The Israel-Arab Reader

by Walter Laqueur

  Despite that element of protest against the Arab states embodied in the Palestinians’ organizations, they could be created only with the help of some Arab official quarters. The PLO did not come into being only by Palestinian spontaneity. It was established from above by the Summit Meetings and derived its authority and part of its finances from them. The Fatah acted under the aegis of the Syrian radical Baath. Thus protest and dependence intermingled.

  Palestinian activism came in the early 1960s to be cherished widely in Palestinian circles. Palestinian initiative seemed vital after the Arab states’ failure. Mr. Nashashibi ends his book as follows: “Oh Palestinians, if you do not restore the land, you will not return to it, and it will not return to you.”

  An important factor in the Palestinian move for the “re-Palestinization” of the conflict was the influence of the Algerian War. It was a source of both pride and inspiration. If the Algerians prevailed over a great power such as France, so it was argued, there was hope in defeating small Israel.

  Hence the effort to draw analogies between Algeria and Palestine and the effort to describe Israel as only another colonialist case, whose fate is doomed as part of the general historical trend of the liquidation of colonies.

  Palestinian ideologists argued that previous presentation of the conflict as an inter-state one was erroneous. It was an Imperialist ruse aimed at excluding the Palestinians from their natural role, thus “liquidating” the conflict. This argument was, too, an apologia for the Arabs themselves as they too described the conflict as international. They were only deluded and their failing was only naïvety. Both Israel and the Imperialists conspired to blur the “liberation” aspect of the conflict.

  Naming the conflict a “War of National Liberation” after it had already reached a mature age, and the identification of “War of National Liberation” with guerrilla warfare, produced among Palestinians an inclination to project it backwards and describe the conflict as if the Palestinians had waged continuous popular guerrilla warfare against the Jews. The history of the events in Palestine from World War I is being rewritten to appear as a continuous popular resistance and heroic uprisings. The blame for failure is focused on the leadership. Naji Alush in his book Arab Resistance in Palestine 1917-1948 gives a Marxist explanation for this failing. Because of its class interests the Palestinian leadership tied its destiny to colonialism, and betrayed the national cause.

  Palestinian radio programmes abound with plays and descriptions of brave resistance against the Jews in Palestine. Small ambushes or attacks on Jewish settlers are elevated into heroic acts of guerrilla warfare. Thus, heroism anticipated in the future is reinforced by inspiration drawn from the past, and if the real past cannot be a source of such inspiration, some retouching is done. Such an account may have another merit: it implies that the Palestinians are not only imitators of Mao and Che, but preceded them.

  The allure of activism is presumably very powerful for the Palestinians. The Palestinians suffered not only from the agony of defeat, deprivation, refugee status, living in camps, but from contempt by the other Arabs. Losing their land and property was a blow to their dignity, as traditionally the criterion for position and prestige in Arab society is ownership of real estate. Activism and “revolutionarism” are means of gaining self-respect, especially for the younger generation. This generation is ambivalent towards their parents—they reproach them for their weaknesses and failings, calling them “the generation of defeat,” or “the defeated generation” (Jil al-Hazima,Al-Jil al-Munhar). Whereas the young generation dubbed itself (already before the Six-Day War) the “generation of resistance” or “the generation of revenge” (Jil al-Muqawama, Jil-al-Naqma). On the other hand, in order to bolster themselves up as Palestinians, they have to praise the Palestinian record and stress the continuity of the struggle.

  Activism has the psychological function of atoning for past failings and inadequacies. It symbolizes the Palestinians’ regeneration, and a reaction against fatalism, proverbial in Arab society, about which the young generation feels uneasy. Activism is a manly quality, hailed in a masculine society, and a reaction against emotionalism treated derogatorily in Arab political literature, including Fatah’s. “Revolutionarism” (Thauria) exerts a strong influence in most of the Arab world signifying a radical change, spectacular and forceful, a protest against the past, and a guarantee of success for the future. The adjective “revolutionary” is attached to all kinds of nouns in Arab political literature as a word of approbation and optimism.

