Complete Works
Page 257
(aidōs), modesty: voluntarily drawing back from reckless behavior, according to what is right and seems best; voluntarily holding to what is best; being cautious to avoid justified [d] criticism.
(eleutheria), freedom: being in control of one’s life; having sole authority in all respects; power to do what one likes in life; being unsparing in using and possessing property.
(eleutheriotēs), liberality: the proper state in respect of money-making; appropriate expenditure4 and saving of property.
(praiotēs), even temper: suppression of the impulse caused by anger; an harmonious blend of the soul.
(kosmiotēs), decorum: voluntary submission to what seems best; being disciplined in moving the body.
(eudaimonia), success in life: the good composed of all goods; an ability which suffices for living well; perfection in respect of virtue; resources sufficient [e] for a living creature.
(megaloprepeia), magnificence: being estimable, according to the correct reasoning of the most dignified of men.5
(anchinoia), quick wit: talent of the soul which enables its possessor to hit upon what is necessary in each case; mental penetration.
(chrēstotēs), honesty: moral sincerity, together with intelligence; excellence of character.
(kalokagathia), moral perfection: the state which decides to do the best things.
(megalopsuchia), magnanimity: nobility in dealing with events; magnificence of soul, together with reason.
(philanthrōpia), love of humanity, or kindness: the easy-going character state of being friendly to people; the state of being helpful to people; the trait of gratefulness; memory, together with helpfulness.
(eusebeia), piety: justice concerning the gods; the ability to serve the gods voluntarily; [413] the correct conception of the honor due to gods; knowledge of the honor due to gods.
(agathon), good: that which is for its own sake.
(aphobia), fearlessness: the state in which we are not subject to fear.
(apatheia), passionlessness: the state in which we are not subject to passions.
(eirēnē), peace: a quiet period in respect of military conflict.
(rāithumia), laziness: inertia of the soul; having no passion in the spirited part.
(deinotēs), cleverness: the disposition which enables its possessor to hit upon his particular objective.
(philia), friendship: agreeing about what is admirable and just; deciding on the same way of life; having the same views about moral decision and moral [b] conduct; agreeing on a way of life; sharing on the basis of benevolence; sharing in rendering and accepting favors.
(eugeneia), nobility: the virtue of a noble character; a soul well cultivated in words and deeds.
(hairesis), selection: correct evaluation.
(eunoia), benevolence: kindliness of a man towards another.
(oikeiotēs), kinship: sharing in the same descent.
(homonoia), agreement: sharing everything that is on one’s mind;6 harmony of thoughts and assumptions.
(agapēsis), contentment: welcoming everything.
(politikē), political skill: the knowledge of what is admirable and useful; the knowledge of how to produce justice in a city. [c]
(hetairia), camaraderie: the friendship among people of the same age formed by keeping company with each other.
(euboulia), good counsel: the inborn virtue of reasoning.
(pistis), faith: the conception7 that things are as they appear to one; firmness of character.
(alētheia), truth, veracity: the correct state expressed in affirmation and denial; edge of truths.
(boulēsis), will: wanting, based on correct reason; reasonable desire; natural desire, based on reason.
(sumbouleusis), consultation: advice to another person about conduct, how he should conduct himself.
(eukairia), good timing: hitting upon the right time to do something or have something done to one. [d]
(eulabeia), caution: being on guard against what is bad; being sure to be on guard.
(taxis), order: functional similarity in all the mutual elements of a whole; due proportion in a society; cause of all the mutual elements of a whole; due proportion in respect of learning.8
(prosexis), attention: the effort the soul makes to learn something.
(euphuïa), talent: speed in learning; good natural9 inheritance; natural virtue.
(eumatheia), cleverness: the mental talent to learn quickly.
(dikē), judgment, trial: authoritative declaration about a disputed matter; dispute10 about whether or not there has been injustice.
(eunomia), law-abidingness: obedience to good laws.
