With Our Backs to Berlin

by Tony Le Tissier

  In Spandau the stream of vehicles had to cross a bridge over the river.[21] The Russians were sitting only a few metres away and brought down everything possible to inflict more casualties. The bridge was already half destroyed by artillery fire and only one vehicle at a time could cross, but thousands wanted to. Every man opened fire on the Russians. Hundreds of dead and wounded lay in several layers on top of each other. At first there were twenty men clinging to our tank; all but four were shot off.

  The route went on via Staaken. While there had been ten thousand wanting to break out through Spandau, there were now hardly a thousand at Staaken, and only a few hundred left when we came to Döberitz. We crossed the Döberitz Training Area with a Russian biplane keeping an eye on us and warning of our coming.

  Our force was getting smaller and smaller. We saw no more infantry, only three Mark IVs and three Hetzers and several armoured personnel carriers were still together. Suddenly our tank stopped and refused to go any more. I was able to get aboard a Mark IV as our tank was blown up. The crew stayed behind. We then drove through a Russian artillery position before the Russians realised it and were away.

  When we came to about 20 kilometres from Brandenburg, we went through a village that was swarming with Russians. This village lay deep in the Russian rear, the front being far distant. In any case the Russians had never expected us to appear here, but before they could recover from the shock and get hold of their weapons, we were away again. Then we had to drive round a corner and, as we drove round slowly, a fat Russian came out of a house on the corner and pulled up his sub-machine gun and started shooting at us. I already had my pistol out and fired back. As we turned the corner there was a sudden bang and I flew in a high curve off the tank. It had received a direct hit from an anti-tank gun and burst into flames. I thought to myself: ‘If you don’t want to be caught here, you are going to have to play it cool.’

  But where should I go? There was thick smoke all around me, and a few metres away was a ditch with a bridge leading over it, so I hid myself in the reeds of the ditch until it was dark. Then I went further along through the reeds. The ditch opened out into a reed-lined lake. With two other soldiers that I found in the reeds, I stayed here four days. We hid ourselves in a willow bush. The ground was so wet that puddles formed whenever you put your foot down. None of us had anything to eat. I developed a high fever and was unable to think clearly about continuing our flight. It was very cold at night and my clothing was wet, so with the fever, no food, and Russians all around, there seemed no point in hanging on.

  After four nights I was so weak that I could not last out any longer. Nearby was a farmhouse a little apart from the rest, at which I asked for something to eat. I was given some bread, a few potatoes boiled in their jackets, and a pan full of milk. The farmer’s wife also gave me a civilian suit, quite an old thing, but I put it on. I sank my uniform in the lake together with my pistol, medal, papers and letters. Then I slept in the hay for a few hours.

  Next morning, 7 May, I set off with one of my comrades. Although every step was painful and I was still very weak, we left the farmhouse in good heart and marched off to the west. As far as we were concerned, the war was over and we hoped to get back home soon.

  Unfortunately it did not work out this way and one and a half years in Russian captivity were to follow.

  Tillery was captured on 6 May and released again after a week because of his wounds. He stayed with a farmer near Rathenow for about four weeks only to be arrested once more and sent to a camp near Brest-Litovsk, where a third of the 800 prisoners died, and he himself lost over 40 lbs in weight. He was repatriated in the autumn of 1946 as unfit for work, and obtained a job as an interpreter in an American hospital kitchen, where he soon regained his strength. He then made his career in the German Post Office. He married in 1954 and now has a son and a grandson serving in the Bundeswehr.

  FOUR

  The Siege of Klessin

  TONY LE TISSIER

  I have pieced together this account from an after action report and extracts of a radio log provided by Lieutenant General Hans-Joachim von Hopffgarten, who was Ia (chief-of-staff) of the Panzergrenadier Division ‘Kurmark’ at the time. Further information was provided by Herr Helmut Jurisch, then a radio operator in the Tank Regiment ‘Brandenburg’. Prewar photographs and the diary of Herr Otto Karl Paul von Albedyll, the then 57-year-old squire of Klessin, were kindly provided by Dr. Reinhard Schmook of the Oderlandmuseum, Bad Freienwalde, plus additional photographs and material supplied by Dr Jürgen Freymuth OBE.

