Double Cross
Page 1
Double Cross
Ben Macintyre
Crown Publishing Group (2012)
* * *
In his celebrated bestsellers Agent Zigzag and Operation Mincemeat, Ben Macintyre told the dazzling true stories of a remarkable WWII double agent and of how the Allies employed a corpse to fool the Nazis and assure a decisive victory. In Double Cross, Macintyre returns with the untold story of the grand final deception of the war and of the extraordinary spies who achieved it.
On June 6, 1944, 150,000 Allied troops landed on the beaches of Normandy at the astonishingly low cost of just 5,000 casualties. D-Day was a stunning military accomplishment, but it was also a masterpiece of trickery. Operation Fortitude, which protected and enabled the invasion, and the Double Cross system, which specialized in turning German spies into double agents, deceived the Nazis into believing that the Allies would attack at Calais and Norway rather than Normandy. It was the most sophisticated and successful deception operation ever carried out, ensuring...
ALSO BY BEN MACINTYRE
Forgotten Fatherland
The Napoleon of Crime
A Foreign Field
Josiah the Great
Agent Zigzag
For Your Eyes Only
The Last Word
Operation Mincemeat
Copyright © 2012 by Ben Macintyre
All rights reserved.
Published in the United States by Crown Publishers,
an imprint of the Crown Publishing Group,
a division of Random House, Inc., New York.
www.crownpublishing.com
CROWN and the Crown colophon are registered trademarks of Random House, Inc.
Originally published in Great Britain by Bloomsbury Publishing Plc., London.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Macintyre, Ben, 1963–
Double cross : the true story of the D-day spies / Ben Macintyre.—1st ed.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references.
1. World War, 1939–1945—Secret service. 2. World War, 1939–1945—Campaigns—France—Normandy. 3. World War, 1939–1945—Military intelligence. 4. World War, 1939–1945—Deception. 5. Deception (Military science)—History—20th century. 6. Espionage—Europe—History—20th century. 7. Spies—Europe—Biography. I. Title.
D810.S8M237 2012
940.54′21421—dc23 2012003089
eISBN: 978-0-307-88876-1
JACKET DESIGN BY CHRISTOPHER BRAND
MAP BY JOHN GILKES
v3.1
For Callum, Pablo, Minnie, and Wilf
Tangle within tangle, plot and counter-plot, ruse and treachery, cross and double-cross, true agent, false agent, double agent, gold and steel, the bomb, the dagger and the firing party, were interwoven in many a texture so intricate as to be incredible and yet true.
—WINSTON CHURCHILL
The enemy must not know where I intend to give battle. For if he does not know where I intend to give battle he must prepare in a great many places. And when he prepares in a great many places, those I have to fight in any one place will be few. And when he prepares everywhere he will be weak everywhere.
—SUN TZU
Contents
Cover
Other Books by This Author
Title Page
Copyright
Dedication
Epigraph
Map
The Agents and Their Handlers
Preface
1. Raw Recruits
2. A Bit of an Enigma
3. Roman and the Cat
4. Coat Trailing
5. The Club
6. Garbo Takes the Stage
7. Popov Goes Shopping
8. The Great Game
Photo Insert 1
9. The Flock
10. True Agent, False Agent, Double Agent
11. Cockade
12. Discovered Treasure
13. The Walk-In
14. A Time for Fortitude
15. Enriching the Chicken Feed
16. Artist Paints a Picture
17. Monty’s Double
18. The Double Dash
19. Jebsen’s New Friend
20. “Am I Not Always Careful?”
Photo Insert 2
21. Operation Dora
22. Guest of the Gestapo
23. Bronx Gets Toothache
24. Garbo’s Warning
25. Second Innings
Aftermath
Acknowledgments
Notes
Select Bibliography
About the Author
The Agents and Their Handlers
DUSAN “DUSKO” POPOV
MI5 code names: Tricycle, Skoot
MI5 case officers: Billy Luke, Ian Wilson
Abwehr code name: Ivan
Abwehr case officers: Ludovico von Karsthoff, Johnny Jebsen
ROMAN CZERNIAWSKI
MI5 code names: Brutus, Armand, Walenty
MI5 case officers: Christopher Harmer, Hugh Astor
Abwehr code name: Hubert
Abwehr case officer: Oscar Reile
LILY SERGEYEV
MI5 code name: Treasure
MI5 case officer: Mary Sherer
Abwehr code names: Solange, Tramp
Abwehr case officer: Emile Kliemann
JUAN PUJOL GARCÍA
MI5 code names: Garbo, Bovril
MI5 case officer: Tomás Harris
Abwehr code name: Arabel
Abwehr case officer: Karl-Erich Kühlenthal
ELVIRA DE LA FUENTE CHAUDOIR
MI5 code names: Bronx, Cyril
MI5 case officers: Christopher Harmer, Hugh Astor
Abwehr code name: Dorette
Abwehr case officers: Helmut “Bibi” Bleil, Berndt Schluetter
Preface
In the summer of 1943, a genteel and soft-spoken intelligence officer wearing tartan trousers and smoking a pipe put the finishing touches to a secret weapon he had been working on for more than three years. This weapon—unique in its power and unlimited in its range—was quite different from any built before or since. It was so shrouded in secrecy that its inventors were, for some time, unaware that they possessed it and unsure how to use it. This weapon did not kill or maim. It did not rely on science, engineering, or force. It did not destroy cities, sink U-boats, or pierce the armor of panzers. It did something far more subtle. Instead of killing the enemy, it could make the Nazis think what the British wanted them to think, and therefore do what the British wanted them to do.
Tar Robertson of the British Security Service (better known as MI5) had built a weapon that could lie to Hitler, and at the most critical juncture of the Second World War he urged Winston Churchill to use it.
Allied military planners were already working on plans for the great assault on Nazi-occupied Europe. The D-Day invasion, so long awaited, would decide the outcome of the war, and both sides knew it. If the Allies could sweep across the English Channel and smash through the massive German coastal defenses known as the Atlantic Wall, then the Nazis might be rolled back out of Paris, out of Brussels, and then across the Rhine all the way to Berlin. Hitler, however, was convinced that if the invaders could be successfully resisted in the early stages of an assault, even for one day, then the attack would fail; Allied morale would slump, and it would take many months before another invasion could be attempted. In that time, Hitler could concentrate on destroying the Red Army on the eastern front. The first twenty-four hours would be, in Erwin Rommel’s famous words, the “longest day”: how that day would end was far from certain.
D-Day stands today as a monumental victory and, with hindsight, historically inevitable. It did not look that way in prospect. Amphibiou
s assaults are among the most difficult operations in warfare. The Germans had constructed a “zone of death” along the coast more than five miles deep, a lethal obstacle course of barbed wire, concrete, and beaches sowed with six million mines. As Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, chief of the Imperial General Staff, observed in a gloomy diary entry just before D-Day: “It may well be the most ghastly disaster of the whole war.”
In war, no variable is more important, and less easy to control, than the element of surprise. If the Germans could be confused or, even better, actively misled as to where and when the landings would take place, then the odds of success improved dramatically. German forces in occupied France greatly outnumbered the invaders, but if they could be kept in the wrong place at the right time, then the numerical equation appeared less daunting. Conversely, if the Germans knew where the assault was coming, they would attack the invasion force at sea, as Rommel planned, and prevent the Allies from establishing a beachhead. By 1944, the war was claiming the lives of ten million people a year. If Hitler had correctly anticipated the site of the D-Day invasion, then the war might have been extended for an additional year, or two, or more, with an incalculable cost in bloodshed and misery. The stakes could not have been higher or the margin for error smaller.
At the Tehran Conference in November 1943, the first of the “big three” meetings bringing together Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin, the Allies laid plans for the invasion of Europe code-named “Operation Overlord,” which would take place in May 1944 (later delayed by a month), with General Dwight Eisenhower as supreme Allied commander and General Bernard Montgomery as Allied ground forces commander for the assault across the English Channel. During the conference, Winston Churchill turned to Joseph Stalin and uttered a typically Churchillian remark that has since become a sort of myth: “In wartime, truth is so precious that she should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies.” Stalin, who had little time for literary metaphor, replied: “This is what we call military cunning.” The D-Day invasion would be protected and supported by a comprehensive, worldwide deception campaign, a body of lies to shield the truth: in a tip of the hat to Churchill’s remark, it was code-named “Bodyguard.”
The central aim of Operation Bodyguard was to fool the Germans into believing the invasion was coming at a point where it was not, and that it was not coming in the place where it was. More than that, to ensure that those troops preparing to fight off the bogus invasion were not redeployed to repel the real one, the deception must be maintained after D-Day. Goliath could be cut down to size only if he didn’t know which direction David’s slingshot was coming from and was kept guessing. The target range for a cross-Channel invasion, however, was extremely narrow. The Germans were sure to spot the buildup of troops in Britain, and since the assault had to take place within fighter range, there were only a handful of suitable spots for a massed landing. In the words of one planner, it was “utterly impossible to disguise the fact that the major attack would come somewhere between the Cherbourg Peninsula and Dunkirk.”
The most obvious target was the Pas de Calais in the northeast, the region nearest the British coast. Deepwater ports at Calais and Boulogne could easily be resupplied and reinforced once they were in Allied hands, and a bridgehead in Calais would offer the most direct route for a march on Paris and the German industrial heartland in the Ruhr. The logic of attacking Calais was not lost on German tacticians. Hitler himself identified Calais as the likeliest target: “It is here that the enemy must and will attack, and it is here—unless all the indications are misleading—that the decisive battle against the landing forces will be fought.” Hitler was fully alert to the possibility of being misled: he had been wrong-footed over the invasions of North Africa and Sicily. He would be far harder to dupe this time.
By July 1943, Allied military planners had concluded that, “in spite of the obvious advantages of the Pas de Calais provided by its proximity to our coasts,” the coast of Normandy north of Caen represented a better target. The Normandy beaches were long, wide, and gently sloping, with suitable gaps in the dunes through which an invading force could spread quickly inland. The lack of a deep-water anchorage would be ingeniously solved by constructing vast artificial ports, code-named “Mulberry harbours.”
The successful deception surrounding the Sicilian landings in 1943 had persuaded the Germans that the most likely target was not the real target. Now the aim was reversed: Hitler must be made to think that the most plausible target really was the target. If generals always fight the last battle, then this one might be won. Along the mighty 1,600-mile Atlantic wall, the brickwork was thinnest in Normandy. That was where the wrecking ball would hit. But in order to strike with maximum effect, the truth would need to be protected by a bodyguard of liars, which is precisely what Tar Robertson had created.
Robertson and the small team of intelligence officers under his command specialized in turning German spies into double agents. This was the “Double Cross” system, coordinated by the intensely secret Twenty Committee, so named because the number twenty in Roman numerals, XX, forms a double cross. Hitherto these double agents—several dozen in number—had been used defensively: to catch more spies, obtain information about German military intelligence, and lull the enemy into believing he was running a large and efficient espionage network in Britain, when he was running nothing of the sort. In June 1943, Robertson reached the startling conclusion that every single German agent in Britain was actually under his control. Not some, not most, but all of them—which meant that Robertson’s team of double agents could now begin feeding the Germans not just snippets of falsehood but a gigantic, war-changing lie.
The D-Day deception plot involved every branch of the secret war machine: scientists laid false trails, engineers built dummy tanks, radio operators put up a barrage of fake signals, and counterfeit generals led nonexistent armies toward targets that were never in danger. While the overall, global deception campaign was code-named “Bodyguard,” the plan specifically covering the cross-Channel invasion, the pivotal element in the deception, was named “Fortitude,” the quality most essential to its success. Operation Fortitude, the ruse to bottle up German troops in the Pas de Calais and keep them there, was an extraordinary collective effort, but at its core it depended on Robertson’s spies and a web of deception so intricate and strong that it would snare Hitler’s armies and help to carry thousands of soldiers across the Channel in safety.
The military saga of D-Day has been described many times, and the role of Operation Fortitude in that victory, though long shrouded in secrecy, has slowly emerged since the war. But the story of the five spies who formed the nucleus of the Double Cross system, Robertson’s secret weapons, has never been fully told before. The spies themselves expected their story to remain hidden, as it would have had MI5 not chosen, in recent years, to declassify its wartime intelligence files. Indeed, if their stories had been told at the time, no one would have believed them.
For the D-Day spies were, without question, one of the oddest military units ever assembled. They included a bisexual Peruvian playgirl, a tiny Polish fighter pilot, a mercurial Frenchwoman, a Serbian seducer, and a deeply eccentric Spaniard with a diploma in chicken farming. Together, under Robertson’s guidance, they delivered all the little lies that together made up the big lie. Their success depended on the delicate, dubious relationship between spy and spymasters, both German and British.
This is a story of war, but it is also about the nuanced qualities of psychology, character, and personality; the thin line between fidelity and treachery, truth and falsehood; and the strange impulsion of the spy. The Double Cross spies were, variously, courageous, treacherous, capricious, greedy, and inspired. They were not obvious heroes, and their organization was betrayed from within by a Soviet spy. One was so obsessed with her pet dog that she came close to derailing the entire invasion. All were, to some extent, fantasists, for that is the very essence of espionage. Two were of dubious moral character. One was
a triple, and possibly a quadruple, agent. For another, the game ended in torture, imprisonment, and death.
All weapons, including secret ones, are liable to backfire. Robertson and his spies knew only too keenly that if their deception was found out, then rather than diverting attention from Normandy and tying up German troops in the Pas de Calais, they would lead the Germans to the truth, with catastrophic consequences. German troops could be redeployed from Calais to Normandy in a matter of days: every hour the deception held firm would be measured in thousands of lives saved; if it failed, the butcher’s bill would soar. As it was, D-Day was a damn close-run thing and a brutal struggle: Allied casualty rates averaged 6,674 a day for the seventy-seven days of the Normandy campaign. Those numbers would have been far higher, had it not been for a small and most peculiar band of men and women fighting a secret battle.
The D-Day spies were not traditional warriors. None carried weapons, yet the soldiers who did owed the spies a huge and unconscious debt as they stormed the beaches of Normandy in June 1944. These secret agents fought exclusively with words, drama, and make-believe. Their tales begin before the outbreak of war but then overlap, interconnect, and finally interlock on D-Day, in the greatest deception operation ever attempted. Their real names are a mouthful, a sort of European mélange that might have sprung from a period novel: Elvira Concepción Josefina de la Fuente Chaudoir, Roman Czerniawski, Lily Sergeyev, Dusko Popov, and Juan Pujol García. Their code names are blunter and, in each case, were deliberately chosen: Bronx, Brutus, Treasure, Tricycle, and Garbo.
This is their story.
1. Raw Recruits
Dusko and Johnny were friends. Their friendship was founded on a shared appreciation of money, cars, parties, and women, in no particular order and preferably all at the same time. Their relationship, based almost entirely on frivolity, would have a profound impact on world history.