(euphrosunē), cheerfulness: joy in doing what a temperate man does.
(timē), honor: the gift of good things given for virtuous deeds; the dignity conferred by virtue; dignified bearing; the cultivation of one’s dignity.
(prothumia), zeal: manifestation of an active will.
(charis), charity: voluntary beneficence; giving up something good which is of service at an opportune moment.
(homonoia), concord: opinion shared between those who govern and those who are governed about how to govern and be governed.
(politeia), republic: community of many men, self-sufficient for living successfully; community of many under the [414] rule of law.
(pronoia), foresight, providence: preparation for some future event.
(boulē), deliberation: investigation about what would be beneficial in the future.
(nikē), victory: ability triumphant in a competition.
(euporia), inventiveness: good judgment which triumphs over something said.
(dōrea), gift: exchange of favors.
(kairos), opportunity: the ideal time for something beneficial; the time that contributes to obtaining something good.
(mnēmē), memory: disposition of the soul which guards over the truth which resides in it.
(ennoia), reflection: intense thinking.
(noēsis), intuition: the starting point of knowledge.
(hagneia), piety: caution about mistakes with respect to the gods; paying service, in a normal way, to the honor of a [b] god.
(manteia), divining: the knowledge which predicts events without proof.
(mantikē), divination: the knowledge which contemplates the present and future of mortal beings.
(sophia), wisdom: non-hypothetical knowledge; knowledge of what always exists; knowledge which contemplates the cause of beings.
(philosophia), philosophy: desire for the knowledge of what always exists; the state which contemplates the truth, what makes it true; cultivation of the soul, based on correct reason.
(epistēmē), knowledge: conception of the soul which cannot be dislodged by reasoning; ability to conceive one or more things which cannot be dislodged by reasoning; true argument which cannot be dislodged by thinking.
(doxa), opinion: conception which is open to persuasion by reason; fluctuation in reasoning; the thinking which is led by to the false as well as the true.
(aisthēsis), perception: fluctuation in the soul; movement of the mind via the body;11 announcement for the benefit of human beings, from which arises a non-rational ability in the soul to recognize things through the body.
(hexis), state: disposition of the soul on account of which people are said to be of a [d] certain sort.
(phōnē), voiced sound: an emission of thought through the mouth.
(logos), speech: voice articulated in letters capable of indicating each existing thing; linguistic sound compounded of nouns and verbs, without music.
(onoma), noun: uncompounded linguistic sound expressing both what is predicated in the essence and everything which is not said of a thing in its own right.
(dialektos), language, linguistic expression: human sound with letters; a common sign which is expressive, without music.
(sullabē), syllable: articulaction of the human voice that can be written.
(horos), definition: something said, comprised of genus and differentia.
(tekmērion), evidence: proof of the non-evident.
(apodeixis), proof: true argument reasoning to a conclusion; argument that declares something through what is previously known.
(stoicheion phōnēs), element of voiced sound: uncompounded voiced sound, the reason that the other voiced sounds are voiced sounds.
(ōphelimon), utility: what causes something to be well off; what causes good.
(sumpheron), beneficial: what conduces to the good.
(agathon), good: what causes the preservation of beings; the cause toward which everything tends, from which is derived what should be chosen.
(sōphron), self-controlled: being orderly in the soul.
(dikaion), just: prescription of law which produces justice. [415]
(hekousion), voluntary: what produces its own action; what is chosen for itself; what is achieved with thinking.
(eleutheron), free: what rules itself.
(metrion), moderate: in between excess and insufficiency, satisfying the strictures of skill.
(metron), measure: the mean between excess and insufficiency.
(athlon aretēs), prize of virtue: the reward worth choosing for its own sake.
(athanasia), immortality: the eternal duration of a living substance.12
(hosion), holy: service to a god which is agreeable to the god.
(heortē), festival: time that is sacred by law.
