Complete Works
Page 92
ALCIBIADES: You’re right about me.
SOCRATES: And about me.
ALCIBIADES: So what should we do?
SOCRATES: There must be no giving up, my friend, and no slacking off.
ALCIBIADES: No, Socrates, that really wouldn’t do.
SOCRATES: No it wouldn’t. So let’s work it out together. Tell me—we say [e] that we want to be as good as possible, don’t we?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: In what respect?
ALCIBIADES: In what good men do, obviously.
SOCRATES: Good at what?
ALCIBIADES: Taking care of things, obviously.
SOCRATES: What sorts of things? Horses?
ALCIBIADES: Of course not.
SOCRATES: In that case, we’d consult a horse expert.
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: Well, do you mean sailing?
ALCIBIADES: No.
SOCRATES: In that case, we’d consult a sailing expert.
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: Well, what sorts of things? Whose business is it?
ALCIBIADES: The leading citizens of Athens.
SOCRATES: By ‘leading citizens’ do you mean clever men or stupid men? [125]
ALCIBIADES: Clever.
SOCRATES: But isn’t everybody good at what they’re clever at?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And bad at what they’re not?
ALCIBIADES: Of course.
SOCRATES: And is the shoemaker clever at making shoes?
ALCIBIADES: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Then he’s good at it.
ALCIBIADES: That’s right.
SOCRATES: Well now, isn’t the shoemaker stupid at making clothes?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
[b] SOCRATES: So he’s bad at that.
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: So the same person is both good and bad, at least by this argument.
ALCIBIADES: Apparently.
SOCRATES: Do you mean to say that good men are also bad?
ALCIBIADES: Of course not.
SOCRATES: So which ones do you say are good men?
ALCIBIADES: I mean those with the ability to rule in the city.
SOCRATES: But not, I presume, over horses.
ALCIBIADES: No, of course not.
SOCRATES: Over people?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: When they’re sick?
ALCIBIADES: No.
SOCRATES: When they’re at sea?
ALCIBIADES: No.
SOCRATES: When they’re harvesting?
ALCIBIADES: No.
[c] SOCRATES: When they’re doing nothing? Or when they’re doing something?
ALCIBIADES: Doing something.
SOCRATES: Doing what? Try to make it clear for me.
ALCIBIADES: It’s when they’re helping each other and dealing with each other, as we do in our urban way of life.
SOCRATES: So you mean ruling over men who deal with men.
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: Over the boatswains who deal with rowers?
ALCIBIADES: Of course not.
SOCRATES: That’s what the pilot is good at.
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
[d] SOCRATES: Do you mean ruling over flute-players, who direct the singers and deal with the dancers?
ALCIBIADES: Of course not.
SOCRATES: Again, that’s what the chorus-master is good at.
ALCIBIADES: Certainly.
SOCRATES: So what do you mean by being able to ‘rule over men who deal with men’?
ALCIBIADES: I mean ruling over the men in the city who take part in citizenship and who make a mutual contribution.
SOCRATES: Well, what skill is this? Suppose I asked you the same thing again—what skill makes men understand how to rule over men who take part in sailing?
ALCIBIADES: The pilot’s.
SOCRATES: And what knowledge did we say enables them to rule over [e] those who take part in singing?
ALCIBIADES: The chorus-master’s, as you just said.
SOCRATES: Well now, what do you call the knowledge that enables you to rule over those who take part in citizenship?
ALCIBIADES: I call it the knowledge of good advice, Socrates.
SOCRATES: But then do you think the pilot’s advice is bad advice?
ALCIBIADES: Of course not.
SOCRATES: Then is it good advice?
ALCIBIADES: I should think so; he has to ensure the safety of his passengers. [126]
SOCRATES: You’re right. Well then, what’s the purpose of this good advice you’re talking about?
ALCIBIADES: The safety and better management of the city.
SOCRATES: But what is present or absent when the city is safe and better managed? If, for example, you asked me, “What is present or absent in the body when it is safe and better managed?” I’d reply, “Health is present and disease is absent.” Wouldn’t you agree?
ALCIBIADES: Yes. [b]
SOCRATES: And if you asked me again, “What is present in our eyes when they are better cared for?” I’d say the same sort of thing—“Sight is present and blindness is absent.” Again, with our ears, deafness is absent and hearing is present when they’re in better condition and getting better treatment.
ALCIBIADES: You’re right.
SOCRATES: Well then, what about a city? What is it that’s present or absent when it’s in a better condition and getting better management and treatment?
ALCIBIADES: The way I look at it, Socrates, mutual friendship will be [c] present, and hatred and insurrection will be absent.
SOCRATES: When you say ‘friendship’, do you mean agreement or disagreement?
ALCIBIADES: Agreement.
SOCRATES: What skill is it that makes cities agree about numbers?
ALCIBIADES: Arithmetic.
SOCRATES: What about private citizens? Isn’t it the same skill?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And doesn’t it also make each person agree with himself?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And what skill is it that makes each of us agree with himself about whether a hand’s-width is larger than an arm’s-length? It’s measuring [d], isn’t it?
ALCIBIADES: Of course.
SOCRATES: Doesn’t it make both cities and private citizens agree?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And isn’t it the same with weighing?
ALCIBIADES: It is.
SOCRATES: Well, this agreement you’re talking about, what is it? What’s it about? What skill provides it? Doesn’t the same skill make both a city and a private citizen agree, both with themselves and with others?
ALCIBIADES: That does seem quite likely.
[e] SOCRATES: What is it then? Don’t give up… . Try your best to tell me.
ALCIBIADES: I suppose I mean the sort of friendship and agreement you find when a mother and father agree with a son they love, and when a brother agrees with his brother, and a woman agrees with her husband.
SOCRATES: Well, Alcibiades, do you think that a husband is able to agree with his wife about wool-working, when he doesn’t understand it and she does?
ALCIBIADES: Of course not.
SOCRATES: Nor does he have any need to, because that’s for a woman to know about.
ALCIBIADES: That’s right.
[127] SOCRATES: And is a woman able to agree with her husband about military tactics, without having learned about it?
ALCIBIADES: Of course not.
SOCRATES: I suppose you’d say that that’s for a man to know about.
ALCIBIADES: I would.
SOCRATES: So, according to your argument, some subjects are women’s subjects and some are men’s subjects.
ALCIBIADES: Of course.
SOCRATES: So, in these areas at least, there’s no agreement between men and women.
ALCIBIADES: No.
SOCRATES: Nor is there any friendship, since friendship was agreement.
&n
bsp; ALCIBIADES: Apparently not.
SOCRATES: So women are not loved by men, insofar as they do their own work.
[b] ALCIBIADES: It seems not.
SOCRATES: Nor are men loved by women, insofar as they do theirs.
ALCIBIADES: No.
SOCRATES: So neither are cities well governed when the different groups each do their own work.
ALCIBIADES: But I think they are, Socrates.
SOCRATES: What do you mean? In that case there’s no friendship in cities, but we said friendship was present when cities are well governed, and not otherwise.
ALCIBIADES: But I think it’s when each person does his own work that mutual friendship results.
SOCRATES: You’ve just changed your mind. What do you mean now? [c] Can there be friendship without agreement? Can there be any agreement when some know about the matter and others don’t?
ALCIBIADES: There can’t possibly.
SOCRATES: But when everyone does his own work, is everyone being just, or unjust?
ALCIBIADES: Just, of course.
SOCRATES: So when the citizens do what is just in the city, there is no friendship between them.
ALCIBIADES: Again, Socrates, I think there must be.
SOCRATES: Then what do you mean by this ‘friendship’ and ‘agreement’ [d] that we must be wise and good advisers in if we’re to be good men? I can’t figure out what it is, or who’s got it. According to your argument, it seems that sometimes certain people have it and sometimes they don’t.
ALCIBIADES: Well, Socrates, I swear by the gods that I don’t even know what I mean. I think I must have been in an appalling state for a long time, without being aware of it.
SOCRATES: But don’t lose heart. If you were fifty when you realized it, [e] then it would be hard for you to cultivate yourself, but now you’re just the right age to see it.
ALCIBIADES: Now that I’ve seen it, Socrates, what should I do about it?
SOCRATES: Answer my questions, Alcibiades. If you do that, then, God willing,—if we are to trust in my divination—you and I will be in a better state.
ALCIBIADES: Then we will be, if it depends on my answering.
SOCRATES: Well then, what does it mean to cultivate oneself?—I’m afraid [128] we often think we’re cultivating ourselves when we’re not. When does a man do that? Is he cultivating himself when he cultivates what he has?
ALCIBIADES: I think so, anyway.
SOCRATES: Really? When does a man cultivate or care for his feet? Is it when he’s caring for what belongs to his feet?
ALCIBIADES: I don’t understand.
SOCRATES: Is there anything you’d say belonged to a hand? Take a ring, for example—could it belong anywhere else on a man but on his finger?
ALCIBIADES: Of course not.
SOCRATES: Similarly a shoe belongs nowhere but on the feet.
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: Likewise cloaks and bedclothes belong to the rest of the body.
ALCIBIADES: Yes. [b]
SOCRATES: So when we cultivate or care for our shoes, are we caring for our feet?
ALCIBIADES: I don’t really understand, Socrates.
SOCRATES: Surely, Alcibiades, you talk about taking proper care of one thing or another, don’t you?
ALCIBIADES: Yes, I do.
SOCRATES: And when you make something better, you say you’re taking proper care of it.
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: What skill is it that makes shoes better?
ALCIBIADES: Shoemaking.
SOCRATES: So shoemaking is the skill by which we take care of shoes.
[c] ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: Do we use shoemaking to take care of our feet, too? Or do we use the skill that makes our feet better?
ALCIBIADES: The latter.
SOCRATES: Isn’t the skill that makes the feet better the same as what makes the rest of the body better?
ALCIBIADES: I think so.
SOCRATES: Isn’t this skill athletics?
ALCIBIADES: Yes, absolutely.
SOCRATES: So while we take care of our feet with athletics, we take care of what belongs to our feet with shoemaking.
ALCIBIADES: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And while we take care of our hands with athletics, we take care of what belongs to our hands with ring-making.
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And while we cultivate our bodies with athletics, we take care [d] of what belongs to our bodies with weaving and other skills.
ALCIBIADES: That’s absolutely right.
SOCRATES: So while we cultivate each thing with one skill, we cultivate what belongs to it with another skill.
ALCIBIADES: Apparently so.
SOCRATES: And so when you’re cultivating what belongs to you, you’re not cultivating yourself.
ALCIBIADES: Not at all.
SOCRATES: For it seems that cultivating yourself and cultivating what belongs to you require different skills.
ALCIBIADES: Apparently.
SOCRATES: Well then, what sort of skill could we use to cultivate ourselves?
ALCIBIADES: I couldn’t say.
[e] SOCRATES: But we’ve agreed on this much, at least—it’s a skill that won’t make anything that belongs to us better, but it will make us better.
ALCIBIADES: You’re right.
SOCRATES: Now if we didn’t know what a shoe was, would we have known what skill makes a shoe better?
ALCIBIADES: No, we couldn’t have.
SOCRATES: Nor would we have known what skill makes a ring better if we didn’t know what a ring was.
ALCIBIADES: True.
SOCRATES: Well then, could we ever know what skill makes us better if we didn’t know what we were?
ALCIBIADES: We couldn’t. [129]
SOCRATES: Is it actually such an easy thing to know oneself? Was it some simpleton who inscribed those words on the temple wall at Delphi? Or is it difficult, and not for everybody?
ALCIBIADES: Sometimes I think, Socrates, that anyone can do it, but then sometimes I think it’s extremely difficult.
SOCRATES: But Alcibiades, whether it’s easy or not, nevertheless this is the situation we’re in: if we know ourselves, then we might be able to know how to cultivate ourselves, but if we don’t know ourselves, we’ll never know how.
ALCIBIADES: I agree.
SOCRATES: Tell me, how can we find out what ‘itself’ is, in itself?20 Maybe [b] this is the way to find out what we ourselves might be—maybe it’s the only possible way.
ALCIBIADES: You’re right.
SOCRATES: Hold on, by Zeus—who are you speaking with now? Anybody but me?
ALCIBIADES: No.
SOCRATES: And I’m speaking with you.
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: Is Socrates doing the talking?
ALCIBIADES: He certainly is.
SOCRATES: And is Alcibiades doing the listening?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And isn’t Socrates talking with words?
ALCIBIADES: Of course. [c]
SOCRATES: I suppose you’d say that talking is the same as using words?
ALCIBIADES: Certainly.
SOCRATES: But the thing being used and the person using it—they’re different, aren’t they?
ALCIBIADES: What do you mean?
SOCRATES: A shoemaker, for example, cuts with a knife and a scraper, I think, and with other tools.
ALCIBIADES: Yes, he does.
SOCRATES: So isn’t the cutter who uses the tools different from the tools he’s cutting with?
ALCIBIADES: Of course.
SOCRATES: And likewise isn’t the lyre-player different from what he’s playing with?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
[d] SOCRATES: This is what I was just asking—doesn’t the user of a thing always seem to be different from what he’s using?
ALCIBIADES: It seems so.
SOCRATES: Let’s think about the shoemaker again. Does he cut with his tools only, o
r does he also cut with his hands?
ALCIBIADES: With his hands, too.
SOCRATES: So he uses his hands, too.
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And doesn’t he use his eyes, too, in shoemaking?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: Didn’t we agree that the person who uses something is different from the thing that he uses?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: So the shoemaker and the lyre-player are different from the hands and eyes they use in their work.
[e] ALCIBIADES: So it seems.
SOCRATES: Doesn’t a man use his whole body, too?
ALCIBIADES: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And we agreed that the user is different from the thing being used.
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: So a man is different from his own body.
ALCIBIADES: So it seems.
SOCRATES: Then what is a man?
ALCIBIADES: I don’t know what to say.
SOCRATES: Yes, you do—say that it’s what uses the body.
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
[130] SOCRATES: What else uses it but the soul?
ALCIBIADES: Nothing else.
SOCRATES: And doesn’t the soul rule the body?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: Now here’s something I don’t think anybody would disagree with.
ALCIBIADES: What?
SOCRATES: Man is one of three things.
ALCIBIADES: What things?
SOCRATES: The body, the soul, or the two of them together, the whole thing.
ALCIBIADES: Of course.
SOCRATES: But we agreed that man is that which rules the body.
[b] ALCIBIADES: Yes, we did agree to that.
SOCRATES: Does the body rule itself?
ALCIBIADES: It couldn’t.
SOCRATES: Because we said it was ruled.
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: So this can’t be what we’re looking for.
ALCIBIADES: Not likely.
SOCRATES: Well then, can the two of them together rule the body? Is this what man is?
ALCIBIADES: Yes, maybe that’s it.
SOCRATES: No, that’s the least likely of all. If one of them doesn’t take part in ruling, then surely no combination of the two of them could rule.
ALCIBIADES: You’re right.
SOCRATES: Since a man is neither his body, nor his body and soul together, [c] what remains, I think, is either that he’s nothing, or else, if he is something, he’s nothing other than his soul.
ALCIBIADES: Quite so.
SOCRATES: Do you need any clearer proof that the soul is the man?
ALCIBIADES: No, by Zeus, I think you’ve given ample proof.