A Civil War
Page 36
72 Cerri (Norberto Duzioni), one of the organisers of the GL in the province of Bergamo, abandoned them when he realised that, instead of working for the patria, he was working for the Action Party. See his letter of resignation, 15 September 1944, in Formazioni GL, pp. 158–60. For the anti-partyism of Tuscan band chief tied to the GLs, see the minutes of the executive committee of the Florence Action Party, 7 April 1945 (ISRT, Carte Carlo Campolmi, envelope 2).
73 See the letter to the Regional Command for Lombardy, 16 August 1944 (Atti CVL, pp. 151–2).
74 This seems to have been the case with a Parma province formation that distanced itself from the CLN (also accused of inefficiency). See the report by ‘Dario’ (Luigi Marchini) titled ‘al compagno federale e al compagno commissario’, 7 June 1944 (Le Brigate Garibaldi, vol. II, p. 21). See also the report of the Nanetti division Command to the General Command, 10 August 1944 (ibid., pp. 245–7).
75 See Mautino, Guerra di popolo, pp. 34–5. For similar views of the CLNs of the provinces of Mantua and Biella, see the report to the Lombardy delegation by the Command of the group of lower Po Sap brigades, 8 January 1945, and the letter to the Biella federation, 27 November 1943 (Le Brigate Garibaldi, vol. II, p. 212, and vol. I, p. 141).
76 See Bernardo, Il momento buono, p. 109.
77 This is the CLN of Cassolnovo in Lomellina. See Ballone, Una sezione, un paese, p. 445.
78 See the letter by Michele, commissar of the 1st Gramsci division, to the commissar of the 124th Pisio Greta brigade, 1 April 1945 (Le Brigate Garibaldi, vol. III, p. 555).
79 ‘Situazione delle bande nella zona preappenninica a est e a ovest della via Emilia’, signed Emilio, undated (November 1944?) (INSMLI, Brigate Garibaldi envelope I, folder 4).
80 Asdrubale’s letter to Matteo, in Casali, Il movimento di liberazione a Ravenna, vol. II, pp. 283–4.
81 Letter by the Command of the group of northern brigades of the Friuli Garibaldi division to the Carnia CLN, 18 March 1945, after the end of the free zone (IRSFVG, Fondo Magrini, envelope CLV, folder I).
82 See Celso Ghini’s report ‘sul movimento della zone di confine umbromarchigiano’, 16 August 1944 (Le Brigate Garibaldi, vol. I, p. 256); the protest of the commander of the 2nd Cascione division to the Cuneo, Imperia and Mondovì CLNs, 6 December 1944 (ibid., vol. III, p. 33); the letter by the Lombardy delegation to the Regional Command, 18 May 1945, inspector Giorgio’s report on the 3rd Aliotta division, 6 March 1945 (ibid., pp. 247–8, 443); the report by the PCI ‘Comitato federale bis’ of La Spezia on the ‘situazione militare e politica della 4a zona operative’, 28 March 1945 (ibid., pp. 543–4).
83 This is what the Command of the group of Lombardy divisions wrote to the Command of the Nanetti battalion, 24 December 1944 (IG, BG, 01326). For a Nanetti detachment of the Certosa-Rho zone, see ibid., 011055 (5 September 1944).
84 See battaglia, Un uomo, pp. 134, 197–8. The criticism is addressed to the Apuania CLN.
85 ‘This is a warning: just words. If you don’t change your attitude you will learn very quickly what our habitual style is: facts’, 12 October 1944 (Le Brigate Garibaldi, vol. II, pp. 437–8).
86 Regarding the free zones see Legnani, Politica e amministrazione nelle repubbliche partigiane. For the general problem, dealt with in all histories of the Resistance, here I shall just mention G. Quazza, L. Valiani and E. Volterra, Il governo dei CLN, Turin: Giappichelli, 1966, and Quazza, Resistenza e storia d’Italia, Chapter VII, entitled ‘I CLN direzione giacobina’.
87 See Bianco, Guerra partigiana, pp. 26, 42.
88 See Atti CVL, pp. 41–2, 459–65; Atti CLNAI, pp. 136–7. The decision to create the CVL had been taken by the central CLN on 9 January 1944 (Atti CVL, p. 538).
89 ‘Dichiarazione del rappresentante del PCI nel CLN’ (IG, Archivio PCI).
90 Letter of 10 December 1943 (IG, Archivio PCI).
91 See the ‘Promemoria della delegazione del PCI presso il CLN per l’Alta Italia’, late December 1943 (in Atti CVL, pp. 526-33). On the entire controversy over this question, above all with Parri, who had been dragged along until March 1944, see ibid., documents in Appendix I.
