During talks in Washington in October 1985, we again raised the issue of an international conference after having proposed it to the administration prior to our departure for the United States. Meetings were held between Jordanian and U.S. officials in Washington. The United States submitted a proposal concerning the international conference, which, after careful examination, seemed to suggest a conference in name only. We on the other hand insisted that the conference should have clear powers.
Among the various U.S. suggestions was the inclusion of the Soviet Union in the conference only after it restored diplomatic relations with Israel, because this was an Israeli condition. We argued for the rejection of this approach for the following reasons: 1. An international conference without the participation of the Soviet Union would be a flawed conference.
2. If the reason to exclude the Soviet Union from the conference was that it had no diplomatic relations with Israel, which is a party to the conflict, the United States on its part does not recognize the PLO, which is equally a party to the conflict. Thus, in this regard, the Soviet Union and the United States were in the same position.
3. It would be futile to plan seriously to convene an international peace conference if any party had the right to place conditions on who could attend. This applies to the five permanent members of the Security Council as well as the parties involved in the conflict. Therefore, it was imperative that an invitation be extended to Syria, the PLO, and the Soviet Union to attend the conference if the peace process was to continue and the efforts for a just and comprehensive peace were to produce fruitful results.
After extensive discussions lasting three days, the United States accepted the following points which we proposed: 1. The UN secretary general would issue invitations to an international conference under UN auspices.
2. Invitations to attend the conference would be issued to the permanent members of the Security Council, including the Soviet Union, in addition to the parties involved in the conflict.
3. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 would form the basis for the international conference.
4. The Americans held to their position of requiring acceptance by the PLO of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, since these formed the basis for the convening of the international conference. We agreed to this understanding on the basis that Arafat had himself agreed to this last August.
We continued our intensive discussions with the U.S. Administration concerning the powers of the conference and we insisted that it should not be a conference in name only, but rather that it should be one that was effective and had a clear mandate. Despite prolonged discussions, we did not reach a final understanding with the U.S. Administration regarding this issue. We agreed to continue our discussions on this central point, and considered that what we had agreed upon constituted a basis from which to proceed. While we were still in Washington, the cycle of terrorism and counterterrorism began with the Larnaca incident, followed by the Israeli raid on the PLO headquarters in Tunis. This had a negative effect on the peace process and our efforts were once again jeopardized by fears and suspicions.
Upon our return to Amman in October 1985 we informed the Palestinian leadership of what we had accomplished during our talks in Washington. We informed them that the PLO would be required to accept Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 in order to be invited to the international conference, to accept the principle of participating in negotiations with the Government of Israel as part of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation within the context of the international conference, which would be convened to establish a comprehensive settlement, and to renounce terrorism. We also informed the Palestinian leadership that our discussions with the U.S. Administration regarding the question of the mandate of the conference were still inconclusive, and that further discussions would follow. We made it clear to the Palestinian leadership that a written statement of acceptance was needed from them, while leaving them to choose the appropriate time to announce that approval. The written acceptance was needed so that we could encourage the U.S. Administration to proceed earnestly to convene an international conference and to reassure them that the PLO was anxious to participate in the peace process. We had already made clear to the U.S. Administration that Jordan would not attend the conference unless invitations were extended to the PLO, sister Syria, and all other parties involved in the conflict, because we are after a comprehensive peace.
We also promised the Palestinian leadership that their acceptance would be kept confidential and shown only to the concerned U.S. officials until they themselves decided to announce it.
On 7 November 1985, after talks with President Husni Mubarak, Yasir Arafat issued a statement in Cairo denouncing terrorism in all its forms, irrespective of its source. The PLO Executive Committee then held a meeting in Baghdad, and as we were not officially notified of its decisions, we awaited Arafat’s visit to Amman to hear from him, once again, the final position of the PLO on Security Council Resolution 242.
Meanwhile, I made a private visit to London on 7 January 1986 for medical reasons. While I was there, the assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs [Richard Murphy] arrived in London with a U.S. delegation. He requested to see me to continue our discussions regarding the issue of the international conference. We held two rounds of talks in London, the first attended by the prime minister and the chief of the Royal Court on 18 January, and the second, on 20 January, attended by the chief of the Royal Court. Throughout both meetings the discussions focused on defining the mandate of the international conference and the participation of the PLO, as both issues had become interwoven as a result of progress achieved in the peace process. The American position had developed to the extent of agreeing to the right of the concerned parties to submit any disagreements between them to the conference. However, we could not reach full agreement regarding the role of the conference in settling disputes among the negotiating parties.
