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The Dreadful Patriot: A Thrilling Conspiracy Novel (Techno thriller, Mystery & Suspense Book 3)

Page 16

by Charles Z David


  The Imam felt that he could no longer keep his grand plan from them. He asked the Senior Assistant if there were any audio or video recording devices in the room. The Senior Assistant stretched his hand and opened a drawer at the bottom of his desk and flicked a switch that turned off the video camera that was concealed in the frame of the large photograph of the Supreme Leader that hung on the wall behind him right next to a similarly sized photo of Imam Khomeini. None of the participants was surprised, after all they knew that everything said in this office reached the ears of the Supreme Leader.

  Imam Mourtashef started presenting his grand plan "Honorable colleagues, ever since I was put in charge the liaison between the Supreme Leader and Dr. Fathi's laboratory I have been trying to devise a way that will put to good use the products of the laboratory. I was thinking of a way to transport a nuclear device into the heart of the Zionist entity. I knew that an overt attack would result in retaliation that could tear the fabric of our Islamic society and destroy our beautiful country. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that we could successfully deliver such a device and penetrate the advanced defensive systems that the enemy has developed against aircraft, short range missiles and even against our latest ballistic long-range missiles. None of our allies are willing, and probably unable, to supply us with offensive weapons that would do the job." He looked at his two colleagues who seemed to be fascinated by his words, and continued "So I thought that we could use the hostages we are holding to deliver the device. Ironically, both hostages and the device are in the same Evin Prison complex within less than 100 meters of one another."

  General Aslawi was considering the practicalities of the idea. He said "How can you combine the device with the hostages. Do you think it would fit in the pocket of one of them?" and snickered.

  The Imam was not in the least amused, and as the Senior Assistant looked at him expectantly he replied "Surely you are joking General Aslawi" in reference to the title of Richard Feynman's book "I have given a lot of thought to this crucial stage of my grand plan". He then explained in detail how he intended to overcome the problem of delivering the nuclear device.

  The Senior Assistant was impressed and even the general wiped off the smug expression from his face and nodded appreciatively. The Senior Assistant concluded the meeting by saying "So far only the three of us know about this plan. I suggest that we tell the Supreme Leader only as much as he needs to know at this stage. I believe that we need his consent to proceed but can spare him the details." The other two consented and the meeting was adjourned.

  October 11th, Mossad Headquarters, Tel-Aviv

  A deeply frustrated David Avivi sat across the desk from Haim Shimony and gave him a verbatim report of the meeting in Moscow. Shimony who had known David well for many years had never before seen him in such a state of anxiety. David said "I have totally failed in convincing the Imam, or even General Koliagin, that we had nothing to do with the elimination of the Iranian nuclear scientists. Haim, we need unequivocal proof that the whole operation was carried out by Segan's firm and that he acted without our approval and without our knowledge. Now that Sam and Ruby are dead there are only two people who can clear us – Segan and the English gentleman, if he even exists. In order to do so we must find Segan, break him and have him publicly admit his guilt and exonerate Israel. I am afraid that the Russians may lay their hands on him first or that some other intelligence organization would simply eliminate him before we can get him to do this. With regard to the English gentleman our only link is through Segan, unless we can uncover some other way of contacting him".

  Shimony listened patiently and then said "Let's go back to the basics of criminology – look for the motive. We should go straight to whoever sent this gentleman to Segan in the first place. Surely he was not acting on his own. Someone was funding the whole operation, someone who stood to benefit directly from the elimination of the scientists or indirectly from the consequences of the operation. I believe we should divide our focus. You, David, go after Segan and the English gentleman, while our top analysts will figure out who stood to gain from the removal of these scientists. You can enlist help from Julia, to whom I am told by my sources, you have taken quite a fancy". This last statement was with a small smile, watching David's reaction that caused him to blush.

  David responded "I'll be off to Berlin tomorrow. I would like to meet the analysts this evening and share the information I have on the Iranians, particularly the reaction of the Imam to my presentation. I am sure that he is up to some mischief and had something up his sleeve. The way he ignored my question about the hostages must have been intentional. Yet I believe that they are willing to meet again and negotiate the release of the hostages."

  Shimony responded "I am not sure that they have given up their intentions of developing nuclear weapons. At present they have a lot to lose if the sanctions are renewed but we are all aware that the nuclear deal that they signed has some loopholes they would exploit if the circumstances change. I'll instruct the analysts to focus on scenarios that may drive the Iranian regime to take risks and carry out dangerous steps. First and foremost is the fear of losing control of the country. This is where the interests of the religious leadership coincide with the concerns of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard for the economic empire they had constructed."

  David fully agreed with his boss and said he would go to see the analysts immediately.