(anthrōpos), man: wingless, two-footed, flat-fingernailed animal; the only being capable of acquiring [b] rational knowledge.
(thusia), sacrifice: offering of a victim to a god.
(euchē), prayer: request by men to the gods for what is good or seems good.
(basileus), king: an officer who is legally beyond accountability; an officer of a political organization.
(archē), command: being in charge of everything.
(exousia), legal authority: power granted by law.
(nomothetēs), lawgiver: the maker of the laws under which a city is to be governed.
(nomos), law: political judgment of many people, not limited to a certain time.
(hypothesis), hypothesis: indemonstrable first principle; summary of the principal points in a discourse.
(psēphisma), decree: political judgment limited to a certain time.
(politikos), statesman: one who knows how to organize a city.
(polis), city-state: the place of residence of a number of men who follow decisions made in being under the same law.
(poleōs aretē), virtue of a city: the establishment of a good constitution.
(polemikē), military skill: having experience of war.
(summachia), military alliance: community of warring parties.
(sōtēria), preservation: keeping safe and sound.
(turannos), dictator: an officer of a city who rules according to his own ideas.
(sophistēs), sophist: paid hunter of rich and distinguished young men.
(ploutos), wealth: having sufficient possessions to live happily; an abundance of property which conduces to happiness.
(parakatathēkē), deposit: something given on trust.
(katharsis), purification: the separation of the worse from the better.
(nikan), being victorious: prevailing in a conflict.
(agathos anthrōpos), good person: the sort of person who can achieve what is good for a human being.
(sōphrōn), self-controlled: person having moderate desires.
(enkratēs), self-restrained: one who overpowers the parts of the soul when they are contrary to right reason.
(spoudaios), excellent: he who is completely good; he who has the virtue proper to human [e] beings.
(sunnoia), worry: an irrational and disturbing thought.
(dusmathia), stupidity: slowness in learning.
(despoteia), rule over slaves: just authority which is accountable to nobody.
(aphilosophia), lack of philosophy: the state whose possessor is a hater of argument.
(phobos), fear: consternation of the soul in expectation of something bad.
(thumos), passion: forceful impulse of the non-rational part of the soul, without being disordered by reasoning and thought.13
(ekplēxis), consternation: fear in the expectation of something bad.
(kolakeia), flattery: keeping company for the sake of pleasure, without considering what is best; the state of socializing for pleasure in excess of what is moderate.
(orgē), anger: the urging of the passionate part of the soul for vengeance.
(hubris), assault: injustice driving one to dishonor [416] someone.
(akrasia), lack of self-restraint: the violent state, without correct reasoning, which is oriented towards what seems to be pleasant.
(oknos), laziness: running away from labor; cowardice which paralyzes impulses.
(archē), origin: first cause of being.
(diabolē), slander: the alienation of friends by speech.
(kairos), opportunity: the time it is appropriate to do each thing or undergo it.
(adikia), injustice: the state of despising the laws.
(endeia), poverty: being short of goods.
(aischunē), shame: fear in expectation of bad reputation.
(alazoneia), pretentiousness: the state which makes those who lack a good or goods pretend to have it or them.
(hamartia), error: an action against correct reasoning.
(phthonos), envy: being distressed by the goods of one’s friends, either present or past.
(anaischuntia), shamelessness: the state of the soul which endures dishonor for the sake of profit.
(thrasutēs), temerity: excessive boldness in face of dangers which one should not face.
(philotimia), vanity: the state of the soul which is lavish with every expense without thinking.
(kakophuïa), bad nature: badness in nature and an error of what is natural; disease of what is natural.
(elpis), hope: the expectation of good.
(mania), madness: the state which is destructive of true conception.
(lalia), talkativeness: irrational lack of self-restraint in speech.
(enantiotēs), contrariety: the greatest distance between objects of the same genus which fall under some difference.
(akousion), involuntary: what is accomplished without thinking.