Concerning the issue of PLO participation in the conference, the American delegation reiterated its previous position requiring that the PLO should first accept Security Council Resolution 242 in order for the United States to start a dialogue with it. The United States did not commit itself to accepting the inviting of the PLO to the conference. Our reply was that we wanted the United States to agree to have the PLO invited to participate in the conference if it accepted Security Council Resolution 242. This point became the subject of extensive discussions, during which I asked for a clear American position to relay to the PLO. The American delegation agreed to take this up at the highest level on its return to Washington.
On 21 January 1986, I returned to Amman having achieved these results on the issues of an international conference and PLO participation. On 25 January 1986, our efforts bore fruit when I received a final reply from the U.S. Administration concerning PLO participation in the international conference. Their reply came in a written commitment which said:
When it is clearly on the public record that the PLO has accepted Resolutions 242 and 338, is prepared to negotiate peace with Israel, and has renounced terrorism, the United States accepts the fact that an invitation will be issued to the PLO to attend an international conference.
The United States would then start contacts with the Soviet Union with the purpose of having them participate, together with the other permanent members of the Security Council, in the international conference, which would be convened by the secretary general of the United Nations.
On that same day, Arafat arrived in Amman with a Palestinian leadership delegation. We held four extensive meetings in four days. I presided over three of these meetings. The discussion concentrated on the subject of American assurances and the PLO’s position regarding those assurances. We assumed that the PLO would accept these since: 1. The assurances met the PLO’s requirements.
2. They reflected a significant change in the U.S. position in favor of the PLO. The U.S. position regarding the PLO when we first started our intensiv
e year-long dialogue had been that the United States would only enter into talks with the PLO after the latter’s acceptance of Security Council Resolution 242. Now, by comparison, the present U.S. position was that it was willing to go one step beyond talking to the PLO by agreeing to have the PLO invited to the international conference.
But our brothers in the Palestinian leadership surprised us by refusing to accept Security Council Resolution 242 within this context, while acknowledging what they described as our “extraordinary effort,” which had caused a significant change in the U.S. position, and which would not have been possible had it not been for the respect, credibility and trust which our country, Jordan, enjoyed in this world.
In spite of this, we continued our discussions with the PLO leadership in the hope of convincing them that their acceptance would cement a very important link in peace efforts leading to an international conference, which in the unanimous view of the Arabs and all peace-loving peoples constitutes the major venue for the establishment of a comprehensive, permanent, and just peace. It is towards the objective of convening such a conference that we have worked tirelessly for the past nine years, but to no avail. Now that the opportunity presented itself, we hoped that it would not be wasted like other missed opportunities if we were to remain faithful to our goals of saving our people and liberating our land and Holy Places.
The answer of the brothers in the Palestinian leadership was that they wanted an amendment to the proposed text in return for acceptance of Resolution 242. The amendment would require the addition of a statement indicating the agreement of the United States to the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, including their right to self-determination within the context of a confederation between Jordan and Palestine, as stated in the February 11 accord. We reminded the Palestinian leadership that the subject of self-determination within the context of a confederation was a matter for Jordanians and Palestinians and that no other party had anything to do with it. Nothing was to be gained from the support of this or that state as long as we ourselves were committed to this text. The important thing was to achieve withdrawal first, then to proceed with what we had agreed upon. We reminded them that this had always been our position and that it had been clear all along, starting from my opening address in Amman at the 17th PNC session, in which I referred to the proposed Jordanian-Palestinian relationship, and continuing through all our discussions to date.
We also said to them that involving the United States, or others, in this matter meant that we were voluntarily opening the door to others to interfere in our common concerns and those of a people who had a sovereign right to their land and their own decisionmaking—unless they were dealing with us on a basis of lack of confidence. But despite this, our brothers in the Palestinian leadership insisted on their position. And despite the fact that the most recent American position had satisfied PLO demands, we agreed to resume contacts with officials in Washington through the American Embassy in Amman on the evening of 27 January 1986.
The American response was as follows: 1. The February 11 accord is a Jordanian-Palestinian accord which does not involve the United States.
2. The United States supports the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people as stated in the Reagan peace initiative.
3. The PLO, like any other party, has the right to propose anything it wishes, including the right of self-determination, at the international conference.
4. For all these reasons, the United States adheres to its position.
We relayed the American response to Yasir Arafat during an enlarged meeting at Al-Nawdah Palace on 28 January 1986, but he insisted that we try again. We indicated to him that we had gone as far as we could with the U.S. Administration at that stage, but he insisted. Thus, we got in touch once again and the reply was still that the United States adhered to its position.