  To find Klessin on the map, one has to follow the road running north out of Frankfurt on the Oder to Lebus and then look for the first turn-off on the right, where this tiny hamlet sits on the eastern edge of the Reitwein Spur, a good hundred feet above the Oder valley. The Klessin of today bears little resemblance to the Klessin of early 1945, the few remaining houses having been resited, but the geographical features are the same, with two tracks rising steeply from the Oder valley on either side of the promontory on which the Schloss, or manor house, once stood. Capping the promontory between these tracks, the house had magnificent commanding views over the valley that gave it its military significance, but today its site and former gardens are completely overgrown with trees.

  The metalled road from Podelzig ran directly toward the main entrance to the house, being flanked by labourers’ cottages and outhouses either side of the approach to the courtyard entrance. This long rectangular courtyard was in turn flanked by barns, cowsheds and stables with access to the external parallel streets. A further group of cottages and outhouses lay at right-angles to the north of this formal grouping.

  The owner of the Schloss, Otto von Abedyll, kept a diary from which it is clear that the Klessin Gut, or manor farm, was a prosperous concern with a variety of livestock, including dairy cattle, pigs and sheep, and considerable stocks of grain and other produce stored in its various barns. When the Red Army closed up to the line of the Oder in early February 1945, von Abedyll was able to evacuate the civilian population and most of his livestock, but the produce was lost when the area came under shellfire and the barns caught fire.

  Then on the late afternoon of 15 February the Soviet 69th Army launched a surprise attack across the last of the ice into Lebus. Unheralded by the usual preparatory bombardment, two infantry divisions, supported by tanks, broke through the German lines to threaten the rear of the Reitwein Spur position, but were contained in time by elements of the Panzergrenadier-Division ‘Kurmark’ under Colonel Willy Langkeit, which had meanwhile taken over the defence of this sector. To reinforce the ‘Kurmark’ had come several two-battalion officer-cadet grenadier regiments raised from potential officers at the Reich’s various Kriegschule (KS), after which they were named. Thus the core of these units was of unusually high calibre, for the officers were instructors from these schools and the potential officers all experienced NCOs, but numbers and replacements had to be made up from all sorts, including Volkssturm.

  With the ice melting, the Soviets had to resort to bridgebuilding against which the Germans turned their air and artillery resources with varying success. During the second half of February the ‘Kurmark’ received formidable artillery reinforcements and could eventually summon up to 250 guns in its support, the cooperation in providing defensive fire for the infantry working extremely well. With unusually plentiful supplies of ammunition readily available, these resources could lay up to 8,000 shells on an area of 11,000 square metres to support or quell an infantry attack. Bombardment conditions on the Reitwein Spur from the artillery of both sides were described by some First World War veterans as comparable to those experienced at Fort Douamont near Verdun in 1916. In the severe winter weather of 1945 the Wuhden and Klessin positions were of particular value as observation points.

  On 2 March a night attack by elements of 8th Guards Army sweeping down the Reitwein Spur forced the German lines back to the eastern edge of Podelzig, leaving a battalion of the 1st Grenadi
er Regiment ‘KS Potsdam’ isolated in Wuhden, where it had to set up an all-round defence. A counterattack next day stalled under heavy Soviet fire and failed to get through. A Führer Order was then issued declaring Wuhden a ‘fortress’, which meant defending it to the last man, but it was totally unprepared for this role, its only supply resources being a potato store and a single well. Air supply was decided upon and a transport aircraft allocated for making night drops, but the Soviets promptly brought up their anti-aircraft artillery and soon rendered this means of supply impracticable. The Corps Commander, SS-General Matthias Kleinheisterkamp, then ordered an armoured thrust to relieve the garrison, but this met such a hail of anti-tank gunfire that the tanks hardly got across their start line. A subsequent dash at night by three of the ‘Brandenburg’s’ Panthers was more successful. Although one tank was knocked out and another damaged, the latter got through with the third tank, which happened to be a communications vehicle manned by radio operators and thus provided good communications for the beleaguered garrison. However, the first message out reported the majority of the battalion either dead or wounded, leaving a combatant strength of only 150–160 men. They had no medical officer with them to tend to their wounded and they were under frequent attack by Soviet infantry and being heavily shelled day and night.

