Abraham Lincoln: A Life, Volume 1

by Michael Burlingame

  The four states’ delegates met on May 17. Thomas Dudley of New Jersey, observing that no compromise candidate was emerging, successfully moved that a special committee of three members from each state recommend a standard-bearer. From Pennsylvania, Governor Andrew Reeder chose David Wilmot, B. Rush Peterkin, and Henry D. Moore, all of whom were Cameron backers. But half the delegation was poised to vote against Cameron, and those anti-Cameron men objected to Reeder’s slate. To placate them, Moore stepped aside for William B. Mann, a rising boss of Philadelphia and a fierce critic of Cameron.

  David Davis headed the Illinois contingent, Caleb B. Smith the Indianans, and Dudley the Jerseymen. That evening they all gathered in Wilmot’s rooms, where for five hours they negotiated inconclusively. Around ten o’clock Horace Greeley dropped by, observed the deadlock, and telegraphed the New York Tribune that Seward would be nominated the next day.

  After Greeley left, Dudley suggested that each delegation rank order its preferences. Indiana, Illinois, and New Jersey quickly determined that they could all agree on Lincoln. In Pennsylvania, Cameron topped the list, and McLean, who was championed by Thaddeus Stevens, came in second. Since neither Cameron nor McLean could win the nomination, the choice of the third name would determine how Pennsylvania would go after casting a complimentary vote for her native son. The contest between Lincoln and Bates for that crucial third spot was close, with the Illinoisan prevailing by a few votes after a tension-filled debate. Curtin and some of Cameron’s supporters who favored the selection of Congressman John Hickman or John M. Read as vice-president swung the delegation to support Lincoln. (On the first day of the convention, there had been much talk of a Lincoln-Hickman ticket.)

  That choice by the twelve-member committee proved a crucial and unexpected turning point. When Andrew learned of the decision, he “said he could not comprehend it.”79 The New Jersey and Pennsylvania men were unable to guarantee their states, but they promised to try. At 1 A.M. the Jerseymen met and agreed to support Lincoln after casting complimentary ballots for Dayton. The Pennsylvania delegation was scheduled to consider the committee’s recommendation the next morning, as polling for the presidential nomination began.

  That night, while the Sewardites complacently downed innumerable bottles of champagne in anticipation of their imminent triumph, Davis and his cohorts barely slept. Henry S. Lane, Caleb B. Smith, and George K. Steele lobbied furiously for Lincoln, especially among the Vermont and Virginia delegates. They broke Seward’s momentum, undermining his support in the New England and Southern delegations. Lane repeatedly declared that Seward’s nomination would be so injurious to his gubernatorial chances that he would quit rather than waste time and money on a futile campaign. Helping to persuade the Pennsylvanians were the heroic efforts of George W. Lawrence of Maine, who boarded at the hotel where the Keystone State delegation was staying.

  David Davis wanted to cut a deal with the Pennsylvanians, but the previous day Lincoln had sent a terse message via Edward L. Baker: “Make no contracts that will bind me.”80 According to Henry C. Whitney, Baker “related that when he read the note to the delegates and workers gathered at the Lincoln headquarters he was greeted with a burst of laughter.” Davis, who guffawed louder than anyone, said: “Lincoln ain’t here, and don’t know what we have to meet, so we will go ahead, as if we hadn’t heard from him, and he must ratify it.”81 Davis and Swett negotiated with the leading Cameron operatives, John P. Sanderson and Joseph Casey, deep into the night. Even before the convention met, Sanderson had predicted that Lincoln, unlike other contenders, might carry the Keystone State. In the wee hours of Friday morning, Cameron was allegedly offered a cabinet post in return for the votes of the Pennsylvania delegates. Cameron’s representatives, wary because their counterparts had no authorization from Lincoln to act, were reassured that the Rail-splitter would never repudiate a promise they made.

  Whitney’s account of the Cameron bargain has been challenged, but it seems plausible in light of abundant reminiscent testimony. Swett described to a convention delegate “his labors with Cameron,” the “promises he made Pennsylvania on behalf of Mr. Lincoln,” and “the subsequent difficulty he encountered in persuading Mr. Lincoln to carry out the contracts, or ‘bargains,’ as Mr. Lincoln called them.”82 Swett also confided to his law partner that he had promised Cameron a cabinet appointment if Pennsylvania supported Lincoln on the second ballot. In 1875, Cameron informed an interviewer that when “Lincoln told me that he was more indebted to Judd than any other one man for his nomination, … I told him I thought Davis and Swett did more for him. They bought all my men—Casey and Sanderson and the rest of them. I was for Seward[.] I knew I couldn’t be nominated but I wanted a complimentary vote from my own State. But Davis and the rest of them stole all my men. Seward accused me of having cheated him.”83

  Cameron’s statement may have been disingenuous. To be sure, he had told Seward he would back him, but on May 10, Casey wrote Cameron (aka the Chief) from Chicago that if he could not be nominated, then the delegation would go for Seward “unless we are satisfied that we can do better for our State, by the arrangement we spoke of when I last saw you.” That arrangement is unclear, but evidently Cameron was willing to abandon Seward if he could obtain a better deal for Pennsylvania and himself.84 Seward’s confidential friends were, according to Casey, “overbearing and refused to talk of any thing but his unconditional nomination.”85 Their cocky inflexibility may have cost Seward the nomination.

  Norman B. Judd told his son about a deal that gave Cameron an unspecified cabinet post in exchange for Pennsylvania’s votes. Alexander K. McClure of Pennsylvania, chairman of the Republican State Committee, testified that two cabinet posts, “one for Pennsylvania and one for Indiana, were positively promised by David Davis at an early period of the contest.”86 McClure added that the bargain with Pennsylvania was, in fact, unnecessary. Sanderson approached Swett and Davis with an offer to switch to Lincoln on the second ballot only after the delegation had already made Lincoln their third choice, thus guaranteeing that the Illinoisan would receive their support once Cameron had his complimentary vote. The deal specified that the Chief would have a cabinet post if a majority of the Pennsylvania congressional delegation backed him for it. McClure reported that Lincoln was unaware of the bargain until early 1861. Upon learning of it, Lincoln allegedly declared: “They have gambled me all around, bought and sold me a hundred times. I cannot begin to fill all the pledges made in my name.”87

  Contemporary evidence supports those various recollections. On May 21, the Philadelphia Press reported a rumor that Cameron had been promised the Treasury Department portfolio. A week after the convention, Swett informed Lincoln about assurances he had given to delegates at Chicago. He explained that on May 16, in an attempt to woo the Pennsylvanians, he had approached an intimate friend, John W. Shaffer of Freeport, Illinois, who supported Cameron and enjoyed the confidence of some Keystone State delegates. Reluctantly, Shaffer confided that Cameron’s supporters would not back Lincoln as their second choice for fear that he might deny them a fair share of patronage; they suspected that Lincoln’s allies would vindictively persuade him to shut them out because they had not supported the Rail-splitter early on. Encouraging them in this belief were eight Illinois delegates who, though pledged to Lincoln, actually preferred Seward. Those Illinoisans had been in discussions with both the Pennsylvania and New York delegations. After consulting with Davis, Swett tried to appease those eight men. As he told Lincoln, “I gave them the most solemn assurances I am capable of giving, that they should not only not be proscribed but that by-gones should be by-gones & they should be placed upon the same footing as if originally they had been your friends[.] After a general talk of all past grievances, which I answered as well as I could they agreed to go to the two delegations [Pennsylvania and New York] & try to get you as their second choice[.] From that time I have the fullest confidence they did labor honestly and effectively & I shall always believe it was through S
haffer we got the real friends of Cameron on that delegation.”

  Swett apologized for burdening Lincoln with this tale of wheeling and dealing: “Now of course it is unpleasant for me to write all this stuff & for you to read it[.] Of course I have never feared you would intentionally do anything unfair towards these men[.] I only mean to suggest the very delicate situation I am placed towards them so that you might cultivate them as much as possible[.] My position towards them is that I agreed to hold myself personally responsible to them for general fairness, and agreed forever to forfeit their confidence if it were not done.” After the November election, Swett informed Lincoln of other negotiations he had conducted at the convention: “The truth is, at Chicago we thought the Cameron influence was the controlling element & tried to procure that rather than the factions[.] The negotiations we had with them, so far as I can judge was one of the reasons, which induced the Cameron leaders to throw the bulk of that force to you.”88

  Letters by Joseph Casey shed light on what Swett and Davis may have pledged. Less than a week after the convention, Casey told Cameron that a virtually united Pennsylvania delegation was able “to control & make the nomination. It was only done after every thing was arranged carefully & unconditionally in reference to yourself to our satisfaction.… Mr. Lincoln’s confidential friend Hon. Leonard Swett, will be here [in Harrisburg] in a couple of weeks, & will bring with him assurances from Mr. Lincoln himself to you—&c.”89 (In fact, Swett did not go east during the campaign.) Five months later, Casey discussed patronage with Lincoln in Springfield. Afterward, the Pennsylvanian wrote to Swett: “From some things that occurred when I was at Springfield, my mind has since been in doubt, as to whether Mr. Lincoln has been made fully acquainted with the conversations and understandings had between you & Judge Davis on the one side, & myself, on the other, at the Tremont House, the night before the nomination.” Casey said he had been compelled to reveal their agreement to Cameron’s friends “to counteract other schemes, and overcome other inducements, proceeding from different quarters.”90 It is possible that Swett and Davis merely pledged that a Pennsylvanian would receive a cabinet post, but since that agreement had been struck with Cameron’s spokesman, clearly the Chief would be that man.

  In addition to these recollections and contemporary documents, common sense suggests that deals were made on Lincoln’s behalf. Politicians strike bargains all the time, and there is little reason to doubt the conclusion of historian Paul M. Angle: “that understandings, no less effective because they were not explicit, existed, is certain.”91

  Lincoln appointed Cameron and Smith to his cabinet; both proved inadequate.

  In addition to slowing Seward’s momentum and gaining Indiana’s twenty-six votes and most of Pennsylvania’s fifty-four (at least on the second ballot), Davis and his allies tried to bolster their strength at the very outset of the polling. They found key support in New England, the region which would lead off the roll call. Weed, Seward, and many delegates assumed that at least the northern part of that region was solidly behind the New Yorker. If Seward’s support there proved weak at the opening stage of the first ballot, and Lincoln’s stronger than anticipated, it might have a profound psychological effect.

  Gideon Welles of Connecticut, a Chase partisan, rallied New Englanders against Seward. Ably assisting Lincoln’s men in lining up New England support was Amos Tuck of New Hampshire, a militant opponent of slavery who had served in Congress with Lincoln. Weeks later, Tuck modestly told David Davis: “It was but a trifle that I did, in attempting early to carry our entire delegation for Lincoln, but that trifle is enough to give me sincere satisfaction in the belief that the nomination was the only fit and proper nomination we could have made.”92 Tuck had originally supported Chase, but as the convention approached, he switched his allegiance to Lincoln. On May 14, Tuck informed his quondam House colleague: “I am taking hold of hands with our N[ew] Eng[land] delegates, and find the prospect good for general co-operation. Be not misled by our first votes. It will be expedient not to strike at first, but to let the west make the first move. But we shall come in, ‘on time.’ ”93 Other New Hampshiremen, including George G. Fogg, William E. Chandler, and Nehemiah Ordway, had long been working on Lincoln’s behalf. Fogg boasted that “I had much more to do with the action of our delegation than any other man.”94 These pro-Lincoln New Englanders reflected public opinion back home, for, as a Granite State newspaper noted, “Mr. Lincoln’s eastern tour last spring had given him popularity in N. H., and his sterling qualities were fully recognized.”95

  Swett, born and raised in Maine, lobbied his old friends from the Pine Tree State. He received help from George W. Lawrence, Governor Lot M. Morrill, Mark F. Wentworth, and James G. Blaine. On the train to Chicago, Blaine buttonholed Morrill, who remained noncommittal until arriving at the Windy City, whereupon he quickly became an ardent Lincoln man. Hannibal Hamlin, realizing that his favorite, John M. Read, had no chance, worked behind the scenes in Maine to keep the delegation from endorsing Seward. Davis and Swett told Lincoln that the Maine delegates at first “were apparently united for Govr Seward. We thought it important to break into the New England States, as much as we could, & that it was exceedingly important for us, as Maine led off, in the vote for President, & vice President, to have as much strength as possible from Maine.” Lawrence and Governor Morrill won six votes for Lincoln on the first ballot.96 The uncommitted Maine delegates wanted to support William P. Fessenden, but he expressed no interest. They then decided to go for Lincoln as long as he seemed viable. Helping persuade the Pine State contingent to support Lincoln was Orville Browning, who addressed it on May 15. Greeley, disappointed by his failure to line up support for Bates, called Maine and Massachusetts “the two worst behaved delegations in the Convention” and bemoaned the absence of his newspaper’s top Washington reporter, James Shepherd Pike, who “ought to have been able to do something” with delegates from his native state of Maine.97

  Also on May 15, Browning spoke to the New Hampshire delegates, many of whom were former Know-Nothings or Democrats and thus unenthusiastic about Seward. David Davis sent natives of Vermont, including Samuel C. Parks and Gurdon Hubbard, to angle for that state’s ten votes, all of which were pledged to favorite son Jacob Collamer on the first ballot. Under the leadership of Gideon Welles, the Connecticut and Rhode Island forces, though not pro-Lincoln, agreed that they would cast no votes for Seward.

  Massachusetts was presumed to be safely in Seward’s camp, but the state convention refused to instruct the nineteen radical and seven moderate delegates to support him. The chairman of that convention’s credentials committee told Charles Sumner: “A majority of our delegates, I fear, though elected as Seward men, & going to Chicago nominally to support him, really mean to cut his throat.”98 William Schouler explained that “Seward was not Strong in Massachusetts. He had many strong friends, but he had no especial hold upon the people. The truth is that there is a very strong American feeling in our Republican ranks and the old Puritan faith, so hostile to popery and priest craft, permeates our whole social system, and Seward has been regarded as ‘a seeker after popularity, through the highways and byways of Popery and irishmen.’ ”99 Delegation chairman John A. Andrew sympathized with Lincoln’s cause, as did the influential editor of the Worcester Spy, Congressman John D. Baldwin. Lincoln also enjoyed the support of Charles O. Rogers, Josiah Dunham, Timothy Davis, and Timothy Winn, all of whom voted for the Illinoisan on each ballot. Boston merchant Samuel Hooper also worked behind the scenes to thwart Seward and pave the way for Lincoln. Edward Lillie Pierce, who claimed that he “favored the nomination of Lincoln and quite early too,” voted for him on the third ballot, along with thirteen others in addition to the original four backers.100 National committeeman John Z. Goodrich of Stockbridge, a major fundraiser for the party, urged his fellow Bay Staters to support Lincoln.

  David Davis’s minions also trolled for votes in Southern state delegations (most notably Virginia and Ken
tucky) and in Midwestern states like Ohio (which was badly split among Salmon P. Chase, Benjamin F. Wade, and John McLean) and Iowa (where Lincoln’s old friend Hawkins Taylor lived and was working hard for his candidacy). By the time the convention opened on May 16, Lincoln’s operatives felt confident that they had secured about 100 votes for the initial ballot, with some reserves ready to be added on the second ballot (from Pennsylvania, Vermont, New Hampshire, and Delaware).

  Victory

  Most observers believed Seward had the nomination locked up. With remarkable prescience, the Chicago Times estimated that on the first ballot, the senator would command 172 votes. (He actually received 173½.) Less accurately, it predicted that Bates would get 100, Cameron 81, Lincoln 45, McLean 24, Banks 11, Chase 10, and Wade 5. Weed and his colleagues said “that if Seward is not the man, let the opposition bring forward a better candidate,” and argued that since that opposition “cannot probably unite upon anybody else, their candidate must and should be nominated.”101 They were encouraged when the convention voted down a proposal requiring that a majority of the entire electoral college was needed to nominate a candidate. The defeated change, offered by an anti-Seward delegate from Massachusetts, would have stipulated that the winning candidate must secure 304 votes instead of 233.

  Weed and his allies boasted that Seward’s nomination was a sure thing. Thursday night, New York Congressman Elbridge G. Spaulding wired the senator: “Your friends are firm & confident that you will be nominated after a few ballots.” E. D. Morgan echoed that sentiment: “We have no doubt of a favorable result tomorrow.” The next morning other Seward lieutenants assured their man: “Everything indicates your nomination today sure.”102 Straw polls taken on trains pouring into Chicago showed overwhelming support for Seward. The night before the balloting began, champagne corks popped like firecrackers and bands played festive music at the New Yorker’s headquarters. Murat Halstead reported that “every one of the forty thousand men in attendance upon the Chicago Convention will testify that at midnight of Thursday-Friday night, the universal impression was that Seward’s success was certain.”103