Ghosts and Shadows

by Phil Ball

  I explained to him that I was writing a book and I hoped to dedicate it to Don. I also wrote and told him how I found the body after the battle, and that he’d been shot in the back of the head. Perhaps that was all he needed to hear. We have not kept in touch since then.

  In researching this book, I was fortunate to speak to many Vietnam vets, many of whom still suffer from PTSD. Knowing that I am not alone in my painful recollections, that the war still affects many different people in many different ways, is disturbing, but at the same time helpful. No matter how bad your own problems might seem, someone always has it worse.

  In spite of it all, I am proud to be a former Marine and combat Vietnam vet. I often wonder what my life would have been like if I hadn’t fought in the war, and whether I would have been better off had I not gone over. Although I did not have to pay the “ultimate price,” I feel the price I did pay was too high considering the outcome. Had we been allowed to finish the job and win the war with a decisive military victory, I might feel differently about it.

  I don’t know that I learned a great deal or that I am a stronger person for my experience in Vietnam, yet I have no regrets anymore. There was a time in the not-so-distant past when I could not have made that claim, an era when I actually tried to hide the fact that I had participated in the war at all. The ghosts and demons that still follow me today are not quite as terrifying as they were when I was younger. They have grown older and wiser along with me, I guess, so today our relationships are more tolerant and respectful.

  I once read about NVA soldiers who were being asked why they do not suffer the same PTSD as American troops who fought in Vietnam. The answers were unanimous and very simple. “Because we won the war,” they said with a smile. I believe that just about says it all. Even though they lost so many more troops than we did and their victory was political instead of military, they reached their goal in the end to force us out of Vietnam so they could take over the south. For them it was a “David beats Goliath” story, and they certainly had the right to feel proud of what they had accomplished. Meanwhile, we came home in disgrace; the foot soldier became the scapegoat. For the United States to ever lose a war was unimaginable. It had never happened before, and the citizenry was not shy about letting us hear about it. It didn’t help our situation to have the government lying to the people about nearly every aspect of the war. Before long you would think that we lowly grunts had been running roughshod over the countryside for the whole war, with no leadership or organization, stoned out of our minds, killing innocent women and children. The Vietnam vet’s image was not a good one. The older generation didn’t want us, nor did the large majority of young people, especially college students. We were very unpopular in nearly all social circles for a very long time. These days, especially since Desert Storm, things have improved somewhat. There are even some wannabes, Vietnam-era vets who did not go to Nam but like to let on they did. Vietnam vets who were assigned to support roles with jobs in the rear areas now claim to have PTSD from combat experiences that never took place.

  I had an extremely difficult time finding my place in society after Nam. Even today I am considered to exhibit some antisocial behavior. Before I went into the service, I was outgoing and had a powerful, positive outlook on life. I had a lot of friends and I enjoyed being with people. After Nam, all that changed. I was the complete opposite.

  The best thing I personally have been able to do to rid myself of the pain caused in Vietnam was to write everything down on paper like I have. I could never have achieved such a task without first getting clean and sober, and there is no doubt in my mind that that struggle was as significant as anything else. Putting it all down on paper with a clear mind allowed me to look at things from a new perspective. My experience became a third-party incident, at least to a certain extent, where I could remove myself emotionally and view it all from an intellectual point of view. Writing removed the emotional shrapnel from my body and allowed me to hold it in my hand.

  Today I’m still clean and sober, and still with Kathy. If it hadn’t been for her, I doubt that I’d be here now. I’d probably be in jail, or in the cemetery.

  Appendix A: Marine Corps Field Interview on the Events at Foxtrot Ridge

  What follows is a United States Marine Corps document (Ref. # MCO 5750.3A), a transcribed interview with 1st Lieutenant James L. Jones, the commander at Foxtrot, and Senior Corpsman Emanuel D. Layos. The interviewer was PFC Robert A. Armbruster, and the interview took place at Landing Zone Hawk, Quang Tri Province, RVN, May 28–29, 1968. Lt. Jones and Corpsman Layos describe the events of May 27–28 on Foxtrot Ridge.

  James Jones is now a three-star general in the United States Marine Corps, assigned to the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

  Tape #2745

  May 27–28, ’68 Attack on F/2/3 by NVA units

  Interview: LZ Hawk, May 28–29, 1968

  [Place—“Fort Dix”!]

  1/Lt. James L. Jones, Jr.

  I had command of Foxtrot, 2/3. I picked up this company on the 25th of May, and we were assigned to secure a piece of high ground and hold it as part of our battalion mission (?) we had security for a certain sector of Route #9 running into Khe Sanh.

  My supporting elements included air and artillery. We had, of course, 81s on call, supporting 60MMs, things of that nature. The closest friendlies were 1500 to 2000 meters to our north.

  We moved into our position the 25th of May, and we spent most of the time preparing our position. Most of the time was spent securing the top of the hill and making it defensible. I feel it is a very good position. It had vertical slopes on all sides with one prominent piece of terrain on the easternmost boundary. We called this the Crow’s Nest; it overlooked our position, and we could see Laos to the south, where the enemy had been infiltrating. So consequently this was also a very good OP. We had quite a number of successful artillery missions fired on the advancing NVA.