  Corps turned down all requests by Colonel Langkeit for permission for a break-out as being contrary to Hitler’s orders. Eventually Colonel Langkeit decided on his own responsibility to order a break-out on the 12th March, by which time the potato store and the well had been destroyed, only 80 of the original 400 men were still on their feet and the wounded had to be abandoned. Nevertheless, the ‘Kurmark’ continued to report Wuhden held for a further four days until formal permission to break out finally came through. The survivors were then rewarded with their commissions as second lieutenants and fourteen day’s leave.

  The Deployment of the 2nd Battalion Fahnenjunker-Grenadier-Regiment 1242 on the 7th March 1945

  The Target areas indicated are based upon interpretation of the radio log.

  A similar fate was now to befall Klessin, which had also been declared a ‘fortress’ at the beginning of March while defended by elements of the Panzergrenadier Regiment ‘Kurmark’. Franz Schaberich, who was serving with that regiment, recalls assisting in the knocking down of walls to enable a Hetzer to get through the front door of the Schloss and manoeuvre into position to fire through the windows at the Soviet bridge below. Several hits from the vehicle’s 75 mm gun partially destroyed the bridge before returning fire obliged it to withdraw.

  Then on 7 March, Grenadier Regiment 1242 (formerly known as the ‘KS Wetzlar’) took over the sector Point 54.2-Klessin-Alt Podelzig, its 2nd Battalion being assigned to Klessin under the command of a Captain Wiegand. The original deployment, with Grenadier Regiment 1241 (also formerly ‘KS Weslar’) on its right, was as follows:

  7th Company – between Point 54.2 and Klessin

  6th Company – southern front of Klessin

  Bicycle Platoon – Schloss Klessin

  5th Company – eastern and northern fronts of Klessin as far as the Wuhden road, where it connected with the 2nd Company of the 1st Battalion

  8th Company + Mortar Platoon + 2 or 3 HMG Sections – 3–400 metres south of Klessin road junction with Reichstrasse 112

  Battalion HQ – cellar on the north side of Klessin street

  Three days later Captain Wiegand was sent off on a General Staff course and Lieutenant Wolfgang Schöne, commanding the 8th Company, appointed in his place, being the only officer in the battalion who had done an artillery spotting course, even though he was not the senior subaltern. One of his subsequent letters read: ‘Far right a pontoon bridge, submerged by day and refloated at night when they bring their tanks across cheekily with their headlights full on. We have to count them and report the number to Regiment. That is our main task.’

  On his first afternoon in command, the Soviets advanced up the sunken road from the south with the aid of tanks to reach the Klessin-Podelzig road, but a counterattack by the regiment that evening re-opened the route and destroyed a T-34 tank. Again the following afternoon, 11 March, the Soviets in battalion strength attacked the German positions north of the hamlet and were only forced back by committing the last of the regimental reserves. That night the Soviets broke the German lines at the juncture between Grenadier Regiments 1242 and 1235 west of Wuhden and thrust south, cutting off and surrounding Klessin. Those German troops that had been fighting north of Klessin were forced back into it, adding elements of the 2nd and 3rd Companies of the 1st Battalion to the garrison strength. Only a weak and by day untenable line of positions now connected the Klessin garrison with Point 54.2 and the rest of the regiment.

  During the night of 12/13 March it was possible to re-supply the garrison once more using tanks and armoured personnel carriers, which were also able to remove the wounded, but came under heavy artillery fire on their return journey.

  Temporarily reinforced by the remains of the Replacement Battalion ‘Feldherrnhalle’,[22] Grenadier Regiment 1242 made a bid to re-open the link to Klessin on the evening of the 13th March, but failed with heavy losses attributed mainly to heavy anti-tank gunfire coming from the direction of Wuhden. Only a few Soviet tanks were engaged in this action.

  The only well providing water for Klessin was destroyed by shellfire that day and there were to be four waterless days for the garrison before some enterprising individuals managed to re-open the well and discover a second one. The garrison remained under constant artillery and mortar fire with mounting casualties. The wounded were tended by the battalion medical officer, Junior Surgeon Dr. Gehre, who worked untiringly under the most difficult circumstances, not least a lack of medical supplies. The accumulating wounded spread from the neighbouring cellar into the battalion command post itself.

  The supply difficulties were partly eased by some calves, several lambs, a quantity of potatoes and a sack of peas left behind by Herr von Albedyll after the evacuation of the property.

  Communications were provided by the regimental signals platoon with a radio section under Corporal Hopp, later to be promoted sergeant, whose radiomen fortunately had a faster speed of transmission than those usually encountered with the infantry. Then there was the Armoured Artillery Regiment ‘Kurmark’’s forward observer, Sergeant Hennecke, who was later to be recommended for promotion and the award of the Iron Cross First Class for his brilliant work in directing artillery fire under the most arduous conditions, and the forward observer of the SS-Artillery Battalion 101, Sergeant Hagen, whose radio failed to function throughout. However, there was an acute shortage of batteries for the sets, and expired batteries were supposed to be returned to Regiment for recharging whenever possible. Extracts of Sergeant Major Baier’s radio log at the regimental command post survive and provide a comprehensive background to events.

  At 0941 hours on the 13th March, Klessin garrison reported the massing of Soviet anti-tank guns, mortars and infantry northeast of the hamlet and called for a fire concentration. At 1320 hours 5 Company holding the northeastern perimeter came under attack but managed to beat the enemy back. The garrison reported a fighting strength of 196 with six severely wounded awaiting collection.

  At 1416 hours the Soviets repeated their attack from the northeast and then minutes later the position came under attack from the southeast as tanks and infantry emerged from the hollow below the Schloss. Because of the steepness of the approach, this latter group could only be countered with mortar fire, but the request for this was closely followed by a call for a complete fire bell around the battalion position. By 1520 hours the garrison was calling urgently and repeatedly for water, which was promised for delivery by tanks that night.

  The Soviet attacks continued, causing the garrison to call for heavy machine gunfire over the position, as well as artillery, rocket and mortar fire on specific target areas. Three and a half hours later the garrison was able to report a complete defensive s
uccess by 5 and 6 Companies, but tetanus inoculations and bandages were urgently needed.

  At 0210 hours next morning, 14 March, Regiment announced the armoured relief attack would commence at 0245 hours assisted by infantry. As soon as the tanks broke through, the 2nd Battalion was to push out on the flanks to re-establish contact with its neighbours on either side. The 2nd Company of the ‘Brandenburg’ provided fire cover for the 3rd Company, but then a Panther hit a mine and the tank in which Matthias Hamedinger was the radio operator was ordered to recover it. He reported: ‘The Russians were firing at our tank with Panzerfausts without hitting it. Then one hit the petrol tank alongside the engine and our tank burst into flames and the ammunition started exploding. I baled out through the radio operator’s hatch without difficulty, but the Russian infantry closed in and started firing at us with their sub-machine guns. The tracks cut by the tank into the meadow provided us with good cover, but our tank commander, Sergeant Räth, was hit and wounded.’

  As Helmut Jurisch commented: ‘That first night the enemy put up such a hail of fire that, although it did not penetrate, the closer we got to Klessin, the greater was the danger that they would penetrate the side armour. Eventually the attack was broken off at dawn.’

  The attempt at relief had failed and at 1000 hours the Soviets resumed their attacks from the north and south. Again this was eventually checked by artillery fire. That evening Regiment called on the garrison to hold out for one more day. The garrison was now down to 37 officer cadets, 8 senior NCOs, 116 other ranks and 27 wounded, already on their fourth day without water.

  At some stage during the siege, the Political Department of the 8th Guards Army produced a special leaflet to try and get the garrison to surrender, which started as follows: