; however, they recovered and redoubled their efforts with Major William Taylor taking over. They temporarily gained 200 yards of breastworks on the hill—originally held by Wheeler’s cavalry—but were forced to abandon it again before significant reinforcements from the rest of Cleburne’s division arrived.23

  To prevent friendly-fire catastrophes during the fight for Bald Hill, Captain Gay’s Iowa Battery had not fired during the charge of Force’s brigade. No longer threatened by those deadly rounds, the Confederates opposite the northern portion of Bald Hill brazenly assaulted Force’s right flank, supported by a large body of Southerners firing from the shelter of trees north and west of the knoll. The 20th Illinois became the unlucky recipient of that cross fire. To minimize their losses the Illinoisans flattened themselves on their stomachs to escape a certain death. While prone they took cover behind the ready-made earthen bank created by Cleburne’s men and attempted to entrench on the eastern side of it.24

  General Blair would have to win it with more infantry. South of General Force, a couple of Ohio regiments from Leggett’s 2nd Brigade encountered no opposition and would survive the day with only 2 casualties (the remaining regiment from Leggett’s 2nd Brigade and his regiment and battalion in the 3rd Brigade stayed in reserve). To this point General Blair had held his 4th Division from the fight, the force that lost its leader the evening before when General Gresham went down with his incapacitating wound. To keep control of Bald Hill he needed to commit them and so attack orders were sent to its brand new commander.25

  At 8:00 A.M. on July 21 Brigadier General Giles A. Smith had been in charge of Gresham’s division for a grand total of six hours. General Smith was disadvantaged by not only commanding a division not containing his old brigade, but also one in an entirely different corps from the XV Corps where he had commanded since 1862. He stepped into his new role that morning in less-than-perfect health. Coughing up blood during a winter-long convalescence, Smith apparently believed the hemorrhaging from his lungs was due to a bullet wound in his chest (received at Chattanooga). He was unaware that he had begun the slow decline to death from tuberculosis.26

  Notwithstanding the newness of his command and his failing health, Giles Smith was up to the task. Back in 1863, assistant secretary of war Charles A. Dana performed an extensive evaluation of the Army of the Tennessee and its commanders for Secretary Stanton. Dana was impressed with Giles Smith (a colonel at that time), so much so as to inform his boss, “There are plenty of men with general’s commissions who, in all military respects, are not fit to tie his shoes.” The accolade was impressive and Smith’s performance on the field of battle after it was made merely strengthened it.27

  Smith had been shocked to learn how quickly General Force had captured Bald Hill but not surprised at all to receive the orders to support him. He first relieved Colonel William Hall who had commanded the division in the interim between Gresham and Smith. The division consisted of two brigades (a third brigade had been detached to guard a railroad). North of Force’s attackers, General Smith deployed his new division with the Iowa brigade, presumably back under the command of Colonel William Hall, on the right flank of Force and Colonel Benjamin Franklin Potts’s brigade of Ohio, Illinois, Iowa, and Indiana men on the right of the Iowans.

  Oddly, after Giles Smith replaced him at the division helm, Colonel Hall did not resume command of his Iowa brigade from where he originated, leaving those duties to Colonel John Shane of the 13th Iowa. The Iowans had already advanced a short distance to support Force’s attack when General Giles Smith changed their mission to take the enemy works northwest of Bald Hill. Shane organized his attack with two regiments in front and the remaining t
wo supporting them. The charge started shortly after 8:00 A.M. with the 15th Iowa on the left and the 13th Iowa on the right. They trudged over a slough and ascended a ridge through the immense cornfield, stalks 3 feet high. Each step by Shane’s men appeared to be contested by Confederate infantry, but the terrain protected the Iowans. As one of them explained, “We were sheltered by a hill in our front, or we would have been cut to pieces.”28