  As I said, we moved into this position the 25th and it was very uneventful—the 26th. We weren’t probed; there was no enemy contact whatsoever—direct enemy contact—until the night of the 27th.

  On the night of the 27th, things were proceeding as normal until about 1 a.m. The LPs were out—the usual security, normal Marine company type, were put into effect. We had claymores; we had night defensives with 81s, 105s. 60s were registered.

  And approximately 1 a.m., we were probed on our eastern flank. Due to the very good position I thought we had I wasn’t too preoccupied by it at the time. We dispersed the enemy which was first sighted through a Starlight scope on one of the LPs, with 60MM fire.

  However, this turned out to be a diversionary attack on our position. And within 20 minutes after this diversionary movement, the complete southern perimeter of my defensive position reported heavy movement coming straight up the hill. And then the incoming volley of RPGs, a really unusual amount of RPG fire at us. They hit my position and the Crow’s Nest, which was the OP, simultaneously, although I feel that this was two different attacks since the Crow’s Nest constituted a separate position.

  It covered the length of our position. We had a reinforced squad on the Crow’s Nest. The attack was triggered by green pencil flares by the enemy leaders. As I say, it covered the whole frontage of our perimeter. Due to the intensity of the attack on the western portion of our perimeter, by about 3 a.m. the NVA had succeeded in overrunning one of our positions, primarily with the RPGs and hand grenades. There was very little small arms fire delivered upon us by the enemy. They felt, I believe, that they could knock us out with a volume of RPGs and grenades.

  So as I said they penetrated our position on the western tip, overrun in effect, part of my First Platoon. The First Platoon Commander was three positions down from where the NVA broke through and he immediately gave the order to pull back towards the western tip of our perimeter and set up—just tie in again. And I just swung my flanks around and tied in and in effect cut ourselves off from the NVA which were occupying part of our
position.

  It was reported by witnesses that witnessed the enemy advance that approximately 60 of them poured up on top of the hill, in effect, securing it. We had no choice, I thought, but to call in artillery on our position. My arty FO did an outstanding job, I feel, of doing this. It was within 50 meters of us, but it was accurate direct fire and again witnesses testify that this immediately caused approximately 20 enemy KIAs and forced the majority of them that were again pouring on top of the hill back down the slopes. 81s supported artillery. We had a flareship on station; we had constant illumination. And I instructed my remaining units to fire only at targets of opportunity due to the ammo shortage that was beginning to make itself apparent.

  I remember my gunnery sergeant telling me that he had a pencil flare and I happened to have some flares in my pocket. And just to see what would happen, we fired two or three green flares up in the air. And surprisingly enough, this—the enemy interpreted as being a signal from them, and they withdrew temporarily. The amount of enemy activity decreased significantly and we kept on doing this as much as possible. However, eventually I think they figured it out.

  Having a certain amount of enemy on our position still—they took over our fighting positions—we just kept artillery coming in.

  And the Crow’s Nest up there was being hit, as I said, by a separate attack. And they were in a virtually, I think, impregnable position. They were surrounded, and they were cut off from us but they had a M-60 machinegun. They had a (LAW’s). They had an arty FO scout team. And they had a M79 and they had plenty of ammunition and they just held them off. They said they were in absolutely no danger and they did a magnificent job considering the fact that they were surrounded.

  We set up our own perimeter, as I say. We had concealment. We made sure we didn’t have a barren hill and had pretty well camouflaged positions. We did hear the NVA talking excitedly on the end of our positions. Witnesses, again, that saw the NVA come up will testify to the fact that these people were acting as though they were under the influence of some medicine or narcotic or something like this. They were babbling incoherently, yelling, laughing, screaming, smoking, anything that you might imagine. It was not at all like the tactics we might imagine. They were very young. And once they got on top they didn’t seem to really know what to do. Their movement—it was evident they didn’t know where we were. They were firing RPGs at random. I was very amazed at the lack of small arms fire that we did not receive.

  We didn’t return fire too much except with M79s and hand grenades. We wanted to save on our ammunition, and some (?) we had on station. And from that time on we just called artillery on my position.

  ECHO Company, 2/3, was coming to relieve us, and they had tank support from the road that could see the Gooks running around on top of the hill and were able to fire direct fire on them and able to force them back into our position.

  For some reason they refused to leave the hill and the Air Observer informed me that there were as much as twenty of them at one time.

  One significant thing I feel is that this attack was so well organized that they had stretcher-bearers to cart off their dead, which they did. And we’ll probably never know exactly how many bodies there were. I’m sure they got quite a few out. They started quite early doing this. As a matter of fact, they made it a point to get their dead out. This was something, they’d come back in under fire, under intense fire, and put people on stretchers and take them out.

  Echo Company was, as I said, progressing towards our position. They called in napalm on our western tip. The napalm had a, I think, more of a psychological effect on them than anything else, as they started abandoning the position soon after. Still there were the hard-core few that refused to leave and the HU-1E gunships that were on station, plus Echo Company which reinforced us, we easily secured the hill again without any real problems.

  Our casualties: there were 13 KIAs and approximately 25 WIAs, four or five of which were emergency medevacs; the rest were shrapnel wounds—very few gunshot wounds. I was just informed this morning that the total body count is in excess of 200 NVA. I’m awed by the figure. I think the supporting arms did an outstanding job. The Air Observers proved their worth many, many times, as did the Artillery FOs, so well trained, know their job so well and know how close they can bring it in without bringing it actually physically on top of friendly positions.

  As far as enemy equipment and weapons is concerned, I might remark that this was the most well-trained, well-equipped NVA fighting force that I have ever seen over here. They had virtually all new 782 gear, brand new weapons. The variety of weapons ranging from anti-aircraft, .30 caliber, to AK-50s of which we captured something like ten just lying around the hill. Of course the AK-47 the usual rocket launcher, the RPG. They were using small TNT blocks to throw at us. They had ChiCom grenades. They had some M-26 grenades and we even captured a M-16 rifle.

  The 782 gear really impressed me because it was new. We captured alot of it. And there’s no question about it, these people were new troops, I feel. They may have been operating in the area for awhile and received their complete refurbishment, but their equipment was brand new. They were young. I’d say 21 at the oldest. We did kill one captain and one lieutenant. They were identified by their rank.

  Recommendations that I would make concerning this is: I would stress again the use of night defensive fires and I recommend that FOs not take it too lightly. These night defensive fires should be in such a position that they can be adjusted immediately and they are registered in avenues of approach to your position. I would take heed of the fact that the NVA in this area seem to be using pencil flares, of red and green colors to halt or launch an attack. This has been used against our battalion several times. Those are the main two things—night defensive fires and the way the enemy launches an attack.

  I’d also stress the importance of LPs. In this regard the starlight scope—its worth has been proven to me time and time again. We not too long ago spotted three NVA moving 300 meters out and called in artillery on them, and this was at eleven o’clock at night. Called in artillery and the next morning the AOs were over and there were 8 KIAs still laying in the open. But again this is just to stress the importance of the starlight scope; its value to a rifle platoon is (?) effective … (speaks more on starlight scope).

  The size of the unit that hit us—I couldn’t guess. There were hundreds of them. The body count was over 200, so…

  The company strength: we were under strength to start out with; I think we had something like 120 total and we have now, our company strength is something like, I believe, 75 or 80. Most of the WIAs, I feel, will be returning to us, which was good news to me.

  I might mention in passing as far as recommendations are concerned, the use of claymore mines. I feel that proper instruction in the use of claymore mines is vital to a Marine company’s position…

  I might throw in also that one should never be too sure of one’s position over in Vietnam, especially in regard to the NVA. While I thought we had a secure position and I felt a ground attack would not be profitable to the NVA—indeed, I don’t think it was, it did happen it will happen again because this is the type of war that they fight. They hit you when you don’t think you’re going to be hit.

  The enemy movement was masterful: to move that many men within our position reflects on their leadership and their military training.

  My LPs were all wide awake and we were—the line was at 50 percent and we still didn’t spot them until they were almost on top of us. And they slip up and make mistakes like we do; there was alot of mistakes and we catch them. But they do get up there and they will mix it up.

  They will hit you, as I say, at any time. And every unit leader should be aware of this. I’m sure that most of them are.

  The other thing that I would mention is use of napalm. The enemy position from ours was at the maximum a hundred meters where I wanted to clear them off. And I conversed with the AO that was flying above and I told h
im that I wasn’t exactly sure whether napalm could be delivered effectively by a jet aircraft at such a close range from friendlies. The AO felt that it could be done and left the decision to me and I chose to try it.

  The first aircraft dropped two napalm canisters right on target. It was beautiful. It was right on them. No problem to the friendlies whatsoever. However the second one was not so successful; one of the canisters hung up a little and carried past my position and hit the reverse end of my position, causing a fire. Didn’t hit any of the troops but it did cause a fire and it did us a great deal of trouble, trying to put it out and still secure our position. So my recommendation in this matter would be to carefully speak to the AO, aerial observer, and again it’s just going to have to be a personal decision. The napalm, I feel, at close range, can be a dangerous thing. You have to find out from the aircraft which headings they’re going to be running on, and then make your own decision. It’s up to you. The AO cannot tell you he’s going to use it; you have to make up your own mind. I made the decision this time and I feel I was lucky. I secured the napalm as soon as the one canister was off of target and reverted back to the use of Huey gunships.

  I also recommend that all Marine rifle companies carry a large amount of smoke of various colors. This is instrumental in marking their positions for the AO or for anybody. It’s just nice to be able to say: OK, I’m going to mark my position and throw some smoke out there, and they got you, no problem. If you’re short on smoke there’s just really very little way that you can be able to show anybody where you are.