On the morning of 29 January 1986, an enlarged meeting was held at the Prime Ministry and I headed the Jordanian side. I informed Yasir Arafat and his party of the American position as reaffirmed to us once again. The meeting ended with a statement by Yasir Arafat saying that he needed to consult the Palestinian leadership. We asked him to give us the final answer on the PLO position with regard to Resolution 242 while he was still in Amman, although we had ascertained, only then, that the PLO’s decision to reject Resolution 242 had been made during the meeting of the PLO leadership in Baghdad on 24 November 1985. We had not, however, officially been notified of that.
On the same evening, 29 January 1986, we received a suggestion from the U.S. Administration to the effect that the United States felt that since the PLO could not presently decide to accept Resolution 242, the PLO could wait until a time it considered appropriate. The United States felt that the peace process could still proceed with Palestinian participation from the occupied territories. The opportunity would remain available for the PLO to take part in the international conference the moment it accepted Resolution 242.
In our reply to the United States, we rejected this suggestion, indicating that this time the suggestion concerned not only the PLO but Jordan as well, since our unwavering position was: no separate settlement.
President Reagan wrote to me on 31 January 1986 explaining his inability to proceed in his efforts with Congress for the sale of sophisticated U.S. arms to Jordan. We had sought to acquire the arms since 1979 in the face of fierce Zionist opposition. I had received assurances from the President that our requirements would be met.
On the evening of the same day, the minister of the court informed Yasir Arafat of the latest American suggestion to proceed with the peace process without the PLO until it met the set conditions. He also informed him of our categorical refusal of this suggestion and apprised him of President Reagan’s letter explaining his inability to meet Jordan’s requirements.
On 5 February 1986, the American side presented a new text containing the approval by the United States to convene an international conference on the basis of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, including the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. We met with Yasir Arafat on the same evening at Al-Nadwah Palace and we handed him the new American text. He promised to study it and at the same time gave us three differently worded texts which were the same in substance, reaffirming the same PLO position which we had heard from the start of this round of meetings.
On 6 February, Yasir Arafat had a meeting with our prime minister at his residence. The meeting was attended by the chief of the Royal Court and by ’Abd al-Razzaq al-Yahya and Hani al-Hasan from the Palestinian side. Arafat informed the prime minister that despite the positive development of the American position, recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people did not encompass the right to self-determination to which, the PLO insisted, the United States ought to give its prior approval.
On 7 February, Yasir Arafat left Amman still insisting on his position and on the reasons why the PLO was unable to accept Resolution 242. Hinging on this agreement, of course, was an immediate opening of a U.S.-Palestinian dialogue on the basis of which we would have continued our efforts to convene an international peace conference to which the PLO would be invited to participate as a representative of the Palestinian people.
Thus, another chapter came to an end in the search for peace. Another extremely important and significant round of Jordanian-Palestinian action was terminated—after a full year of serious and persistent efforts to transform the PLO role, referred to in the Arab Peace Plan, into a significant reality that would go beyond a mere statement of positions. It would have led to the presence and participation by the PLO in an international conference at the invitation of the UN secretary general, to represent its people and speak on their behalf with their adversary under the eyes of the world, side by side with the other parties concerned and the five permanent members of the Security Council. . . .
But if this phase of political action with the PLO has ended differently from what we had hoped for, the principle
s and tenets of the Jordanian-Palestinian accord will continue to embody the foundations governing relations between the Jordanian and Palestinian peoples with regard to equality of rights and obligations in facing our joint destiny.
Brothers, it has been my destiny to experience the various phases of the Palestine tragedy, as well as the results of the implementation of Zionist plans drawn up by forces which know what they want and carry out what they have planned, stage by stage. I have not seen or observed any emergence of the long-awaited Arab plan which would be capable of defending the most just cause of a brotherly and dear people who surely deserve better than their continued plight currently holds for them.
Israel and Jordan: “The London Document” (April 11, 1987)
Invitation by the UN Secretary General:
The UN Secretary General will send invitations to the five permanent members of the Security Council and to the parties involved in the Israeli-Arab conflict to negotiate an agreement by peaceful means based on UN resolutions 242 and 338 with the purpose of attaining comprehensive peace in the region and security for the countries in the area, and granting the Palestinian people their legitimate rights.
The Israel-Arab Reader Page 45
