A Civil War
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88 See the ‘Regolamento’, undated, in sixteen paragraphs, conserved in INSMLI, CVL, envelope 90, folder 12.
89 For a comparison between the Alpini and the arditi, see Rochat, Gli arditi della grande guerra, pp. 72–3.
90 See Folgore. Foglio da campo del paracadutista italiano, 15 October 1943 (cited in Di Giovanni, degree thesis).
91 See Di Giovanni, degree thesis.
92 One of the most authoritative is the one that Togliatti was to make in his report to the 5th Congress of the PCI (Togliatti, Opere, vol. V, p. 192).
93 See Di Giovanni’s degree thesis, which also records the fears that in the transfer from Sardinia to Naples the paracadutisti would divert the ship towards the territory of the RSI.
94 This episode is recounted by Gaetano, regular NCO, in his answer to a questionnaire given to him by M. Di Giovanni (see the latter’s degree thesis).
95 ‘Saluto al Gruppo Folgore’, in Folgore, 15 November 1944 (cited in the degree thesis of M. Di Giovanni).
96 See the chapter entitled ‘The Battle for the Republican Army’, in Deakin, The Brutal Friendship; Bocca, La Repubblica di Mussolini, chapter entitled ‘Il riarmo’; Pansa, L’esercito di Salò; Setta, Renato Ricci, pp. 251–58.
97 See Deakin, The Brutal Friendship, p. 575.
98 Ibid., p. 602.
99 ‘Esame della correspondenza censurata al 30 giugno 1944’. ‘È un’altra volta come prima’, ‘It’s again like before’, says one of the censored letters (ACS, SPD, CR, RSI, envelope 9, folder 3).
100 See Bianco, Guerra partigiana, pp. 120–1.
101 See Pansa, L’esercito di Salò, p. 139. Pansa’s book has a wealth of documents similar in tenor to this.
102 See Rizzi, Lo sguardo del potere, p. 153.
103 Report by Captain Gino Greco, commander of the Sassuolo infantry training battalion, to the provincial chief and the military Command of the province of Modena, 18 December 1943 (see Gorrieri, La Repubblica di Montefiorino, p. 56).
104 ‘Rapporto sulla situazione di Biella e dintorni’, signed by ‘Zollrat’, 15 June 1944 (IG, BG, 06139).
105 Quoted in Deakin, The Brutal Friendship, p. 599.
106 See for example the Report on conditions in enemy occupied Italy, n. 37, of the Italian Theatre, HQ, PWB, Secret, 7 February 1945 (ISRT, Archivio Medici Tornaquinci, envelope 3, 6, n. 1).
107 ‘Relazione fatta da Nardi per conto del Partito d’Azione, dalla zona Lecco-Brianza’, 14 April 1945 (INSMLI, CVL, envelope 93, folder 5).
108 See the circular by General Mischi, head of the General Staff, quoted in Pansa, L’esercito di Salò, p. 140. For songs in the Italian military tradition, see M. Isnenghi, Le guerre degli Italiani. Parole, immagini, ricordi 1848–1945, Milan: Mondadori, 1989, pp. 71–113.
109 ‘Esame della corrispondenza censurata al 30 giugno 1944’ (ACS, SPD, CR, RSI, envelope 9, folder 3).
110 Ibid. The director of SIM, C. Amè (Guerra segreta in Italia, 1940–1943, Rome: Casini 1954, quoted in Rizzi, Lo sguardo del potere, p. 64), has spoken of the impression that the ‘different … form of mutual spiritual relations between officers and troops’ made on the Italian troops in North Africa.
111 Mazzantini, A cercar la bella morte, p. 41.
112 The episode is recounted in ibid., p. 170.
113 Ibid., pp. 143–4.
114 See Rizzi, Lo sguardo del potere, p. 91, and ‘Esame della corrispondenza censurata al 30 giugno 1944’ (ACS, SPD, CR, RSI, envelope 9, folder 3).
115 M. Bernardo, Il momento buono. Il movimento garibaldino bellunese nella lotta di liberazione del Veneto, Rome: Ideologie, 1969, p. 91.
116 Neppi Modona, Giustizia penale, p. 75.
117 See particularly M. Occhipinti, Una donna di Ragusa, preceded by E. Forcella, Un altro dopoguerra, Milan: Feltrinelli, 1976, and the above-mentioned collection of essays, edited by N. Gallerano, L’altro dopoguerra. See also Rizzi, Lo sguardo del potere, p. 84.
118 See Gorrieri, La Repubblica di Montefiorino, Chapter I, ‘Il passaggio di Armando [Mario Ricci] oltre il fronte’, and Chapter LIII, ‘L’esodo in massa oltre il fronte’. On 5 June 1944 the PCI leadership for occupied Italy had sent all the federal committees orders against changing sides (Le Brigate Garibaldi, vol. II, pp. 15–19).
119 See Bernardo, Il momento buono, pp. 125–6. The circular with the pessimistic news about the South, to which the author alludes, is probably that of 20 December 1944, conserved in IG, BG, 09505. See also the ‘Relazione militare’ (Military Report) to the ‘ufficiale di collegamento’ (liaison officer) of the CUMER, Toetti (Bruno Gombi), regarding the situation of partisans in liberated Tuscany, undated, but winter 1944–45 (IG, BG, Emilia-Romagna, G.IV.3.2).
120 ‘Il nostro esercito’, article by ‘quelli della montagna’ (‘those of the mountains’), republished in L’Italia Libera, northern edition, 6 February 1945.
121 Report by Tristan Codignola: minutes of the 15 June 1945 session, in ISRT, Carte Carlo Campolmi, envelope 2.
122 Anonymous ‘Appunti’ (‘Notes’) of 9 March 1945, in ACS, Carte Casati, folder S.
123 The text of the radio conversation is in ISRT, Archivio Medici Tornaquinci, envelope 10.2, n. 2. But in a report of 27 February 1945 the same under-secretary would complain that in Romagna enlistment was being impeded, and that it had not yet been possible to obtain parity of treatment between the families of regular soldiers and those of the partisans fighting alongside them (ibid., envelope 3.3, n. 1).
124 Minutes in IG, Archivio PCI, ‘Direzione’. See G. Conti, L’esercito italiano sulla linea gotica fra alleati e partigiani, and G. Boatti, ‘Partigiani voluntari nel Regio Esercito: l’esperienza del gruppo di combattimento Cremona’, in G. Rochat, E. Santarelli and P. Sorcinelli, eds, Linea gotica 1944. Eserciti, popolazioni, partigiani, Milan: Franco Angeli, 1986, pp. 143–60. See also, in general, G. Conti, ‘Aspetti della riorganizzazione delle forze armate nel regno del Sud (September 1943–June 1944)’, in Storia contemporanea VI (1975), pp. 85–120, and L. Rizzi, ‘L’ esercito italiano nella guerra di liberazione: appunti e ipotesi per la ricerca’, in Italia contemporanea 135 (April–June 1979), pp. 53–81.
125 ‘Sintesi delle relazioni deli uffici militari censura di guerra del mese di settembre 1944’, in Aga-Rossi, La situazione politica ed economica, pp. 128–36.
126 Ibid.
127 Ibid.
128 See Rizzi, Lo sguardo del potere, p. 83. For the impact of the culture and organisation of the Allied armies, see in particular N. Gallerano’s essay in L’altro guerra.
129 ACS, Carte Casati, folder U.
130 On the ill will demonstrated by the Allies in Rome immediately after the liberation of the city, see the ‘Notizie varie sulla Capitale’, sent by Orlando, General Commander of the Carabinieri, to Bonomi, prime minister and minister of the interior, 10 August 1944 (quoted in Aga-Rossi, La situazione politica ed economica, pp. 109–11). On the obstructionism practised by a local military governor, see the minutes of the 28 January 1945 session of the Empoli CLN (ISRT, Archivi comunali, envelope 2, folder I, S., folder 3, CLN Empoli).
131 See in particular Kogan, Italy and the Allies; P. Secchia and F. Frassati, La Resistenza e gli Alleati, Milan: Feltrinelli, 1962; D. Ellwood, Italy 1943–1945, Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1985.
132 ‘Weekly Bulletin’ of the Allied control commission, 26 November 1944 (cited in Kogan, Italy and the Allies, p. 73).
133 La Voce del Popolo, 24 February 1944, article entitled ‘Fuori dall’equivoco’. The newspaper referred to the activities of the Gruppi combattenti Italia, for which see C. Pavone, ‘Combattenti Italia: un fallito tentativo di costituzione di un corpo di volontari nell’Italia meridionale’, in Il Movimento di liberazione in Italia 34–35 (1955), pp. 80–119. On the repercussions that the episode had in the Actionist circles of the North, who tended to overestimate its republican significance, see L’Italia libera, Lombard edition, articles entitled ‘La situazione’, 20 November 1943, and ‘Il congresso’ (of Bari)
, 18 February 1944.
134 See, for example, the letter by Second Lieutenant Sforzino Sforza (Carlo’s son) to Minister Casati, where the Corpo italiano di liberazione (Italian Liberation Corps), and particularly its officers, cut a very poor figure (ACS, Carte Casati, folder A).