92 Minutes in IG, Archivio PCI, ‘Direzione. Verbali della Delegazione PCI per l’Italia Meridionale’. It is published under the title ‘Istruzione per l’insurrezione di tutto il popolo’, in Togliatti, Opere, vol. V., pp. 41–2.
93 See Atti CVL, pp. 576–9.
94 The inclusion of the partisans in the army and in the public safety forces was a request that the Action Party pressingly made to the recently formed Bonomi government. See the article entitled ‘Guerra, Governo e Popolo’, which appeared in L’Italia Libera, northern edition, 19 June 1944.
95 See Catalano, Storia del CLNAI, p. 165, which refers the reader to a June 1944 issue of Il Partigiano alpino.
96 ‘Relazione sullo schema di decreto per l’unificazione delle formazioni partigiane nel CVL’, written by the party’s Alta Italia executive on 9 January 1945 (INSMLI, CLNAI, envelope 10, folder I, s, folder 2). The concepts expressed in the report are amply illustrated in a pamphlet, L’Unificazione, published 15 March 1945 by the ‘Edizioni del Comando delle formazioni partigiane Giustizia e Libertà’. As regards France, the Corsican partisans who were appointed officers in the army – ‘gli Hoche e i Marceau della Resistenza’ – must have come to a thousand, while about 60,000 elements of the FFI (Forces Françaises de l’Intérieur) were included in General Jean Lattre de Tassigny’s army deployed on the Rhine (see Michel, La guerra dell’ombra, pp. 313, 333).
97 See, as an example of all, the project presented by Longo, 8 January 1945, to the CLNAI, which is in fact entitled ‘Per la trasformazione delle unità partigiane in formazioni regolari dell’esercito italiano’ (Le Brigate Garibaldi, vol. III, pp. 206–8), as well as Togliatti’s speech at the Brancaccio theatre in Rome, 9 July 1944, his declarations to the party’s national council, 7 April 1945 (Togliatti, Opere, vol. V, pp. 69, 117), and his letter to the insurrectional triumvirate of Emilia-Romagna, 2 March 1945 (Le Brigate Garibaldi, vol. III, pp. 430–1).
98 See in particular the proposal presented to the CLNAI, 31 December 1944, conserved in INSMLI, Carte Damiani, and amply summarised in Catalano, Storia del CLNAI, pp. 352–3.
99 A note sent by the Liberals to Under-Secretary Medici Tornaquinci during his mission to the North (or possibly written by the under-secretary himself) contains these words: ‘Communisti promotori della unificazione per evitare lo scioglimento delle bande’ (‘Communists promoters of unification in order to avoid the dissolution of the bands’) (ISRT, Archivio Medici Tornaquinci, envelope 4, 5, n. I). For Cadorna’s fears, see Catalano, Storia del CLNAI, pp. 356–8.
100 See his stances in the CLNAI meetings of 28 January and 5 February 1945 (ibid., pp. 355–6).
101 See L. Valiani, ‘Gli azionisti’ in Valiani, Bianchi and Ragionieri, Azionisti, cattolici e comunisti nella Resistenza, p. 98.
102 Formazioni GL, p. 278.
103 Alberto’s letter to Pierino, 24 February 1945 (IG, BG, Emilia-Romagna, G. IV. 2.11).
104 See Gorrieri, La Repubblica di Montefiorino, p. 638. On the difficulties the Matteotti brigades had in finding the necessary men, see a letter sent to Citterio, 10 April 1945, by Gianni (Ridella), vice-commander of the GL formations in the unified zone Command of the Pavese Oltrepò, and by Albero, sector commissar (INSMLI, CVL, envelope 93, folder 5).
105 For the poor relations with the Action Party and ‘a certain major Mauri’), see the ‘Relazione dell’ispettore B. sulla Ia divisione Piemonte’, 25 May 1944; and, for relations with another group of autonomi, the ‘Relazione del Comando unico di zona brigate Garibaldi e Fiamme Verdi di Reggio Emilia alla Delegazione del CUMER’, 5 January 1945 (Le Brigate Garibaldi, vol. I, pp. 430–2, and vol. III, pp. 201–4).
106 See for example the report by Riccardo, inspector in the Pavese Oltrepò, to the ‘military delegation’, 26 March 1945 (ibid., vol. III, pp. 536–7, n. 6).
107 ‘Highly confid
ential’ document sent by the Piedmont delegation to ‘compagni responsabili di P.’, undated, but later than June 1944 (INSMLI, Brigate Garibaldi, envelope 2, folder 4, s. file I).
108 Le Brigate Garibaldi, vol. III, p. 619, and IG, BG, 08564, 08584, 08585, 08604.
109 ISRP, II and IV Divisione Garibaldi Piemonte. Carteggio con organi militari superiori, C. 7 a.
110 Report by Giorgio, 20 March 1945 (Le Brigate Garibaldi, vol. III, p. 509).
111 Letter to ‘compagni responsabili’ (IG, BG, 056617).
112 See the article entitled ‘L’Unificazione’, April 1945, quoted in Giovana, Storia di una formazione partigiana, p. 346, and the balanced judgments that the author expresses on the question (pp. 343–7).
