Abraham Lincoln: A Life, Volume 1

by Michael Burlingame

  In fact, no artist did justice to Lincoln’s face. As Nicolay observed many years later, “Lincoln’s features were the despair of every artist who undertook his portrait.” Nicolay recalled seeing “nearly a dozen, one after another, soon after the first nomination to the presidency, attempt the task. They put into their pictures the large rugged features, and strong prominent lines; they made measurements to obtain exact proportions; they ‘petrified’ some single look, but the picture remained hard and cold. Even before these paintings were finished it was plain to see that they were unsatisfactory to the artists themselves, and much more so to the intimate friends of the man; this was not he who smiled, spoke, laughed, charmed. The picture was to the man as the grain of sand to the mountain, as the dead to the living. Graphic art was powerless before a face that moved through a thousand delicate gradations of line and contour, light and shade, sparkle of the eye and curve of the lip, in the long gamut of expression from grave to gay, and back again from the rollicking jollity of laughter to that serious, far-away look that with prophetic intuitions beheld the awful panorama of war, and heard the cry of oppression and suffering. There are many pictures of Lincoln; there is no portrait of him.”253

  One of those pictures was taken by the Springfield photographer Christopher S. German in January 1861, just as Lincoln’s new beard began to fill out. The candidate told a visitor that it “was in his judgment, and that of his friends, the best ever had.”254

  Artists enjoyed working with Lincoln. Thomas D. Jones, a sculptor for whom he sat in the winter after his election, wrote a friend that he was “astounded at the man’s simplicity & modesty” and that he had spent “some very happy hours” with him. Jones described him as “a perfect child of nature—so fond of fun,” one who “tells the best stories in the world, and more of them than any man I have ever met.”255 To his patron, J. Henry Brown reported that Lincoln “must be seen and known to be properly appreciated. Ten minutes after I was in his presence I felt as if I had known him for years,” for “he has an easy frankness and charm of manner which made me comfortable and happy while in his presence.”256

  Wooing the Fillmore Supporters and the Protectionists

  The election hinged on the Whig/American voters of 1856, especially in Indiana and Pennsylvania, where gubernatorial contests were to be held in October, and also in New York. Such voters might easily follow the lead of their 1856 candidate, Millard Fillmore, who supported John Bell. To prevent that from happening was Lincoln’s greatest electoral challenge. To do so, he realized that he must win over men like “the great high priest of Know-nothingism,” James O. Putnam, the postmaster at Fillmore’s hometown of Buffalo and a close friend of the former president.257 Putnam, said Lincoln, resembled Weed: “these men ask for just the same thing—fairness, and fairness only.”258 Putnam came to admire Lincoln vastly, calling him “one of the most remarkable speakers of English, living.” For “logical eloquence, straight-forwardness, clearness of statement, sincerity that commands your admiration and assent, and a compact stren[g]th of argument,” Lincoln was “infinitely superior to Douglas,” he thought.259 As for Bell, Putnam acknowledged that the Tennesseean “has the respect and confidence of every man of American antecedents, but of what earthly service can 20,000 or 30,000 votes be to him in New York?” Putnam deserted the Bell forces because “he saw no chance for them to carry the Northern States, and his only hope in defeating the Democratic party, and thereby promoting the interests of the country, was in a union with the Republicans upon the Chicago platform and nominees.”260 (As president, Lincoln was to name Putnam consul at Le Havre.)

  In Putnam’s hometown of Buffalo, the leading American Party newspaper detected in Lincoln qualities that the corrupt Republican legislature at Albany lacked: “Mr. Lincoln’s nomination … guarantees executive honesty. It assures us that no bargains have been made, no greedy disposition of the spoils already accomplished. His principles are our principles. We only differ from Republicans in the relative importance attached to the Slavery issue and in having perhaps a larger faith in the final triumph of the right. Thus holding, thus satisfied of the honesty of the party with which we act, we are unreserved in our support of Lincoln and Hamlin.”261 Such admiration of Lincoln’s honesty was characteristic of American Party members, who tended to blame corruption on immigrants. It proved to be a key factor in making Lincoln’s election possible. Commenting on this endorsement, Washington Hunt, a leading conservative, said that the editor’s view of Lincoln, “unsound and fallacious as it is, operates upon many persons who are disposed to follow the current and take refuge in what they consider a strong and prosperous party.”262 Other American Party members shared the belief that voting for Bell would be futile, while electing Lincoln would rebuke the hated Democrats and stem the tide of corruption.

