Complete Works
Page 99
SOCRATES: So, can you say whether Aegisthus, who killed Agamemnon [c] in Argos, ruled over those you mean—the workers and the ordinary people, both men and women, all together, or over other people?
THEAGES: No; just those.
SOCRATES: Really? Didn’t Peleus (son of Aeacus) rule over the same sorts of people in Phthia?
THEAGES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And have you heard about how Periander (son of Cypselus) ruled in Corinth?
THEAGES: I have.
SOCRATES: Weren’t these the people he ruled over in his city?
THEAGES: Yes. [d]
SOCRATES: Well, then. Don’t you think that Archelaus (son of Perdiccas), who recently ruled in Macedonia, ruled over the same sorts of people?
THEAGES: I do.
SOCRATES: And whom do you suppose did Hippias (son of Pisistratus) rule over when he ruled this city? Weren’t they the same sort of people?
THEAGES: Of course.
SOCRATES: Tell me next, then, what name do Bakis, and Sibyl, and our own Amphilytus have?
THEAGES: “Oracle-givers,” Socrates. What else?
[e] SOCRATES: Right. Now try to answer me in the same way about these: what name do Hippias and Periander have, considering their style of ruling?
THEAGES: “Tyrants,” I suppose. What else could we call them?
SOCRATES: When someone wants to rule over all the people in the city together, doesn’t he want the same sort of rule as these people had—tyranny, and to be a tyrant?
THEAGES: Apparently.
SOCRATES: Isn’t this what you claim to desire?
THEAGES: It seems so, from what I said.
SOCRATES: You rascal! So you want to be a tyrant over us, and that’s [125] why you criticized your father all along for refusing to send you to some tyrant-teacher! And you, Demodocus, aren’t you ashamed for having known all along what he wants, and though you knew where you could have sent him to make him skilled in the wisdom he wants, you begrudge it to him and refuse to send him! But look here; now that he has accused you right in front of me, don’t you think you and I had better discuss this together? To whom should we send him? Whose company will make him a wise tyrant? [b]
DEMODOCUS: Yes, by Zeus, Socrates, let’s do it. It seems to me that this issue requires careful consideration.
SOCRATES: Not now, my good man; let’s first finish our examination of him.
DEMODOCUS: Let’s do that.
SOCRATES: Well now, what if we were to bring in Euripides, Theages? For Euripides somewhere says, “Wise company makes wise tyrants.” So if someone were to ask Euripides, “Euripides, in what are these men wise, [c] whose company, you say, makes tyrants wise? For example, if he said, “Wise company makes wise farmers,” and we asked: “Wise in what?,” what would his answer be? Wouldn’t it be: “in what’s pertinent to farming”?
THEAGES: Right.
SOCRATES: And what if he said, “Wise company makes wise cooks?” If we asked “wise in what?,” what would his answer be? Wouldn’t it be: “in what’s pertinent to cooking”?3
THEAGES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And what if “Wise company makes wise wrestlers” were what [d] he said? If we asked “Wise in what?,” wouldn’t he say, “in wrestling”?
THEAGES: Yes.
SOCRATES: But since he said: “Wise company makes wise tyrants,” we are asking, “What do you mean, Euripides, those who are wise in what?” What would he reply? What would he say it was this time?4
THEAGES: Well, by Zeus, I don’t know!
SOCRATES: Well, do you want me to tell you?
THEAGES: If you want to.
SOCRATES: These are the kinds of things that Anacreon said that Callicrite knew. Or don’t you know the song?
THEAGES: I do.
SOCRATES: Well, now, do you, too, desire to get together with some man who has the same skill as Callicrite (daughter of Cyane), and knows what [e] is pertinent to tyranny, as the poet said, so that you, too, may become a tyrant over us and the city?
THEAGES: All along, Socrates, you’ve been joking and playing games with me.
SOCRATES: Really? Don’t you claim to desire that wisdom by which you might rule over all the citizens? If you did this, would you be anything other than a tyrant?
THEAGES: I would pray, no doubt, to become a tyrant, over all people if possible, but if not, over as many as possible. And so would you, I think, [126] and everyone else. Or perhaps even to become a god. But that’s not what I said I wanted.
SOCRATES: Well, what is it you want, then? Didn’t you claim to want to rule over the citizens?
THEAGES: But not by violence, the way tyrants do. I want to rule over those who voluntarily submit. This is the way other people—men of good repute in the city—rule over people.
SOCRATES: So you mean you want to rule over people in the way Themistocles and Pericles and Cimon did,5 and whoever else was an outstanding politician.
THEAGES: Yes, by Zeus, that’s what I mean!
SOCRATES: Well, then, what if you wanted to become wise in horsemanship? To whom do you suppose you’d have to go, in order to become an [b] outstanding horseman? To the horsemen, right?
THEAGES: Right, by Zeus!
SOCRATES: Moreover, you’d go to those who are themselves outstanding at these things, and who have horses and work with them all the time, both their own horses and many other people’s, too?
THEAGES: Obviously.
SOCRATES: And what if you wanted to become wise in javelin-throwing? Don’t you suppose that you’d become wise by going to the javelin-throwers, [c] who have javelins, and work with them all the time, many of them, both others’ and their own?6
THEAGES: I think so.
SOCRATES: Then tell me: since you want to become wise in politics, do you suppose that you’ll become wise by going to anyone else than the politicians, the ones who are outstanding at politics, and work with their own city all the time, and many others, conducting business with both Greek and foreign cities? Or do you believe you’ll become wise in what these men do by associating with other people and not with the politicians themselves?
[d] THEAGES: I’ve heard, Socrates, about the arguments they say you offer, that the sons of the politicians are no better than the sons of the shoemakers.7 And I believe that what you say is really true, from what I’ve been able to see. So I’d be foolish if I thought that one of these men would give his wisdom to me, but wouldn’t be of any help to his own son, if indeed he could have been helpful to anyone else at all in these matters.
SOCRATES: Well, then, my dear sir, how would you deal with it, if, when you came to have a son, he pestered you like this, and said that he wanted [e] to become a good painter, and criticized you, his father, for refusing to spend money on him for this, and yet he didn’t respect those who practiced this very thing, the painters, and refused to learn from them? Or the flute-players, if he wanted to become a flute-player, or the lyre-players? Would you know what to do with him and where else to send him, if he refused to learn from them?
THEAGES: By Zeus, I wouldn’t.
[127] SOCRATES: So now, when you yourself are acting like this with your father, how can you be surprised and criticize him if he’s at a loss as to what to do with you and where to send you? And yet we’ll place you with any of the gentlemen in politics you want, of the Athenians at least, who’ll associate with you without charge. You won’t waste any money, and you’ll also gain a much better reputation among the general public than if you associate with someone else.
THEAGES: Well, then, Socrates—aren’t you one of these gentlemen? If you’ll agree to associate with me, that satisfies me, and I won’t look for anyone else.
[b] SOCRATES: What do you mean by that, Theages?
DEMODOCUS: Oh, Socrates, that’s not a bad idea at all! And you would oblige me as well; for there’s nothing I’d consider a greater stroke of luck than if he were content to associate with you and you agreed to associate with him. Indeed, I’m even ashamed
to say how much I want it! I beg you both: you—to agree to associate with this boy, and you—not to seek [c] to associate with anyone other than Socrates. You’ll thereby relieve me of a great load of worry. As it is now, I’m very afraid that he might fall in with some other person who’ll corrupt him.
THEAGES: Don’t worry any more about me now, father, if you’re able to persuade him to accept me!
DEMODOCUS: Excellent! Socrates, what I have to say from here on is now your business: to be brief, I’m prepared to make available to you both myself and what I own, as freely as I can, pretty well whatever you might [d] need—if you’ll welcome Theages here and be of whatever service you can.
SOCRATES: Demodocus, I’m not surprised at your seriousness, if you think that I could really help this boy of yours—for I don’t know what a sensible person should be more serious about than that his own son become the best he can be. But I do wonder where you got the idea that I would be better able than you yourself to help your son become a good citizen—and how he imagined that I’d help him more than you could. In the first place, you’re older than I am, and moreover you’ve served in many of the [e] highest offices for the Athenians, and are held in the highest esteem by those of the Anagyrus district, as well as by the rest of the city. You don’t see this in my case.
Moreover, if Theages here refuses to associate with the politicians and seeks some other men, who claim to be able to educate young people, there are a number of such men here: Prodicus of Ceos, and Gorgias of Leontini, and Polus of Acragas, and many others, who are so wise that [128] they go from city to city and persuade the most aristocratic and wealthiest of the young men—who can associate with any of the citizens they want without charge—these men persuade them to desert the others and associate only with them instead, to pay a great deal of money up front,8 and, on top of that, to be grateful! It would be reasonable for your son and you [b] to choose one of these men, but it wouldn’t be reasonable to choose me. I know none of these magnificent and splendid subjects. I wish I did! I am always saying, indeed, that I know virtually nothing, except a certain small subject—love, although on this subject, I’m thought to be amazing, better than anyone else, past or present.
THEAGES: You see, father? I really don’t think that Socrates is actually willing to associate with me, and yet I’d be prepared to if he were willing. But he’s only playing games with us. I know some people my age, and [c] some a little older, who were nothing before they associated with him, but after associating even for a very short time with him became obviously better than all of those they had been worse than before.
SOCRATES: Do you know how that’s possible, son of Demodocus?
THEAGES: Yes, by Zeus, I do: if you agree, I will become like them, too.
SOCRATES: No, sir; you don’t understand. I’ll have to explain it to you. [d] There’s a certain spiritual thing which, by divine dispensation, has been with me from childhood. It’s a voice that, when it comes, always signals me to turn away from what I’m about to do, but never prescribes anything. And if some one of my friends consults with me and the voice comes, it’s the same: it prohibits him and won’t allow him to act.
[e] I have witnesses for this: Surely you know Charmides (son of Glaucon) who’s become so good-looking. He once happened to be consulting with me when he was just about to train for the race at Nemea. As soon as he began to tell me that he was going to train, the voice came and I tried to stop him and said, “As you were speaking, the voice of the spiritual thing came to me. Don’t train!”
“Maybe,” he said, “its significance is that I won’t win; but even if I’m not going to win, I’ll benefit from the exercise I’ll get.” Saying this, he [129] trained; it would be worthwhile to ask him what happened to him as a result of his training.
Or if you want, ask Clitomachus, the brother of Timarchus, what Timarchus said to him when he was on his way to his death together with Euathlus the runner,9 who harbored Timarchus as a fugitive. This is what Timarchus said, according to him …
THEAGES: What?
SOCRATES: “Clitomachus,” he said, “I’m going off to die now, because I refused to trust Socrates.”
You might wonder why Timarchus would say that. I’ll explain. When [b] Timarchus and Philemon (son of Philemonides) got up to leave the banquet, they were planning to kill Nicias (son of Heroscamandrus). Only those two knew the plot.
But Timarchus, as he got up to leave, said to me, “What do you say, Socrates? You guys go on drinking, but I have to get up and go somewhere. I’ll be back a little later, perhaps.”
And then the voice came to me and I said to him, “No! Don’t get up! [c] For my familiar spiritual sign has come to me.” And he stayed.
But after a while he again started to go and said, “Well, I’m going, Socrates.”
Again the voice came, and so again I compelled him to stay. The third time, wanting me not to notice, he got up without saying anything more to me, watching until I had my attention elsewhere. Thus it was that he went off and did what led him to his death. And this is why he spoke to his brother in the way I just told you—he was going to his death because he hadn’t trusted me.
[d] Moreover, many people can tell you what I said about the destruction of the army in Sicily.10 You can hear about past events from those who know the details, but it’s still possible to test the sign, to see if it means anything. For when the good-looking Sannio went out on campaign, the sign came to me; and he’s now with Thrasyllus on an expedition to Ephesus and the rest of Ionia. So I suppose he’ll either die or else come close to it, and I’m really afraid about the rest of that business.11
I’ve told you all these things because this spiritual thing has absolute [e] power in my dealings with those who associate with me. On the one hand, it opposes many, and it’s impossible for them to be helped by associating with me, so I can’t associate with them. On the other hand, it does not prevent my associating with many others, but it is of no help to them. Those whose association with me the power of the spiritual thing assists, however—these are the ones you’ve noticed, for they make rapid progress [130] right away. And of these, again, who make progress, some are helped in a secure and permanent way, whereas many make wonderful progress as long as they’re with me, but when they go away from me they’re again no different from anyone else.
This is what happened to Aristides (son of Lysimachus, grandson of Aristides). While he was associating with me he made tremendous progress in a short time; but then there was some military expedition and he sailed away. On his return he learned that Thucydides (son of Melesias, grandson of Thucydides)12 was associating with me. Thucydides had quarrelled with [b] me the day before about some arguments that had come up.
When Aristides saw me, after greeting me and talking of other things, he said, “I hear, Socrates, that Thucydides is rather indignant and irritated with you, as if he were someone important.”
“Yes, that’s right,” I said.
“Doesn’t he know,” he said, “what a slave13 he was before he began associating with you?”
“Apparently not, by the gods,” I said.
“You know, Socrates, he said, “I am also in a ridiculous situation!”
“Why?” I said. [c]
“Because,” he said, “before I sailed away, I was able to discuss things with anyone, and never came off worse than anyone in arguments; I even tried to associate with the cleverest people. But now, on the contrary, whenever I even see anybody with any education, I avoid them. That’s how ashamed I am of my incompetence.”
“Did you lose your ability all of a sudden,” I asked, “or little by little?”
“Little by little,” he said.
“And when you had your ability,” I said, “Did you have it by learning something from me, or some other way?” [d]
“By the gods, Socrates, you’re not going to believe this, but it’s true! I’ve never learned anything from you, as you know. But I made progress whenever I was
with you, even if I was only in the same house and not in the same room—but more when I was in the same room. And it seemed, to me at least, that when I was in the same room and looked at you when you were speaking, I made much more progress than when I looked away. [e] And I made by far the most and greatest progress when I sat right beside you, and physically held on to you or touched you. But now,” he said, “all that condition has trickled away.”
So this is how it is when you associate with me, Theages. If it’s favored by the god, you’ll make great and rapid progress; if not, you won’t. So think about it; wouldn’t it be safer for you to become educated in the company of somebody who has control over the way he benefits people rather than taking your chances with me?
[131] THEAGES: It seems to me, Socrates, that we should do this: let’s test this spiritual thing by associating with one another. If it allows us, then that’s what’s best; if not, then we’ll immediately think about what we should do—whether to go and associate with someone else, or try to appease the divine thing that comes to you with prayers and sacrifices and any other way the diviners might suggest.
DEMODOCUS: Don’t oppose the boy any more in these things, Socrates; for Theages is right.
SOCRATES: Well, if it seems that this is what we ought to do, then let’s do it.
1. The name seems to mean either “guided by god” or “revered by god” or “revering god.”
2. Reading eti kai hetera in a7.
3. Accepting the emendation to tōn ta mageirika in c10.
4. Accepting an emendation to poia au in d6.
5. Three of the most famous leaders of democratic Athens.
6. Accepting the conjectural deletion of akontiois in c1.
7. Cf. Alcibiades 118d–119a; Meno 93a–94e; Protagoras 319e–320b.
8. Accepting an emendation to prokatatithentas in a6.
9. Accepting a conjectural deletion of euthu tou daimoniou in a3.
10. Socrates refers to the ill-fated Sicilian expedition of 415–413 B.C., in which the Athenian invasion force was almost totally lost.