113 ‘L’Unificazione’, 15 March 1945.
114 Report by the ‘Comando della 2a divisione Garibaldi Gardoncini Battista’ (Piedmont), 4 March 1945, signed by Commander Maggi (IG, BG, 04848).
115 Bernardo, Il momento buono, p. 162, where the author writes that ‘le stellette ricordavano il triste periodo dell’esercito’ (‘the stars recalled the sad period of the royal army’).
116 Michel, Les courants, pp. 794–5.
117 Letter of December 1943 (IG, Archivio PCI). For Secchia’s criticisms of the Rome edition of L’Unità, see also his previous letter of 19 December, which partly includes the Milan edition as well (Longo, I centri dirigenti del PCI, pp. 127–31).
118 Circular of the Lombardy delegation, 29 September 1944 (INSMLI, CVL, envelope 93, folder 4, subfolder a). See Bernardo, Il momento buono, p. 143, regarding the Nanetti division.
119 ‘Rapporto da Torino’, 6 October 1943, by Giovanni, where the view expressed about Il Grido di Spartaco is wholly positive (IG, Archivio PCI).
120 Bernardo, Il momento buono, p. 144.
121 Exchange of letters between Rossi and Alfredo, 9 and 13 November 1943 (IG, Archivio PCI).
122 Letter by the Command of the 1st Gramsci division to that of the 118th Servadei brigade, 6 February 1945, and by the delegation for Lombardy to the Command of the Valsesia, Ossola, Cusio, Verbano group, undated (IG, BG, 07870, and INSMLI, CVL, envelope 93, folder 4, subfolder a).
123 Minutes of the meeting of the ‘Comitato esecutivo del PCI presso la divisione Garibaldi Nanetti’, held 17 April 1945, which was sent to the political brigade and battalion committees (INSMLI, CVL, envelope 34, folder 3, subfolder 2).
124 See Falaschi, La Resistenza armata, pp. 14, 11.
125 See the letters by ‘compagni responsibili della delegazione per il Piemonte’ to those of the Valle di Susa brigades, 12 July 1944; by Neri, vice-commander of the Lombardy group to the ‘Delegazione Intendenza 52a brigata’, 7 November 1944; of the Lombard Command of the GLs to the ‘Servizio Stampa’ (‘Press Service’) of the Action Party, 23 December 1944 (Le Brigate Garibaldi, vol. II, pp. 116–20; IG, BG, 01231; INSMLI, CVL, envelope 93, folder 5, subfolder a).
126 Letters by the Command of the 1st Gramsci division to the Command of the Ossola, Valsesia, Cusio, Verbano group, 7 December 1944. The most enterprising readers were advised as to the possibility of ‘posting up at least two copies in every village’ (IG, BG, 07288).
127 ‘Appunti sull’organizzazione di Genova’, undated, but late November 1943, quoted in Gibelli and Ilardi, Lotte operaie: Genova, p. 119; circular letter of the Command of the Carnia brigade, dated 25 March 1945 (IRSFVG, Fondo Magrini, envelope CLV, folder I).
128 Minutes of the meeting between commissars and party officials of the 3rd Lombardy division (Oltrepò pavese), 20 October 1944 (IG, BG, 01519).
129 Letter to Franz, a brigade vice-commissar of the Command of the 1st Gramsci division, 11 December 1944 (ibid., 07341).
130 Instructions ‘a tutti i commissari politici’ by the Cuneo brigade commissar, undated (ibid., 04291). Some newspapers displayed the front page of their daily editions on walls around the city, as mural newspapers (giornale murale).
131 Circular to the commissars of the Command of the 3rd Piedmont division, 4 August 1944, on the subject of mural newspapers (Le Brigate Garibaldi, vol. II, pp. 198–201).
132 See the circular cited in the previous note; the letter of the Piedmontese delegation to the Command of the detachment of the lower Valle di Susa, undated, but spring (or summer) 1944 (IG, BG, 004897); and a further circular of the Command of the Piedmont division, 14 September (ibid., 005003). As one of the many examples of mural newspapers, see the one mentioned in Lazagna, Ponte rotto, p. 156.
133 Report to the Command of the Valsesia, Ossola, Cusio, Verbano group, 11 January 1945 (IG, BG, 07612). But the French Revolution is a relatively widespread subject: for example, as regards the difference between bourgeois revolution and proletarian revolution, see the plans of the lessons held at the 1st Garibaldi Osoppo division, in IZDG, envelope 272b, folder I/A.
