The Palestinian people in the occupied territories are weak without the PLO. By the same token, the Palestinian people and the PLO, which represents its aspirations, hopes and interests, are weaker without Jordan, and all three are weaker without the Arab nation as a whole. This has been our vision in all our endeavors. The components are as clear as the sun; and the position we occupy vis-à-vis the Palestinian issue on the one hand, and the Arab world on the other, provides us with no alternative vision. In Jordan we stand in two circles at once: one representing the Palestine tragedy and the other residing in national commitment. This has dictated our position on direct confrontation with Israel on military and political levels.
One facet of our conflict with Israel perhaps lies in the fact that Israel is attempting to dislodge us from the circle of national commitment into the sphere of tragedy. On our part, we are resisting this with all our might, attempting in the process to endow the circle of commitment with content which is both practical and effective. National commitment is not a one-way street, nor is it a passive or negative stance. Armed with true content, it leads to proper preparation and action. If national commitment is taken to mean a state of inaction in regard to declared positions and is characterized by fatalism, dependence, or expectancy of what lies in store, this would mean only one thing to us; acquiescence in the fait accompli as well as a willing acceptance of the loss of what remains of Palestinian land and of the resulting destructive consequences allowing greater room for expansionist Zionist designs.
It is for this reason, dear brothers, that Jordan had to act and must continue to act. We cannot possibly close down borders and deal with the issue as separate from us. Experience has shown that inaction leads to erosion in positions, as well as on the ground. The state of no war-no peace which has been imposed on us is a salient manifestation of this inaction. We must break out of its grasp. We must absolutely assert that the suffocation resulting from giving in to the state of no war-no peace is as reprehensible as the suicide arising from action leading to the relinquishing of rights. As we move towards peace, we reject the latter proposition as strongly as we do the former. . . .
The significance of setting up the PLO as a way station was that the Arab governments at the time wished to reaffirm that the Palestinian issue was an Arab issue while the Palestinian people had a say and a role to play in the struggle for liberation.
This decision represented the first turning point in the Arab position between 1947 and 1964. In other words, the PLO was established not with the purpose of giving the Palestinians an exclusive say, but to include the PLO, in its capacity as a representative of the Palestinian people, in Arab positions and action vis-à-vis the Palestine issue—as a means of keeping it alive. This was confirmed in the years immediately following the establishment of the PLO, when it had no significant weight in matters pertaining to the Palestine issue, since the Arab states continued to hold the reins and make decisions at will. The PLO itself was a tool used by this or that Arab state on the basis of its political positions, whether at the Arab or international levels. When the June war erupted, the PLO was still a form almost devoid of any real content.
But in the wake of the June war, Palestinian resistance to Israeli occupation experienced rapid growth, with the result that form and content became one and the PLO came to embody the resistance to occupation and the struggle for the rights of the Palestinian Arabs. Thus, the PLO rejected Security Council Resolution 242 because it dealt only with occupied Palestinian territory and not with the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people. Because of our keen awareness of Israel’s expansionist aims, it was natural that we should accord priority to restoring the territories occupied by Israel through war. Likewise, because of our sincere commitment to the restoration of the legitimate national rights of the Palestinians, we tried, along with Egypt, to persuade the PLO to separate the two objectives of our political action in the international arena. This separation would call for an attempt by the Arab states, whose territories had been occupied through war and were the subject of Resolution 242, to ensure Israeli withdrawal from these territories, while the PLO would continue to fulfill its role of representing the Palestinian people in their struggle for legitimate national rights above and beyond the mere withdrawal of Israel from the occupied territories.
The PLO, however, rejected this line of thinking, as it had rejected Resolution 242, and proceeded to make this dual rejection a basis for its political stand on the Arab and world scenes. It also became the basis of its dealings with Jordan in particular, on the grounds of the following suspicions. First: There was the probability that Jordan might succeed in restoring the West Bank by virtue of its good relations with the West, which had influence over Israel. Second: Jordan had territorial ambitions in the West Bank. Third: As long as the possibility of Jordan’s restoration of the West Bank existed, who would guarantee that Jordan would relinquish the territory thus restored to the PLO?
It is to be noted from this position, which is based on suspicion, that, at the time, the PLO was not fully aware of a basic fact emphasized us and borne out by events, namely that Israel gave the utmost priority to territorial gain. It was also evident that the PLO based its dealings with Jordan on suspicion rather than trust. . . .
On November 22, 1984, I opened the 17th session of the PNC by delivering a speech which contained our assessment of prevailing Palestinian conditions and our conclusion that we needed to move politically outside the status quo of no peace-no war, which only helped to advance expansionist Zionist designs and posed serious dangers to the Palestinian issue, the Palestinian people, and Palestinian land, as well as a consequent threat to Jordan’s national security. We proposed to the PNC members our view of future cooperation, should the PLO decide to work with Jordan to reach a joint Jordanian-Palestinian formula. . . .
