The War for All the Oceans

by Roy Adkins

  The trade winds or ‘trades’ are steady, reliable winds that occur north and south of the equator from about the 30th parallel, and are caused by the rapidly rising hot air above the equator sucking in air from north and south. The rotation of the earth gives this air a direction, producing steady westerly winds north of the equator and easterly winds to the south. The name ‘trade winds’ derived from the fact that sailing merchant ships relied on them for a rapid voyage, and Basil Hall, an experienced naval officer of that time, pointed out that they were impossible to ignore: ‘These vast currents of air, which sweep round and round the globe in huge strips of more than twelve hundred miles in width, are in a manner forced, more or less, on everyone’s notice, from contributing essentially to that boundless interchange of the productions of distant regions by which modern times are so agreeably distinguished from the old.’24 Outside the trades, winds were more variable, although immediately north and south of the trades the winds could generally be relied on to be westerly. Even routes relying on these westerlies could be locally disrupted by tides and currents, and seamen knew very well that the quickest route between two places was seldom the shortest - only for very short journeys were shipping routes a straight line.

  For ships bound for the East and caught in the south-east trades, it was necessary to edge south while being blown westwards, in order to pick up westerly winds again. Since time was the important factor, rather than distance, it did not matter how far west the ships travelled - once into the westerly winds, it was usually straightforward sailing back across the Atlantic and round the tip of South Africa before heading north again towards India. Some ships paused for a few days at a port in the West Indies or South America for fresh water or supplies, but even if they did not, this westerly leg of their journey had previously put them in danger from privateers operating from French colonies in the West Indies. With these bases now denied to them, the threat from the privateers gradually diminished.

  Passing through the doldrums and the south-east trades was only the start of the problems for ships heading east. The pattern of prevailing winds in the Indian Ocean is seasonal, blowing from the south-west between April and September and from the north-east between October and March, so that ships from Britain aimed to arrive there in early summer and sailed for home in the autumn. Although the winds in the northern hemisphere did not impose such rigid restrictions, to make best use of prevailing winds ships tended to set sail from Britain for North America in the latter half of the summer, while those headed for the Caribbean and South America departed in midwinter. This seasonal rhythm of the sailing of merchant vessels to and from Britain made them predictable, and therefore extremely vulnerable to enemy warships and privateers.

  With journey times between Britain and India averaging six months, and sailing times dictated by seasonal wind patterns, it was all but impossible to carry out instructions from Britain that might be many months out of date when they arrived in India. Consequently East India Company employees in India enjoyed a great deal of autonomy, while the Company itself struggled to control them by letters from London. This led to many dubious transactions and outright corruption and fraud, but even with legitimate trading there were widespread opportunities for profit, and many East India Company officials were extremely wealthy by the time they returned home. By 1810 the East India Company had become an agent of government, no longer relying on trade but on the collection of taxes. Large swathes of what is now divided into India and Pakistan were ruled by the Company through conquest or indirectly through alliances with hundreds of small states ruled by Indian princes. The Company relied on its substantial army of mainly native troops in India, but further east, as far as China, they had made few territorial gains and here they depended on their own navy and the Royal Navy to keep open the sea lanes for trade. For now, the Company had a monopoly on trade with India and China, and tea was of immense importance.

  In his expedition to Egypt in 1798 Napoleon had already made one serious attempt to threaten Britain’s hold on India, and there was always the possibility that he would try again. French officers and agents helped those Indian states actively opposed to the spread of British rule, and the Dutch, allies of France, still had colonies in the East Indies that provided bases for French ships and potentially for an attack on India itself. To counter this a fleet of British ships was kept in East Indian waters with instructions to blockade the Dutch settlements in the islands. This was an extremely difficult task with so few vessels, and in 1809 the commander in charge of this blockade, Rear-Admiral William O’Brien Drury, decided to shorten the odds, as he later explained to the Admiralty:In consequence of His Majesty’s Order in Council, and their Lordship’s directions to put the Island of Java and the Moluccas [islands] under the most rigid state of blockade, I endeavoured to effect it with the few ships that could be spared from India; but finding it impossible to cover such an extent of coast, so as to answer the purpose of annoying or distressing the enemy to any extent, I judged it would best be done, by seizing upon the principal settlement in the Eastern Islands, securing their shipping and valuable crops of the Moluccas, and thereby fulfilling the intention of the blockade in a great degree, and at the least risk to the commercial and political interests of India.25

  Just as East India Company personnel had great freedom to act on their own initiative, so did the commanders of the British Navy in eastern waters, and by the time Drury’s dispatch, with his explanation of why he had attacked a particular island, arrived at the Admiralty, the Dutch had lost almost all their bases in the Moluccan Islands.

  Drury had come out to the East Indies at the beginning of 1808 to serve under Edward Pellew. By then Pellew was again sole commander, no longer sharing the territory with Troubridge, who had instead been ordered to the Cape of Good Hope. In January 1807 Troubridge had left Madras, still in the forty-six-year-old warship Blenheim in which he had sailed from England with Mary Sherwood’s convoy. He took with him the frigate Java and the sloop Harriet. At the beginning of March, off Madagascar, the Blenheim and Java were lost with all hands in a terrible hurricane.

  When Pellew went home in early 1809, Drury took over as commander-in-chief. In the autumn of 1809 he sent Captain Edward Tucker with the frigates Dover and Cornwallis, the sloop Samarang and two companies of troops from the native regiments of India to attack the Dutch on the island of Amboyna (now Ambon). Tucker’s force anchored off Amboyna on 9 December and began the attack on the 16th, using the ships to shield and hide a landing party of troops and marines in boats until the last possible moment. Pretending to sail away from the island, he allowed his ships to drift within reach of the chosen landing place, then turned and engaged the Dutch forts and gun batteries while the landing party stormed ashore. As these drove the Dutch and the native troops from their fortifications, a further force of seamen and marines with two small field guns was landed. An officer belonging to this second party sent an anonymous report to the Calcutta Gazette:The party I belonged to had to perform a most fatiguing march, and a worse one I never made, with a view of gaining the height over the second battery. We succeeded in these points beyond our most sanguine expectation. The Dutch officers have since told us, we completely surprised them, they never could bring themselves to believe that so small a force would ever make even an attempt. On our appearing on the heights, they deserted the battery, and much about the same time the two batteries near the sea. We had now command of Fort Victoria [in range of the battery’s guns], and amused ourselves next morning firing at Mynheer, his shells only reaching in return to the face of the hill, much to our comfort.26

  By the end of that day much of the island was in British hands, and the Dutch stronghold of Victoria Castle was invited to surrender, which was done on the 19th. The island formally passed into British hands in mid-February 1810, but in the meantime Tucker mopped up Dutch outposts and strongholds on nearby islands, as well as capturing Dutch shipping in the area. It had all been deceptively easy, and ce
rtainly the Dutch authorities thought so: the Dutch commander was subsequently tried for treachery on Java and shot.

  Amboyna was the headquarters of the Dutch in the Moluccas, and by May most of their settlements in the islands were in British hands, with the exception of Banda Neira, Ternate and a few outposts. Tucker’s forces were now badly stretched and potentially vulnerable to a counterattack, so Rear-Admiral Drury instructed Captain Christopher Cole to sail with reinforcements from Madras. Captain Cole, from Marazion in Cornwall, had spent most of his naval career in the West Indies. He had more seniority than Tucker, and according to Cole’s unpublished narrative of the expedition, he himself approached Drury and persuaded him to allow an attack on Banda Neira, or any other Dutch stronghold on the way to Amboyna. However it came about, Cole was given a very free hand to act, and he wanted to achieve something on his own account during the voyage. His ship, the frigate Caroline, was accompanied by another frigate, the Piedmontaise, the brig Barracouta and the transport brig Mandarin. The reinforcements that they carried were a hundred officers and men of the Madras European Regiment, while the Mandarin carried supplies and specie.

  The ships sailed from Madras on 10 May, and soon Cole told Captain Charles Foote of the Piedmontaise and Captain Richard Kenah of the Barracouta about his intentions. Cole was determined to capture one of the spice islands because, as he said, ‘it did not appear to me that any of the smaller possessions of the enemy would give us that credit which is so naturally looked forward to, from the successful issue of a service of this nature’.27 After ten days’ sailing they reached the island of Penang, in the Strait of Malacca between Sumatra and Malaya. Here the ships took on twenty artillery men, two field guns and twenty scaling ladders, but although Cole was able to question various people who had lived on Banda Neira, he was disappointed in not being able to obtain a map or plan of the island. He moved on from Penang on 10 June, sailing south-east down the Strait of Malacca, and five days later, off Singapore, he met Captain Richard Spencer in the sloop Samarang. Spencer had been with Tucker at Amboyna, and Cole was told by him that a record of the Dutch garrison of Banda Neira ‘had been found at the capture of Amboyna and it stated the force at Banda to amount to more than seven hundred regular troops. Captn. Spencer seemed surprized at my determination to attempt the reduction of Banda before we were reinforced, and gave me all the information he had obtained by his active exertions under Captain Tucker.’28

  Undaunted by Spencer’s scepticism, Cole continued south-east, but on the 25th he was forced to halt off the coast of Borneo while repairs were made to the mainmast of the Piedmontaise, which had been struck by lightning. Because of the information from Spencer, Cole had decided to break off from the usual route and thread his way through unfamiliar waters to try to gain an element of surprise. He recorded that ‘being anxious to get forward, and fearful that Daendels the Dutch Captain-General of Java and the Moluccas might by unusual exertions succeed in getting supplies and reinforcements thrown into Banda, before my arrival in that quarter, I was induced to try the passage between Borneo and Malwalli to enable us to get the quicker into the Sooloo Sea’.29 It was reasonable to expect that once he heard about the capture of Amboyna, General Daendels, the Governor based on Java, would take steps to reinforce the remaining Dutch possessions, but the route that Cole was proposing to take was dangerous, because he was literally sailing into the unknown.

  The first Europeans to explore the East Indies were the Portuguese and the Dutch, followed by the Spanish and the French. As part of the attempts to preserve their own footholds in the region, the sailors of these nations tended to keep any maps and charts to themselves, and the British, as relative newcomers, found it extremely difficult to obtain reliable information. To Cole, the route he proposed to follow, up the west and north coasts of Borneo and into the Sulu Sea, was a voyage through uncharted waters. It was to be more nerve-racking than he expected:The passage proved the most dangerous I had ever navigated. The coral reefs were innumerable, and most of them but just covered with water, and not easily seen until the sun had risen considerably above the horizon. Our pilot had overrated his knowledge of this part of the navigation, but by an unceasing good look out, and strict attention, in the course of forty eight hours we had nearly cleared the shoals called by Dalrymple ‘Felicia Proper’ and the pilot had reported the ship past all danger, when we discovered a ship which had been recently wrecked on a coral reef just below the water’s edge and directly ahead of us. The wreck was surrounded by piratical proas57, which fled at our approach. I went in my boat to examine the shoal and the wreck, and we found the deck of the latter streaming with blood that had been recently shed, and locks of human hair in many places, which proved that there had been a severe contest about the plunder. The Piedmontaise which had been ordered to proceed on, with the Mandarin in tow, whilst I examined the wreck, now made the signal for shoals in every direction between the NE, and SE; and the approach of night and the discovery of those shoals immediately in our track, obliged me to return to the ship, without pursuing the proas.30

  As darkness fell, the Barracouta continued sailing, followed by the Caroline, but not without difficulty as Cole recorded:In joining the Piedmontaise, the Barracouta was several times nearly on the rocks, but Captain Kenah’s activity and perseverance carried her safe through every difficulty, and was of infinite service to the Caroline in her progress. At 6 in the evening we saw the small islands off the S.W. end of Cagayan Sooloo [now Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi]; and as the only directions published for the Sooloo Sea, mention the probability of a ship’s being to the Easterrd [easternward] of the shoals on the NE coast of Borneo when these islands are in sight, I decided on running on, instead of anchoring and remaining quiet until the morning. The ships were put under easy sail, and the Barracouta leading was directed to steer a course for the night; and the other ships followed in her track. The night which was dark, rainy, and squally, was passed by all the ships in sounding, as quick as the lead could be sent to the bottom, and in momentary expectation of the signal for danger; but the small island of Manbahenawen [Mambahenauhan] close to us in the morning, gave some respite to our anxieties, for it assured us that our greatest difficulties were passed.31

  The next problem was one of supplies, and so on 5 July, as Cole related, the shipsanchored at Sooloo [Sulu], where we obtained supplies of water, fresh meat, and vegetables in abundance, and many fair promises of friendship and amity from the Sultan. I thought it right to tell him my principal business in that quarter was to protect the merchants, and to punish all piratical proceedings, for the inhabitants of the smaller islands in this immense archipelago are addicted to the most cruel piratical warfare, and His Majesty of Sooloo is in some measure implicated in their proceedings. To give our force a more imposing appearance the Barracouta was converted [from a brig] into a ship, and as the alteration was made between daylight and breakfast, it occasioned no small surprise amongst the ignorant natives, and many inquiries from the Sultan whose fears induced him to give me a salute of thirteen guns, when I paid my visit of ceremony.32

  What the crew of the Barracouta had done was to change the appearance of the ship overnight, since a brig had only two masts and a distinctly different pattern of sails from a ship. It seemed to the Sultan that one vessel had left, to be replaced by another, leaving him in doubt as to how large a force Cole had at his command.

  After four days Cole set sail again, heading east into the Pacific, and was in sight of New Guinea by the 21st. He then turned southwards towards the island of Seram, which is due north of Amboyna and within easy distance of Banda Neira, but contrary winds and currents slowed his progress. The time was spent in preparing for the assault on Banda Neira, as he explained:During our tedious passage the seamen had been constantly exercised in the use of the musket, pike, and pistol, and the scaling ladders were placed against the masts, and the men were practised in ascending them quickly with their arms [weapons] in their hands. Every arrangement had been
made that seemed necessary to ensure success. Our men were in the highest health and spirits, and not a death had happened since our departure from Madras. The general orders for the attack had not only been delivered to the leaders of divisions, but they were read repeatedly to the men by the respective officers, and the greatest confidence and cheerfulness prevailed. The necessity of silence and steadiness, in the event of our making a night attack, was strongly enforced, and the most prompt and severe punishment held out against plunder and straggling.33

  On 7 August the ships reached the island of Seram, after something of an epic voyage without adequate charts, through dangerous waters studded with islands. By taking this circuitous northern route, rather than heading south past Java, Cole had stayed clear of the usual sea lanes and avoided all the Dutch outposts so that no early warning would be sent to the garrison of Banda Neira. At Seram Cole picked up ‘two Malay guides who professed to know the roads and situations of the batteries on Banda-Neira’ 34 and continued on his way. The next day the ships made a stealthy approach towards their target and began preparations for the assault:The weather on the 8th was very fine, with a haze round the horizon that favoured our near approach; and the ships were kept under easy sail [minimum area of sails spread for their required speed], to prevent as much as possible their being discovered before dark, as it was my intention to push the ships in suddenly against the batteries a little before daylight on the following morning. This day was occupied in making our final preparations; and at 2 o’clock all the boats were hoisted out, and the ammunition and provisions put into them. At 5 the ships were brought to, and at ½ past the small island of Rosengen became just visible through the haze . . . Great Banda appeared at the distance of ten or eleven leagues. My final orders were now given to Captains Foote and Kenah, and after having told the men whom I had selected from the Caroline’s ship’s crew to accompany me, how much I expected from them, the ships bore up for the lee point of Great Banda.35