Complete Works

by Plato, Cooper, John M. , Hutchinson, D. S.

  For us nothing, but for the Delphic Apollo it remains to enact the greatest, finest, and first of laws.

  What laws are those?

  Those having to do with the establishing of temples, sacrifices, and other forms of service to gods, daemons, and heroes, the burial of the dead, and the services that ensure their favor. We have no knowledge of these things, and in establishing our city, if we have any understanding, we won’t be persuaded to trust them to anyone other than the ancestral guide. And [c] this god, sitting upon the rock at the center of the earth,4 is without a doubt the ancestral guide on these matters for all people.

  Nicely put. And that’s what we must do.

  Well, son of Ariston, your city might now be said to be established. The [d] next step is to get an adequate light somewhere and to call upon your brother as well as Polemarchus and the others, so as to look inside it and see where the justice and the injustice might be in it, what the difference between them is, and which of the two the person who is to be happy should possess, whether its possession is unnoticed by all the gods and human beings or not.

  You’re talking nonsense, Glaucon said. You promised to look for them yourself because you said it was impious for you not to come to the rescue of justice in every way you could. [e]

  That’s true, and I must do what I promised, but you’ll have to help.

  We will.

  I hope to find it in this way. I think our city, if indeed it has been correctly founded, is completely good.

  Necessarily so.

  Clearly, then, it is wise, courageous, moderate, and just.

  Clearly.

  Then, if we find any of these in it, what’s left over will be the ones we haven’t found?

  Of course. [428]

  Therefore, as with any other four things, if we were looking for any one of them in something and recognized it first, that would be enough for us, but if we recognized the other three first, this itself would be sufficient to enable us to recognize what we are looking for. Clearly it couldn’t be anything other than what’s left over.

  That’s right.

  Therefore, since there are four virtues, mustn’t we look for them in the same way?

  Clearly.

  Now, the first thing I think I can see clearly in the city is wisdom, and [b] there seems to be something odd about it.

  What’s that?

  I think that the city we described is really wise. And that’s because it has good judgment, isn’t it?

  Yes.

  Now, this very thing, good judgment, is clearly some kind of knowledge, for it’s through knowledge, not ignorance, that people judge well.

  Clearly.

  But there are many kinds of knowledge in the city.

  Of course.

  Is it because of the knowledge possessed by its carpenters, then, that the city is to be called wise and sound in judgment?

  [c] Not at all. It’s called skilled in carpentry because of that.

  Then it isn’t to be called wise because of the knowledge by which it arranges to have the best wooden implements.

  No, indeed.

  What about the knowledge of bronze items or the like?

  It isn’t because of any knowledge of that sort.

  Nor because of the knowledge of how to raise a harvest from the earth, for it’s called skilled in farming because of that.

  I should think so.

  Then, is there some knowledge possessed by some of the citizens in the city we just founded that doesn’t judge about any particular matter but about the city as a whole and the maintenance of good relations, both [d] internally and with other cities?

  There is indeed.

  What is this knowledge, and who has it?

  It is guardianship, and it is possessed by those rulers we just now called complete guardians.

  Then, what does this knowledge entitle you to say about the city?

  That it has good judgment and is really wise.

  Who do you think that there will be more of in our city, metal-workers [e] or these true guardians?

  There will be far more metal-workers.

  Indeed, of all those who are called by a certain name because they have some kind of knowledge, aren’t the guardians the least numerous?

  By far.

  Then, a whole city established according to nature would be wise because of the smallest class and part in it, namely, the governing or ruling one. And to this class, which seems to be by nature the smallest, belongs a share of the knowledge that alone among all the other kinds of knowledge [429] is to be called wisdom.

  That’s completely true.

  Then we’ve found one of the four virtues, as well as its place in the city, though I don’t know how we found it.

  Our way of finding it seems good enough to me.

  And surely courage and the part of the city it’s in, the part on account of which the city is called courageous, aren’t difficult to see.

  How is that?

  Who, in calling the city cowardly or courageous, would look anywhere [b] other than to the part of it that fights and does battle on its behalf?

  No one would look anywhere else.

  At any rate, I don’t think that the courage or cowardice of its other citizens would cause the city itself to be called either courageous or cowardly.

  No, it wouldn’t.

  The city is courageous, then, because of a part of itself that has the power to preserve through everything its belief about what things are to be feared, namely, that they are the things and kinds of things that the lawgiver [c] declared to be such in the course of educating it. Or don’t you call that courage?

  I don’t completely understand what you mean. Please, say it again.

  I mean that courage is a kind of preservation.

  What sort of preservation?

  That preservation of the belief that has been inculcated by the law through education about what things and sorts of things are to be feared. And by preserving this belief “through everything,” I mean preserving it and not abandoning it because of pains, pleasures, desires, or fears. If you [d] like, I’ll compare it to something I think it resembles.

  I’d like that.

  You know that dyers, who want to dye wool purple, first pick out from the many colors of wool the one that is naturally white, then they carefully prepare this in various ways, so that it will absorb the color as well as possible, and only at that point do they apply the purple dye. When something is dyed in this way, the color is fast—no amount of washing, [e] whether with soap or without it, can remove it. But you also know what happens to material if it hasn’t been dyed in this way, but instead is dyed purple or some other color without careful preparation.

  I know that it looks washed out and ridiculous.

  Then, you should understand that, as far as we could, we were doing something similar when we selected our soldiers and educated them in music and physical training. What we were contriving was nothing other [430] than this: That because they had the proper nature and upbringing, they would absorb the laws in the finest possible way, just like a dye, so that their belief about what they should fear and all the rest would become so fast that even such extremely effective detergents as pleasure, pain, fear, and desire wouldn’t wash it out—and pleasure is much more potent than [b] any powder, washing soda, or soap. This power to preserve through everything the correct and law-inculcated belief about what is to be feared and what isn’t is what I call courage, unless, of course, you say otherwise.

  I have nothing different to say, for I assume that you don’t consider the correct belief about these same things, which you find in animals and slaves, and which is not the result of education, to be inculcated by law, and that you don’t call it courage but something else.

  [c] That’s absolutely true.

  Then I accept your account of courage.

  Accept it instead as my account of civic courage, and you will be right. We’ll discuss courage more fully some othe
r time, if you like. At present, our inquiry concerns not it but justice. And what we’ve said is sufficient for that purpose.

  You’re quite right.

  There are now two things left for us to find in the city, namely, moderation5 [d] and—the goal of our entire inquiry—justice.

  That’s right.

  Is there a way we could find justice so as not to have to bother with moderation any further?

  I don’t know any, and I wouldn’t want justice to appear first if that means that we won’t investigate moderation. So if you want to please me, look for the latter first.

  [e] I’m certainly willing. It would be wrong not to be.

  Look, then.

  We will. Seen from here, it is more like a kind of consonance and harmony than the previous ones.

  In what way?

  Moderation is surely a kind of order, the mastery of certain kinds of pleasures and desires. People indicate as much when they use the phrase “self-control” and other similar phrases. I don’t know just what they mean by them, but they are, so to speak, like tracks or clues that moderation has left behind in language. Isn’t that so?

  Absolutely.

  Yet isn’t the expression “self-control” ridiculous? The stronger self that does the controlling is the same as the weaker self that gets controlled, so [431] that only one person is referred to in all such expressions.

  Of course.

  Nonetheless, the expression is apparently trying to indicate that, in the soul of that very person, there is a better part and a worse one and that, whenever the naturally better part is in control of the worse, this is expressed by saying that the person is self-controlled or master of himself. At any rate, one praises someone by calling him self-controlled. But when, on the other hand, the smaller and better part is overpowered by the larger, because of bad upbringing or bad company, this is called being self-defeated or licentious and is a reproach. [b]

  Appropriately so.

  Take a look at our new city, and you’ll find one of these in it. You’ll say that it is rightly called self-controlled, if indeed something in which the better rules the worse is properly called moderate and self-controlled.

  I am looking, and what you say is true.

  Now, one finds all kinds of diverse desires, pleasures, and pains, mostly in children, women, household slaves, and in those of the inferior majority [c] who are called free.

  That’s right.

  But you meet with the desires that are simple, measured, and directed by calculation in accordance with understanding and correct belief only in the few people who are born with the best natures and receive the best education.

  That’s true.

  Then, don’t you see that in your city, too, the desires of the inferior many are controlled by the wisdom and desires of the superior few? [d]

  I do.

  Therefore, if any city is said to be in control of itself and of its pleasures and desires, it is this one.

  Absolutely.

  And isn’t it, therefore, also moderate because of all this?

  It is.

  And, further, if indeed the ruler and the ruled in any city share the same [e] belief about who should rule, it is in this one. Or don’t you agree?

  I agree entirely.

  And when the citizens agree in this way, in which of them do you say moderation is located? In the ruler or the ruled?

  I suppose in both.

  Then, you see how right we were to divine that moderation resembles a kind of harmony?

  How so?

  Because, unlike courage and wisdom, each of which resides in one part, making the city brave and wise respectively, moderation spreads throughout the whole. It makes the weakest, the strongest, and those in [432] between—whether in regard to reason, physical strength, numbers, wealth, or anything else—all sing the same song together. And this unanimity, this agreement between the naturally worse and the naturally better as to which of the two is to rule both in the city and in each one, is rightly called moderation.

  [b] I agree completely.

  All right. We’ve now found, at least from the point of view of our present beliefs, three out of the four virtues in our city. So what kind of virtue is left, then, that makes the city share even further in virtue? Surely, it’s clear that it is justice.

  That is clear.

  Then, Glaucon, we must station ourselves like hunters surrounding a wood and focus our understanding, so that justice doesn’t escape us and vanish into obscurity, for obviously it’s around here somewhere. So look [c] and try eagerly to catch sight of it, and if you happen to see it before I do, you can tell me about it.

  I wish I could, but you’ll make better use of me if you take me to be a follower who can see things when you point them out to him.

  Follow, then, and join me in a prayer.

  I’ll do that, just so long as you lead.

  I certainly will, though the place seems to be impenetrable and full of shadows. It is certainly dark and hard to search through. But all the same, we must go on.

  [d] Indeed we must.

  And then I caught sight of something. Ah ha! Glaucon, it looks as though there’s a track here, so it seems that our quarry won’t altogether escape us.

  That’s good news.

  Either that, or we’ve just been stupid.

  In what way?

  Because what we are looking for seems to have been rolling around at our feet from the very beginning, and we didn’t see it, which was ridiculous of us. Just as people sometimes search for the very thing they are holding [e] in their hands, so we didn’t look in the right direction but gazed off into the distance, and that’s probably why we didn’t notice it.

  What do you mean?

  I mean that, though we’ve been talking and hearing about it for a long time, I think we didn’t understand what we were saying or that, in a way, we were talking about justice.

  That’s a long prelude for someone who wants to hear the answer.

  [433] Then listen and see whether there’s anything in what I say. Justice, I think, is exactly what we said must be established throughout the city when we were founding it—either that or some form of it. We stated, and often repeated, if you remember, that everyone must practice one of the occupations in the city for which he is naturally best suited.

  Yes, we did keep saying that.

  Moreover, we’ve heard many people say and have often said ourselves that justice is doing one’s own work and not meddling with what isn’t [b] one’s own.

  Yes, we have.

  Then, it turns out that this doing one’s own work—provided that it comes to be in a certain way—is justice. And do you know what I take as evidence of this?

  No, tell me.

  I think that this is what was left over in the city when moderation, courage, and wisdom have been found. It is the power that makes it possible for them to grow in the city and that preserves them when they’ve grown for as long as it remains there itself. And of course we said that [c] justice would be what was left over when we had found the other three.

  Yes, that must be so.

  And surely, if we had to decide which of the four will make the city good by its presence, it would be a hard decision. Is it the agreement in belief between the rulers and the ruled? Or the preservation among the soldiers of the law-inspired belief about what is to be feared and what isn’t? Or the wisdom and guardianship of the rulers? Or is it, above all, [d] the fact that every child, woman, slave, freeman, craftsman, ruler, and ruled each does his own work and doesn’t meddle with what is other people’s?

  How could this fail to be a hard decision?

  It seems, then, that the power that consists in everyone’s doing his own work rivals wisdom, moderation, and courage in its contribution to the virtue of the city. [e]

  It certainly does.

  And wouldn’t you call this rival to the others in its contribution to the city’s virtue justice?

  Absolutely.

/>   Look at it this way if you want to be convinced. Won’t you order your rulers to act as judges in the city’s courts?

  Of course.

  And won’t their sole aim in delivering judgments be that no citizen should have what belongs to another or be deprived of what is his own?

  They’ll have no aim but that.

  Because that is just?

  Yes.

  Therefore, from this point of view also, the having and doing of one’s own would be accepted as justice. [434]

  That’s right.

  Consider, then, and see whether you agree with me about this. If a carpenter attempts to do the work of a cobbler, or a cobbler that of a carpenter, or they exchange their tools or honors with one another, or if the same person tries to do both jobs, and all other such exchanges are made, do you think that does any great harm to the city?

  Not much.

  But I suppose that when someone, who is by nature a craftsman or some other kind of money-maker, is puffed up by wealth, or by having a majority of votes, or by his own strength, or by some other such thing, and attempts [b] to enter the class of soldiers, or one of the unworthy soldiers tries to enter that of the judges and guardians, and these exchange their tools and honors, or when the same person tries to do all these things at once, then I think you’ll agree that these exchanges and this sort of meddling bring the city to ruin.

  Absolutely.

  Meddling and exchange between these three classes, then, is the greatest harm that can happen to the city and would rightly be called the worst [c] thing someone could do to it.

  Exactly.

  And wouldn’t you say that the worst thing that someone could do to his city is injustice?

  Of course.

  Then, that exchange and meddling is injustice. Or to put it the other way around: For the money-making, auxiliary, and guardian classes each to do its own work in the city, is the opposite. That’s justice, isn’t it, and makes the city just?

  [d] I agree. Justice is that and nothing else.

  Let’s not take that as secure just yet, but if we find that the same form, when it comes to be in each individual person, is accepted as justice there as well, we can assent to it. What else can we say? But if that isn’t what we find, we must look for something else to be justice. For the moment, however, let’s complete the present inquiry. We thought that, if we first tried to observe justice in some larger thing that possessed it, this would make it easier to observe in a single individual.6 We agreed that this larger thing is a city, and so we established the best city we could, knowing well [e] that justice would be in one that was good. So, let’s apply what has come to light in the city to an individual, and if it is accepted there, all will be well. But if something different is found in the individual, then we must go back and test that on the city. And if we do this, and compare them [435] side by side, we might well make justice light up as if we were rubbing fire-sticks together. And, when it has come to light, we can get a secure grip on it for ourselves.