  Fatah described what this Palestinian revolution will accomplish: “The staging of the revolutionary movement is a conscious transcendence of the circumstances of the Arab Palestinian people, of the traditional leadership, of the stagnated situations, of the opportunism and the self-seeking political arrangements, or those directed from beyond the Palestinian pale, it is a rejection of this fragmented reality. The Palestinian revolutionary movement on this level is a social revolution and a mutation in the social relationship of the Palestinian Arab people.”

  Adulation of Violence

  It is not by sheer accident that the third Fatah pamphlet entitled The Revolutionand Violence, the Road to Victory is a selective précis of Frantz Fanon’s book, The Wretched of the Earth. Fanon’s influence is manifested in other Fatah writings, especially on the psychological impact of Israel on the Arabs and on the transformations that their armed struggle will produce in the Palestinians. “Violence,” “Violent Struggle” and “Vengeance” are expressions of great frequency in Fatah literature. The reader of these texts is introduced to a world of simmering frustrated hatred and a drive for unquenchable vengeance.

  Violence is described as imperative in wiping out colonialism, for between the colonialist and the colonized there is such a contradiction that no coexistence is possible. One of the two has to be liquidated. (Descriptions of the Arab-Israel conflict as both a zero-sum game and a deadly quarrel are frequent in Arab publications.) Such a conflict is “a war of annihilation of one of the rivals, either wiping out the national entity, or wiping out colonialism. . . . The colonized will be liberated from violence by violence. “The Palestinian Revolution” is such a cataclysmic event that it can only be achieved by violence.

  Violence liberates people from their shortcomings and anxieties. It inculcates in them both courage and fearlessness concerning death. Violence has a therapeutic effect, purifying society of its diseases. “Violence will purify the individuals from venom, it will redeem the colonized from inferiority complex, it will return courage to the countryman.” In a memorandum to Arab journalists, Fatah stated: “Blazing our armed revolution inside the occupied territory [i.e. Israel, it was written before the Six-Day War] is a healing medicine for all our people’s diseases.”

  The praising of violence as purgative, may imply also an element of self-indictment for flaws which will now be rectified, and a desire to exorcize the record of failings. The praising of violence may have as well the function of giving cathartic satisfaction as a substitute for operational action.

  Violence, Fatah asserts, will have a unifying influence on people, forging one nation from them. It will draw the individuals from the pettiness of their ego, and imbue them with the effusiveness of collective endeavour, as bloodshed will produce a common experience binding them together. Thus, “the territoriality, [i.e. the fragmentation into different Arab states] which was imposed by Imperialism and Arab leaderships and which was sustained by traditional circumstances in the societies, will end.”

  The struggle, besides its political goals, will have as a by-product an important impact on those who participate in it. It is “a creative struggling” (Nidalia khallaqa). Violence, Revolutionarism, Activism, “the battle of vengeance,” “armed struggle,” all coalesce in an apocalyptic vision of heroic and just aggression, meting out revenge on Israel.

  Engineering a Revolution

  Fatah ideologists have been inclined to deal with general ideas of guerrilla warfare,
rather than specifying in detail how their objectives will be accomplished through it. Like the other exponents of guerrilla warfare Fatah deals with the more practical problems, by means of tracing the phases by which the war or the revolution will evolve. It is called “revolution” in which warfare proper is only a part of a larger complex of activities, mobilizing the support and the participation in the struggle of the masses, and their own transformation through it.

  The pamphlet entitled How Will the Armed Popular Revolution Explode?dwells on the mechanism and process of this “revolution.” It explains that a revolution originates when the oppressed people become aware of the evils of the present reality, and as a result of the growth of an urge to avenge themselves upon it. Needless to say, the reality here is Israel. Though the feelings of revolt against the oppressive reality are spontaneous, they have to be assisted and to be organized. The revolution has to be orchestrated by stages, by its leaders, the “Revolutionary Vanguard.”

  In Fatah’s descriptions of the stages and their names there are some inconsistencies. They may originate either from different authorship, reflecting diverse influences, or be caused by simple imprecision and vagueness. This vagueness is even more accentuated by the lack of differentiation between the organizational and the operational aspects of the stages, and the relationship between the two.

  The parts of Fatah’s writings which deal with the phases of war make uneasy reading. Fatah’s terminology and formulation may seem both esoteric and highfalutin’. However, what may be more wearisome for the reader who is not versed in such parlance is the generality and abstraction of the discussion. It contains a mixture of a terminology influenced by Marxist literature, attempting to interpret developments in a rational way, with mythical overtones expressed in figures of speech like the “ignition” or “detonation” or a revolution, and leaves the reader wondering how it is to be done.

  The organizational stages symbolize the expansion of the circles of those involved in the revolution or war. Stage one is the Formation of the Revolutionary Vanguard. This is achieved by “the movement of revolutionary gathering of the revengeful conscious wills.” “The individual of the Revolutionary Vanguard is distinguished by his revolutionary intuition.” His task is “to discover the vital tide in his society, for its own sake and for its usefulness for action and movement, and then to realize what obstacles hamper his movement in accordance with history’s logic.” Thus, “the Revolutionary Vanguard signifies the type of human who interacts positively with the reality [of his predicament], and so elevates himself by his consciousness until he releases himself from reality’s grip, in order to pursue the superseding of this reality by another, which differs basically in its values and traits. To take a concrete example, the reality of Arab Palestinian people is fragmented, disfigured and corrupted, and shows signs of stagnation. However, despite this stagnation and immobility, the historical direction imposes the existence of a current of vitality among the Palestinian people, so long as the Palestinian man treasures vengeance on this reality. As this wish for vengeance grows, the current of vitality congeals in the form of a Revolutionary Vanguard.”

  The second stage is the Formation of the Revolutionary Organization. In it the Revolutionary Vanguard achieves a psychological mobilization of the Palestinian masses by stimulating their urge for revenge, until “the constructive revolutionary anxiety embraces all the Palestinian Arabs.” It is thus called the stage of Revolutionary Embracing (Al-Shumul al-Thauri). Indoctrination of the masses will not precede the staging of the armed struggle but will be achieved by it. “Mistaken are those who advocate the need for rousing a national consciousness before the armed struggle assumes a concrete form. . . . Ineluctably the armed struggle and mass consciousness will go side by side, because the armed struggle will make the masses feel their active personality and restore their selfconfidence.” The Vanguard will galvanize the masses by means of its example and sacrifice in guerrilla activities.

  Fatah’s publications state that irresistible might is stored in the Arab masses. They are “latent volcanoes,” they are the main “instrument” of the struggle. This explosive capacity has to be activated and this task is allotted to the Vanguard.

  The revolution’s success is dependent on co-operation between the Vanguard and the masses. “The Revolution in its composition has a leadership and a basis, necessitates the accomplishment of a conscious interaction between the basis, which is the masses, and the leadership, in order to ensure the revolution’s success and continuation.”

  The third stage is the Formation of the Supporting Arab Front. Popular support for the “Palestinian Revolution” is to be secured in all Arab countries in order to safeguard rear bases in Arab countries for the war, and as a means of putting pressure on the Arab governments not to slacken or deviate from aiding the Palestinian Revolution by pursuit of their local interests. The Supporting Arab Front is thus expressed on two levels, the popular and the governmental. The popular support is used as an instrument of pressure against the Arab governments.

  In the same publications the overall development of the revolution is divided into two major stages: one, Organization and Mobilization, called elsewhere the Phases of Revolutionary Maturing, comprises the organizational stages already enumerated. The second stage is called that of the Revolutionary Explosion (Marhal atal-Tafjir al-Thauri). The stage of the Revolutionary Explosion is described in colourful language: “The hating revengeful masses plunge into the road of revolution in a pressing and vehement fashion as pouring forces that burn everything that stands in their way.” In this stage “tempests of revenge” will be let loose. However, the Vanguard should ensure mass discipline to prevent violence going berserk. “The Revolution’s Will should obey its regulating brain.”