In January 1985, we received the reply that the PLO Executive Committee had chosen to work with us on our proposal for joint political action. We started our consultations with Arafat’s envoys on the third general outline—the Jordanian-Palestinian formula—since this formula constituted the base from which we were to move on the Arab and international arenas to convene an international peace conference.
In February 1985, Arafat, accompanied by other members of the Palestinian leadership, arrived in Amman. An expanded meeting was held in Al-Nadwah Palace which was concluded by the signing of the Jordanian-Palestinian agreement, known as the 11 February Accord. This accord incorporated the following principles: 1. Territory in return for peace as established in UN and Security Council resolutions.
2. The right of self-determination for the Palestinian people: Palestinians will exercise their inalienable right of self-determination when it becomes possible to do so within the context of the formation of the proposed confederated Arab states of Jordan and Palestine.
3. Resolution of the problem of Palestinian refugees in accordance with UN resolutions.
4. Resolution of all aspects of the Palestine question.
5. On this basis, peace negotiations will be conducted under the auspices of an international conference in which the five permanent members of the Security Council and all parties involved in the conflict will participate, including the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, within a joint delegation—a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. . . .
The accord became a mover for the peace process because of the principles it contained. These were: 1. The accord’s affirmation of a peaceful resolution to the conflict in accordance with the UN Charter.
2. The accord’s conformity with the principles of the Arab Peace Plan, derived from United Nations resolutions concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict in general and the Palestinian problem in particular.
3. The agreement between Jordan and the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, to form a confederation between Jordan and Palestine.
This last item, while it reflects the objecti
ve considerations which require close institutional links between Jordan and a free Palestine to mutual benefit of their peoples and the Arab nation at large, provides the key, or mechanism, to the peace process for two main reasons:
First, it justifies PLO participation in the proposed international conference within a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. Since confederation is the ultimate objective, why not have the two parties concerned assume one of the confederation’s functions before it is established as a reality on the ground, particularly since this function allows for the participation of the PLO in the international conference which in the past decade has posed one of the most difficult obstacles in convening an international peace conference?
Second, it lays the foundations for a responsible role for the PLO in realizing and safeguarding a just settlement through its links with Jordan, the sovereign state which enjoys credible international standing due to its serious and sincere efforts to achieve peace. . . .
Dear brethren, after signing the 11 February accord and the agreement of the PLO Executive Committee, which was empowered by the PNC to arrive at a joint formula with Jordan, we embarked with the Palestinian leadership upon drawing up a plan for our proposed action. Two objectives were defined for this purpose: 1. To rally international support for the convening of an international peace conference, to be attended by the five permanent members of the Security Council and all parties involved in the conflict. This conference would be convened under the auspices of the United Nations and called for by the UN secretary general.
2. To ensure that an invitation will be extended to the PLO, representing the Palestinian people, to attend the conference within a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. . . .
We agree with the Palestinian leadership on the following procedures for joint action: 1. We asked the U.S. Administration to start a dialogue with a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation composed of Jordanian Government officials and members chosen by the PLO.
2. After this dialogue, the PLO would declare its acceptance of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.
3. If this took place, the United States would no longer be bound by its previous position not to conduct any talks with the PLO before the latter’s acceptance of the two pertinent Security Council resolutions. Thus, the United States would recognize the PLO and a meeting between U.S. officials and members of the PLO could be held in Washington to discuss the issue of a peaceful settlement and relations between them would be normalized.
4. As a result of the normalization of U.S.-Palestinian relations a major political obstacle blocking the Arab Peace Plan, which gave an important role to the PLO, would have been removed. Arab efforts could then be channeled to pursue the efforts with the United States and other countries to convene an international peace conference.
After agreeing on this procedure with the Palestinian leadership, we accordingly contacted the officials in the U.S. Administration at the end of March 1985 and presented them with the idea of meeting a joint delegation in preparation for the next two steps which would follow as a result of the meeting.
In early April 1985, we received the U.S. reply which, in principle, accepted this proposal provided that the Palestinian members of the joint delegation were not leading members of the PLO or any fedayeen organization.
We consulted with the Palestinian leadership, which provided us with the names of three candidates. The Americans refused them because they did not meet their criteria and asked that we provide them with the names of others who did.
In May 1985, we met with the U.S. secretary of state in Qaba, who reiterated the administration’s position regarding the subject of the names. However, he did not exclude those who were members of the PNC.
The U.S. side expressed its government’s doubts about the PLO’s intentions and its government’s fears that if the suggested meeting were to take place between a U.S. official and a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation—a meeting after that would not be followed by PLO’s acceptance of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338—the PLO would obtain a political weapon as a result of its member’s meeting with an American official. The U.S. Government would then be left to face criticism and political troubles resulting from this in the U.S. arena. Thus, the serious political efforts would end at that point.
Our prime minister conveyed this recent U.S. stand to Yasir Arafat in a meeting held at the Prime Ministry on 18 May 1985. At that time, we were preparing for a visit to Washington. In order to remove the U.S. fears, the prime minister agreed with Yasir Arafat on the text of a press statement which we would make at the end of our talks with the U.S. President.
The statement which I made at the White House garden on 29 May 1985 says: I also asserted to President Reagan that, on the basis of the Jordanian agreement with the PLO signed on 11 February, as a result of the talks which I recently held with the PLO, and in view of our sincere desire to achieve peace, we are determined to negotiate to achieve a peaceful settlement within the framework of an international conference on the basis of the related UN resolutions, including Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.
The U.S. officials affirmed, during my talks in Washington, their position regarding Palestinian participation in the joint delegation. They limited the number to four, two from the occupied territories and two from the outside. They requested that we provide them with these names in advance and as soon as possible so that the U.S. Administration could make its decision at the appropriate time.
Upon our return to Amman in June 1985, we conveyed to the Palestinian leadership our discussions in Washington. They in turn accepted this proposal and promised to provide us with the names of the candidates as soon as possible. We waited until 11 July 1985, when some names were provided to us. We were then told that a meeting of the PLO Executive Committee and the Fatah Central Committee had discussed this subject and had agreed upon the names of the candidates.
On 12 July 1985, we relayed a list of seven names to the U.S. Administration and waited for the administration to inform us of its approval of four of the names on that list. We agreed that no public announcement should be made on this issue. But a few days later, we were surprised when the world press began to discuss those names. Suddenly the issue turned into a U.S. political issue. The press began to discuss it and the Zionist lobby activated influential political institutions in opposition to it, culminating in pressure on the U.S. Administration to justify, defend, and finally retract its position. As a result, we received American approval of only two names from the list, instead of four: one from the West Bank and the other from the Gaza Strip. After inquiries we were told by U.S. officials that the administration was still not sure that the PLO would fulfill the second phase of the agreed scenario, namely, to accept Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.
On 15 August 1985, a meeting was held at our prime minister’s residence in Amman attended by the prime minister, the chief of the Royal Hashemite Court, the minister of the court and the foreign minister from the Jordanian side, and Yasir Arafat, accompanied by Khalil al-Wazir, Abd al-Razzaq al-Yahya and Muhammad Milhim from the Palestinian side. During that meeting, the prime minister again asked Arafat whether he was clear on the method of proceeding, particularly with regard to the second phase—PLO readiness to accept Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Arafat reaffirmed his acceptance of all steps and arrangements agreed upon between us, including the PLO’s readiness to accept the abovementioned resolutions.
In light of Arafat’s reply, we informed the U.S. Administration that the suspicions it had on this subject were not justified and that we were awaiting their positive reply concerning the date of the meeting between U.S. officials and a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation.
On 7 September 1985, we received the U.S. reply, which said that it was not possible to hold the meeting, thus terminating this scenario before the first step, originally expected in June, was taken. This came at the time we were preparing for a visit to New York
to celebrate the 40th anniversary of the United Nations, and to Washington to discuss bilateral issues and the peace process with the U.S. Administration.
Assessment of the situation, prior to the visit, led us to believe that we could pursue our dialogue with the United States by concentrating this time on the second phase of the process, the international conference, since not much progress had been achieved on the issue of Palestinian representation. Our reading of the U.S. position led us to believe that further discussions could take place on that other issue, which was last discussed in May 1985. I mentioned earlier that from the beginning our dialogue with the Americans had dealt with two issues separately: Palestinian representation and the international conference, with emphasis on the subject of Palestinian representation.
I will now turn to our efforts on the second issue, the convening of an international conference.
In May 1985, in our discussions with the U.S. Administration in Washington, we raised the issue of convening such a conference because we considered it to be the venue for all parties concerned to meet, including the PLO. The U.S. position was a flat rejection of an international conference. Instead, the United States proposed that, after the PLO was brought into the peace talks, a meeting should be set up between Israel and a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, under the auspices of the United States, to be held in a U.S. city. Upon learning this, we decided to cut our visit short and reaffirmed to them our definite and unequivocal rejection of seeking a unilateral approach similar to that of Camp David in the negotiations.
The U.S. Administration then changed its position and proposed that the talks could be held at the United Nations in Geneva. Once again, we informed the U.S. Administration that we rejected this proposal, like the one before it, as we did not see that the problem was one of where the talks should be held. We reiterated that Jordan’s unwavering position was that it sought to reach a comprehensive settlement through the convening of an international conference attended by all the parties to the conflict, including the permanent members of the Security Council. As a result, the U.S. Administration reconsidered its proposal and promised to seriously ponder the issue of convening an international conference. We accepted this and continued our discussions concerning the issue of Palestinian representation.
The Israel-Arab Reader Page 44
