December 1941

by Craig Shirley

  Charles J. Pietsch of the Gideons met with the chaplain of the navy, Robert D. Workman, in Washington to present him with a Bible to give to the president. Pietsch was the Gideons’ representative from Hawaii.87

  The weather across the East Coast, which had been unseasonably warm, all of a sudden turned much chillier, especially in Washington, where administration officials also braced for the worst in the Far East. “Certain extremely well-informed American officials are . . . convinced that Japan will start a fight in the near future.”88 Golfers had been on the links well into winter in the East because of the mild temperatures, but now they retreated to their favorite 19th hole.

  A correspondent for the New York Herald Tribune, Wilfred Fleisher, who had spent several years in Japan, bluntly told a group in Washington that the United States and Japan were “at the end of negotiations.”89 Indeed, most headlines across the country said war between Great Britain and Japan was imminent in the Pacific.

  But the “World Golden Rule Foundation” called for a week of “Self-Denial and Generosity” and designated the next seven days for seven occupied countries, beginning on the seventh, which had been proclaimed to be “Chinese Day.”90

  A more authoritative source, a Chinese diplomat, Dr. Wel Tao-Ming, said Japan was running a “bluff.”91 Dr. Tao-Ming said Japan’s expansionist policies had reached the end of their supply lines, and while the island nation had harbored dreams of controlling access to natural resources it did not possess, they had pursued their course out of weakness and not strength. “My personal opinion . . . is that the Tojo Cabinet is a bluff. . . . In our struggle of more than four years, we have drained them, both militarily and economically, to such an extent that they have neither war materials nor man power left to launch into an adventure on a grand scale in other zones.”92

  Japan had hundreds of daily newspapers, most of which strongly reflected the policies of the government of Gen. Hideki Tojo. Of the deteriorating situation in the Far East one Japanese paper said, “Japan might be forced to abandon her peaceful endeavors.” With all the arrogance he could muster, a member of the Tojo Cabinet declaimed, “We watch tensely to see whether Mr. Roosevelt or Mr. Churchill will commit on an epochal crime and further extend the world upheaval.”93

  CHAPTER 7

  THE SEVENTH OF DECEMBER

  “Extra! War!”

  San Francisco Chronicle

  “Japs Attack Manila, Far East Crisis Explodes”

  Marysville Daily Forum—Extra!

  “War! Oahu Bombed by Japanese Planes”

  Honolulu Star-Bulletin 1st Extra

  “U.S. at War! Japan Bombs Hawaii, Manila”

  Washington Post Extra

  “Navy Is Superior to Any Says Knox”

  New York Times

  Sunday in America was a day for relaxing whether you followed the fourth commandment or not. It was a day for church, for family meals, for reading the newspapers, listening to the radio, going for long walks, for afternoon naps, for working in the yard and visiting with neighbors.

  Sunday, December 7 was different.

  Ten days earlier, on November 27, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Harold R. Stark and Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army Gen. George C. Marshall authored a two-page memo stamped “Secret” for their commander in chief, “Subject: Far Eastern Situation.”1

  “If the current negotiations end without agreement,” they wrote, “Japan may attack: the Burma Road; Thailand; Malaya; the Netherlands East Indies; the Philippines; the Russian Maritime Provinces.” The memo then went on to discount why the Japanese would attack most of the cited strategic locations. “There is little probability of an immediate Japanese attack on the Maritime Provinces. . . . The magnitude of the effort required will militate against direct attack against Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies until the threat exercised by United States forces in Luzon is removed. Attack on the Burma Road would, however, be difficult and might fail. Occupation of Thailand gains a limited strategic advantage as a preliminary to operations against Malaya or the Netherlands East Indies, might relieve internal political pressure, and to a lesser extent, external economic pressure. The most essential thing now, from the United States viewpoint, was to gain time. Considerable Navy and Army reinforcements have been rushed to the Philippines but the desirable strength has not yet been reached. Of great and immediate concern is the safety of the Army convoy now near Guam, and the Marine Corps’ convoy just leaving Shanghai. Ground forces to a total of 21,000 are due to sail from the United States by December 8, 1941, and it is important that this troop reinforcement reach the Philippines before hostilities commence.”2

  “Precipitance of military action on our part should be avoided so long as consistent with national policy. The longer the delay, the more positive becomes the assurance of retention of these Islands as a naval and air base. Japanese action to the south of Formosa will be hindered and perhaps seriously blocked as long as we hold the Philippine Islands.”3

  “After consultation with each other, United States, British, and Dutch military authorities in the Far East agreed that joint military counteraction against Japan should be undertaken only in case Japan attacks or directly threatens the territory or mandated territory of the United States. . . .”4

  “It is recommended that: prior to the completion of the Philippine reinforcement, military, counter-action be considered only if Japan attacks or directly threatens United States, British, or Dutch territory . . . in case of a Japanese advance into Thailand, Japan be warned by the United States . . . that advance beyond the lines indicated may lead to war; prior to such warning no joint military opposition be undertaken.”5

  Significantly, no mention was made by Stark or Marshall of any other American military installation in the Pacific region, including Hawaii.

  Adm. Husband E. Kimmel, newly installed commander of the Pacific Fleet in Hawaii, had obsessed for months about a Japanese naval attack on the American fleet at Pearl Harbor located on the south side of the island of Oahu, up a narrow and well-protected channel.6

  A navy report had been given to him detailing how the Japanese could pull off such an attack on the base. The report said the Japanese would attack on a weekend and would not declare war first. Outside of those in the “war gaming” sections of the military, no one in or outside of government had given the notion of an audacious daytime bombing on a weekend even a passing thought. There had been only one blackout drill on Oahu in May the year before to simulate response in an attack.7

  An extraordinary Sunday meeting was requested by the Japanese embassy in Washington with Secretary of State Cordell Hull. The meeting was set for 1:00 p.m. (EST). It would be 7:30 a.m. in Honolulu. In 1941, Hawaii was in its own “half time zone.” Tokyo had already reassigned some of their Washington envoys back to Japan.

  Just one day before, Hull had told reporters that he anticipated no further meetings with his Japanese counterparts.8 Privately, Hull had already told Henry Stimson, “I have washed my hands of it and now it is in the hands of you and [Frank] Knox—the Army and the Navy.”9

  Most American newspapers Sunday morning were by and large quiet when it came to the Pacific crisis. The Honolulu Advertiser was covering local news involving housing issues, a display by the Shriners, and the typical international war news coming from Russia, Germany, and England.10 There was also a special feature on where children could see Santa Claus—from 11:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. that day—in front of a fake fireplace in the lobby of the newspaper.11 Another front-page story reported on the newly formed “Razor Blades for Britain Committee in Hawaii,” which was taking up a collection because blades could no longer be purchased in England as all steel was being devoted to their war effort. “All razor blade donations . . . must be new,” the story cautioned.12

  Inside, stories and features favorably reviewed the movie A Yank in the R.A.F.; announced clipper tours between Hawaii, the West Coast, Midway, Wake Island, and the Philippines; and detailed the ongoing prostituti
on problems in Hawaii. On page seven was a feature, “Week’s War Review.” The column opened saying, “A critical week of war news was highlighted by heightening tension in the Pacific, but no new developments towards war.”13

  In the Washington Star, only one story was devoted to the Far East while the rest of the war and foreign news was about the Russian Front, North Africa, and the North Atlantic. The other news of the day covered sports, the weather, traffic reports, human-interest stories, metro articles, editorials, and columns. The most human of human-interest stories ran across the wires on Sunday morning about the death of a ninety-seven-year-old man, “Ray Fritman, who had spent a lifetime seeking his true identity. . . . He became lost during a parade in New York in 1852 and never saw his parents again.” He got his name from an orphanage in New York, fought in the Civil War, and later taught school in Indiana.14

  When there was news in some papers about the crisis with Japan, it was tucked between all sorts of other stories. However, buried on page three of the New York Times was an ominous piece dateline “Tokyo, Sunday, Dec. 7.” The headline read, “Japanese Herald ‘Supreme Crisis.’” The account was on the United Press wire. “Japan indicated early today that she was on the verge of abandoning efforts to achieve a settlement of Pacific issues by diplomatic negotiation [in] Washington.” The story further detailed Tokyo’s anger over Russia’s apparent decision to throw in her lot with the “ABCD” powers of America, Britain, China, and the Dutch and oppose Japan in the Far East. But also a Japanese government official said, “[T]he time for alteration of the Thai Government’s neutrality is believed at hand.”15

  The Thai government announced a state of emergency, and despite the claims of Tokyo, the Thais said they were not worried about the British. However, the British were worried about the Japanese. Civilians throughout the Far East had been told to evacuate and all British troops had been recalled, some picked up in bars and clubs in Singapore and taken back to their respective bases and ships. Twenty Japanese nationals had been taken off of a ship headed for Bangkok and detained by the British.16

  England’s military commanders planned an “all hands on deck” meeting for December 8 to game out the dire situation.17 One fact was becoming increasingly clear: Britain was now incapable of defending its Far Eastern prizes—especially oil, the greatest prize of all. To defend its empire against the resource-hungry Japanese, the British desperately needed the assistance of its rich cousins across the Atlantic, something President Roosevelt well understood.

  On Saturday evening, December 6, FDR sent a message directly to Emperor Hirohito, “an unprecedented action—as disturbing reports reached the State Department that two large and heavily escorted convoys were seen yesterday morning steaming into the Gulf of Siam, which washes the shores of Thailand.”18 The contents of the president’s message to the emperor were not revealed at the time. Later it became known and was utterly respectful and solicitous of the emperor. Words such as “friendship” and “virtue” and “wisdom” littered the missive, but also words like “fear” and “concern.”19

  “Only in situations of extraordinary importance to our two countries need I address to Your Majesty messages on matters of state. I feel I should now so address you because of the deep and far-reaching emergency which appears to be in formation. Developments are occurring in the Pacific area which threaten to deprive each of our nations and all humanity of the beneficial influence of the long peace between our two countries. These developments contain tragic possibilities.” Roosevelt politely raised the subject of China and Indo-China and expressed concern over Japan’s military incursions in those two countries. “During the past few weeks it has become clear . . . that Japanese military, naval and air forces have been sent to Southern Indo-China in such large numbers as to create a reasonable doubt on the part of other nations that this continuing concentration in Indo-China is not defensive in its character.” Roosevelt reviewed other matters in the area including the Philippines, the East Indies, and Malaya and the apparent Japanese designs on these countries as well. “I am sure that Your Majesty will understand that the fear of all these people is a legitimate fear in as much as it involves their peace and their national existence. I am sure that Your Majesty will understand why the people of the United States in such large numbers look askance at the establishment of military . . . bases manned and equipped so greatly as to constitute armed forces capable of measures of offense.” He assured Hirohito that the United States and the other countries of the region had no warlike designs on Japan.20

  Roosevelt closed with a plea. “I address myself to Your Majesty at this moment in the fervent hope that Your Majesty may, as I am doing, give thought in this definite emergency to ways of dispelling the dark clouds. I am confident that both of us, for the sake of the peoples not only of our own great countries but for the sake of humanity in neighboring territories, have a sacred duty to restore traditional amity and prevent further death and destruction in the world.”21 The telegram was sent at 6:00 p.m. Washington time on the sixth, but there was no evidence Hirohito ever saw it.

  Even with the details of the message then unknown to the public, it was clear to most that the Roosevelt administration felt some sort of breakthrough was still possible in the Far East that might relieve the pressure cooker it had become. “The dispatch of the President’s message was announced after a day in which appeared some slight hopes that the crisis with Japan would subside and that conversations could be resumed . . . on some satisfactory lines.”22

  Only once before, on December 13, 1937, had Roosevelt communicated with Hirohito. That was when the Japanese had bombed an American ship, the gunboat Panay, while she sailed in Chinese waters. That message was delivered orally to the Japanese ambassador in Washington and “it produced results, and the United States received satisfaction for the Panay attack.”23 The new Roosevelt initiative was interpreted to reflect his dissatisfaction with Tokyo’s military maneuvers in the Far East and as a last ditch effort to restart the talks.

  Following FDR’s plea observers agreed, “The next step, it was felt, is wholly up to Japan . . .”24

  “The message also was viewed as possibly a step of last resort to avert an open break with Japan since it was considered unlikely that Mr. Roosevelt would communicate directly with the Emperor unless virtually all hope had been abandoned of a satisfactory adjustment of Japanese-American difficulties through the usual diplomatic channels.”25

  While coverage might have otherwise been slight, every radio newspaper in America covered in detail Roosevelt’s olive branch to Japan the morning of December 8, though not all reported on the “two large and heavily escorted Japanese convoys . . . steaming toward the Gulf of Siam (Thailand) this morning.”26 Another large convoy featuring six aircraft carriers heading southeast from Japan and briefly reported on six days earlier had not been seen or heard from since. Kimmel had received a notice on December 2 that this Japanese task force, moving at flank speed, around 24 knots per hour, had been lost to American trackers.27

  The American military policy in the Far East had never been completely clear, and Roosevelt never articulated specifically that if Japan went ahead and invaded Thailand the United States would get into a shooting war with Tokyo. But everybody assumed Thailand was the line in the sand, especially since the British had made clear their intention to attack Japan if Thailand were invaded.28

  The Japanese press meanwhile continued to pound the United States, accusing Washington of stalling and “insincerity,” though without elaborating.29 Domei, the government-owned news agency, announced that the Japanese government, from Premier General Hideki Tojo to the foreign minister to the navy minister Vice Adm. Shigetaro Shimada “‘would speak the whole truth about the current international situation as well as the Japanese-American talks’ in speeches Monday.”30

  The Japanese, having invaded China, incredibly called for “self-determination” for the Chinese and had used this as yet another reason to tell Wash
ington to butt out of the affairs of the Far East.31 They also blasted the “sensationalism” of American “press and radio,” but that was nothing new. American politicians had complained of this for years.32 The War Department had done a little saber-rattling of its own and called attention to new bases it was building in the Aleutian Islands, a potential threat to Japan.33

  Yet another Japanese spokesman, Dr. Morinosuki Kashima, unsurprisingly blasted the United States and its “offensive attitude diplomatically, politically and strategically.” News reports confirmed that “certain attaches of the Japanese Embassy in Washington had been shifted, but reasons for the move were not specified.” Other unexplained actions by the Japanese were reported, including the recall of the heads of steamship offices in Bombay and Singapore.34

  Australia was actively preparing for war and ordered “nonessential” civilians to leave the Philippines immediately and that an evacuation might be necessary.35 The British were still furiously evacuating Singapore, sending trucks around the city to pick up soldiers and sailors.36

  On the other side of the world, Great Britain declared war against Finland, which had become an “ally” of the Third Reich. “Each of the German satellite states had refused ultimatums that they halt hostilities against Russia, Britain’s ally.” Immediately, the British government arrested 150 Finns “who will be removed later to concentration camps,” while “[n]ewly designated ‘enemy diplomats’ prepared to leave London.”37

  In concert with the British declaration of war, FDR put Finnish ships in American ports in New York, Philadelphia, Boston, and Baltimore under “protective custody.”38 Finland’s president Risto Ryti received “a telegram of independence day congratulations from Adolf Hitler.”39 In the Mediterranean, another German ally, the Vichy government of France, activated its fleet there to assist the Nazis and Italians against “British piracy.”40