  While the first stage is preparatory, the second is the main interesting stage. Unfortunately, Fatah’s description of it is rather rudimentary. Even the question of the timing of its beginning is not clear. Fatah specified: “Our operations in the occupied territory can never reach the stage of the aspired revolution unless all Palestinian groups are polarized around the revolution.” Fatah does have an ambition to become the central leader of all the Palestinians, proving that the other movements, which have not matured round what has been described as a Revolutionary Vanguard like itself, are artificial and “counterfeited.” Thus the stage of revolution will arrive only when Fatah has mobilized all the Palestinians.

  Nevertheless, Fatah’s small action at the beginning of January 1965 is frequently hailed as the “detonation of the revolution,” implying that the revolution started then. By the same token, at the beginning of 1968, Fatah’s official journal celebrated the fourth anniversary” of our Palestinian people’s revolution in the occupied territory.” Perhaps this ambiguity as to the timing of the revolutionary stage stems from Fatah’s emphasis of the need to precipitate action. Once action is launched the development proceeds spontaneously. . . .

  Fatah: The Seven Points (January 1969)7

  1. Fatah, the Palestine National Liberation Movement, is the expression of the Palestinian people and of its will to free its land from Zionist colonisation in order to recover its national identity.

  2. Fatah, the Palestine National Liberation Movement, is not struggling against the Jews as an ethnic and religious community. It is struggling against Israel as the expression of colonisation based on a theocratic, racist and expansionist system and of Zionism and colonialism.

  3. Fatah, the Palestine National Liberation Movement, rejects any solution that does not take account of the existence of the Palestinian people and its right to dispose of itself.

  4. Fatah, the Palestine National Liberation Movement, categorically rejects the Security Council Resolution of 22 November 1967 and the Jarring Mission to which it gave rise. This resolution ignores the national rights of the Palestinian people— failing to mention its existence. Any solution claiming to be peaceful which ignores this basic factor, will thereby be
doomed to failure.

  In any event, the acceptance of the resolution of 22 November 1967, or any pseudo-political solution, by whatsoever party, is in no way binding upon the Palestinian people, which is determined to pursue mercilessly its struggle against foreign occupation and Zionist colonisation.

  5. Fatah, the Palestine National Liberation Movement, solemnly proclaims that the final objective of its struggle is the restoration of the independent, democratic State of Palestine, all of whose citizens will enjoy equal rights irrespective of their religion.

  6. Since Palestine forms part of the Arab fatherland, Fatah, the Palestine National Liberation Movement, will work for the State of Palestine to contribute actively towards the establishment of a progressive and united Arab society.

  7. The struggle of the Palestinian People, like that of the Vietnamese people and other peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, is part of the historic process of the liberation of the oppressed peoples from colonialism and imperialism.

  Muhammad Hassanain Haykal: The Strategy of the War of Attrition (March-April 1969)

  . . . To my mind there is one chief method which cannot be ignored or avoided in tipping the balance of fear and assurance in the Arab-Israeli conflict in favour of the Arabs. This course, which meets all the requirements and necessities and is in harmony with logic and nature—this main course to tip the balance in our favour, or merely precisely to adjust it, is: to inflict a clear defeat on the Israeli Army in battle, in one military battle.

  I should like to be more specific because there is no room under present conditions for irresponsible talk. I would make the following points: (1) I am not speaking about the enemy’s defeat in the war, but his defeat in a battle. There is still a long way to go before the enemy can be defeated in the war. The possibilities for this are still not within sight. But the enemy’s defeat in one battle presupposes capabilities which could be available at an early stage in the long period before the end of the war. (2) I am not speaking of a battle on the scale of that of 5th June 1967—a 5th June in reverse, with the Arabs taking the initiative and Israel taken by surprise. Most likely 5th June will not be repeated either in form or in effect. In the coming battle neither we nor the enemy will be taken by surprise . . . I am speaking about a limited battle which would result in a clear victory for the Arabs and a clear defeat for Israel—naturally within the limits of that battle. (3) The requirements and necessities I am speaking about, and which will impose the military battle, do not include any marked consideration for the so-called revenge for injured Arab dignity. . . .