  Another American Party leader to be cultivated was David Davis’s cousin, Henry Winter Davis of Maryland, who was so influential that the committee of twelve at the Chicago Convention had asked him to run for vice-president. He declined lest his candidacy ruin the ticket in the Northwest. Like many other Know-Nothings, he objected to the Republican platform’s “Dutch plank” regarding immigration policy. Since the term Republican was poison in Maryland, Davis said he would support Bell there but hinted that he might be willing to stump for Lincoln in Pennsylvania and New Jersey. He thought “the Chicago nomination a wise one.”263

  Lincoln urged Richard W. Thompson, his friend from their days together in Congress and a leader of the Constitutional Union Party in Indiana, to “converse freely” with Davis.264 Thompson did so. He also told Lincoln that while he might not vote Republican, he would work to block a Bell ticket in Indiana. (In 1856, Thompson had badly damaged the Republicans’ chances in the Hoosier state by thwarting their attempts to fuse with the Americans; in return, he received a rich reward from the Democrats.) Thompson, whose influence with Midwestern Know-Nothings was considerable, assured them that the Rail-splitter could not “be led into ultraism by radical men” and that his administration “will be national.” In choosing the Illinoisan over Seward, the delegates at Chicago “demonstrated to the country that the great body of the Republicans are conservative.” Lincoln’s “strength consists in his conservatism. His own principles are conservative.” Thompson asked Lincoln if he could cite his 1849 vote against the Gott resolution (to end the slave trade in the District of Columbia) in order to allay the fears of conservatives. The candidate, fearful of alienating antislavery Radicals, replied: “If my record would hurt any, there is no hope that it will be over-looked; so that if friends can help any with it, they may as well do so. Of course, due caution and circumspection, will be used.”265 (A week later, Horace Greeley pointed to Lincoln’s vote on the Gott resolution as proof of his conservatism.)

  In July, when Thompson expressed a wish to meet with Lincoln, the candidate hesitated. Because Democratic papers had been accusing Lincoln of nativist proclivities (even charging falsely that he had attended a Know-Nothing lodge), he wished to do nothing that might lend credence to such allegations. So rather than invite Thompson to Springfield, he dispatched Nicolay to Indiana with instructions to ask what his old friend wanted to discuss and assure him that his motto was “Fairness to all,” but to make no commitments. In mid-July Nicolay carried out this mission, finding that Thompson “sought only to be assured of the general ‘fairness’ to all elements giving Mr Lincoln their support, and that he did not even hint at any exaction or promise as being necessary to secure the ‘Know Nothing’ vote for the Republican ticket.”266

  Anxious about the influence of Know-Nothings in northern Illinois, Lincoln asked Thompson to write to John Wilson, an American Party leader in Chicago who had been a delegate to the Constitutional Union Party’s convention. Thompson complied, and Wilson abandoned the Bell movement after its Illinois leaders tried to merge with the Douglasites. David Davis urged Lincoln to cultivate Wilson, which he did, making sure that the Chicagoan was invited to speak at a ma
jor Republican rally in Springfield.

  More worrisome than Chicago nativists were those in Pennsylvania, which everyone agreed was a vitally important state. If the Democrats carried all the Slave States plus either California or Oregon, they could, with the addition of Pennsylvania, win the election. “We expect to have hard work in Pennsylvania, & in the Eastern part especially, where Mr. Bell has many friends, & the American element is Considerable in numbers,” the influential journalist James E. Harvey told Lincoln immediately after the Chicago Convention.267 Charles Leib advised Lincoln that the Dutch plank was “the only thing that causes the radical Americans in Penna. to even halt for an instant, and I trust and pray, that every time friends of yours will extend the ‘Olive branch’ to that party.”268 Schuyler Colfax also reported that there was “a little discontent in Eastern Pa. about the German plank.”269 From Washington, Elihu B. Washburne wrote that the “idea now prevails here that Pennsylvania is the battle ground, and that the locofocos will Stake all on that State. The American element of the State we must have, and it is wise to consider fully its importance.”270

  Lyman Trumbull sounded the alarm, too, complaining that the Dutch plank made John Bell more attractive to the Fillmore voters of 1856. The senator told Lincoln: “I wish our German friends could have been satisfied without such a resolution. Surely they were in no danger of an abridgement of their rights from any actions of the Republicans; but the thing is done, & we must now make the best of it.”271 Horace Greeley scolded Germans for their attempts at “dictation” and declared that any man “who votes in our election as an Irishman or German has no moral right to vote at all.”272

  In the end, Republican worries about Fillmore voters flocking to Bell proved unfounded. In June, an Indianan reported that many people “like Bell and Everett, but they say, as there is no chance for them, they will support Lincoln and Hamlin.”273 From the capital of New Jersey, a resident observed that Bell was “like a ‘tinkling cymball,’ an empty sound wherever it goes.”274 This reluctance to throw away their vote affected large numbers of Bell supporters above the Mason-Dixon line.

  South of that line, Lincoln had little hope of winning electoral votes, partly because of John J. Crittenden’s public warning that, although the Republican nominee was “an honest, worthy and patriotic man,” nevertheless as “the Republicans’ President” he “would be at least a terror to the South.”275 A former congressman (and future senator) from the Blue Grass State, Garrett Davis, called Lincoln “an honest man of fair ability” but found him unacceptable because “for some years past he has been possessed of but one idea—hostility to slavery.”276

  Lincoln had to win over protectionists as well as Know-Nothings in the Keystone State, whose Republican politicians said “you may cry nigger, nigger, as much as you please, only give us a chance to carry Pennsylvania by crying tariff.”277 From Chambersburg, state party chairman A. K. McClure informed Lincoln that in “the Eastern, Southern & Central counties especially, the Tariff will be the overshadowing question in this contest.… In these Tariff counties the Conservative element predominates.”278 Pennsylvanians had been hit hard by the Panic of 1857, which depressed iron and coal prices and threw thousands of men out of work. The unemployed blamed low tariff rates for their misery. Republican newspapers hammered away at the tariff issue incessantly. To counter that popular cry, Democrats appealed to racial prejudice, condemning the Republicans for their support of “niggerism and ‘the Negro.’ ”279

  At the Chicago Convention, Leonard Swett and David Davis had agreed to stump Pennsylvania and testify to Lincoln’s soundness as a protectionist. John P. Sanderson urged that they pay special attention to the Keystone State, for Republicans there were in real danger. Similar appeals came from Joseph Casey and Joseph J. Lewis. Davis and Swett replied that they would rather remain in Illinois, but said they would go east if they must. McClure advised against the proposed visit, telling Lincoln the two Illinoisans “would be presumed to represent you, and with even the greatest care, might put us on the defensive in some respect.”280 McClure probably feared that Davis and Swett would be induced to side with the Cameron faction against the Curtin faction, which McClure supported. Lincoln grew alarmed about Pennsylvania when Joseph Casey warned that the Republican state committee, led by McClure, inspired little confidence. This led Lincoln to fear that Casey and other malcontents might “rebel, and make a dangerous explosion.”281 (They did, in fact, establish a separate state committee and packed it with Cameron supporters.)

  Another problem in Pennsylvania was the lackluster campaigning of gubernatorial candidate Andrew G. Curtin. “We have been somewhat disappointed in Curtin as an efficient stumper and he really excites but little interest,” reported Joseph J. Lewis from West Chester. But, Lewis noted, “there is a feeling that his success is of importance to Lincoln and that consideration helps Curtin greatly.”282