  The real challenge faced the Iowans once they reached the spine of that ridge. Thankfully, their left flank was held by Force’s brigade with their tenuous claim on the frowning hill, but the Iowans received the same ugly greeting that had met the north flank of Force’s brigade. One of the Texans opposing them recalled, “As the enemy came nearer, our boys looked into each others [sic] eyes for a moment and there was a determination written upon every face to die rather than yield an inch. Suddenly the command ‘fire’ was given and a sheet of flame ran along our line.” Confederate infantry and artillery assailed them in front and flank. The searing lead and iron forced them on their stomachs to shoot from a prone position. “I never heard such a rain of bullets as passed over us and among us!” declared a soldier in the 15th Iowa. His regiment attached itself to the left flank of Force’s brigade as it extended up the northern slope of Bald Hill. Although that position provided succor to the 20th Illinois on the hill and allowed General Force to shift his right to fire obliquely at Cleburne’s men in the woods, the Iowa brigade could not complete their mission. Stuck on the spine of the ridge, the brigade found it impossible to attempt the final 100 yards to dislodge the Southerners.29

  Colonel Potts’s brigade had advanced north of the Iowans and without protection on their right flank, they buckled and retreated. That exposed the Hawkeyes to a withering fire against their right flank. Their position was deemed untenable. By 8:45 A.M. Colonel Shane received permission to pull his brigade back 500 yards to their earthworks where he returned the regiments back to the command of Colonel Hall. Shane’s half-hour brigade attack was costly; he calculated that 1 out of every 4 men in three of his regiments were killed or wounded in that bloody thirty minutes (only the 11th Iowa escaped that destruction). In particular, Jacob Easterly of the 13th Iowa proved to be a lead magnet. He had been wounded in four engagements prior to July 21, including a slight wound the day before, but on Thursday just north of Bald Hill, Private Easterly was struck seven times. He survived the ordeal but his fighting days were over.30

  Although on its face it appeared that nothing was gained, Giles Smith saw the glass half full. “Although the enemy’s works in my front were not carried, the main object of the assault, viz, enabling General Leggett to hold his position … was accomplished,” Smith reported. His point had merit, for within that half hour, considerable firepower buttressed the blue wall on the crest of Bald Hill when a Union battery rolled up onto the crest—Battery H, 1st Michigan Light Artillery, commanded by Captain Marcus D. Elliott. That was the “Black Horse Battery,” identified by the jet-black horses that pulled the black steel guns. Elliott had 4 of his 6 rifled Rodmans with him. They unlimbered and opened fire on Cleburne’s men, which seemed to trigger the Iowa battery several hundred yards north of them to resume the work it initiated earlier that morning. The character of the fight was permanently altered by the deployment of the Union cannons. “We could do nothing during the remainder of the day but to lie and take that terrible fire, and to fire back whenever any thing to shoot at came within range,” complained William Oliphant of the 6th Texas.31

  By 11:00 A.M. most of the killing was done for the day—but not all. The action surrounding Bald Hill produced over 1,000 casualties on July 21. In the first three hours of that incessant action, General Blair had sacrificed 700 soldiers to seize and hold the hill while General Cleburne lost close to 300 men defending against the first assault and then trying to win back the height (most of those losses came from the Texas brigade). Captured Confederates were rounded up and herded over to General Blair’s headquarters to be reprimanded by the Union corps commander. “They had a large flag over his tent,” recalled a Georgian captured from Wheeler’s cavalry. “He made us a speech and told us what bad boys we were and that we ought to honor the flag, but I felt more like cutting his throat than listening to his speech.”32

  Cleburne refrained from attempting any more fruitless assaults to reclaim the high ground. The cannons on Bald Hill were much too foreboding for such an endeavor. Instead, both sides settled in to engage in combat by firing at distances no closer than 150 yards. One of the Iowans noted that “Heavy cannonading was kept up all day and the skirmishing was incessant.” On Bald Hill, the Wisconsin and Illinois men could only concur. “I don’t know how many guns they had,” remembered a Badger, “but the shells were screaming in the air all the while.” A Confederate counterpart complained about the unnerving and unyielding barrage of infantry and artillery. “The carnage during the day was awful,” he continued, “our loss was very heavy and the ground was slippery with blood.”33