134 ‘Istruzioni per i compagni commissari politici’ of the Parma federal secretariat of the PCI, 18 December 1943 (IG, BG, Emilia-Romagna, G.IV.2.2). The request for books for the formations appears in many documents.
135 Bernardo, Il momento buono, p. 255.
136 Ibid.
137 Laura Conti’s catalogue (Saggio bibliografico), frequently cited, registers (and it is incomplete) 2,357 newspaper titles and 2,623 pamphlets and leaflets. Some partial information can be given regarding their circulation. In Romagna the Communist newspapers would seem to have sold between 1,500 and 3,000 copies (Flamigni and Marzocchi, Resistenza in Romagna, p. 191, in which four newspaper titles are recorded). According to the person in charge of the cultural section of the 50th Nedo brigade, the newspaper Baita had a circulation of 4,000 copies (report of 25 September 1944, in IG, BG, 05187). For Stella Alpina, Moscatelli, in a letter to Moro (the diplomat Mario Lanza, who was in Switzerland at the time), speaks in terms of 10,000 copies (IG, BG, 07850). The Florence edition of Il Popolo would seem to have had a circulation of 9,000 copies (Webster, The Fasces and the Cross, p. 170). Attention was drawn to the aggregative function of the press, for party ends, from 26 December 1943 by Sandrelli (?), the person in charge of military work for Piedmont, writing to the party leadership (Le Brigate Garibaldi, vol. I, pp. 183–8).
CHAPTER 4
The Patriotic War
1. REGAINING NATIONAL IDENTITY
Who had been defeated in the Fascist war fought between 1940 and 1943? Only Fascism? Or the Italian state with which Fascism had identified itself? Or even Italy herself, as an historically defined national entity?
For the Fascists the defeat of Fascism and the defeat of Italy were one and the same thing: it was this not least that gave rise to their stubborn refusal to face facts, their continuing to desperately play the losing card. Some Roman youths who immediately after 8 September had presented themselves to the Germans in order to continue fighting alongside them were reminded by the officer that ‘Italy no longer exists; there is no longer a government, an army’, and he asked: ‘Do you want to become German soldiers?’1
The anti-Fascists obviously distinguished Fascism from Italy; but the more thoughtful of them realised that merely changing sides was not enough to put to flight all the shadows that had gathered around the nation’s identity. Taken in its most elementary sense, the war against Germany, declared by the Royal Army of the South on 13 October 1943, might seem nothing other than the continuance of the preceding war, on the right and, what is more, the winning side; and undoubtedly to a certain number of combatants in the partisan formations, and not only in the ‘autonomous’ ones, it seemed just this. But we have seen how not even to those called to fight in the army of the South did this motivation appear sufficient.
To give legitimacy to the new war, it seemed that the anti-Fascists needed to take the full blame for the defeat suffered first at the hands of the Anglo-Americans and the Soviets, and then of the Germans; and that it was at the same time indispensable to uncouple the difficult business of recovery from any connection with the Italian nationalist tradition, which had been exacerbated by Fascism. This was an e
xtremely arduous task, and the attitudes taken towards it help define the positions manifested at the time among the Italians.
The most radical and at the same time fecund attitude was the one which took for granted the finis Italiae as an autonomous state. This position is expressed with particular lucidity in a memorandum by Giorgio Diena and Vittorio Foa, according to whom ‘the responsibility for creating the new state of affairs that may save Italy falls completely on those anti-Fascist forces which, in the absence of any authority, must themselves become the authority with autonomous initiative. Only on this condition will Italy, today a passive battlefield, cease to be a simple geographical expression.’2
In the same spirit Ugo La Malfa wrote: ‘Between 28 October 1922 and 8 September 1943 Italy, as a great national state inherited from the Risorgimento, was destroyed.’3
Strongly Mazzinian in inspiration, both in its denunciation and in the desire to redeem things, the Bollettino Popolo Libertà stated that ‘there is no longer a patria for the Italian people. It is right that things be so’, otherwise Mussolini and Victor Emmanuel III, beating the old patriotic drum, would gull the people once again. Yet ‘to rise again into a nation’ was ‘the duty we set ourselves to seek together to accomplish’.4
It has been justly observed that, in the Italian Resistance, the ‘idea of the patria [is] less elementary, less physical than was the case outside Italy’.5 This was due precisely to the difficulty in reconstituting a univocal concept of the patria, capable of giving a human face back to the nation’.6 Above all in the first few weeks, outbursts of individual pride, aimed at safeguarding one’s own personal identity, fuse with the reaffirmation of national identity. At other times in history as well the sense of individual and collective unhappiness had been seen, in Enlightenment terms, as the generator of patriotism.7
A demonstration of dignity in defeat was given by the old general called on to command the volunteer corps, which was one of the very first things the Americans attempted to establish in the Mezzogiorno, independently of the Badoglio government: