Dirty Wars

by Jeremy Scahill

  Shaye was held in solitary confinement for thirty-four days with no access to a lawyer. His family did not even know where he had been taken or why. Eventually, his lawyers received a tip from a released prisoner that Shaye was in the political security prison, and they were able to see him. “When Abdulelah was arrested, he was put in a narrow dirty and foul-smelling bathroom for five days. I noticed that one of Abdulelah’s teeth was extracted and another one was broken, in addition to the presence of some scars on his chest,” recalled Barman. “There were a lot of scars on his chest. He was psychologically tortured. He had been told that all his friends and family members had left him and that no one had raised his case. He was tortured by false information.”

  On September 22, Shaye was eventually hauled into a court. Prosecutors asked for more time to prepare a case against him. A month later, he was locked in a cage in Yemen’s state security court, which was established by presidential decree and had been roundly denounced by human and media rights groups as illegal and unfair. The Yemeni government called it a trial. “Yeah. The trial does not pass the laugh test, at all. And the court does not pass the laugh test,” said Dayem, of the Committee to Protect Journalists. “I could not locate a single case that was tried in this specialized criminal tribunal...that met, even remotely, fair trial standards.”

  The judge read out a list of charges against Shaye. He was accused of being the “media man” for al Qaeda, recruiting new operatives for the group and providing al Qaeda with photos of Yemeni bases and foreign embassies for potential targeting. “The government filed many charges against him,” said Barman. “Some of these charges were: joining an armed group aiming to target the stability and security of the country, inciting al Qaeda members to assassinate President Ali Abdullah Saleh and his son, recruiting new al Qaeda members, working as propagandist for al Qaeda and Anwar Awlaki in particular. Most of these charges carry the death sentence under Yemeni law.” As the charges against him were read, according to journalist Iona Craig, a longtime foreign correspondent who reported regularly for the Times of London from Yemen, Shaye “paced slowly around the white cell, smiling and shaking his head in disbelief.”

  When the judge finished reading the charges against him, Shaye stood behind the bars of the holding cell and addressed his fellow journalists. “When they hid murderers of children and women in Abyan, when I revealed the locations and camps of nomads and civilians in Abyan, Shabwah and Arhab when they were going to be hit by cruise missiles, it was on that day they decided to arrest me,” he declared. “You notice in the court how they have turned all of my journalistic contributions into accusations. All of my journalistic contributions and quotations to international reporters and news channels have been turned into accusations.” As security guards dragged him away, Shaye yelled, “Yemen, this is a place where, when a young journalist becomes successful, he is viewed with suspicion.”

  The President Can Write His Own Rules

  WASHINGTON, DC, AND YEMEN, LATE 2010 —While US counterterrorism operations expanded in Yemen in the summer of 2010, Washington and other political and economic forces were drawing up plans for a neoliberal restructuring of Yemen’s economy. Organized under the banner of “Friends of Yemen,” the US and British governments joined with the European Union, the International Monetary Fund and some of Yemen’s neighbors. “Progress against violent extremists and progress toward a better future for the Yemeni people will depend upon fortifying development efforts,” US secretary of state Hillary Clinton said at an early meeting of the group in January 2010. This included what Aaron W. Jost, the National Security Council’s director for Arabian Peninsula affairs, called “greatly expanded... economic and humanitarian assistance to the Yemeni people.”

  The Obama administration increased USAID funding, humanitarian assistance and “democracy promotion” funds for Yemen from $14 million two years earlier to $110 million in 2010. “There is no doubt AQAP is a serious threat to Yemen, the United States, and our allies,” Jost asserted. “However, support for operations against AQAP is only one piece of the United States’ strategy for Yemen.” But as a condition of the increased aid Yemen was to receive, President Saleh was forced to accept IMF structural adjustments, among them “the gradual reduction in the level of Government subsidies on fuel.” A declaration from the “Friends” openly acknowledged that “necessary economic reforms would have an adverse impact on the poor.”

  Washington and its allies made clear to Saleh that continued military aid was conditioned on his cooperation with the economic reforms. “The Yemeni people and the international community are both confronted by real threats from AQAP, and it may take years to decisively defeat it,” Jost declared. “However, we believe that the future belongs to those who build, not to those who are focused on destruction. And the United States stands with the people of Yemen as they seek to build a more positive future and reject AQAP’s efforts to kill innocent men, women and children.”

  Saleh’s main priority was not fighting AQAP, but rather suppressing the internal rebellions he faced from the Houthis and the southern secessionists. But in order to continue receiving the US military aid he needed for these internal fights, he had to prove to Washington he was serious about fighting AQAP. Colonel Lang, who spent years dealing with Saleh as US defense attaché, said that Saleh was very weary of what he perceived as an attempt by the Obama administration to apply the counterinsurgency doctrine in Yemen but had to play the game to keep the military aid flowing. “Saleh doesn’t really want us to get involved to the extent that the full implications of that doctrine would imply, because then he would be increasingly relegated to the position of a Karzai-like state—and, in fact, whereas Afghan President [Hamid] Karzai has never been able to play the game with sufficient skill, to manipulate all the factors to some end that approximates something that he wants, Saleh has. With great skill,” Lang said at the time. He added that Saleh knew that the type of money allocated by the “Friends of Yemen” and USAID and for political reform would be monitored by the United States “so that any graft that occurs does not excessively benefit him and his cronies, and other things like that which will tend to reduce his net power. So he’s not gonna be really in favor of that.” But with the intense US focus on AQAP, Saleh’s military aid lunch ticket, he needed to play the game.

  In August 2010, following the rash of killings of Yemeni military and intelligence officials by the motorcycle assassins, Yemeni forces launched a major offensive in the Lawdar District of Abyan, an alleged AQAP stronghold. In several days of gun battles, a dozen Yemeni soldiers were reportedly killed, along with nineteen people the Yemeni government identified as al Qaeda figures. At least three civilians were also killed, and scores of others fled their homes. “Security forces have taught the terrorists of Al-Qaeda a hard lesson and inflicted painful hits on them, forcing those terrorist elements that tried to hide, to flee after dozens were killed and wounded,” Yemen’s deputy interior minister, General Saleh al Zaweri, declared.

  That assessment was not shared in Washington. JSOC forces were scoring occasional victories against AQAP, but Yemeni Special Operations Forces were perceived as lazy and largely incompetent by their American counterparts and Saleh’s double-dealing often resulted in shoddy intelligence. In short, there was what senior US officials described as a “dearth of solid intelligence” in Yemen. JSOC’s forces were certainly more than capable of finding, fixing and finishing targets, but those operations required solid intelligence. “All Land Rovers look pretty much alike,” a former high-ranking U.S. intelligence official familiar with operations in Yemen told the Washington Post. “You have to have something that tells you this is the one to follow.” The CIA had historically culled personnel from JSOC and other special operations units for lethal missions, but the ascent of JSOC within the Bush and Obama administrations had altered that process. JSOC, insiders told me, wanted to run point—and the CIA was not happy about it.

  The day the Lawdar offensiv
e was over, on August 25, the Washington Post and Wall Street Journal both ran front-page stories that were clearly based on leaks from the CIA and its allies in the administration. “For the first time since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, CIA analysts see one of al-Qaeda’s offshoots—rather than the core group now based in Pakistan—as the most urgent threat to U.S. security,” the Post story began. The Wall Street Journal added that the administration was considering plans to “mount a more intense targeted killing program in Yemen.” The Post went on to quote an unnamed senior administration official as saying that AQAP was “on the upswing,” adding that, between Pakistan and Yemen, “the relative concern ratios are changing. We’re more concerned now about AQAP than we were before.” The official said, “We are looking to draw on all of the capabilities at our disposal,” describing plans for “a ramp-up over a period of months.”

  The leaks appeared to reflect a power play by the CIA to assert a greater role in Yemen operations, which had become dominated by JSOC. “You’re not going to find bomb parts with USA markings on them,” the senior official said, clearly referencing JSOC’s December 2009 Tomahawk strike in al Majalah and the misinformed attack in Marib that killed the deputy governor on his negotiation mission. The official made it clear that the White House was considering a plan to deploy more CIA drones.

  “The Agency has taken advantage of every criticism of the performance of JSOC as an argument to regain control over covert operations,” said Colonel Lang, who spent his career working with both Special Operations Forces and the CIA, including operationally in Yemen. “The competition between the military clandestine services and the CIA is greater than ever before.” Although the CIA was clearly seeking an advantage in its power struggle with JSOC over control of the Yemen ops, there was also a crucial strategic interest on the part of the administration in making a shift in the CIA’s direction: placing JSOC forces under the sponsorship of the CIA would, under US law, allow “elite U.S. hunter-killer teams” to operate far more freely in Yemen without the consent of Yemen’s government.

  In September 2010, as Obama’s senior counterterrorism adviser, John Brennan, visited Yemen, Saleh launched yet another offensive against AQAP, this time in the city of Hawta in Shabwah Province, sixty miles from the home of Anwar Awlaki. Led by CTU forces trained and armed by the United States, Yemeni commandos laid siege to the town, shelling it with artillery and launching helicopter attacks. Although the extent of the US role remains classified, military officials confirmed US forces were involved in a limited capacity. As thousands of people fled their homes, Brennan was in Sana’a on September 20 for meetings with Saleh. The timing of the offensive was classic Saleh, enabling him to point to a concrete, ongoing operation against AQAP in his meetings with Brennan. As the two men met, the Friends of Yemen group was preparing to hold ministerial-level talks in New York on aid to the country. According to a statement released by the National Security Council, Brennan and Saleh “discussed cooperation against the continuing threat of al-Qa’ida, and Mr. Brennan conveyed the United States’ condolences to the Yemeni people for the loss of Yemeni security officers and citizens killed in recent al-Qa’ida attacks.” Although Yemen’s government publicly hailed its success in Hawta and Lawdar, the operations amounted to a failure, as the main al Qaeda targets of the raids in both places escaped and tribal rage increased against the government.

  A MONTH AFTER MEETING WITH SALEH, Brennan received a late-night phone call on October 28, 2010, from his friend Prince Mohammed bin Nayef. Saudi intelligence, the prince said, had uncovered a plot by AQAP to bring down US cargo planes. The bombs, he said, were already in place. Shortly after 10:30 p.m., Brennan warned President Obama of a “potential terrorist threat” to the US homeland. Saudi intelligence provided US and British intelligence with tracking numbers for packages they believed contained explosives. By the time Brennan heard of the plot, one of the planes carrying the alleged bomb had already left Sana’a. The package was transferred to a UPS plane and flown to Germany, where it was transferred again before arriving at 2:13 a.m. local time at East Midlands Airport in Leicestershire, one hundred miles north of London. British security forces recovered the package, which was addressed to a synagogue in Chicago.

  The package contained an office-sized printer cartridge equipped with a circuit board. Instead of toner, the cartridge contained white powder. Initial tests performed in Britain, including with bomb-sniffing dogs and explosive detection equipment, indicated it was not a bomb. The package was kept in Britain for further tests and the plane was cleared to continue its journey to Philadelphia. The suspicious package, meanwhile, was flown by helicopter to the Defense Science and Technology Laboratory at Fort Halstead for analysis. It was later revealed that the powder contained 400 grams of PETN, the same material used in Abdulmutallab’s underwear device and in the attempt on Prince bin Nayef’s life. The package was armed with an alarm clock on a Nokia mobile phone’s circuit board. Scotland Yard subsequently said that had the bomb not been removed, “activation could have occurred over the eastern seaboard of the U.S.,” with detonation set to occur at 5:30 a.m. Eastern time. A senior British counterterrorism official told the Guardian newspaper that the device was “one of the most sophisticated we’ve seen. The naked eye won’t pick it up, experienced bomb officers did not see it, x-ray screening is highly unlikely to catch it.” A second bomb was discovered in Dubai on board a FedEx plane. It contained 300 grams of PETN. Like the other package, it was addressed to a Jewish organization based in Chicago. Ironically, neither of the addresses was current. Investigators suspected that whoever sent the packages had obtained outdated information online.

  The packages were sent to the Jewish organizations in Chicago but addressed to two infamous and long-dead historical figures. One was addressed care of Diego Deza, the brutal grand inquisitor who, for a period, led the Spanish Inquisition. The other was addressed to Reynald Krak, a French knight of the Second Crusade known for his mass murder of Muslims. Krak was eventually beheaded by Saladin, the Muslim warrior who defeated the Crusaders in the twelfth century.

  On Friday, October 29, Americans watched as breaking news coverage showed US warplanes escorting a cargo plane to an emergency landing at JFK Airport. Images were broadcast of other planes being swept at Philadelphia and Newark Airports. And reports of more potentially dangerous packages spread. That night, President Obama said that the explosives had posed a “credible terrorist threat.” In the end, none of the bombs detonated and the speculation of explosives aboard other planes proved to be just that. Once the Yemen connection was clear, there was no debate within the administration: all eyes focused on AQAP.

  In November, AQAP published a “special issue” of Inspire. The cover featured a foggy image of a UPS cargo plane with the simple headline: “$4,200.” That was the cost, according to AQAP, of the attempted bombings, which the group labeled “Operation Hemorrhage.” The magazine featured photos purporting to show the printer cartridge bombs before they were shipped and articles outlining the objectives and technical details of the bombs. AQAP also claimed that it had succeeded in taking down a UPS plane a few months earlier, on September 3. “We have succeeded in bringing down the UPS plane but because the enemy’s media did not attribute the operation to us we have remained silent so we may repeat the operation,” the magazine stated. A UPS plane did indeed crash that day, killing two crew members. Investigators said the accident occurred after a fire broke out in the plane. US officials dismissed suggestions it was a terror attack. “We would like to ask: Why didn’t the enemy reveal the truth about what happened with the downed UPS plane?” AQAP’s statement read. “Is it because the enemy could not discover why the plane was brought down? Or was it because the Obama administration wanted to conceal the truth so it doesn’t expose the failure of his administration especially...during an election season?” AQAP labeled September 3, “The day a tree fell into a forest that no one heard.”

  As for the attempted bombings in Oc
tober, AQAP’s “Head of Foreign Operations” wrote in Inspire that bringing down the planes would have been a bonus but that the “objective was not to cause maximum casualties but to cause maximum losses to the American economy. That is also the reason why we singled out the two U.S. air freight companies: FedEx and UPS for our dual operation.” Noting that the US and other governments would likely spend substantial amounts of money reviewing and changing airport screening procedures, he wrote, “You either spend billions of dollars to inspect each and every package in the world or you do nothing and we keep trying again.” He said they had selected addresses in Chicago because it was “Obama’s city.” The magazine also featured a picture of a beat-up copy of a Dickens book. It was a title that Awlaki had read in prison. “We were very optimistic about the outcome of this operation,” the alleged head of foreign ops wrote. “That is why we dropped into one of the boxes a novel titled, Great Expectations.”

  Four days after the cargo bombs were discovered, Yemen indicted Awlaki in absentia on charges unrelated to the bomb plot. The official charge was “incitement to kill foreigners and members of security services.” The judge ordered prosecutors to hunt down Awlaki and bring him to justice dead or alive. Regardless of the specific charges against Awlaki, it was clear that the indictment was coordinated with Washington and intended to give legitimacy to the continued targeting and potential assassination of Awlaki while placing responsibility once again on the Yemenis.

  JUDGE JOHN BATES, a 2001 appointee of President George W. Bush, heard oral arguments in Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, challenging the administration’s placement of a US citizen on an assassination list. “How is it that judicial approval is required when the United States decides to target a U.S. citizen overseas for electronic surveillance, but that, according to defendants, judicial scrutiny is prohibited when the United States decides to target a U.S. citizen overseas for death?” the judge asked. The government’s lawyers maintained that the matter of Anwar Awlaki was a state secret, was a national security policy determined by the president and did not belong in the courts. Judge Bates called the lawsuit “a unique and extraordinary case” in which “vital considerations of national security and of military and foreign affairs (and hence potentially of state secrets) are at play.” Bates asked: Can a US citizen “use the U.S. judicial system to vindicate his constitutional rights while simultaneously evading U.S. law enforcement authorities, calling for ‘jihad against the West,’ and engaging in operational planning for an organization that has already carried out numerous terrorist attacks against the United States? Can the Executive order the assassination of a U.S. citizen without first affording him any form of judicial process whatsoever, based on the mere assertion that he is a dangerous member of a terrorist organization?” Judge Bates concluded, “These and other legal and policy questions posed by this case are controversial and of great public interest.”