  Chapter 14

  October 11th, General Koliagn's office, Moscow

  General Koliagin looked at the full ashtray on his desk and then glanced at the antique clock that hung opposite his chair at the head of the large conference table. He was waiting for his top aides and analysts to enter the room but had been wondering how to open the meeting and how much he would tell them about the recent events. He pressed a button on the intercom and barked an order to summon his personal secretary. The tall girl entered the room without knocking on the door, looked at the general and saw the overflowing ashtray and knew that he was in a foul mood. She leaned over allowing her ample breasts to linger on his shoulder and gently picked up the ashtray. He managed to force a smile and she slowly stroked the back of his neck feeling the tension dissipating. She asked him if he wanted something to drink before the meeting and he just motioned for her to take the ashtray and let them in.

  They filed in silently and took their seats according to their rank and importance. Those in uniform sat on both sides near the head of the table while the advisors and analysts took the chairs at the far end of the table. The general's adjutant turned on the projector and pressed a button that rolled down the screen and another that closed the curtains. The senior analyst stood up and took the remote control in his hand waiting for the general to open the meeting.

  General Koliagin looked around the table holding the eyes of each participant for a few seconds and reading their expressions. All of them were experts on the political situation in Iran or officers in the Russian military that were familiar with the plans for armed intervention in Iran if such a case arose. Some were FSB personnel that were in charge of gathering intelligence for the analysts as well as recruit collaborators inside the Iranian establishment. The older hands displayed no emotion and appeared to be "poker faced" without even a hint of what was going on in their minds, while the junior members were clearly intimated by the iron stare of the general. They all knew that their careers could rise and prosper or be abruptly terminated by the general. He spoke so quietly that those at the far end of the table had to strain their ears to hear him. "I would like a candid review of the situation in Iran. I am especially curious about the changes, if any, brought about by the signing of the nuclear deal. We have never fully trusted Iran, even after we supplied them with advance weapon systems like the S-300 aerial defense anti-aircraft missiles, with armament of various kinds and contracted to build more nuclear power plants in addition to the one in Bushehr. Their course record in respecting agreements has been less than perfect to say the least.
They were caught in violation of signed contracts numerous times and always came up with lame excuses to justify these infractions. Who knows what they managed to get away with. We don't know what we don't know but there is no limit to what we suspect. Please speak freely."

  The senior analyst who was considered as the expert on Iranian affairs cleared his throat and screened his first slide that showed a schematic of the different government organizations in Iran. "The legislature or Islamic Consultative Assembly (the Majles for short) consists of 290 members who are elected by popular vote, as is the president, for a four-year term. However, all the candidates have to gain approval of the Council of Guardians whose members are in charge of interpreting the constitution and supervising the elections. In addition there is a council of experts that consists of 88 masters of Islamic law, called the Assembly of Experts. They are elected for an 8-year term. This council is controlled by the clerics who wield the real power and they elect the Supreme Leader. The Supreme Leader is also commander-in-chief of the armed forces and controls the intelligence and security agencies. He practically has absolute power over the judiciary system, the media and appoints all the members of the Council of Guardians who oversee the Majles. The elected president has some authority but cannot take any significant action without the approval of the Supreme Leader and Council". The analyst continued to describe the power structure in Iran highlighting the fact that it is first and foremost a theocratic Islamic government. At the end of his talk he said that there is an ongoing struggle between the conservative elements that wish to retain control by the clerics and religious Islamic establishment and the more liberal factions. He emphasized that he is using the term "liberal" freely because they are also not against a theocratic regime. Their main objectives are to be more open to the West and reduce unemployment especially among the educated people who cannot find suitable jobs in Iran. Finally he said that in the election that was held in 2016 the ultra-conservatives lost several seats in the Majlis and the Assembly of Experts to the more liberal candidates. This was especially prominent in Tehran and among the more educated voters, while in the rural areas the turn-out of voters was lower but they still gave support to the conservative candidates.

  The general was not impressed by this presentation "You have told us nothing new. Everything can be found in Wikipedia or other websites that are accessible to any 10-year old with a computer and internet access, although I doubt that 10-year olds would bother with the power structure of Iran. I want to know about the Iranian nuclear program after, I repeat after, they signed the nuclear deal. Can you tell us what they are really up to?"

  The senior analyst turned pale and managed to say "Well, I was just getting to this in my next slides" and went on to describe the clandestine Iranian program to develop nuclear weapons that was curtailed by the nuclear deal. He said that the program consisted of three major efforts: first, enrichment of uranium to officially manufacture only low-enriched-uranium (LEU). This was also approved in the nuclear deal but the amount was restricted to 300 kg. The Iranians had developed the capability, perhaps even the actual clandestine production, of high-enriched-uranium (HEU) that can be used in nuclear weapons. Second to produce weapon-grade plutonium in a specially designed nuclear reactor or by adaptation of legitimate nuclear power plants; and third to carry out research, and perhaps testing, of nuclear weapon designs. He added "The nuclear deal has put an end to most of these programs, or at least imposed severe limitations on them. But we suspect that the Iranians have continued to pursue the acquisition of nuclear weapons at clandestine sites and in secret laboratories."

  Before he could continue General Koliagin interrupted "Have we any proof of this or is it just speculation?"