135 These are Rizzi’s words, from Lo sguardo del potere, p. 81.
136 ‘Il partito liberale e i doveri dell’ora’, conversation broadcast on Radio Roma, 22 January 1945 (ISRT, Archivio Medici Tornaquinci, envelope 10, 2, n. 1).
137 Information taken from Agostino Bistarelli’s degree thesis on Italian Second World War veterans (University of Pisa). The 1982 article referred to is by G. Gerosa Brichetto, ‘Come nacque la nostra associazione’.
138 Togliatti, Opere, vol. V. p. 137.
139 AS Teramo, CLN provinciale, envelope I, folder 4/C: minutes of the session of 23 October 1944, which register, among other things, the fear that the recalled servicemen had of being used in the Far East.
140 Letter to the Presidency of the Council, 29 January 1945 (ACS, Carte Casati, folder S).
141 Letter to Casati of 30 July 1944 (ibid., folder A).
142 Minutes of the session of the CTLN of 11 January 1945 (ISRT, Carte Francesco Berti, envelope I, folder I).
143 Words of a memorandum of 20 April 1944 of the Ufficio operazioni dello Stato Maggiore (Operations Office of the General Staff), quoted in Rizzi, Lo sguardo del potere, p. 219.
144 H. S. Hughes, United States and Italy, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953, p. 128.
145 Letter to the author (2 July 1945) by reserve Second Lieutenant Antonio Niccolaj, stationed at the time in Sicily.
146 Anonymous ‘Appunti’ (‘Notes’), dated 8 March 1945, in ACS, Carte Casati, folder S.
147 The first episode was reported by the Fiesole CLN to the CTLN, 29 June 1945; the second was denounced to the CTLN on 7 February 1945 by the Florentine federation of the PCI (ISRT, CTLN, envelope II, folder 5).
148 See, for example, in Il Risorgimento liberale, Piedmont edition, June–July 1944, the article entitled ‘Il partito liberale italiano ai fratelli dell’Italia occupata’. The same newspaper published the ‘Radiomessagio di Messe ai Patrioti’, giving it a prominent position.
149 Article entitled ‘Il volontari della libertà, Roman edition, 30 October 1943, in italics, in the 20 January 1944 number of the Rome edition. See the Italia Libera articles, ‘La situazione’ and ‘Il congresso di Bari’, cited in note 133.
150 Article entitled ‘La nostra guerra per l’indipendenza e la libertà’, Rome edition, 19 September 1943.
151 ‘Dichiarazione programmatica da sottoporsi ai membri del CLN di Biella’, 20 November 1943 (IG, Archivio PCI).
152 Title of an article that appeared in the Rome edition, 15 December 1943. See also ‘L’eroismo dei soldati italiani sul fronte meridionale’, in ibid., 30 December 1943.
153 See the undated account written for use by the PLI and conserved in ISRT, Archivio Medici Tornaquinci, envelope 5, I, 4, n. 9. The episode can be ascribed to the weeks straddling 1944 and 1945.
154 Undated anonymous note, in ISRT, Archivio Medici Tornaquinci, envelope 5, I, 4, n. 20.
155 Article entitled ‘Perché? Per chi?’, in L’Idea 13, (January?) 1944.
156 On 28 March 1945 the Command of the 22nd Cremona infantry regiment wrote to the Tuscan CLN that, although the Tuscan volunteers behaved well, among them there were cases of desertion and abandonment of units; and the CLN examined the question at the session held the very next day (ISRT, CTLN, envelope II, folder 5; and Carte Francesco Berti, envelope I, folder I, minutes for 29 March 1945).
157 As proof of this, see the fruitless sally by General Arnaldo Azzi, ‘La guerra e l’esercito’, in L’Italia Libera, Rome, 24 December 1944.
158 Giovanni (former commander of the Pisacane and Gramsci central GAPs) to ‘Caro G.’, undated (IG, Archivio PCI). On this point, as on the entire line taken by the PCI towards the reconstitution of the armed forces, see Paolo Miggiano’s laureate thesis, discussed at the university of Rome with Professor Gastone Manacorda.
159 ACS, Carte Casati, folder S. It should be borne in mind that, almost a year earlier Orlando, the general commander of the carabinieri, had warned that the formation of the new government should abandon all prejudices against the parties, provided the cohesion and discipline of the units was guaranteed (circular of 25 May 1944, quoted in Di Giovanni, degree thesis).
160 See leading article entitled ‘L’insurrezione nazionale per la salvaguardia e l’avvenire d’Italia’, in L’Unità, northern edition, 8 October 1944.
161 The text of the radio message, from Cesenatico, 16 March 1945, is in ISRR, catalogue 2. XC, c. I.
162 Leading article, northern edition, entitled ‘L’ offensiva generale su tutto il fronte patriottico è iniziata’.
CHAPTER 3
Paths to a New Institutionalisation
1. MILITARISATION AND ITS LIMITS
The partisan bands, born of an initial reaction against institutions, or at least as an attempt to fill the void left by their eclipse, evolved rapidly and originally, becoming, in Weberian terms, no longer a simple ‘community’ or ‘association’ but a ‘social group’ governed by a ‘set of regulations’ in which conduct is orientated ‘(on average and approximately)’ ‘towards determinable maxims’ that are ‘in some way obligatory or exemplary’.1 Experience itself seemed to call for new and adequate rules. ‘There’s a wish for everything to be set in order, for everything to be legalised’, wrote Roberto Battaglia, commenting on the desire he saw among the men of the Lunense division to ‘regain also the written expression of their thoughts, the documents to which they were accustomed: laws or sentences or orders’.2 This re-emergent desire to establish normative standards may be interpreted in two ways, according to the frame of reference one adopts. The first reading is based on the premise that every movement born in society denies its origin and betrays its true nature when it takes even the most approximate institutional or juridical path. This reading is reductive because, while indicating a real risk, it ignores the opposite risk that those very initial driving forces will be dispersed and rapidly ebb away. To use organisation as a means of countering this process takes firmness of conviction and tenacity of intention that do not necessarily conflict with the fundamental values at stake. It is as if, at a certain point, one were to realise that putting one’s life at risk is not enough to guarantee the pursuit of one’s heart’s desires. Only analysis can help us understand who, in this recurrent dialectic, the palm goes to – the most desirable victory being one that somehow manages to synthesise the two principles. While this reductive reading errs on the side of excessive generosity, the other, by contrast, belongs to that type of realism which transforms the viewpoint of established power into a criterion of value. According to this second reading, the irregular must look to legitimising itself with the regular, otherwise it becomes ‘purely criminal because it loses the positive interconnectedness with some available regularity’.3 All the European Resistance movements were, in fact, beset with the problem of whether there really did exist a pre-constituted ‘regularity’ ‘somewhere’ to appeal to: the different ways they answered this question might indeed serve as a criterion for distinguishing between the Resistance movements of the various countries, from Denmark to Yugoslavia. In Italy the most authentic resistance impulse lay in not feeling the need for any ‘other legitimising parties’. This ‘extremely hard alternative’, which aimed at the ‘imposition of a new regularity relying solely on its own strengths’,4 had to reckon with the slow re-emergence in the distant South of a government which was, furthermore, the only one recognised by the Allies. The only aspect of this question that we shall examine here, which culminated in the delegation of powers to the CLNAI by the Rome government,5 is the process illustrated by the historiography of the Resistance as the militarisation and politicisation of the partisan bands. These two forms of institutionalisation, born as they were o
n the field from within the movement, would, however, eventually come to perform the work of mediation between the spontaneity of the movement itself and the ‘regular’ institutional order that was destined to re-emerge. Here a further distinction needs to be made. While the ‘autonomous’ formations believed that they could limit themselves to the first aspect, militarisation, and indeed saw it as a guarantee against the risks they regarded as implicit in the second, the formations that were in fact ‘political’ – and above all the Garibaldi and Justice and Liberty brigades – tended consciously to interweave one aspect with the other, though making every effort to keep them distinct.
During the Spanish Civil War, in an interview given to an English journalist, the Italian anarchist Camillo Berneri had said: ‘Militarisation is certainly a good thing. But one needs to distinguish between military formalism, which is not just ridiculous but also dangerous, and self-discipline, even rigorously exercised, as it exists in the Durruti Column’.6 Berneri’s distinction, after the arduous experience of the first anarchic formations nourished by equal measures of enthusiasm and disorder, was as simple to formulate as it was difficult to practise. The autonomous formations, only very few of whom had turned against the Royal Army, generally tended to position themselves on the basis of the more traditional ‘formalism’. Nevertheless, the peculiarity of a situation unanticipated by the regulations in which they too found themselves immersed, gave rise to effects like those described by Beppe Fenoglio, with regard to Mauri’s ‘Blues’, in a page whose realism is slightly tinged with irony:
In everything that concerned establishment, distribution and command structures, it was almost excessively evident that they ranked with the Royal Army, whereas the Garibaldini did their bitter best to distance themselves radically from it. The fact was that the Badogliani commanders, elegant, gentlemanlike, vaguely anachronistic, considered guerrilla warfare nothing other than the continuation of the anti-German war for which the disastrous hate of 8 September had not permitted detailed planning, but which was to all intents and purposes planned and declared. The officers were, in large part, authentic army officers and this flattered the men, the other ranks. As little space as possible was given to natural hierarchies and that little with a supercilious grin … All this the troops were happy with, flattered and reassured.7