  Adding to Lincoln’s alarm were reports that McClure had misused campaign funds. Joseph Medill recommended that some trustworthy Republican investigate the allegation. Lincoln concurred and reluctantly sent David Davis eastward with a letter introducing him as “my very good personal and political friend.” Davis also carried “scraps” Lincoln had written in 1847 about the tariff.283 (Pennsylvanians wanted to see the text of speeches Lincoln had delivered on protection during the 1840s, but because newspapers at that time did not carry full accounts of political addresses he had no texts of them.) When Davis showed the scraps to Cameron, the Pennsylvania boss called them “abundantly satisfactory.”284 Quite pleased with Davis’s visit, Cameron agreed “to work earnestly.”285 To Cameron, Sanderson wrote that Davis “had seen enough to know that you were the power in the State, & that if McClure & his party would let you & your friends carry it, it would be done.”286 After consulting with several other leaders, including McClure, Davis confidently predicted to Lincoln, “You will be elected Presdt.”287 While in the East, the judge also visited New Jersey and met with Weed in New York.

  Despite Davis’s visit, internal strife continued to rage in the Keystone State. At the end of August, when John M. Pomeroy of Pennsylvania informed Lincoln about the feud between the Cameron and Curtin factions, the candidate replied: “I am slow to listen to criminations among friends, and never expouse their quarrels on either side. My sincere wish is that both sides will allow by-gones to be by-gones, and look to the present & future only.”288

  Despite the factionalism in Pennsylvania, Lincoln was not discouraged about his prospects. With the Democrats split and the Constitutional Union Party weakening them further in the Border States, his election began to look more and more likely as autumn approached. One Republican predicted that Douglas would carry no states at all. As Charles Henry Ray told Lincoln, “it will do you no harm to begin to consider what shall be the quality and cut of your inaugural suit. It does not seem to me that you have anything else to do in the campaign.”289 Lincoln agreed. To his old friend Simeon Francis he wrote in August: “I hesitate to say it, but it really appears now, as if the success of the Republican ticket is inevitable. We have no reason to doubt any of the states which voted for Fremont. Add to these, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and New-Jersey, and the thing is done. Minnesota is as sure as such a thing can be; while the democracy are so divided between Douglas and Breckenridge in Penn. & N.J. that they are scarcely less sure.”290

  Optimistic though Lincoln was, he shared Henry Wilson’s belief that unglamorous organizational work deserved more attention than it was receiving. He told the Massachusetts senator that the “point you press—the importance of thorough organization—is felt, and appreciated by our friends everywhere. And yet it involves so much more of dry, and irksome labor, that most of them shrink from it—preferring parades, and shows, and monster meetings. I know not how this can be helped. I do what I can in my position, for organization; but it does not amount to so much as it should.”291 Part of that work may have included lending covert support to the Breckinridge forces. The Illinoi
s State Register claimed that the Danites’ successful effort to weaken Douglas by fielding a Breckinridge ticket in the Prairie State “was got up under the immediate personal supervision of Mr. Lincoln and his state committee.”292

  Trumping the Race Card

  Lincoln was publicly silent, working behind the scenes to combat Democratic criticism, especially the frequent charge that he and other Republicans favored social and political equality for blacks. Democrats believed that if they “would ignore the absurd quarrel raised upon the territorial question and resolve to fight the ensuing campaign upon new ground such as broadly, white man vs Negro,” they “could not fail to win.”293 So they energetically played upon racial fears. Commenting on Lincoln’s July 10, 1858 speech, the Chicago Herald observed: “This declaration of Mr. Lincoln unequivocally places the white man and negro on the same level.… This is the ‘ultima thule’ of national self-degradation. The naked, greasy, bandy-shanked, blubber-lipped, monkey-headed, muskrat-scented cannibals from Congo and Guinea can come here in hoards, and settle down upon terms of equality with the descendants of Alfred the Great, the Van Tromps, the Russells, the Washingtons, the Lafayettes, the Emmitts! Mr. Lincoln will have no quibbling about this matter. They are not only not born inferior; but he will have them assigned no inferior position. A race, which for five thousand years has fallen so low as to have almost lost the image of manhood, who eat human flesh and indulge in every horror of vice and infamy, and whose very persons offend every sense of civilized man, are to rank at once with the races which, from their virtue and inherent strength, have, after a conflict of a thousand years, won the brilliant civilization of the nineteenth century!”294