  The senior analyst was dumbfounded "General, I can base my presentation only on the intelligence provided to me, the rest is just innuendo and speculation. So far I have not seen any photos, documents or received reports of actual violations of the nuclear deal. If our esteemed intelligence agencies have anything to the contrary, I'll be glad to get it." He sat back down in his chair and tried to ignore the glaring look that the general gave him.

  General Koliagin looked around the table and noted that all the participants kept themselves busy moving their pens around or fiddling with the papers that were placed in front of them. No one looked up or met his eyes and their expressionless faces could have been carved in stone or wood. He sighed inwardly and thought that the senior analyst was right and the fault lay with the lack of updated information on the activities of the Iranians. The FSB had sources within the Iranian scientific community and several collaborators inside the intelligence services and the IRG but none of these had delivered anything that would imply that Iran was in violation of the nuclear deal that it had signed. The general was well aware of the motto of all intelligence services regarding getting proof of illicit operations "absence of evidence is not evidence of absence".

  He decided that in order to maintain his position and to ensure that people continued to fear him he had to make an example of the senior analyst and to do so then and there. He pressed the intercom button and summoned his secretary. When she entered the conference room he told her to arrange an escort for the senior analyst that would take him to his apartment. They were to help him pack his things as he would be transferred to his new job in Irkutsk where he would serve as the local intelligence coordinator. The general couldn't help thinking that just a few decades earlier the trip would have been much shorter only as far as the Lubyanka Building on Bolshaya Lubyanka Street in Moscow.

  The senior analyst rose to his feet and all color drained from his face as he followed the tall girl out of the room. The general waited another moment and said that he expected some real information about Iran's nuclear program and then adjourned the meeting.

  October 20th, Basement S, Evin Prison, Tehran

  Dr. Fathi was looking forward to the visit by Imam Mourtashef. At long last he had something tangible to show as proof for the success of his efforts – not computer simulations with strange looking shaded lines and dots moving across a computer screen – but a solid sphere made of a metallic substance. A broad smile crossed his face replacing the brooding haunted expression that had become more and more common since some of leading scientists were mysteriously murdered in Europe less than a year previously. He still mourned some of them, especially the tragic end of Dr. Abadi who died alone on a cold street in Vienna and of Dr. Al-Baida who fell to his death from a steep cliff in sunny Taormina. He also wondered what had happened to Dr. Raffsani the brilliant mathematician who mocked the security officers and was whisked away from the laboratory never to be heard from again. Despite these setbacks Fathi and his team were on the verge of achieving the goals that were set for them by the Supreme Leader. Fathi was very proud and now was the moment that he was ready to reap the honors and recognition he felt were well deserved.

  The Imam was unaccompanied when he entered the small office that served Dr. Fathi when he felt that he needed to get away from the test benches and "hot cells" that cluttered the laboratory. Fathi rose from his seat and welcomed the Imam bowing his head slightly as a token of respect. The Imam smiled and told Fathi to sit down and give him a brief progress report. Fathi, brimming with excitement, motioned to the Imam to follow him into the lab and led the way to one of the "hot cells" that at a first glance appeared to be empty. As the Imam approached closer he saw a small metallic sphere that was only a few centimeters in diameter. He looked quizzically at the scientist with an unspoken question in his eyes.

  Fathi said "This may not look like much to you but, believe it or not, the energy contained in this small sphere can destroy a whole city and kill all its residents in a flash".

  The Imam was a bit skeptical, but also in a flippant mood, and smiled while saying "Dr. Fathi, surely you are not implying that someone has to take this sphere and hit every resident on the head with it". Seeing the stunned expression on Fathi's face he quickly added "Only jok
ing. Have you calculated the force of explosion of this sphere?"

  Relieved a little, Fathi said "The yield, or force of explosion, of this little sphere that you can pick up with one hand, is equivalent to that of 20 thousand tons of the common chemical explosive TNT. For comparison, the load a Boeing 747-400 can carry is about 200 tons, so if you take a hundred Jumbo jets fully loaded with TNT and crash all of them in a city the extent of immediate damage of the blast wave would be similar. But then you have to add the effects of ionizing and thermal radiation and the long-lasting deadly residual radiation and contamination to appreciate the difference between conventional explosives and nuclear bombs."

  The Imam was well aware of these physical facts but was more concerned with the reliability of the device. "What if it doesn’t work as planned?"

  Dr. Fathi was now offended. His professional integrity and credibility were challenged. He looked on the verge of a bursting a blood vessel "This unique design was delivered to us by a Russian defector, tested by our most advanced computer simulation modeling and verified by a Chinese expert of nuclear devices. Of course, we couldn't carry out any real full-scale tests. First and foremost, our fissile material is sufficient for just one device – the little sphere you see here represents almost our entire stock. Second, even if we had enough material our chances of getting away with a full scale test without it being detected are infinitesimally close to zero. Last but not least is the logistical problem involved in carrying out such a test – the construction of a site, the measurement equipment and the expenses – in effect prohibit this. So Honorable Imam, I can assure you that we did the best we could under the circumstances and I am confident that it will work as expected."

 

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