(paideia), education: the ability that is of service to the soul.
(paideusis), educating: bestowing education.
(nomothetikē), legislative skill: knowledge of how to produce a good city.
(nouthetēsis), admonition: speech which blames with judgment; speech for the sake of keeping someone from a mistake.
(boētheia), help: the prevention of something bad, either present or about to happen.
(kolasis), chastisement: treatment given to a soul concerning a past mistake.
(dunamis), ability: superiority in word or deed; the state which makes its possessor be able; natural strength.
(sōizein), save: to keep safe and sound.
1. Omitting echon in d3.
2. Reading epistēmē poiētikē eudaimonias after kakōn in d6 (a misprint in Burnet).
3. Accepting the conjecture adeilōn for adēlōn in b1.
4. Accepting the conjecture proesis for prosthesis in d4–5.
5. Accepting the conjecture tou semnotatou in e2–3.
6. Accepting the conjecture tōn en nōi ontōn for tōn ontōn in b8.
7. Accepting a conjectural transposition of orthē from c4 to c6.
8. Reading summetria pros to mathein in d4.
9. Reading phuseōs in d6.
10. Accepting the conjectural restoration Dikē apophasis … pragmatos amphisbētēsis peri tou adikein ē mē.
11. Moving the semicolon from after kinēsis to after sōmatos in c5, and deleting psuchēs.
12. Accepting the emendation ousias empsuchou aïdios monē in a8.
13. Emending nous taxeōs to kai nou taxeōs in e6.
ON JUSTICE
&n
bsp; Translated by Andrew S. Becker.
Socrates discusses with a friend several disjointed questions about justice. He makes the following points: it is speech that decides what is just and unjust (though that does not answer the question what the just is); the same acts can be just or unjust, depending on the situation; justice is knowledge of the right time to do things; people who are unjust are unwillingly unjust. All these are familiar Socratic ideas, presented in an unusually bald and unattractive format.
On Justice verges on incoherence because of its brevity and abrupt transitions. One explanation might be that it is not an original work, but is excerpted or adapted from earlier Socratic literature. The argument that the same actions (even deceiving and stealing) are sometimes just and sometimes unjust, depending on the situation, is urged by Socrates in Xenophon, Memoirs of Socrates IV.ii.12–20, and Plato has Socrates use a similar argument for situational ethics ( Republic 331b–d). Xenophon often adapted earlier Socratic texts, in this case apparently the same text or texts as the author or compiler of On Justice.
That Socrates argued for the propriety of deceiving and stealing was one of the complaints urged by Polycrates in his Accusation of Socrates, written in 393/2 B.C. (a speech now lost but whose contents can be partly inferred from the various replies it provoked, especially the Apology of Libanius, the fourth century A.D. teacher of rhetoric). If Polycrates was replying to a Socratic source excerpted or adapted by the author of On Justice, we can only guess which it was, but the most attractive possibility is a (now lost) dialogue by Antisthenes called On Law or On Rightness and Justice.
Plato’s influence can be felt at one point only: when Socrates argues, apparently needlessly, that since people are unwillingly unjust their unjust conduct must also be unwilling, the author is insisting on a point that Plato felt he needed to insist on at the end of his life (Laws 860c–e). If the dialogue was intended to support Plato’s view, it can be dated to after the middle of the fourth century B.C., perhaps well after.
Some manuscripts of On Justice list as speakers ‘Socrates, Friend’, others say ‘Socrates, Anonymous’, and one says ‘Socrates, Clinias’; that Socrates is a speaker is clear from the dialogue itself, but the other three appellations are evidently guesses by later scholars. So it seems to have been transmitted during antiquity without any indication of who the speakers were. The same is true of the dialogue labeled On Virtue; these two dialogues also lack titles of a normal Platonic sort and may be among those said in ancient lists of Platonic works to be ‘without a heading’. In this translation, we have decided to call the unknown interlocutor ‘Friend’.