  After being knocked off that hill, General Cleburne appeared concerned that General McPherson might attempt to advance his entire army into Atlanta that very day. He realized that his 4,300 men and Wheeler’s cavalry would not be able to stop McPherson’s advance without more manpower. Sending a request in the morning to General Hood for aid, the response was satisfying. Another division of troops from Hardee’s corps—the one commanded by Brigadier General George Maney—was ordered eastward with his all-Tennessee command to extend southward from Wheeler’s right flank. They began to file into position in the first two hours of the afternoon. Cleburne was also promised additional infantrymen to buttress Wheeler’s skittish horse soldiers. Hood intended to create a 10,000-man defense to assure that Atlanta was safe from that eastern threat.34

  On Bald Hill, the Union defenders did not escape the horrors of bullets, shot, and shell; however, relatively few fell in the afternoon and evening hours compared to the casualties incurred during the morning assault. Private Edwin M. Truell of the 12th Wisconsin hobbled on Bald Hill with a Minié ball in his foot, a wound received in the morning charge through the cornfield. Somehow Truell kept up with his company and helped to lay claim to Bald Hill, personally capturing three Confederates in the process. While he was on the high ground, a second Rebel bullet hit Truell in the lower leg, close to the first hole. Refusing to be escorted to the rear, Truell descended the hill on his hands and knees to the creek bottom, dressed and bandaged his own wounds there, and then crawled back up the hill to join his company where he tended to wounded comrades. It was late in the evening before Truell was finally convinced to consider his own needs and was taken to a field hospital. He subsequently lost his leg to amputation, but gained the Congressional Medal of Honor for his selfless performance on July 21.35

  Both sides suffered casualties from climate in addition to enemy metal. The hot weather withered soldiers on July 21, not discriminating between Blue and Gray although one would expect Wisconsin men in particular to be more brutalized by the stifling heat and humidity of a Georgia summer. Even those acclimated to the summer conditions of the South told their diaries how “verry warm” and “excessively warm” that day felt. Cleburne’s assistant adjutant general remembered the day as “fearfully hot” and added that “it truly seemed that a modern Joshua had appeared and commanded the sun to stand still.” Sunstroke wiped out men from both sides. It found ways to throw obstacles into the paths of success for the opposing field commanders. General Force, for example, was not personally affected by the heat, but his generalship was impaired when one of his aides was removed from the field by sunstroke. Those that stayed on their feet were still affected by the ill effects of temperatures that must have risen well into the 90s that day, and perhaps flirted with the 100-degree mark.36

  Securing the highest ground between Atlanta and Decatur allowed General Blair to form a line of XVII Corps troops from the hill. He could not extend northward as that ground would be contested for the remainder o
f July 21, but the region south of the hill was beyond the Confederate flank. Two of Leggett’s regiments encountered no resistance when they moved with Force’s brigade on their left. Scouts in those advanced positions notified General Blair that Southern troops appeared to be shifting to outflank his Bald Hill defense on the left. (What they saw were the Tennesseans from General Maney’s division marching in, south of Cleburne and Wheeler’s men.) Blair could not allow the hill to be surrounded on three sides.

  The Flat Shoals Road, also known as the Old McDonough Road (not to be confused with McDonough Road south of Atlanta), ran southeastward from Bald Hill. That road was a prominent thoroughfare for the region and served as a perfect line on which to form a defense. With Force’s men atop the hill—and still engaged in a death struggle to keep it in their possession—Blair claimed that ground by shifting Giles Smith’s troops south of Bald Hill during Thursday’s afternoon hours. Giles Smith’s division would be the new left flank of the Army of the Tennessee. Smith aligned Potts’s brigade on the Flat Shoals Road with his right connecting with Leggett’s left flank. South of Potts’s men, the Iowa brigade under Colonel Hall continued the Union left along the bed of the road. By midafternoon 4,500 soldiers extended the Union line for half a mile down the road. They spent the rest of the daylight hours entrenching to secure their defense.37